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UNITED STATES NAVY 

ill I 

WARFARE DEFENSE 
ASHORE 




TECHNICAL PUBLICATION 

NAVDOCKS-TP-PL-2 

REVISED 

APRIL 1960 



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS 

WASHINGTON 25. D.C. 



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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS 

Washington 25, D. C. 






April 5, I960 



This revised publication contains the latest information on the de- 
velopment of defense measures ashore against atomic, biological, and 
chemical warfare attacks. This information has been prepared in ac- 
cordance with this Bureau's responsibility for the development, pro- 
curement, and distribution of materials and appliances for defense 
ashore against such attacks. 

It should be emphasized that personnel who are responsible for 
planning for defense must be fully aware of the risks that are involved 
and of the ability of an activity to recover from an attack, whether it be 
atomic, biological, chemical, or any combination thereof. 

The data given in this publication will be useful to all personnel 
who are concerned with planning for defense against ABC warfare at- 
tack and executing the recovery measures to be taken in the event of 
any attack. If adequate preparatory measures are taken, as outlined 
herein, substantial protection will be afforded against ABC warfare 
attack despite the increased effectiveness of such warfare and improve- 
ment in weapons. 




PELTIER 












FOREWORD 



This revised publication brings up to date and combines in one 
volume the data that were previously contained in Atomic Warfare De- 
fense , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-2, Chemical Warfare Defense , NAVDOCKS 
TP-PL-3; and Biological Warfare Defense , NAVDOCKS TF-PL-4. It 
also contains a list of abbreviations, a glossary of terms, and a bibli- 
ography pertaining to ABC warfare and disaster control. 

This publication delineates the authority and responsibility of the 
various bureaus and offices of the Navy Department in connection with 
planning ABC warfare defense, presents information on preparatory 
measures that are involved in planning and executing an ABC warfare 
defense program, and provides a description of techniques and equip- 
ment to be used by a disaster control organization. 

Additional copies of this technical publication may be obtained 
from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Forms and Publications 
Supply Points in accordance with procedures outlined in NAVSANDA 
Publication 2002. Requisitions for additional copies of this publication 
should specify the TP number and title. 



Distribution: 

SNDL: Nl, N2, N8, X7 {Disaster Control Activities) 

Copy to: 

SNDL: A3, E4 (Washington, D. C, only), J56 (100 copies), 
J64 (100 copies), J65 (100 copies), J66, J84, A5 












CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL NATURE OF ABC DEFENSE 

PART A. INTRODUCTION 

Section 1. GENERAL 

Page 



1A1.01 Purpose 
1A1.02 Scope, 



1A1.03 Cancellation 

1A1.04 Authority and Responsibilities 
1A1.05 Definitions 

1. Disaster Control 

2, ABC Warfare Defense . . . . 



Section 2. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DISASTER CONTROL 

1A2.01 Disaster Control Program ■ ■ ■ , 1-3 

1A2.02 Bureau of Yards and Docks Functional Responsibilities 1-3 

1A2.03 Field Responsibilities 1-3 

1, District Public Works Officer 1-3 

2. Public Works Officer 1-3 

1A2.04 Responsibilities of Other Bureaus and Offices 1-3 

1. Chief of Naval Operations . , 1-3 

2. Bureau of Aeronautics {Now Bureau of Weapons) 1-3 

3. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery 1-4 

4. Bureau of Naval Personnel , 1-4 

5. Bureau of Ships . 1-4 

6. Bureau of Supplies and Accounts . ." 1-5 

7. Bureau of Ordnance (Now Bureau of Weapons) 1-5 

8. Judge Advocate General 1-5 

9. Chief of Information 1-5 

1A2.05 Responsibilities of Commandants of Naval Districts and River Commands ,,...., 1-5 

PART B. CONCEPTS OF ATTACK AND DEFENSE IN ABC WARFARE 

Section 1. ABC ATTACK 

1B1.01 Purposes 1-7 

1B1.02 Methods 1-7 

1. Manned Aircraft „ 1-7 

2. Projectiles , 1-7 

3. Guided Missiles and Rockets 1-7 

4. Miscellaneous Delivery Methods 1-7 

5. Covert Attack 1-7 

IB 1.0 3 Likelihood of Attack 1-8 

Section 2. ABC DEFENSE 

1B2.01 Purposes 1-9 

1B2.02 Methods 1-9 

1B2.03 Summary , 1-9 






CHAPTER 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ABC ATTACK 
PART A. NATURE OF ABC ATTACK 

Section 1. GENERAL APPLICATION OF WEAPONS 

Page 

2A1.01 Multiple Application 2-1 

2A1.02 Mobility and Persistency 2-1 

2A1.03 Misaion 2-1 

Section 2. TYPES OF WEAPONS AND AGENTS USED 

2A2.01 Nuclear Weapons 2-3 

2A2.02 RW Agents 2-3 

2A2.03 BW Agents . . 2-3 

2A2.04 CW Agents . . . 2-3 

PART B. CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTS OF ABC WEAPONS 

Section 1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

2B1.01 Types of Bursts 2-5 

2B1.02 Blast Effects , 2-5 

1. Airburst ; 2-5 

2. Surface Burst 2-5 

3. Underground Burst 2-5 

4. Underwater Burst 2-5 

5. Comparison of Blast Effects 2-6 

2B1.03 Thermal Effects 2-6 

2B1.04 Initial Nuclear Radiation 2-6 

1. Gamma Radiation Dose 2-6 

2. Neutron Radiation Dose 2-8 

2B1.05 Fallout 2-9 

1. Early and Remote Fallouts 2-9 

2. Fallout in Relation to Bomb Yield , . . . . 2-9 

2B1.06 Induced Radiation. , 2-11 

2B1.07 Unfissioned Plutonium and Uranium 2-12 

2B1.08 RW Contamination 2-12 

2B1.09 Persistency of Radioactive Substances 2-12 

2B1.10 Radioactivity Decay Rates 2-12 

2B1.11 Problems of Terrain 2-13 

2B1.12 Craters 2-13 

2B1.13 Comparative Hazards From Bursts 2-14 

Section 2. BW AGENTS 

2B2.01 Pathogens 2-17 

2B2.02 Groups of Potential BW Agents 2-17 

1. Viruses 2-17 

2. Rickettsiae 2-17 

3. Bacteria 2-17 

4. Protozoa 2-17 

5. Fungi 2-17 

6. Toxins 2-17 

2B2.03 Classification 2-17 

1. Tactical and Strategic Employment 2-18 

2. Virulence 2-18 

3. Communicability 2-18 

4. Persistency 2-18 

2B2.04 Defense 2-18 

1. Natural Defenses 2-18 

2. Chemical Defenses 2-18 



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2B2.04 Defense — Continued 

3. Preventive Inoculation 2-18 

4. Intelligence 2-18 

5. Physical Protection 2-19 

2B2.05 Contamination 2-19 

Section 3. WAR GASES 

2B3.01 Classification 2-21 

1. Physical States 2-21 

2. Tactical Uses • 2-21 

3. Physiological Actions 2-21 

2B3.02 Employment 2-21 

2B3.03 War Gases of Primary Importance 2-21 

1. Blister Agents 2-21 

Z. Nerve Agents 2-23 

2B3.04 Chemical Contamination , 2-23 

Section 4. SMOKES AND INCENDIARIES 

2B4.01 Screening Smokes 2-25 

2B4.02 Incendiaries . 2-25 

CHAPTER 3. CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE FROM ABC ATTACK 

PART A. CASUALTIES 

Section L. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

3A1.01 Results of Blast 3-1 

1. Primary Effects on Personnel 3-1 

2. Secondary Effects on Personnel 3-1 

3A1.02 Casualties From Thermal Radiation 3-1 

1. Injuries to Eyes 3-1 

2. Body Burns 3-2 

3. Secondary Fires 3-2 

3A1.03 Casualties From Nuclear Radiation 3-2 

1. Types and Effects of Doses 3-2 

2. Sources of Nuclear Radiation 3-2 

3. Internal Radiation 3-4 

Section 2. BW AND CW AGENTS 

3A2.01 Nature of BW Effects 3-5 

1. Anthrax 3-5 

2. Coccidioidomycosis 3-5 

3. Encephalitis 3-5 

4. Glanders 3-5 

5. Tularemia . . 3-5 

0. Other Diseases ., 3-5 

3A2.02 Casualties From War Gases 3-5 

1. Casualty Rates 3-5 

2. Modifying Factors 3-5 

PART B. DAMAGE TO PHYSICAL PROPERTY 
Section 1. STRUCTURES 

3B1.01 Structural Damage 3-9 

1 . Blast Effects 3-9 

2. Damage Tables 3-9 






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3B1.02 Effects of Fires 3-9 

1. Fire Storms • 3-9 

2. Types of Structures 3-9 

3. Building Density 3-10 

3B1.03 Contamination 3-10 

Section 2. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS 

3B2.01 Effects of Blast on Equipment 3-13 

3B2.02 Fire Potential 3-13 

3B2.03 Contamination 3-13 

Section 3. UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION ROUTES 

3B3.01 Potential Effects of Blast 3-15 

1. Utilities 3-15 

2. Highways and Bridges 3-15 

3. Damage-Distance Relationships 3-15 

3B3.02 Potential Effects of Fire 3-16 

3B3.03 Contamination of Structures and Areas , , 3-16 

3B3.04 Contamination of Water 3-16 

1. Possibility of Radioactivity 3-16 

2. Sewage 3-16 

3. BW Agents 3-16 

4. CW Agents 3-16 

Section 4. FOOD SUPPLY 

3B4.01 Effect of ABC Warfare on Food 3-17 

3B4.02 Radiological Contamination of Food 3-17 

3B4.03 Biological Contamination of Food 3-17 

3B4.04 Chemical Contamination of Food 3-17 



Section 5. PROBLEM OF DEBRIS 

3B5.01 Debris and Access 3-19 

3B5.02 Debris in Structures . . . .* . , . . 3-19 

CHAPTER 4. REQUIREMENTS FOR ABC DEFENSE 

PART A. WARNING, DETECTION, AND IDENTIFICATION 

Section 1. WARNING SYSTEMS 

4A1.01 Patterns of Intelligence. 4-1 

4A1.02 Controlled Warning Devices 4_1 

4A1.03 Warning Signals 4-1 

Section 2. DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION 

4A2.01 Radioactive Substances 4-3 

4A2.02 BW Agents 4-3 

4A2.03 CW Agents 4.3 

4A2.04 Establishment of Perimeters 4-3 

Section 3. RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TECHNIQUES 

4A3.01 Instruments , 4-5 

1. Requests for Allowances 4-5 

2. Basis for Allowances ,,.... , 4-5 

3. Equipment Distribution 4_5 

4A3.02 Aerial Monitoring 4-5 















Page 

4A3.03 Data on Fallout 4-6 

4A3.04 Ground Monitoring 4-6 

1. Procedures i . 4-7 

2. Calibration and Care of Instruments 4-7 

3. Data Processing 4-7 

4A3.05 Detailed Radiological Survey 4-7 

4A3.06 Monitoring After an Accident With a Plutonium-Bearing Weapon 4-8 

Section 4. BW SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 

4A4.01 Field Sampling 4-9 

4A4.02 Field Sampling Kits 4-9 

4A4.03 Air Sampling Techniques 4-9 

1. Exterior Air Sampling 4-9 

2. Interior Air Sampling 4-10 

4A4.04 Water Sampling 4-10 

4A4.05 Surface Sampling 4-10 

4A4.06 SourceB of Samples 4-10 

1. Exterior Samples 4-10 

2. Interior Samples 4-10 

4A4.07 Solid Samples 4-11 

4A4.08 Shipment of Samples 4-11 

4A4.09 Laboratory Studies , 4-11 

Section 5. CW DETECTION TECHNIQUES 

4A5.01 Field Detection 4-13 

4A5.02 Field Sampling Devices 4-13 

4A5.03 Air Sampling Devices 4-13 

1. Automatic Field Alarm 4-13 

2. Chemical Agent Detector Kits MIS and M15 4-13 

4A5.04 Surface Sampling 4-14 

4A5.05 Water Testing and Screening 4-15 

4A5.06 Food Testing and Screening Kit, Chemical Agents, M2 4-15 

PART B. INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION 

Section 1. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES 

4B1.01 Concept of Protection 4-17 

1. General Application 4-17 

2. Special Protection 4-17 

4B1.02 Ordinary Clothing 4-17 

4B1.03 Foul Weather Clothing 4-17 

4B1.04 Permeable Protective Clothing 4-18 

4B1.05 Impermeable Protective Clothing 4-18 

4B1.06 Protective Masks 4-18 

1. Available Models 4-18 

2. Hoods and Eye Glasses 4-18 

4B1.07 Hoods 4-19 

4B1.08 Wearability 4-19 

4B1.09 Precautions 4-19 

4B1.10 Storage of Protective Clothing 4-19 

4B1.11 Clothing Tests and Testing Kits 4-19 

4B1.12 Clothing Impregnating Sets . 4-20 






Page 

Section 2. MISCELLANEOUS PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 

4B2.01 Special Situations 4-21 

4B2.02 Protection and Treatment Set, Chemical Warfare Agents, M5A1 4-21 

1. Protective Ointment 4-21 

2. BAL Eye Ointment 4-21 

3. Atropine Tartrate Injection 4-21 

4B2.03 Protective Mask Waterproofing Sets 4-21 

4B2.04 Individual Protective Covers 4-21 

4B2.05 Protective Dressing for Shoes 4-22 

Section 3. PRECAUTIONARY AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES 

4B3.Q1 Self -Preservation During a Nuclear Attack 4-23 

1. Things To Do 4-23 

2. Things To Avoid 4-23 

4B3.02 Self-Preservation During a BW Attack 4-23 

4B3.03 Self-Preservation During a CW Attack 4-24 

1. Blister Gases . , 4-24 

2. Nerve Gases 4-24 

3. Blood Gases 4-24 

4. Choking Gases 4-24 

5. Vomiting Gases 4-25 

6. Tear Gases . . . . 4-25 

7. Screening Smokes 4-25 

8. Incendiaries , 4-25 

4B3.04 Personnel Dosimetry 4-25 

4B3.05 Medical Aid and Examinations 4-25 

PART C. GROUP PROTECTION 

Section 1. SELECTION, PLACEMENT, AND ALTERATION OF STRUCTURES 

4C1.01 General Policies 4-27 

1. Extent of Protection 4-27 

2. Assumptions 4-27 

4C1.02 Principle of Dispersal . 4-27 

1. Dispersal in Space 4-30 

2. Dispersal in Time 4-30 

4C1.03 Principle of Duplication 4-30 

4C1.04 Personnel Protective Shelters 4-30 

1. Single -Purpose Shelters 4-30 

2. Multipurpose Shelters 4-30 

4C1.05 Problems of Access 4-30 

4C1.06 Shielding Against Radiation 4-30 

4C1.07 Special Marking of Areas 4-31 

4C1.08 Alteration of Structures 4-31 

Section 2. PERSONNEL SHELTERS 

4C2.01 Requirements 4-33 

4C2.02 Command and Communication Centers 4-33 

4C2.03 Disaster Control Centers 4-33 

4C2.04 First-Aid Centers 4-33 

4C2.05 Mask-Type Shelters 4-33 

4C2.06 Special Shelter Equipment 4-33 

4C2.07 Operational Requirements for Shelters 4-33 

1. Heat, Ventilation, and Air Filtration 4-33 

2. Communications Facilities 4-34 

4C2.08 Food and Potable Water 4-34 

4C2.09 Lighting and Power 4-34 

4C2. 10 Functional Supplies 4-34 






Page 

Section 3. DESIGNATED SPECIAL AREAS 

4C3.01 Assembly Areas 4-35 

4C3.02 Evacuation Routes 4-35 

4C3.03 Special Danger Areas 4-35 

PART D. FACILITIES, SERVICES, AND MATERIALS 

Section 1. WATER SUPPLIES 

4D1.01 Survey of Facilities 4-37 

4D1.02 Damage Problems 4-37 

1. Power and Pumping Equipment. 4-37 

2. Pipe Locators and Leak Detectors '. . 4-37 

3. Pipe and Fittings 4-37 

4. Fire Hose 4-37 

4D1.03 Contamination Problems 4-37 

4D1.04 Emergency Water Requirements 4-38 

4D1.05 Distribution Systems . 4-38 

Section 2. POWER SUPPLIES 

4D2.01 General 4-41 

4D2.02 Railway Steam-Electric Plants 4-41 

4D2.Q3 Mobile Power Units 4-41 

4D2.04 Shipboard Diesel-Electric Units 4-41 

Section 3. FOOD SUPPLIES 

4D3.01 Packaged Foods 4-45 

1. Types of Containers 4-45 

2. Contamination 4-45 

4D3.02 Dispersal 4-45 

4D3.03 Stowage 4-45 

PART E. DECONTAMINATION 

Section 1. PURPOSES, PROBLEMS, AND PRIORITIES 

4E1.01 Purposes 4-47 

4E1.02 Problems 4-47 

4E1.03 Priorities 4-47 

Section 2. DEGREE OF CONTAMINATION 

4E2.01 General 4-49 

4E2.02 Radiological Contamination 4-49 

4E2.03 BW Contamination 4-49 

4E2.04 CW Contamination 4-49 

4E2.05 Stay Time 4-50 

4E2.06 Natural Decontamination 4-51 

Section 3. SELECTION OF DECONTAMINATION 
MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT 

4E3.01 Materials 4-55 

4E3.02 Equipment 4-55 



Page 
Section 4. DECONTAMINATION OF TERRAIN 

4E4.01 Radiological Agents 4-57 

1. Paved Areas 4-57 

2. Unpaved Areas 4-57 

3. Aging and Sealing as an Alternate Technique 4-57 

4E4.02 BW Agents 4-58 

1. Decontamination 4-58 

2. Suppressants 4-61 

4E4.03 CW Agents 4-61 

1. Decontaminating Apparatus, M6 and M3A3 ' . . 4-61 

Z. Decontaminating Apparatus, Ml 4-62 

Section 5. DECONTAMINATION OF STRUCTURAL EXTERIORS 

4E5.01 Radiological Decontamination. 4-63 

4E5.02 BW Agents 4-63 

4E5.03 CW Agents 4-63 

Section 6. DECONTAMINATION OF STRUCTURAL INTERIORS 

4E6.01 Radiological Decontamination 4-67 

4E6.02 BW Agents 4-67 

4E6.03 CW Agents 4-67 

Section 7. DECONTAMINATION OF EQUIPMENT 

4E7.01 Radiological Decontamination 4-69 

4E7.02 BW Agents 4-69 

4E7.03 CW Agents 4-69 

Section 8. DECONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL 

4E8.0I Radiological Decontamination 4-73 

1. Personnel Decontamination Procedures 4-73 

2. Emergency Decontamination of Personnel 4-74 

4E8.02 BW Agents 4-74 

4E8.03 CW Agents 4-75 

4E8.04 Decontamination of Clothing 4-75 

Section 9. DECONTAMINATION OF FOOD 

4E9-01 Approval for Consumption 4-77 

4E9.02 Radiological Decontamination 4-77 

4E9.03 BW Agents 4-77 

4E9.04 CW Agents 4-77 

4E9.05 Reclamation of Foods Contaminated by CW Agents 4-77 

1. Group I , 4-77 

2. Group II 4-77 

3. Group III 4-78 

Section 10. DECONTAMINATION OF WATER 

4E10.01 Radiological Decontamination 4-79 

4E10.02 BW Agents 4-79 

1. Rapid Sand Filtration . 4-79 

2. Slow Sand Filtration 4-79 

3. Improvised Methods 4-79 

4. Field Treatment 4-79 

5. Chlor-dechlor Process 4-79 

4E10.03 CW Agents 4-80 

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Section 11. DECONTAMINATION OF STORES AND SUPPLIES 

4E11.01 Radiological Decontamination 4-81 

4E11.02 BW Agents . ; 4-81 

4E11.03 CW Agents 4-81 

Section 12. DISPOSAL OF CONTAMINATED MATERIEL 

4E12.Q1 Radiological Decontamination 4-83 

1. Burial on Land 4-83 

2. Entombment . 4-83 

3. Burial at Sea 4-83 

4E12.02 BW and CW Agents 4-83 

PART F. FACILITIES FOR DECONTAMINATION AND RECOVERY 

Section 1. DECONTAMINATION FACILITIES 

4F1.01 Design of a Decontamination Center 4-85 

4F1.02 Improvised Personnel Decontamination Stations 4-85 

4F1.03 Storage Facilities for Contaminated Material and Equipment 4-85 

Section 2. FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES 

4F2.01 Firefighting Equipment 4-87 

4F2.02 Decentralization and Dispersal 4-87 

4F2.03 Firebreaks 4-87 

Section 3. CLEARING AND REPAIR EQUIPMENT 

4F3.01 General Types 4-89 

4F3.02 Demolition Equipment 4-89 

4F3.03 Earthmoving Equipment 4-89 

4F3.04 Materials -Handling Equipment 4-89 

4F3.05 Repair Equipment 4-89 

4F3.06 Automotive Vehicles 4-90 

CHAPTER 5. PLANS AND OPERATIONS 

PART A. READINESS PLANNING 

Section 1. CONCEPT 

5A1.01 Importance of Planning 5-1 

5A1.02 Phases in Planning 5-1 

5A1.03 Problems of Coordinated Planning 5-1 

5A1.04 Calculated Risk 5-2 

5A1.05 Characteristics of a Naval Shore Activity 5-2 

1. Geographical Location and Importance 5-2 

2. Type of Construction 5-2 

Section 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL CONTROL 

5A2.01 Implementation by Districts and Bureaus 5-3 

1. Disaster Control Force 5-3 

2. Disaster Control Group 5_3 

3. Disaster Control Unit 5-3 

4. Disaster Control Element 5-4 

5A2.02 Command Composition and Designation of Tactical Defense Organizations 5-4 

1. Emergency Recovery Group 5-4 

2. Emergency Recovery Unit 5-4 

3. Emergency Recovery Section 5_4 

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5A2.03 Responsibilities 5-4 

1. Administrative Responsibilities 5-4 

2. Tactical Responsibilities 5-4 

3. Tactical' Organization Staffs 5-4 

PART B. ORGANIZATION FOR ABC DEFENSE 
Section 1. ACTIVITY BILLS AND EQUIPMENT 

5B1.01 Nature and Content of Activity Plans and Bills ,■ 5-7 

5B1.02 Promulgation of Activity Plans . . , 5-7 

5B1.03 Allowance Lists 5-8 

1. Principles for Preparation of Allowance Lists 5-8 

2. Station Requirements Factor ; 5-8 

5B1.04 Procurement of Equipment and Material 5-8 

5B1.05 Care of Equipment and Material 5-8 

Section 2. TRAINING FOR ABC DEFENSE 

5B2.01 Defense Preparation 5-9 

5B2.02 Basic Indoctrination and Training 5-9 

5B2.03 Training of Defense Components 5-9 

5B2.04 Drills and Tests 5-9 

5B2.05 Retraining 5-10 

PART C. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 

Section 1. INITIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEY 

5C1.01 Establishment of Perimeters 5-11 

5C1.02 Designation of Sections 5-11 

1. Section I 5-11 

2. Section II . 5-11 

3. Section III 5-11 

5C1.03 ABC and Damage Reconnaissance 5-12 

1. ABC and Damage Survey Teams , 5-12 

2. Aerial Survey Teams 5-12 

3. Route Survey and Communications Teams 5-12 

5C1.04 Subsequent Surveys 5-12 

Section 2. MEDICAL AID AND WELFARE 

5C2.01 Medical Aid , 5-13 

5C2.02 Evacuation of Casualties 5-13 

5C2.03 Personnel Decontamination 5-13 

5C2.04 Personnel Dosimetry . . . 5-13 

5C2.05 Survivor Classification and Registration 5-14 

5C2.06 Emergency Housing 5-14 

5C2.07 Emergency Feeding 5-14 

5C2.08 Sanitation 5-14 

5C2.09 Refuse Disposal 5-14 

5C2.10 Pest Control 5-14 

Section 3. EMERGENCY REPAIR OF UTILITIES 

5C3.01 Communications and Electrical Systems 5-15 

1. Repairs to Powerlines 5-15 

2. Emergency Units 5-15 

5C3.02 Water Supply Systems 5-15 



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Section 4. REMOVAL, OF DEBRIS 

5C4.01 Reestabliahment of Access 5-17 

5C4.Q2 Debris Clearance 5-17 

5C4.03 Engineering Rescue 5-17 

5C4.04 Removal of Hazards 5-17 

5C4.05 Clearing and Repairing of Wharves '5-18 

5C4.06 Clearing of Channels and Harbors 5-18 

5C4.07 Contamination Problem in Harbors 5-18 

Section 5. REPAIR OF STRUCTURES 

5C5.01 Restoration of Structural Safety 5-19 

5C5.02 Restoration of Weathertightness 5-19 

5C5.03 Conservation of Equipment and Supplies . 5-19 

Section 6. FIREFIGHTING 

5C6.01 Conventional Methods 5-21 

5C6.02 Firefighting Teams 5-21 

5C6.03 Employment of Firebreaks 5-21 

Section 7. SECURITY AND TRAFFIC CONTROL 

5C7.01 Maintenance of Order 5-23 

5C7.02 Prevention of Looting 5-23 

5C7.03 Traffic Control on Evacuation and Access Routes 5-23 

Section 8. RECLAMATION OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 

5C8.01 Salvage of Equipment 5-25 

5C8.02 Salvage of Stores 5-25 

5C8.03 Criteria for Decontamination During Recovery 5-25 

PART D. OPERATIONAL AND FINAL RECOVERY PHASES 

Section 1. OPERATIONAL RECOVERY 

5D1.01 Initiation 5-27 

5D1.Q2 Further Surveys of Damage and Contamination 5-27 

5D1.03 Changes in Perimeters 5-27 

Section 2. FINAL RECOVERY 

5D2.01 Relationship to Initial Damage 5-29 

5D2.02 Relationship to Persistency of Contamination 5-29 

5DZ.03 Degree of Personnel Control 5-29 

Section 3. FINAL REPAIR AND RECLAMATION 

5D3.01 Reclamation of Bypassed Areas 5-31 

5D3.02 Final Repair of Access Routes 5-31 

5D3.03 Final Decontamination 5-31 

5D3.04 Restoration of Harbors and Channels. 5-31 

5D3.05 New Construction 5-31 



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APPENDIXES 

A ABC Defense Materiel A-l 

B Plutonium Monitoring and Decontamination Ashore , B-l 

C Decontamination of Water Contaminated by CW Agents C-l 

D Radiac Repair Facilities . D-l 

E Figures and Tables E-l 

F Monitoring With Fish for CW Agents in Water F-l 

G Abbreviations, Glossary, and Bibliography G-l 

ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure Title Page 

2-1 Atomic Surface Burst 2-3 

2-2 Thermal Energy Received From an Airburst at Various Distances as a 

Function of Weapon Yield — Visibility 2 to 50 Miles - 2-7 

2-3 Percentages of Total Dosage of Initial Gamma Radiation 

Received at Various Times After Explosion 2-8 

2-4 Initial Gamma Radiation Dose Versus Slant Range for a 1-KT Airburst . 2-9 

2-5 Neutron Radiation Dose Versus Slant Range for a 1-KT Airburst 2-10 

2-6 Pattern of Early Fallout Produced by Multimegaton Surface Burst 2-11 

2-7 Rate of Decay of Mixed Fission Products After an Atomic Explosion 2-12 

2-8 Partial Shielding Effect Produced by Unusual Terrain 2-13 

2-9 Cratering Effect Due to Surface Explosion 2-14 

2-10 Crater Characteristics 2-14 

2-11 Early Symptoms of Exposure to Nerve Gases 2-23 

2-12 Smoke Generator 2-25 

2-13 Fires Produces by Napalm-Filled Incendiary Bombs 2-27 

3-1 Skin Burns as a Function of Weapon Yield and Distance From an Airburst 3-3 

3-2 Interior of a Reinforced Concrete Building After a Nuclear Airburst 3-10 

3-3 Probability of Firespread as a Function of Building Density 3-11 

3-4 Structural Damage From a Nominal Airburst to a Steel-Plate-Girder 

Railway Bridge Located About 280 Yards From Ground Zero 3-15 

3-5 Damage Caused by Structural Collapse, Fire, and Debris 3-19 

4-1 Emergency Warning Signals 4-2 

4-2 Altitude Correction Factors for Radiac Readings 4-6 

4-3 Pattern for BW Exterior Surface Sampling 4-11 

4-4 Use of Air-Sampling Pump and Detector Tubes 4-14 

4-5 Impregnating Set, Clothing, Field, M3 4-20 

4-6 A Typical Single -Purpose Shelter 4-28 

4-7 A Typical Multipurpose Shelter 4-29 

4-8 Reduction in Dose Rate of Gamma Radiation Provided by 

Three Half-Thicknesses of Shielding Material 4-31 

4-9 Special Signs 4-32 

4-10 Loop and Gridiron Distribution Systems 4-38 

4-11 Rail -Mounted Gas Turbine Plant. 4-41 

4-12 Mobile Diesel-Electric Plant, Heavyweight, 600 KW 4-42 

4-13 Portable, Diesel-Electric Plant, Lightweight, 600 KW 4-42 

4-14 Floating Power Plant, YFP 10 ' 4-43 

4-15 Nomograph for Determination of Relative Dose Rates From 

Residual (Fallout) Nuclear Radiation 4-52 

4-16 Shrinkage of a Contaminated Area for a Given Dose Rate 4-53 

4-17 Suggested Arrangement of a Personnel Decontamination Station 4-73 

4-18 Improvised Personnel Decontamination Station 4-74 

5-1 Outline of the Passive Defense Organization 5-3 

5-2 Tactical Distribution Pattern of Naval Emergency Recovery Forces 5-11 

5-3 First-Echelon Medical Service Deployment 5-13 

5-4 A Raking Shore 5-19 

5-5 Flying Shores 5-19 

5-6 A Dead or Vertical Shore , , , , 5-20 

5-7 Window Struts 5-20 















2 


■1 


2 


■ z 


2- 


-3 


2 


-4 


2 


-5 


3 


-1 



TABLES 

Table Title Page 

Comparison Between Hazards From Different Types of Atomic Bursts 2-15 

Characteristics of War Gases 2-22 

Effects of Nerve Gases 2-24 

Properties of Screening Smokes 2-26 

Composition and Symbols of V. S. Incendiary Agents 2-28 

Effects of Various Doses of Nuclear Radiation Received 

Over Varying Periods of Time 3-4 

3-2 Median Lethal and Median Incapacitating Dosages for 

Selected War Gases 3-7 

3-3 Conditions of Failure for Sensitive Structural Elements 3-9 

3-4 Damage Criteria for Parked Aircraft and Transmitting Towers 3-13 

3-5 Disposition of Chemically Contaminated Foods 3-18 

4-1 Schedule of Tests for Protective Clothing 4-20 

4-2 Effectiveness of Various Countermeasures on Unprotected 

Materials Subjected to RW Contamination 4-50 

4-3 Effectiveness of Various Countermeasures on Preprotected 

Materials Subjected to RW Contamination 4-51 

4-4 Chlorine Compounds Used as BW Decontaminants 4-60 

4-5 CW Decontamination of Outdoor Areas , 4-62 

4-6 Decontamination of Persistent War Gas 4-64 

4-7 Decontamination of War Gases 4-71 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

Figure Source 

4-11 Clark Bros. Co., Turbo-Mobile Power Plant (brochure). 









CHAPTER 1. GENERAL NATURE OF ABC DEFENSE 
PART A. INTRODUCTION 

Section 1. GENERAL 






1A1.01 PURPOSE 

This publication has been prepared 
by the Bureau of Yards and Docks to provide 
technical information for those who are con- 
cerned with (a) planning preparatory defense 
measures and minimizing the damage that 
might result from nuclear, biological, and 
chemical warfare attacks on the Shore Estab- 
lishment; and {b) exercising control of areas 
that are contaminated as the result of acci- 
dents that involve nuclear weapons. 

1A1.02 SCOPE 

Various phases of ABC warfare de- 
fense and nuclear weapon accidents, as well 
as decontamination procedures and recovery 
measures, are covered. Specifically, this 
publication presents information on the follow- 
ing aspects of this subject. 

(1) The most probable forms of at- 
tack by an enemy and the characteristics of 
weapons that are most likely to be used. 

(2) The fundamentals of an ABC war- 
fare defense and recovery program. 

(3) A basis for organizing such a 
program. 

(4) Detection, protection, and decon- 
tamination equipment, materials, and methods. 

1A1.03 CANCELLATION 

This revised publication cancels and 
supersedes Atomic Warfare Defense, NAY- 
DOCKS TP-PL-2, revised 1 July 1956; Chem- 
ical Warfare Defense, NAVDOCKS TP-PL-3, 



revised 1 July 1955; and Biological Warfare 
Defense , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-4, revised 15 
April 1953. 

1A1.04 AUTHORITY AND RESPON- 
SIBILITIES 

By Article 0455 of United States Navy 
Regulations, 1948, the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks is responsible for the development, 
procurement, and distribution of materials 
and appliances for defense ashore against 
chemical, biological, and radiological warfare, 
except instruments that are used for the de- 
tection and measurement of radioactivity. 

The Marine Corps, however, is re- 
sponsible for supplying its own units, except 
when the units are under the management con- 
trol of a bureau or office of the Navy Depart- 
ment. 

1A1.05 DEFINITIONS 

1. DISASTER CONTROL. Disaster 
control consists of measures that are taken to 

(a) reduce the probability of damage and 

(b) minimize the effects of damage caused by 
hostile action without employing active weapons 
or initiating offensive action. In addition, in 
relation to shore activities, disaster control is 
interpreted to include protection against dam- 
age that is caused by natural forces, as well 
as recovery from damage that is caused by 
such forces. 

2. ABC WARFARE DEFENSE. ABC 
warfare defense consists of those disaster con- 
trol measures that are employed to prepare 
for, and to minimize the effects of, atomic, 
biological, and chemical attacks. 



1-1 






c 









Section 2. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DISASTER CONTROL 



1A2.01 DISASTER CONTROL PROGRAM 

The principles that are common to 
atomic and biological warfare defense pro- 
grams, along with similar principles in chem- 
ical warfare defense, have been jointly in- 
corporated into an all-inclusive disaster control 
program for the Department of the Navy. This 
program involves the organization and training 
of personnel; the development and procurement 
of special equipment; the establishment of 
safety policies and regulations regarding 
atomic, biological, and chemical warfare haz- 
ards; research in damage control and decon- 
tamination procedures and in the medical 
treatment of large numbers of atomic, biologi- 
cal, and chemical warfare casualties; and the 
integration of defense measures into a program 
of defense against ABC warfare and other 
forms of attack or natural disasters. 

1A2.02 BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS 
FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 

The specific interests and responsi- 
bilities of the Bureau of Yards and Docks in 
the area of ABC warfare defense as outlined 
by the Chief of Naval Operations are to: 

(1) Develop techniques and devices 
for (a) the rapid detection and identification of 
chemical warfare agents and (b) the rapid de- 
tection of biological agents ashore. 

(2) Develop equipment and material, 
except clothing and radiac instruments, for 
individual and group protection of personnel 
ashore. 

(3) Furnish military characteristics 
for disaster control protective clothing and 
radiac equipment ashore. 

(4) Develop methods, materials, and 
appliances for decontamination ashore. 

(5) Incorporate protective features 
in new and existing structures to improve their 
resistance to ABC attack. 



(6) Fund, initiate procurement ac- 
tion, and direct distribution of all disaster con- 
trol material and equipment under the cog- 
nizance of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. 



(7) Advise the Bureau of Supplies 
and Accounts of the requirements for disaster 
control standard stock material and equipment. 



(8) Develop techniques for radiologi- 
cal monitoring ashore. 

(9) Provide appropriate support and 
technical guidance on radiological monitoring 
and decontamination, ashore and in water 
areas,inthe event of accidents involving nuclear 
weapons. 

1A2.03 FIELD RESPONSIBILITIES 

1. DISTRICT PUBLIC WORKS OFFI- 
CER. The Chief of the Bureau of YaTds and 
Docks has delegated certain specific phases of 
his authority in the area of ABC warfare de- 
fense to the District Public Works Officers. 
Included are the technical planning aspects of 
ABC warfare defense programs of the Shore 
Establishment within the naval districts; this 
responsibility is assigned to the Disaster 
Control and Emergency Plans Branch (Code 
B-210). 

2. PUBLIC WORKS OFFICER. The 

Public Works Officer has such authority as 
may be delegated and such responsibility as 
is assigned to him by his commanding officer 
for (a) the administration and operation of the 
technical aspects of the activity disaster con- 
trol program and (b) the assignment and 
training of personnel in the Public Works De- 
partment to the disaster control organization. 

1A2.04 RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER 
BUREAUS AND OFFICES 

Other Navy bureaus and offices have 
been assigned by OpNav Instruction 04400. 6A 
the responsibility to perform certain functions 
in basic allowance planning for ABC warfare 
defense ashore. These functions, which am- 
plify the areas of responsibility that are stated 
in general terms in United States Navy Regu- 
lations, 1948, are outlined in the following 
paragraphs. 

1. CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. 

(1) Establish policies with respect 
to organization, equipment, and personnel 
qualifications, assignment, and training. 

(2) Coordinate bureau activities. 

(3) Provide budgetary guidelines. 

2. BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS (NOW 
BUREAU OF WEAPONS). 



(1) Develop airborne detection in- 



struments. 






1-3 



(2) Develop methods and equip- 
ment for individual and collective protection of 
personnel in aircraft. 

(3) Develop equipment for radio- 
logical, biological, and chemical decontamina- 
tion of aircraft. 

(4) Develop materials for in- 
creasing the resistance of aircraft to thermal 
radiation. 

(5) Investigate the ability of air- 
craft to withstand the effects of atomic weapons 
and recommend operational limits for all re- 
sulting hazards to aircraft and their crews. 

(6) Procure and distribute all 
special disaster control material and equipment 
under the cognizance of the Bureau of Aero- 
nautics (now Bureau of Weapons). 

(7) Advise the Bureau of Supplies 
and Accounts of the requirements for disaster 
control standard stock material and equipment. 

(8) Promote ahighstate of readi- 
ness, maintain liaison with other services and 
agencies, and keep the Navy informed as to 
the advances in technology as pertaining to 
nuclear accidents. 

3. BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND 
SURGERY. 

(1) Develop procedures and de- 
velop materials for the medical treatment of 
mass casualties that result from ABC attacks, 
and develop the various preventive medical 
measures appropriate to ABC defense. 

(2) Advise agencies that are re- 
sponsible for the provision of protection, de- 
contamination, and detection devices as to the 
medical aspects involved in their operation or 
development. 

(3) Develop techniques and de- 
vices for the rapid medical identification of 
biological warfare agents. 

(4) Establish tolerances and reg- 
ulations for radiation, and provide information 
on physiological effects of exceeding such tol- 
erances by varying amounts. 

(5) Investigate and develop means 
of increasing the resistance of individuals to 
the effects of atomic, biological, and chemical 
warfare agents. 



(6) Train medical personnel, as 
required, to develop adequate ABC warfare 
defense. 

(7) Procure and distribute all spe- 
cial disaster control material and equipment 
under the cognizance of the Bureau of Medi- 
cine and Surgery. 

(8) Advise the Bureau of Supplies 
and Accounts of the requirements for disaster 
control standard stock material and equipment. 

(9) Provide technical guidance on 
the medical aspects of nuclear accidents, and 
provide for required medical assistance to 
special teams. 

4. BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNE L. 

(1) Establish and promulgate 
qualification standards for personnelperform- 
ing disaster control and damage control duties. 

(2) Establish schools and conduct 
training and educational programs in the fields 
of disaster control and damage control. 

5. BUREAU OF SHIPS. 

(1) Investigate the effects of 
atomic explosives on ship structures and equip- 
ment, and make modifications where indicated 
and practicable. 

(2) Furnish basic technical re- 
quirements for disaster control protective 
clothing afloat. 

(3) Develop methods and equip- 
ment for decontamination of ships and their 
crews. 

(4) Investigate radiological and 
thermal radiation phenomena and provide basic 
data to other interested agencies. 

(5) Study the interrelation of var- 
ious countermeasur es for atomic weapons 
effects, and provide other agencies with data 
necessary for realistic planning. 

(6) Develop techniques and de- 
vices for the rapid detection and identification 
of chemical warfare agents and the rapid de- 
tection of biological agents afloat. 

(7) Develop all radiac equipment 
except airborne. 

(8) Procure, distribute, maintain, 
and establish allowances for radiac equipment 









1-4 









for naval shore activities, aircraft squadrons 
permanently based ashore, and shore-based 
fleet activities. 

(9) Develop, procure, and dis- 
tribute all special disaster control material 
and equipment, except clothing, required for 
individual and group protection on shipboard. 

(10) Advise the Bureau of Supplies 
and Accounts of the requirements for disaster 
control standard stock material and equip- 
ment. 

(11} Provide the Chief of Naval 
Personnel technical assistance (a) in the de- 
velopment of training materia^ (b) advice on 
technical matters affecting the quality of train- 
ing being provided, and (c) information on 
newly developed ABC warfare defense equip- 
ment on which training will be required. 

(12) Provide technical guidance on 
radiological monitoring and decontamination 
afloat; provide necessary radiac equipment 
for use ashore and afloat suitable for use in 
the event of nuclear accidents. 



6. BUREAU OF 
ACCOUNTS. 



SUPPLIES AND 



(3) Procure and distribute stocks 
of approved disaster control emergency medi- 
cal supplies as advised by the Bureau of Medi- 
cine and Surgery. 

7. BUREAU OF ORDNANCE (NOW 
BUREAU OF WEAPONS). 

Provide technical guidance for 
coping with accidents, ashore and afloat that 
involve unexploded nuclear ordnance, and for 
recovering fragments of such ordnance in a 
contaminating event. 

8. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL. 

Provide to appropriate commands 
preplanned legal measures to be utilized in 
event of an accident with nuclear weapons. 

9. CHIEF OF INFORMATION. 

Provide preplanned public infor- 
mation measures for use in accidents involving 
nuclear weapons. 

1A2.05 RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMAN- 
DANTS OF NAVAL DISTRICTS AND 
RIVER COMMANDS 






(1) Develop methods and deter- 
mine requirements for the protection of sup- 
plies in storage and in transit, and for their 
decontamination. 

(2) Develop, procure, and dis- 
tribute disaster control protective clothing. 



In accordance with the provisions of 
General Order 19, the commandants of naval 
districts and river commands are responsible 
for the defense of their naval districts and 
river commands and control of local disasters 
or emergencies, including disasters or emer- 
gencies resulting from ABC warfare attack. 






1-5 






( 









PART B. CONCEPTS OF ATTACK AND DEFENSE IN ABC WARFARE 

Section 1. ABC ATTACK 






IB 1,01 PURPOSES 

Nuclear weapons (AW) and radiolog- 
ical (RW), biological (BW), and chemical (CW) 
agents have various potentials when used in an 
attack. Nuclear weapons are designed to 
(a) produce casualties among personnel as a 
result of blast effects, thermal or heat effects, 
and nuclear radiation and (b) destroy buildings 
and equipment by heat and blast. Similarly, 
certain biological and chemical agents may be 
employed to (a) inflict casualties upon person- 
nel and animals or {b) cause destruction of 
agricultural crops. Casualties to personnel 
may range from slight incapacitation or minor 
injuries to death. The employment of RW, BW, 
and CW agents might be made a part of a gen- 
eral attack plan, or separate attacks might be 
staged by using single agents or any combina- 
tion of agents and weapons. The RW, BW, and 
CW agents, can not be used to destroy struc- 
tures and equipment, but instead they would 
probably be employed to (a) produce a con- 
tamination that would render structures and 
equipment temporarily unusable, (b) assure 
that the use of structures and equipment could 
be undertaken only if severe per sonnel casual- 
ties were accepted as a calculated risk, and 
(c) require considerable decontamination ef- 
fort. The residual radioactivity that results 
from a nuclear explosion may also prevent the 
use of land areas, installations, and equipment 
for a considerable period of time. 

Essential wartime production is not 
limited to the construction of ships, airplanes, 
vehicles, guns, and ammunition but also in- 
cludes the production of food and other essen- 
tials that are necessary for the civilian popu- 
lation and the men under arms. Crops and 
domesticated animals are therefore potential 
targets for RW, BW, and CW agents. 

1B1.02 METHODS 

A variety of weapons and delivery 
methods may be employed in an ABC attack. 
It is possible that two or more types of weap- 
ons might be employed simultaneously if the 
mission were sufficiently important. 

1. MANNED AIRCRAFT. In addition 
to delivering nuclear weapons, airplanes may 



also be utilized to deliver various agents, 
either in bombs or in the form of gases or 
minute particles that are dispersed in air to 
form aerosols. Low-level aerial spray may 
be a favored method of delivering certain BW 
and CW agents in future warfare. This method 
of delivery could also be adapted to RW agents. 

2. PROJECTILES. Atomic warheads 
have been designed for use ia such weapons as 
the 8-inch howitzer and the naval rifle. In the 
past, chemical agents have been incorporated 
in projectiles and used effectively, and similar 
possibility exists with selected BW agents. 
The types of weapons selected would depend 
on the objective; for example, structural dam- 
age, casualties, or the denial of an area through 
contamination. 

3. GUIDED MISSILES AND ROCKETS. 
Missiles obviously provide another means of 
conveying AW weapons or an assortment of 
RW, BW, and CW agents to a target area. 
Missiles provide a means of delivery at medium 
and long ranges without the use of manned air- 
craft. Moreover, the incorporation of BW and 
CW agents in the warhead is a possibility. 

4. MISCELLANEOUS DELIVERY 
METHODS. Consideration must be given to the 
possibility of using balloons to convey incen- 
diaries, other CW agents, or RW and BW 
agents. In addition, BW agents may be de- 
livered by such unusual methods as parachutes, 
gliding or whirling bomblets of small size, 
flying animals such as birds and bats, or by 
the insect vectors for certain agents. 

5. COVERT ATTACK. Sabotage pro- 
vides another potential method for the use of 
ABC weapons and agents. The components of 
nuclear weapons could be smuggled into an 
area and later assembled at an appropriate 
time and place. Nuclear weapons and weapons 
that incorporate CW components, however, are 
limited in potential by their design and mass. 
Various types of biological agents are not so 
restricted. A relatively small amount of 
BW agent culture, produced with ease by a 
semiskilled technician, may be used subse- 
quently to infect many individuals. It is even 
possible that an epidemic might ensue, although 
good public health measures would reduce the 
probability. 



1-7 



In general, the methods that might be 
employed in a covert attack are limited only 
by the degree of the security measures in force 
and the imagination of the saboteur. BW agents 
present the most attractive possibilities fox 
effective use, but AW weapons and certain CW 
agents can not be ruled out as possibilities. 

1B1.03 LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK 

An enemy may possess a given ABC 
weapon, but elect not to employ it because of 
sure knowledge that retaliation in kind would 
be made with devastating effect. The possi- 
bility of abstention by an enemy, however, 
must never be depended upon to assure the 
safety of American forces, because such an 
attitude clearly represents false security. The 
potential of CW agents was proved during 
World War I. Nevertheless, except for chem- 
ical warfare in the form of incendiaries, 
smoke, and flame, CW agents were not em- 
ployed in World War II, and BW agents have 
not been proved in combat. Both BW and CW 
munitions are more restricted by weather 
conditions than are other types. It can not be 
assumed, however, that a potential enemy will 
necessarily give consideration to such facts. 



The use of kamikaze methods in World War II 
is a well-known example of deviation from 
accepted methods of attack. It is for these 
reasons that an effective ABC defense program 
must be developed and maintained. Therefore, 
in formulating a program, an evaluation must 
be made on the likelihood of attack on a par- 
ticular area. In this publication, target areas 
are defined as concentrations of population 
and/or industry; prime targets are concentra- 
tions of population and/ or industry and instal- 
lations of the armed services or Federal 
agencies that are considered to be essential to 
the prosecution of a war. The identity of prime 
targets is classified information that may be 
obtained only from appropriate classified in- 
structions. The Office of Civil and Defense 
Mobilization publishes annually a manual, 
Target Areas for Civil Defense Purposes , that 
may be helpful in planning for disaster control. 
Once it has been determined that an area is a 
potential target, the possible effects on defense 
must be estimated. A discussion on this sub- 
ject, insofar as a nuclear attack is concerned, 
is contained in Protective Construction and 
Personnel Shelters , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8, 
Revised. 



( 






1-8 









Section 2. ABC DEFENSE 






1B2.01 PURPOSES 

Because it is necessary to maintain 
the Shore Establishment in a state of readiness 
to fulfill its mission at all times, plans, organ- 
ization, equipment, and training to effect 
recovery are of vital importance. So are pre- 
attack measures, such as duplication, dis- 
persal, camouflage, strengthening of struc- 
tures, and provision of shelters. 

Recovery measures are steps that 
are taken after an attack to restore the func- 
tional status of an activity. Such measures 
have been divided into three phases and are 
defined as follows: 

(1) Emergency recovery measures : 
immediate actions taken to keep loss of life 
and property at a minimum. 

(2) Operational recovery measures: 
actions taken to restore the essential mission 
of an activity. 

(3) Final recovery measures : ac- 
tions taken to restore all normal functions of 
an activity. 

1B2.02 METHODS 

Because wide areas will be affected 
during an ABC warfare attack, defense plan- 
ning must provide for collective assistance 
among all naval activities within an area. In 
addition, Navy planning must be coordinated 
with the planning of other military services 



and the planning of Federal, State, and local 

civil agencies. 

As set forth in General Order No. 19, 
all naval shore activities within a naval dis- 
trict are under the military command or 
coordination control of the commandant on 
matters that are related to disaster control 
and security. A naval activity that is outside 
the geographical limits of a naval listrict is 
under the military command or control of the 
appropriate fleet or naval force commander. 

1B2.03 SUMMARY 

In summary, ABC warfare defense 
includes: 

(1} Planning an organization that is 
effective and capable of dealing with extensive 
and widespread damage. 



sonnel. 



(2) Assignment and training of per- 



(3) Special construction or alteration 
of existing structures to provide security for 
personnel and equipment. 

(4) Procurement and safe storage of 
equipment that is needed for supply and re- 
covery. 

(5) Employment of personneland ma- 
terial to effect 'rapid recovery after an attack 
or natural disaster, so that the normal func- 
tioning of the naval activity may be reestab- 
lished without unnecessary delay. 






1-9 



r 



( 



o 






CHAPTER 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF ABC ATTACK 
PART A. NATURE OF ABC ATTACK 

Section 1. GENERAL APPLICATION OF WEAPONS 






2 Al . 1 MULTIPLE APPLICATION 

ABC weapons and agents maybe used 
for strategic effects, as well as for tactical 
purposes. In addition to the blast and thermal 
effects of nuclear weapons, the various AW, 
RW, BW, and CW weapons and agents produce 
-a variety of unique results that may be sum- 
marized under the general designation of 
contamination. 

Contamination results when radio- 
active substances, BW agents, or CW agents, 
or any combination thereof, are present in a 
quantity that is large enough to constitute a 
hazard to personnel. 

2A1.02 MOBILITY AND PERSISTENCY 

All ABC agents have characteristics 
of mobility. For example, when a nuclear ex- 
plosion takes place, a fallout of radioactive 
materials occurs downwind, and it may cover 
a considerable area. When RW agents and war 
gases are released by any one of the existing 
methods, they become dispersed and the area 
of dispersion may be extensive. 



The persistency factor is important 
also for most ABC weapons. As described in 
paragraph 2B1.09, radioactive substances 
undergo decay, which is relatively rapid for 
Sonne substances and prolonged for others. 
Potential BW agents include types that might 
be expected to have temporary and limited 
effects and other types that would continue to 
function over a considerable period of time. 
The CW agents also vary with respect to their 
persistency. 

2 A 1.0 3 MISSION 

For a given mission, a nonpersistent 
agent might be desirable for an attack in an 
area soon to be occupied by the attacking 
forces. Conversely, a highly persistent agent 
would be the obvious choice if it were intended 
to deny a given area to the defending forces 
for an indefinite period of time with no concern 
regarding occupancy by the attacking forces. 
Similarly, a weapon that produces major blast 
and heat effects would probably be selected to 
destroy installations and materials; but if the 
mission called for capture rather than destruc- 
tion of the installation, a weapon that did not 
produce excessive blast and heat effects would 
be preferable. 



549252 O-60-5 



Z-l 



o 






u 






Section 2. TYPES OF WEAPONS AND AGENTS USED 



2A2.01 NUCLEAR WEAPONS 

On 6 August 1945 the first military- 
use of an atomic bomb as an airburst wreaked 
havoc upon Hiroshima, Japan. On 9 August 
1945 a similar blast did enormous damage to 
Nagasaki. Termination of Japanese resistance 
undoubtedly was in part dictated by the reali- 
zation that an entirely new type of weapon hav- 
ing enormous destructive capacity had become 
a factor in modern warfare. A typical atomic 
surface burst is shown in Figure 2-1. 




Figure 2-1. Atomic Surface Burst 

Since 1 945 even more destructive weapons have 
been developed in the form of thermonuclear 
bombs, which use fusion as well as fission for 
their energy, 

2A2.02 RW AGENTS 

In the fission process, various radio- 
active isotopes of a number of elements are 
produced. These radioactive substances have 
varying degrees of persistency. Similar 
radioactive substances are developed in the 
operation of atomic piles, and there is some 
chance that they may be used as independent 
weapons to contaminate areas, structures, 
equipment, and personnel. This process is 
known as radiological warfare, or RW, and the 
radioactive substances that are employed are 
the RW agents. 

2A2.03 BW AGENTS 

1 . In a sense, defense against BW 
agents has always been carried on. Disease 
germs have been a part of human experience 
throughout the centuries, although many of 
them were not identified until comparatively 
recent times, and some of them undoubtedly 
remain unknown today. The term "biological 



warfare" as used herein means the deliberate 
and directed use of BW agents to gain a mili- 
tary advantage. 

2. Epidemics of disease have long 
been a problem in times of war, affecting both 
military and civilian populations and often 
accounting for more casualties than the ac- 
cepted weapons of the times. Before the days 
of typhoid inoculation, typhoid fever was an 
inevitable and very real hazard of military 
life. Armies were similarly decimated by 
typhus fever, malaria, and yellow fever until 
effective control measures were devised. 

3. A question naturally arises on 
whether directed attacks that employ BW 
agents would be significantly more devastating 
than the epidemics that have long been a part 
of human experience. Only actual tests can 
provide an answer, and as yet such tests have 
not been made. It is known, however, that our 
defenses against pathogens are better today 
than they have ever been. 

2A2.04 CW AGENTS 

1. There is nothing new about the 
concept or the basic process of chemical war- 
fare. Pitch pots, reportedly used to defend 
Troy in about 1200 B.C., or Greek fire, used 
in the seventh century B.C., may have been the 
first use, because the use of incendiary mate- 
rials is usually classified as a type of chemical 
attack. In the past half century the agents and 
methods of CW have been modernized, and the 
various technical advances must be considered 
in planning an adequate defense. The CW agent 
of today may be a liquid, gas, or solid sub- 
stance that produces lethal, injurious, or 
irritant effects. However, it can have an 
incendiary action or it can be a screening or 
signaling smoke. 

2. The use of modern war gases began 
in World War I when the Germans released 
chlorine gas from cylinders at Ypres in 1915. 
Supported by the element of surprise, this lung 
irritant proved to be extremely effective in the 
initial attack, and in the months that followed 
the Germans successively employed a number 
of other lung irritants, including phosgene. In 
1917, the Germans introduced mustard gas. 
The nitrogen mustard agents were available to 
both the Germans and the Allies in World War 
II. The Germans also produced during World 
War II a group of phosphorus compounds known 
as the G-agents, or nerve gases. These G- 
agents can enter the human body via both lungs 
and skin, and in sufficient dosage they will 



2-3 



inactivate substances that are vital to the func- 
tion of the nervous system. Potentially, the 
G-agents, because of their high toxicity and 
the rapidity of their action, are much more 
deadly than older CW agents. 

3. Incendiary bombs were used to 
some extent during World War I. Some of them 
contained thermite and some white phosphorus. 
Similar weapons, including large napalm bombs 



and projectiles with white phosphorus com- 
ponents, were used extensively during World 
War II. Napalm, which is not particularly 
flammable, is a white powder that is used to 
thicken gasoline, but the term "napalm bomb" 
implies that napalm has been used in the bomb. 
Thickened gasoline contains 3 to 8 percent of 
napalm; bombs, 5 or 6 percent; portable flame 
throwers, 3 or 4 percent; and mechanized 
flame throwers, about 8 percent. 



o 



( 



2-4 



u 






PART B. CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTS OF ABC WEAPONS 

Section 1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 






2B1.01 TYPES OF BURSTS 

A nuclear weapon can be detonated as 
(a) an air burst in which the fireball does not 
extend down to the surface, (b) a surface burst 
in which the fireball does extend down to the 
surface, or (c) a subsurface burst where the 
center of the explosion is beneath the surface. 
In any type of burst the surface may be either 
land or water. The discussion in this publi- 
cation has been limited to specific effects of 
nuclear weapons and does not cover basic 
phenomena. For additional information, see 
Effects of Nuclear Weapons, prepared by the 
Department of Defense and published by the 
Atomic Energy Commission. 

2B1.02 BLAST EFFECTS 

All bursts produce blast effects that 
differ according to the type of burst and the 
medium through which the blast or shock wave 
is traveling. Blast pressures are measured 
in pounds per square inch (psi). 

1. AIRBURST. In an airburst, vir- 
tually at the moment of the explosion, a char- 
acteristic ball of fire begins to take form, and 
about 17/l000th second after the explosion, the 
direct shock wave begins to move outward 
from the ball of fire. The shock wave covers 
the first 500 yards in about one-half second 
and reaches a distance of 2,000 yards from the 
explosion center in about four seconds. The 
velocity equals the speed of sound for the 
atmosphere and temperature conditions that 
exist in the shock front. After a shock front 
has traveled outward a certain distance, the 
pressure behind it falls to less than one atmos- 
phere. This creates a partial vacuum into 
which air tends to rush, thus producing the 
phenomenon that is described as the negative 
phase of the shock wave. Ordinarily, the pos- 
itive or pressure phase of a shock wave can be 
expected to do most of the damage, but the 
effect of the negative phase is considerable and 
must also be anticipated. 

2. SURFACE BURST. The area of 
damage from a weapon that is detonated as a 
surface burst is likely to be of less magnitude 



than the area of damage from a similar weapon 
that is detonated as an airburst. This is true 
because more of the energy of a surface burst 
goes into ground shock and into vaporizing 
materials at the earth's surface. Thus, there 
is a tendency toward (a) overdestruction of 
installations at ground zero and (b) corre- 
sponding underdestruction with an increase of 
range from ground zero. 

3. UNDERGROUND BURST. An un- 
derground explosion causes a shock wave in 
earth and rock and, although the shock wave 
travels faster than an accompanying shock 
wave in air, it loses its potency more rapidly. 
The pressures that are developed in an under- 
ground burst depend to a considerable extent 
on the depth of the burst, because if the location 
of the burst is relatively shallow, the gases of 
the fireball will break through the surface 
quickly to bring relief from pressure. 

4. UNDERWATER BURST, a. In an 
underwater burst, the characteristic fireball 
of hot, compressed gases is formed and rises 
to the surface. Meanwhile, a shock wave in the 
water proceeds outward from the point of, the 
explosion. This underwater shock wave moves 
faster than a shock wave in air. It has very 
high initial overpressures near the center of 
the explosion. Overpressures, however, fall 
off quite rapidly as range increases. 

b. When the fireball breaks through 
the surface, a blast wave is produced in air 
and a hollow column of water is thrown upward. 
Cases from the fireball are vented up through 
the middle of the column. Very roughly the 
blast wave in air for a shallow underwater 
burst is about half of what a comparable bomb 
would produce if the burst took place in air. 
Thus, the comparative destructive range of the 
weapon to surface structures is considerably 
reduced. 

c. A series of water waves that move 
out from the target center is also produced. 
Figure E-l (Appendix E) provides information 
concerning wave height for a I-kt burst and a 
formula for computing wave heights that are 
produced by bursts of different magnitudes and 
at various depths. 



2-5 



5. COMPARISON OF BLAST EF- 
FECTS. It is possible to compare the blast 
effects that may be anticipated when bombs of 
various energies are detonated. In the esti- 
mating of overpressures that are produced 
under similar conditions for various sizes of 
weapons, a scaling rule can be applied, even 
though special characteristics of terrain may 
sometimes impair the accuracy of the esti- 
mates. Thus, in an airburst, the range from 
ground zero at which a specified overpressure 
is attained is proportional to the cube root of 
the bomb's energy yield. 

Figure E-Z (Appendix E) shows ranges 
from ground zero at which certain peak over- 
pressures are attained in the airburst of a 1-kt 
bomb, and it provides the scaling formula for 
computation of results with bombs of other 
magnitudes. Figure E-3 supplies the same 
kinds of information for surface bursts. Fig- 
ure E-4 does likewise for shallow water bursts. 
Figure E-5 provides a cube root scaling curve 
for use in making the computations and explains 
how the cube root scaling curve is used. 

2B1.03 THERMAL EFFECTS 

In air, thermal radiation is given off 
in. two pulses. For a kiloton weapon, the first 
pulse lasts for about 1/ 100th part of a second, 
and for a megaton weapon, the first pulse du- 
ration is about 1/10 second. Extremely high 
temperatures that consist largely of ultraviolet 
radiation are produced. In either instance, the 
first pulse involves only about 1 percent of the 
total thermal radiation and is not likely to do 
extensive damage except at short range. 

The secondpulse follows immediately 
upon the first. It lasts several seconds and 
carries about 99 percent of the total thermal 
radiation energy. Although the temperatures 
are not as high as in the first, this radiation 
causes most of the heat damage. These rays 
travel in straight lines and are stopped by even 
thin, opaque substances. In an airburst of a 
20-kt weapon, the secondpulse will cause skin 
burns at a range of two miles from ground 
zero. Because the duration of the pulse is 
several seconds, very prompt evasive action 
can reduce the damage to personnel. 

It is difficult to make accurate esti- 
mates of thermal energy that is received at a 
given range from ground zero, as the result of 
the detonation of bombs that have different 
magnitudes, because of such variables as the 
height of the burst above surface and the state 
of the atmosphere at the time. Smoke and water 
in the air decrease the effective range of ther- 
mal radiation materially and, therefore, the 



result at one time may be different from the 
result at another time. 

If a clear day and a given height of 
burst is assumed, it is possible to make rea- 
sonably accurate predictions. The scaling rule 
is that the amount of thermal energy received at 
a given range from ground zero will be directly 
proportional to total bomb energy release. 

Thermal energy is measured in cal- 
ories per square centimeter (cal/sq cm). If an 
airburst of a 100-kt bomb delivers 10 cal/sq 
cm at a slant range of 13,000 feet, a similar 
burst of a 1,000-kt bomb will deliver 100 cal/ 
sq cm at the same slant range {Figure 2-2). 
Reference should be made to Figure E-6, which 
shows variation of thermal energy with slant 
range for a 1-kt airburst. Although the total 
thermal energy may be estimated from these 
curves, the yield of weapon must be considered 
in the estimation of the potential damage from 
any level. 

2B1.04 INITIAL NUCLEAR RADIATION 

An atomic burst is accompanied by 
the emission of gamma rays, which travel at 
the speed of light and have considerable pene- 
trating power. In addition, some free neutrons 
and alpha and beta radiations are also liber- 
ated. The gamma and neutrons make up the 
major portion of this radiation, and the alpha 
and beta emissions are usually ignored, except 
inthe immediate area of the explosion, because 
they have a much shorter range. Taken to- 
gether, these factors constitute what is known 
as initial radiation. All of the initial radiation 
is received within one minute after an explo- 
sion, about 50 percent arriving within the first 
second, as shown in Figure 2-3. Initial nuclear 
radiation from a surface burst is similar to 
that of an airburst. The slant range to any 
object outside of target center is also shorter 
in the surface burst; but, conversely, gamma 
rays are subject to shielding by earth, rocks, 
and the walls of buildings. 

1. GAMMA RADIATION DOSE. Initial 
gamma radiation dose is measured in units that 
are called roentgens (r). Figure 2-4 shows 
initial gamma radiation dose at different slant 
ranges from a 1-kt airburst, but may also 
serve to give approximations for surface 
bursts. For yields other than a 1-kt burst, the 
initial gamma radiation dose varies as shown in 






where 



Y = Y x scaling factor 

Y = the dose received from a W-kt burst 
at the given range 



' 



2-6 



c 









Y = the dose received from a 1 -kt burst 

at the given range 
Scaling factor is obtained from Appendix 

E, Figure E-7. 

Consider the computation, of the initial 
gamma radiation dose at one mile for a 100-kt 
burst. Figure 2-4 shows that for a 1 -kt burst 
at one mile the initial gamma radiation dose 
(Y Q ) is 2.3 r. Figure E-7 gives the scaling 



factor for a 100-kt burst as 150. The scaling 
equation then becomes 

Y = 2.3 x 150 

Y = 345. 

At the range of one mile, then, the initial 
gamma radiation dose that is received for a 
100-kt burst is 345 r. 



100,000 



1 0,000 



o 

< 

DC 

■z. 

< 




1,000 



10 100 

WEAPON YIELD (KT) 



1000 



Figure 2-2. Thermal Energy Received From an Airburst at Various Distances as a Function 

of Weapon Yield— Visibility 2 to 50 miles 






2-7 



2. NEUTRON RADIATION DOSE. The 
unit "rem" is used to designate neutron radi- 
ation biological dose. Figure 2-5 shows the 
neutron radiation dose in rem at various slant 



ranges for a 1 -kt burst. For bursts of greater 
magnitude at the same slant range, the dose 
varies according to 






20 



20 

10 ■ 

7 

■ 

4 

2 
O 

UJ 

£ 1.0 

z 

2 0.7 
1/1 

o 

a. 

2 0.4 

DC 
UJ 

H 

u. 

** 0.2 

0.1 
0.07 


r 


r 


1 


\ 


y> 


- 










- 
_ 


tfft c 


»»i&---" 




/ 




j&&& 






/ 


jS 








- 


- / 








- 






y 




- 










- 




•\ 






- 










: 










- 


0.04 

0.02 
0.01 










- 


i / 






^^^ 


- 



40 60 

TOTAL DOSE RECEIVED (%) 



80 



100 






Figure 2-3. Percentages of Total Dosage of Initial Gamma Radiation Received at Various Times 

After Explosion 



2-8 









rem = (rem), x W 

where 

rem = dose received from a 1 -kt burst 
(rem) = dose received from aW-ktburst 
W = yield of the weapon in kt. 

Figure E-8 shows initial gamma ra- 
diation doses as they relate to various peak 
overpressures, and indicates how the curves 
may be used. Figure E-9 shows neutron radi- 
ation dose rem in relationship to various peak 
overpressures, and explains how the curves 
may be used. 

2B1.05 FALLOUT 

When a nuclear explosion occurs, 
fission products, unfissioned materials, and 
neutron-induced radioactive particles sooner 
or later return to the surface as a fallout. 
The behavior of any particular fallout varies, 
depending on the type and magnitude of the 



burst, the terrain, the prevailing atmospheric 
conditions, and other factors. For this dis- 
cussion, fallout maybe arbitrarily divided into 
early fallout and remote fallout. 

1. EARLY AND REMOTE FALL- 
OUTS. Early (close-in) fallout occurs at and 
in the vicinity of the target area. It consists 
of the larger solid particles that are sucked 
up or blown up into the pillar and cloud that 
are developed in an atomic or thermonuclear 
explosion; the particles return to the surface 
contaminated with fission products. Remote 
fallout occurs days, months, and even years 
later. It is composed of small particles of 
fission products and other materials that have 
been carried high into the atmosphere and for 
considerable distances by the winds before 
they settle back to the surface of the earth. 
Many of the radioactive particles in remote 
fallout will have undergone significant degrees 
of radioactive decay because of timelag. 



0.00001 

TM.ooo prm | .. | :|','. i i 



10,000 




100 1|0M 

INITIAL GAMMA RADIATION DOSE (R) 



10,000 



100,000 



FIGURE 2-4 Initial Gamma Radiation Dose Versus Slant Range for a 1 -kt Airburst 



2-9 



0.00001 
100,000 



0.0001 



0.001 0^01 0.1 1 

ip-^f PHI , --.X::4-4'L.j-i!ip:] ::; x:f["~ ' ! ' ] ! * " 1 1 1 ^ T? H •"P^ l igFT H 



10,000 



I 

I— ■ 

o 



o 
z 
< 
ca 

I- 
z 
< 

-j 




1,000 



100 1000 

NEUTRON RADIATION DOSE (REM) 



10,000 



100,000 



Figure 2-5. Neutron Radiation Dose Versus Slant Range For a 1-kt Airburst 



o 









2. FALLOUT IN RELATION TO 
BOMB YIELD. When a nuclear bomb is deto- 
nated as an airburst, the fallout is not likely 
to be an important hazard, because there would 
be little if any close-in fallout and the remote 
fallout may be disregarded from the military 
standpoint. When surface and subsurface 
bursts occur, however, the early fallout will 
be an important hazard. 

The fallout from a hydrogen bomb in 
the multimegaton range is quite different. The 
fireball is much larger, being more than four 
miles in diameter when a 20-megaton bomb is 
detonated. A burst of such a bomb at a 10,000- 
feet altitude would constitute a surface burst 
in which material from the ground would be 
drawn up into the column and resulting cloud. 
When tested in the Pacific Proving Grounds, 
a bomb of this approximate energy produced 
a downwind early fallout that was about 140 
miles long and 20 miles wide. Any unprotected 
personnel in this area probably would not have 
survived. The area of lesser contamination, in 
which there would have been some survival of 
unprotected personnel (but also some injuries, 
including subsequent fatalities), extended 
downwind to 220 miles and laterally for 60 
miles (Figure 2-6). 

In the interpretation of Figure 2-6, it 
should be noted that radioactivity of the fallout 
might be lethal to all unprotected personnel 
in Area I, and lethal to 5 to 50 percent of 



unprotected personnel in Area II. Area III also 
would be one of potential radioactive hazard. 
If a wind as indicated is assumed, the cigar- 
shaped pattern of local fallout appears to be 
characteristic of multimegaton surface bursts. 

Residual radiation dose rate contours 
from a 1-mt surface burst fallout pattern are 
shown in Figure E-l 3 and Table E-l. The 
contours of such patterns depend to a consid- 
erable extent upon wind velocity. Paragraph 
El 3 and Table E-l also provide (a) scaling 
formula for weapon sizes other than 1 mt, and 
(b) adjustment factors for various scaling 
winds. 

2B1.06 INDUCED RADIATION 

Near ground zero, induced radiation 
may be a factor in determining the amount of 
radioactive contamination. Induced radiation 
develops when the free neutrons of an atomic 
burst penetrate certain (but not all) substances. 
As the height of burst increases, the amount 
of induced radiation decreases for any given 
weapon. For airbursts (more than one fireball 
height), this is not likely to be a factor of con- 
sequence. In underwater bursts, the salt in 
the seawater can be a source of considerable 
induced radioactivity, but probably will be 
contained and dissipated by settling and wave 
action. However, in surface or underground 
bursts, there is great possibility that various 
substances will be rendered radioactive. 







220 Ml 



Figure 2-6. Pattern of Early Fallout Produced by Multimegaton Surface Burst 






2-11 



2BI.07 UNFISSIONED PLUTONIUM 
AND URANIUM 

Another potential factor in contami- 
nation is the presence of unfissioned plutonium 
and uranium. These substances emit alpha 
particles and under certain conditions may 
also give off some gamma rays. Alpha par- 
ticles, however, cannot travel more thanthree 
inches in air and will be stopped by clothing 
or even unbroken skin. It is believed that they 
are only a minor hazard, unless unfissioned 
particles of plutonium are ingested or inhaled. 

Plutonium particles are only likely to 
be a military hazard after an accident such as 
a fire that involves nuclear weapons. (See 
Appendix B. ) 



It may be shown that the process of 
radioactive decay has great significance in its 
relationship to radioactive contamination. The 
half- lives of various elements vary greatly, 
for example, that of lutecium 176 is 75 billion 
years and that of polonium 212 is only three 
ten-millionths of a second. After a nuclear 
explosion, a great many different radioactive 
substances are included in the residual radio- 
activity, and among these substances are some 
that have relatively short half-lives and others 
that have longer half- lives. This might, at 
first, seem to constitute a hopelessly compli- 
cated situation. For practical purposes, how- 
ever, the important factor is the average rate 
of decay, which is predictable. 

2B1.10 RADIOACTIVITY DECAY RATES 






2B1.08 RW CONTAMINATION 

It is possible to spread radioactive 
elements (usually only one) over a target. 
These elements are known as RW agents, and 
they have a predetermined rate of decay, as 
might be dictated by strategic or tactical 
requirements. In one situation it might be 
desired to deny access to an area for only a 
brief interval of time, and in another, to deny 
access indefinitely. The radioactive substan- 
ces could be dispersed within a selected area. 
Here the effect of these substances would be 
similar to that of any radioactive contamina- 
tion, and the substances would be selected to 
produce casualties among personnel or to deny 
access to areas. 

From the defense standpoint, there- 
fore, the problem of RW contamination is 
usually the same as the problem of the residual 
radiation that results from anuclear explosion. 
Even though there may be more alpha and beta 
hazards, instruments that are used to detect 
and measure dose rates are the same in either 
case, and so are the psychological and physio- 
logical effects upon personnel. The decon- 
tamination problem, which is discussed in 
Chapter 4, is also broadly similar to that pro- 
duced by certain types of nuclear explosions, 

2B1.09 PERSISTENCY OF 

RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 

A radioactive substance is made up of 
atoms that undergo disintegration as time goes 
on. All of the atoms in a radioactive substance 
do not undergo change at the same time, but 
there are so many atoms in even a relatively 
small amount of matter that the average rate 
of decay is predictable. The half- life of such 
a substance is the length of time in which half 
of its atoms will break down. 



The decay rate that applies to the 
mixture of fission products that result from an 
atomic explosionis represented in Figure 2-7. 
In this graph the dose rate is arbitrarily set as 
a value of 100 at one hour after the explosion. 
During the following two hours the percentage 
of residual radioactivity diminishes rapidly, 
and at four hours it is down to about one fifth 
of its initial magnitude. Further data of value 
in computing decay rates (dose rate versus 
time after explosion) will be found in Figure 
E-14 and paragraph El 4. 







100 
80 
60 
40 
20 































































1 3 5 7 9 II 



71 



TIKE AFTER EXPL05S0N (Hfi) 



Figure 2-7. Rate of Decay of Mixed Fission 
Products After an Atomic Explosion 



2-12 










Figure 2-8. Partial Shielding Effect Produced by Unusual Terrain 



2B1.11 PROBLEMS OF TERRAIN 

Idealized blast, thermal radiation 
effects, initial nuclear radiation effects, and 
residual radiation patterns may all be modified 
by special features of terrain. 

For practical purposes, however, the 
features must be extreme, such as the situation 
shown in Figure 2-8> in order to be of real 
benefit. 

This figure shows how a steep ridge 

may serve as a partial shield against the blast 
effect of a burst. The buildings at location A 
are relatively close to ground zero and receive 
maximum impact from the shock wave for the 
range indicated. The shielding effect of one 
building upon another at A will have no effect 
under the conditions shown in the illustration; 
in fact these buildings maybe worse off because 
of pressure that is reflected from the hill. 
At location B the result will be considerably 
different. At B the ridge provides a partial 
shield against the shock wave. The ridge will 
also furnish some shielding against thermal 
radiation and initial nuclear radiation. 

If the burst shown in Figure 2-8 had 
occurred at the surface of the ground, the 



shielding effect of the ridge would have been 
greater. If the burst were a subsurface explo- 
sion, the blast hazard at B would be minimal. 
The real hazard would be fallout. But if the 
burst shown in Figure 2-8 represented a larger 
bomb and occurred at greater altitude, the 
effect of the ridge would be minimized. 

2B1.12 CRATERS 

A 20 -kt bomb that is exploded 50 ft 
below the saturated surface could produce a 
crater approximately 270 yards in diameter 
and 150 ft deep. A photograph of such a crater 
is shown in Figure 2-9, and Figure 2-10 shows 
the general characteristics in cross section. 

In the crater area, structures, equip- 
ment, pipelines, cables, and other underground 
installations will be destroyed. Transportation 
routes in and about the area will be impassable. 
Moreover, the entire area will have a high 
level of radioactive contamination. 

Appendix E, Figure E- 1 0, gives values 
for crater diameter and depth as a function of 
weapon yield for surface bursts in dry soil, 
and gives a conversion factor for the estima- 
tion of crater size in other types of soil. 



2-13 




Figure 2-9. Cratering Effect Due to Surface 
Explosion 



Figure E-ll compares crater radius 
with depth of burst in dry soil and provides a 
conversion factor for crater radius in other 
types of soil. 

Figure E-12 shows dimensions of 
underwater craters in relationship to weapon 
yield. Conversion factors for various types of 
bottoms are also shown. 

2B1.13 COMPARATIVE HAZARDS 
FROM BURSTS 

It is apparent from the preceding 
paragraphs that the several kinds of hazards 
that are associated with atomic bursts vary in 
degree according to the type of burst and other 
conditions. A comparison of probable hazards 
is summarized in Table 2-1. 



' 



CRATER DIMENSIONS 
Dl 







DEFINITIONS 

D„ = diameter of apparent crater 

H a = depth of apparent crater 

D t = diameter of true crater 

D r = diameter of rupture tone = 1.5 D a 

Dj = diameter overall including lip = 2.0 D a 

H T = height of tip = 0.25 K„ 



Figure 2-10. Crater Characteristics 



2-14 















TABLE 2-1 
Comparison Between Hazards From Different Types of Atomic Bursts 



Type 
of 

burst 


Blast 

effects 


Thermal 
radiation 


Crater 


Initial 

nuclear 

radiation 


Base 
surge 


Nuclear 
residual 
radiation 


Airburst 


Blast wave in air 


Maximum thermal 


None 


Maximum effect 


None 


Not a primary 




causes casualties 


radiation pro- 




likely to pro- 




hazard in most 




and widspread de- 


duces casualties 




duce casualties 




cases. 




struction of physical 


and widespread 




over wide- 








property; also sec- 


damage to struc- 




spread area. 








ondary fires. 


tures and equip- 
ment; also fires. 










Surface 


Blast wave in air is 


Similar to air- 


Moderate to 


Similar to air- 


May be 


Likely to be 


burst 


similar to airburst, 


burst, but more 


extensive 


burst 


devel- 


much more 




but tends to produce 


subject to con- 


crater is 




oped. 


substantial 




overdestruction. near 


tainment. 


developed; 






than in airburst 




ground zero. May 




it varies 






due to larger 




also produce heavy 




with mag- 






fallout. 




ground shock near 




nitude and 










crater. 




height of 
burst. 








Underground 


Earth shock wave of 


Largely contained 


Moderate to 


Largely ab- 


Substan- 


Contamination of 


burst 


great magnitude near 


by earth sur- 


extensive 


sorbed by sur- 


tial; de- 


considerable 




crater. Shock wave 


rounding target 


crater is 


rounding earth; 


livers 


magnitude in 




in air of less magni- 


center. 


developed; 


induced radia- 


residual 


and about cra- 




tude than in airburst 




it varies 


tion produced 


radiation. 


ter. 




or surface burst. 




with magni- 
tude and 
depth of 
burst. 


in earth mate- 
rials by free 
neutrons. 






Underwater 


Water shock wave of 


Largely absorbed 


May produce 


Largely ab- 


Substan- 


May be consid- 


burst 


great magnitude. 


by surrounding 


underwater 


sorbed by sur- 


tial; de- 


erable con- 




Shock wave in air of 


water. 


crater. 


rounding 


livers 


tamination on 




less magnitude than 






water. 


residual 


nearby land 




in airburst or sur- 








radiation. 


areas. 




face burst. 













NOTE: Total bomb energy release is assumed to be comparable in all cases. 



o 



( 



(J 






Section 2. BW AGENTS 






2B2.01 PATHOGENS 

Biological warfare agents consist of 
living germs, toxins that are derived from 
living germs, and certain plant-growth regu- 
lators. They can be used against personnel, 
cultivated plants, and domesticated animals; 
they are also employed in some combinations 
that are designed to delay defense production 
and render the population incapable of effective 
resistance. Biological agents do not destroy 
physical property. However, in an area that 
is heavily contaminated by BW agents, the 
effective use of physical properties would be 
restricted. The number of potential BW agents 
thatare currently acceptable in terms of mili- 
tary requirements is limited. Probabilities 
point in the direction of some of the less well- 
known pathogens that have not been a primary 
concern of the nation under attack because they 
had been confined to other areas of the earth. 
There is also the possibility of developing spe- 
cial genetic varieties of well-known pathogens 
that would be resistant to existing defenses. 

2B2.02 GROUPS OF POTENTIAL 
BW AGENTS 

The potential BW agents belong to a 
number of groups — some are plants, some ani- 
mals, and some are the poisonous products of 
plants and animals. In addition, synthetic 
chemicals are available for use against plants. 
The most important groups are described in 
the following paragraphs. 

1. VIRUSES. The viruses are the 

smallest living organisms and can be viewed 
only with an electron microscope. They grow 
only in living cells and cause diseases of man, 
domestic plants, and animals. 

Viruses are responsible for a number 
of human diseases, including chicken pox, 
common colds, dengue, measles, hepatitis, 
infantile paralysis, influenzas, lymphocytic 
choriomeningitis, mumps, phlebotomus fever, 
psittacosis, rabies, smallpox, trachoma, virus 
pneumonia, and yellow fever. 



3. BACTERIA. The bacteria are uni- 
cellular plants and can usually be grown in the 
absence of living cells. They can not be seen 
without a microscope. They cause such dis- 
eases as anthrax, bacillary dysentery, botu- 
lism, bubonic plague, diphtheria, erysipelas, 
gas gangrene, gonorrhea, leprosy, lobar 
pneumonia, meningococcus meningitis, para- 
typhoid fever, scarlet fever, tetanus, tuber- 
culosis, tularemia, typhoid fever, undulant 
fever, and whooping cough. 

4. PROTOZOA. The protozoa are a 
group of simple animals. Some of the common 
diseases of livestock, such as coccidiosis, are 
protozoan diseases. In the human body proto- 
zoa cause malaria, African sleeping sickness, 
amoebic dysentery, Chaga's disease, and dif- 
ferent types of Leishmania infections. 

5. FUNGI. The multicellular fungi 
are simple achlorophyllic plants that have no 
true stems, leaves, or roots. They range in 
size from microscopic yeasts to molds and 
mushrooms that can be seen with the naked 
eye. They are grown with relative ease in the 
absence of living cells. 

A number of human infections, such 
as actinomycosis, favus, so-called "'ringworm" 
(athelete's foot), and San Joaquin Valley fever, 
are caused by fungi, and so are some diseases 
of livestock. But as BW agents, fungi are 
more likely to be used against crop plants, 
because there are many fungi that cause 
devastating plant diseases. 

6. TOXINS. Toxins include a variety 
of substances that are produced by quite di- 
verse types of plants and animals, including 
some of the pathogens. Successful synthesis 
of potentially useful toxins might bring them to 
the forefront as possible weapons. Toxins can 
not reproduce themselves, hence their effect 
in attack is limited to the toxin that is actually 
delivered at the target. Representative toxins 
are tetanus toxin, botulinum toxin, diphtheria 
toxin, and staphylococcal toxin. Botulinum 
toxin is the most toxic substance known. 



2. RICKETTSIAE. The rickettsiae 
are larger than viruses and smaller than most 
bacteria. They will grow within or between 
living cells but rarely in media that contain 
body fluids. The larger rickettsiae may be 
seen with an ordinary light microscope. They 
cause such diseases as endemic typhus fever, 
epidemic typhus fever, rickettsialpox, scrub 
typhus, South African tick-bite fever, spotted 
fever, and Q-fever. 



2B2.03 CLASSIFICATION 

Biological warfare agents may be 
classified in several ways, for example, by 
type, object of attack, severity of effect pro- 
duced, persistency, virulence, communica- 
bility, and tactical use. Such classifications 
are, of course, relative, often overlap, and are 
subject to change. From the military point of 
view, the important classifications of biological 



549252 O-60-4 



2-17 



agents are virulence, communicability, and 
persistency. 

1. TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC EM- 
PLOYMENT. From the standpoint of tactical 
and strategic employment, pathogens may be 
described as (a) antipersonnel, (b) antianimal, 
or (c) anticrop. There is considerable over- 
lapping among these three categories. For 
example, an ideal BW agent would have equally 
adverse effects upon domestic animals and man. 

2. VIRULENCE. Another type of 
classification relates to the virulence of poten- 
tial BW agents. An agent may be lethal or 
merely debilitating. The problem of virulence 
is complex because the relative virulence of a 
given species of pathogen is subject to varia- 
tion, and the same organism may vary with 
environmental conditions, relative humidity, 
rainfall, and temperature. It is now possible 
to develop particularly virulent strains by 
taking advantage of natural or induced mutation 
and employing the techniques of genetic 
selection. 

3. COMMUNICABILITY. From the 
military standpoint, widespread transmission 
of a pathogen from person to person, which 
might result in an epidemic of disease, would 
be a bonus effect. The intended purpose of a 
BW agent, however, is not to produce such a 
bonus effect, but to directly infect the person- 
nel with whom it is brought in contact. 

Pathogens that can be transmitted 
readily by direct and/or indirect contact pre- 
sent definite advantages as agents. 

5. PERSISTENCY. The persistency 
of BW agents is also an important considera- 
tion in the selection of an agent. The persistent 
agents will remain effective for a long period 
of time and can be very much more resistant 
to the elements than even the most persistent 
chemical agents. 

2B2.04 DEFENSE 

The human body possesses a number 
of natural defenses against invasion by patho- 
gens. These, as a group, constitute the so- 
called resistance to disease. Defense against 
biological agents includes these natural de- 
fenses, together with early detection and iden- 
tification of BW agents, physical protection, 
pest control, sanitation, hygiene, quarantine, 
immunization, and treatment. A discussion of 
several of these defensive measures is con- 
tained in the following paragraphs. 

1. NATURAL DEFENSES. The aver- 
age individual, even when apparently in good 



health, has within his body a host of tiny organ- 
isms. But these do not, ordinarily, produce 
the clinical symptoms of a disease. To do that, 
pathogens must first gain entrance to human 
tissues, and they must then reproduce and be- 
come sufficiently numerous to constitute an 
active infection. Human beings are born with 
some immunities and are in the process of 
acquiring others throughout their lives. Some 
immunities result from having active cases of 
disease, and some result from subclinical 
invasions. Various immunities may be con- 
ferred by vaccination and inoculation. For a 
few germ diseases, however, little or no im- 
munity appears to have been developed. 

2. CHEMICAL DEFENSES. Another 
line of defense involves the employment of 
chemical substances such as (a) the antiseptics 
and disinfectants that prevent infections and 
(b) the drugs that inhibit or kill pathogens that 
have gained access to human tissues. The 
most effective use of drug defenses results 
when the invading pathogens are detected and 
identified promptly. This is the reason why 
provision for such detection and identification 
is so important in defense planning. 

3. PREVENTIVE INOCULATION. 
Preventive inoculation is strictly in the med- 
ical field and will be discussed only briefly 
here. If a suitable vaccine is available, pre- 
ventive inoculation will give a good measure of 
protection against infection by a biological 
agent. However, there are effective vaccines 
for only a few of the BW agents that might be 
used; and even when a vaccine is available, it 
takes time to develop resistance to the agent. 
Most available vaccines, although effective 
against ordinary exposure, may be relatively 
ineffective against extraordinarily high con- 
centrations, such as might be experienced in 
BW attacks. 

Although mass inoculation of the civil 
population would be a gigantic task even if it 
were limited to special areas of the country, it 
should prove very useful in preventing or re- 
ducing casualties. Mass immunization of the 
services, on the other hand, presents no great 
administrative difficulties. The technical and 
administrative problems in connection with 
inoculation are being studied. 

4. INTELLIGENCE. Even though de- 
tection devices may be operating, the initial 
warning may be given by sources of intelli- 
gence. In time of war, intelligence is obtained 
from special organizations such as the Naval 
Intelligence Service, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the State Department, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. In the field, infor- 
mation may be acquired from underground 






( 



2-18 









organizations, refugees, and the local popula- 
tion. Information may also be gleaned from 
captured enemy documents, such as orders, 
health records, memoranda, correspondence, 
and manuals, as well as from captured muni- 
tions, biological materials, defensive and 
offensive equipment, blood tests of prisoners 
of war, and aerial reconnaissance. These are 
but a few of the possible sources of informa- 
tion that may be used to determine the actual 
or contemplated enemy use of biological agents 
in time of war. 

5. PHYSICAL PROTECTION. The 
presence of pathogenic microorganisms on, or 
within, the body of an individual does notassure 
that infection is an inevitable result. Never- 
theless, it seems likely that the chances of 
possible infection would be greater in the 
presence of larger numbers of such organ- 
isms. It is desirable, therefore, to prevent all 
such disease-carrying organisms from coming 
into direct contact with the body. This can be 
accomplished by means of certain physical 
methods of protection such as protective 
masks, protective clothing, and group shelters. 
The ultimate goal of physical protection is the 
absolute exclusion of pathogens from the res- 
piratory passages and from the exposed body 
surfaces. 

2B2.05 CONTAMINATION 

After an attack in which BW agents 
were used, the pattern of contamination would 
depend to a considerable extent on (a) the type 
of agent or agents employed and (b) the manner 
of the employment. Vectors, for example, 



would be important for spreading contamina- 
tion by some agents but not by others. Spore 
formation by pathogens, with resulting persist- 
ency, would be predictable for some agents 
but not for others. Some living BW agents 
would not be expected to remain viable for any 
great length of time unless they penetrated the 
tissues of acceptable hosts, whereas others 
might persist outside of host tissues for a 
comparatively long time. The residual hazard 
to personnel would vary further because some 
pathogens are commonly conveyed by contact, 
others in food and drink, and still others 
through the agency of vectors. 

Covert attack that involves BW agents 
is a real possibility. To contaminate water 
supplies, for example, an agent or agents could 
be introduced into a reservoir or other source 
of supply. More probably they would be 
pumped into the water mains at some location 
that was available to the saboteur. The latter 
action would avoid the possibility that the BW 
agents might be detected and/or destroyed in 
the process of water purification. Sodium 
thiosulfate or some other chlorine- reducing 
substance might also be pumped into the mains 
to render existing chlorine residuals ineffec- 
tive, and thus assure the survival of the path- 
ogens. To even determine the necessity for 
decontamination, early detection and identifi- 
cation of agents must be made. The amount of 
effort and materials required for decontami- 
nation are so large that it will not usually be 
feasible to undertake extensive decontamina- 
tion without some clear-cut indication of 
the identity of the agent and the extent of 
contamination. 






2-19 



r 



( 



c 






Section 3. WAR GASES 



2B3.01 CLASSIFICATION 

The war gases are one group of chem- 
ical agents that are available for use in modern 
warfare. Other groups include the chemical 
smokes and the incendiaries. Chemical agents 
are classified according to their (a) physical 
state, (b) tactical uses, and (c) physiological 
actions. 

1. PHYSICAL STATES. Under ordi- 
nary conditions of temperature and pressure, 
various so-called war gases can exist in the 
gasious, liquid, or solid state. In the past it 
was also customary to classify agents in terms 
of their persistency. This classification has 
been discarded because persistency varies 
over a wide range, depending on temperature 
and moisture (Table 2-2). 

From the standpoint of decontami- 
nation, it is obvious that only the more per- 
sistent agents will be of any concern. 

2. TACTICAL USES. From the tac- 
tical standpoint, war gases are classified as 
casualty gases and harassing gases. As the 
name indicates, casualty gases are those that 
are capable of producing death or serious 
incapacitation of personnel. Harassing gases 
produce only temporary, and sometimes par- 
tial, incapacity. The harassing gases and 
casualty gases maybe used in combination. A 
tacticaluse may include aharassing gas of the 
vomiting type to induce personnel to remove 
their masks, and a casualty gas to inflict the 
serious damage. 

3. PHYSIOLOGICAL ACTIONS. With 
respect to physiological actions, war gases 
include types that are classified as (a) choking 
gases, (b) blister gases, (c) blood gases, (d) 
nerve gases, (e) vomiting gases, and (f) tear 
gases. 

2B3.02 EMPLOYMENT 

War gases may be employed to (a) 
cause casualties, (b) deny the use of an area, 
and (c) harass an enemy. The element of sur- 
prise is an important factor in the use of war 
gases as a means of causing casualties, be- 
cause the prompt employment of protective 
devices would nullify their effects. Usually, 
war gases that are designed to cause casual- 
ties have a high rate of toxicity and very 
limited persistency. The objective would be 
to develop a high concentration of the gas as 
rapidly as possible and within a limited target 



area. If gas were employed by an enemy to 
deny the use of an area, a persistent agent 
would be used. Terrain, however, can not be 
denied to a determined enemy by depending 
solely on persistent agents. Even though 
troops are not protected, they can be ordered 
to secure the area and then replaced after the 
decontamination of essential positions. This 
would be done with the knowledge that there 
would be a large number of casualties. 

Table 2-2 lists a number of war gases 
that are currently considered to be of major 
interest, along with their physical state, 

actions, and persistency. 

Table 2-2 indicates the characteristic 
odor of each gas, but odor should not be relied 
upon as a means of detection during or follow- 
ing an attack, 

2B3.03 WAR GASES OF 

PRIMARY IMPORTANCE 

Currently, only two classes of war 
gases are considered in disaster control plan- 
ning. They are (a) the group of vesicants, 
principally distilled mustard HD, and (b) the 
nerve gases GA, GB, and V. The character- 
istics of gas V are classified and are not 
included in Table 2-2. 

1. BLISTER AGENTS. AH of the 
blister agents are persistent, and all may be 
employed as casualty agents in the form of 
colorless gases and liquids. 

Blister agents include the mustards 
{HD, HN-1, HN-2, and HN-3) Lewisite (L), 
mustard-Lewisite mixture (HL), and a group 
of dichloroar sines (ED, MD, and PD). 

Distilled mustard gas or liquid pro- 
duces no immediate symptoms among person- 
nel. Usually, the symptoms appear 4 to 6 
hours later, whereupon the eyes begin to 
smart, the skin may become red and blistered, 
and the victim may cough and vomit. The rate 
of detoxification is very low, which means that 
even small, repeated doses are cumulative in 
their effects. Gas HD acts first as a cell irri- 
tant and than as a cell poison. Common effects 
are inflammation of the eyes; reddening, blis- 
tering, or ulceration of the skin; and inflam- 
mation of the nasal passages, throat, trachea, 
bronchi, and lung tissues. The agent gains 
entrance through inhalation, skin absorption, 
and contact with the eyes. 



2-21 



TABLE 2-2 
Characteristics of War Gases 






Name and symbol 


Odor 


Tactical and 
physiological 
classifications 


State at 68 °F and 

atmospheric 

pressure 


Effect on body 


Persistency 


Distilled mustard (HD)1.4 


Like garlic or 
horseradish 


Casualty gas 
Blister gas 


Colorless to pale 
yellow liquid 


Injures eyes and lungs; blisters 
skin 


Summer; 3 or 4 days in 
open; 1 week in woods 
"Winter: several weeks 


Mustard <H)1 


Like garlic or 
horseradish 


Casualty gas 
Blister gas 


Dark liquid 


Injures eyes and lungs; blisters 
skin 


Summer: 3 or 4 days in 

open; 1 week in woods 
Winter: several weeks 


Nitrogen mustard (HN-l)l 


Odorless to 
faint fishy 


Casualty gas 
Blister gas 


Dark liquid 


Injures eyes and lungs; blisters 
skin 


Summer: 3 or 4 days in 
open; 1 week in woods 
Winter: several weeks 


Mustard T-mixture (HT)3 


Like garlic or 
horseradish 


Casualty gas 
Blister gas 


Clear to pale 
yellow liquid 


Injures eyes and lungs; blisters 
skin 


Summer: More persist- 
ent than HD or H 

Winter: More persistent 
than HD or H 


Lewisite (L)l 


Irritating, 
unpleasant; 
faintly like 
geraniums 


Casualty gas 
Blister gas 


Dark, oily liquid 


Injures eyes, blisters skin 


Summer: 1 day in open; 

2 or 3 days in woods 
Winter: 1 week or 

longer 


GAl 


Faintly 

fruity, 

sweetish 


Casualty gas 
(fast acting) 
Nerve gas 


Colorless to Causes blurred vision with pin- 
brown liquid pointing of pupils, muscle and 
eye spasms, difficult breathing, 
tight chest, salivation, mental 
confusion, convulsions 


Summer: 10 minutes to 

24 hours 
Winter: 10 minutes to 

24 hours 


GBl.4 


Odor scarcely 
detectable; 
none when 
pure 


Casualty gas 
(fast acting) 
Nerve gas 


Colorless liquid 


Causes blurred vision with pin- 
pointing of pupils, muscle and 
eye spasms, difficult breathing, 
tight chest, salivation, mental 
confusion, convulsions 


Summer; 10 minutes to 

1 2 hours 
Winter: 10 minutes to 

12 hours 
Longer in shell holes 


Hydrocanic acid 
(hydrogen cyanide) 2 


Like bitter 
almonds 


Casualty gas. 
(fast acting) 
Blood gas 


Colorless liquid 


Causes dizziness, convulsions, 
paralysis, coma, collapse 


Summer: 1 to 10 min- 
utes 
Winter: several hours 


Cyanogen chloride ( CK) 


Somewhat like 
AC, but irri- 
tating 


Casualty gas 
(fast acting) 
Blood gas 


Colorless gas 


Injures lungs; causes convul- 
sions, paralysis, respiratory 
arrest 


5 to 10 minutes 


Phosgene (CG) 2 


Like new 
mown hay or 
ensilage 


Casualty gas 
(delayed 
action) 

Choking gas 


Colorless gas 


Injures lungs, causing accu- 
mulation of fluid 


Summer: 5 minutes in 

open; 10 minutes in 

woods 
Winter: 10 minutes in 

open; 20 minutes in 

woods 



Requires protective clothing and mask. ^Requires protective mask. 
pressure, ^Presently a U, S. standard agent. 



^Decomposes below boiling point at normal atmospheric 



r. 



i 









The nitrogen mustards are also 
delayed-action casualty gases. Detoxification 
does not occur — hence effects are cumulative. 
These effects are similar to those produced by- 
distilled mustard, but very low concentrations 
of HN-1 and HN-2 produce eye irritation. 
Injury to the respiratory tract may be followed 
by fever, labored breathing, and bronchopneu- 
monia. The nitrogen mustards may also pro- 
duce lesions in the intestines, which are 
associated with severe diarrhea and hemor- 
rhage. These agents gain entrance to the body 
through inhalation and skin absorption. 

Lewisite (L) is an arsenical gas that 
has only moderately delayed action. The body 
does not detoxify, but detoxification can be in- 
duced through intramuscular injection of BAL 
in oil. Lewisite produces severe eye damage 
and blistering of the skin. It is also a toxic lung 
irritant and a systemic poison, and when it is 
inhaled in quantity, it may produce fatality 
within 10 minutes. Entrance to the body is 
made in the manner used by the preceding 
blister agents, and countermeasures include 
masking and the wearing of protective clothing. 

2. NERVE AGENTS. The nerve gases 
may be used in colorless, gaseous form, or as 
colorless or brown liquids. In general, they 
are moderately persistent agents (Table 2-2). 
They are relatively difficult to detect promptly. 
Nevertheless, early detection is vital because 
the nerve gases are quick casualty producers, 
and for this reason, they will prove to be the 
most effective of all CW agents. 

The primary physiological effect of 
the nerve gases that belong to the G-agent 
series (GA and GB) is upon the nervous sys- 
tem, followed by impairment or failure of body 
functions. Early symptoms of exposure to 
nerve gases include contraction of the pupils 
of the eyes and accompanying impairment of 
vision, followed by chest pains, headache, 
twitchings, rapid breathing, and stomach 
cramps. Lethal exposure terminates with con- 
vulsions, paralysis, and death. Because of 
their potentially great importance, the early 
effects of nerve gases are diagrammed in Fig- 
ure 2-11, and their effects are compared in 
Table 2-3. The G-agents may be inhaled, 
ingested, or absorbed through the skin. 

There are some newer type agents that 
are relatively nonvolatile nerve gases. These 
agents are inherently about twice as toxic as 
the older nerve agents via the inhalation route. 
Percutaneously, the newer agents are several 
hundred times more toxic than the older ones. 

Developments are currently underway 
to improve the present methods of dissemina- 
tion to further increase the effectiveness of 
these newer agents. 



oizziness 



HEADACHE 



PUPILS SHRINK 
TO A PINPOINT SIZE 



RUHNINfi NOSE 



QHTNESS OF CHEST 




Figure 2-11. Early Symptoms of Exposure to 
Nerve Gases 

2B3.04 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION 

Only the more persistent agents will 
require decontamination. It will usually be 
preferable to wait and allow the less persistent 
agents to vaporize. If persistent agents have 
been employed on a large scale, the resulting 
contamination will affect clothing, personnel, 
equipment, supplies, and all objects except 
those in gasproofed shelters that have main- 
tained their structural integrity during attack. 
An ordinary, closed building gives (a) some 
protection against liquid sprays and (b) some- 
what less protection against agents in gaseous 
form, as long as it remains closed. Personnel, 
however, should not stay unprotected (without 
masks or collective protectors) in an unsealed 
building, because as long as an agent cloud 
surrounds the structure, the agent in vapor or 
aerosol form will leak in. As soon as the con- 
centration outside is reduced by natural phe- 
nomenon below that inside, the building should 
be vacated or thoroughly ventilated. 

Terrain, structures, clothing, equip- 
ment, supplies, and any other substances that 
have been contaminated by persistent agents 






2-23 



TABLE 2-3 
Effects of Nerve Gases 



o 



Name 
and 

Symbol 


Mode 

of 

entrance 


Detoxifi- 
cation 


Rate 

of 
action 


Basic 
physiological 

effects 


Persistency 


Tabun (GA) 


By inhalation, 
through skin 
and eyes 


Slight, but 
definite 


Death within 
15 minutes 
after lethal 
dose 


Upon nervous 
system, 
causing 

vasoparesis 


Moderately 
persistent 


Sarin (GB) 


By inhalation, 
through skin 
and eyes 


Low, essen- 
tially 
cumulative 


Death within 
15 minutes 
after lethal 
dose 


Upon nervous 
system, 
causing 
vasoparesis 


Moderately 
persistent 


Soman {GD) 


By inhalation, 
through skin 
and eyes 


Low, essen- 
tially 
cumulative 


Death within 
15 minutes 
after lethal 
dose 


Same effect, 
but lethal in 
lower con- 
centrations 


Less persist- 
ent than 
Tabun and 
Sarin 



remain a hazard to unprotected personnel as 
long as the contamination lasts. The blister 
agents, for example, penetrate the surfaces of 
fabrics, leather, rubber, paint, plastics, and 
wood, and it is sometimes more practicable 
to dispose of the affected materials than to 
attempt their decontamination. 

Many of the chemical agents combine 
with water to form acids that have a corrosive 



effectupon metals, leather, fabrics, and paints. 
This corrosive action is most evident when the 
agent has been used in liquid form, but some 
equipment is likely to be destroyed even though 
the agent is employed as a gas. 

Ae long as the contaminating agents 

persist within an area or building in significant 
amounts, they are a hazard to personnel and 
prevent the effective use of equipment. 



( 



2-24 



L> 






Section 4. SMOKES AND INCENDIARIES 



2B4.01 SCREENING SMOKES 

The physical characteristics of a 
number of screening smokes are shown in 
Table 2-4. When generated, such smokes con- 
sist of liquid or solid particles in air, which 
reflect and absorb light and usually limit 
vision. They may be used to conceal defense 
positions and the movements of attacking 
troops. The use of a smoke generator to pro- 
duce screening smoke is shown in Figure 2-12. 

Primarily, screening smokes are not 
intended to produce casualties; heavy concen- 
trations of some of them, however, may cause 
irritation of the eyes, nose, throat, and lungs 
unless personnel are masked. The possibility 
that screening smokes are being used to hide 
the presence of casualty-producing war gases 
should always be considered. 

2B4.02 INCENDIARIES 

Incendiary materials include ther- 
mite, thermite magnesium, white phosphorus 
(which also produces a smoke), and a number 



of incendiary oils. These materials are used 
in a variety of ways, often for the purpose of 
setting fires that will damage or destroy ma- 
terial, equipment, and structures, but also to 
cause casualties, incite panic, and induce de- 
moralization. The general nature of the incen- 
diary substances is shown in Table 2-5. 
Figure 2-13 shows napalm-filled bombs being 
used to spread fire and destruction in a modern 
city. 



Tactical or strategic use of incendiary 
bombs often depends upon starting a number 
of fires that will merge in time to produce a 
widespread conflagration. Compared with 
thermite-magnesium combinations, thickened 
fuel has a lower burning temperature and a 
shorter burning time, which are sufficient 
to ignite readily combustible materials and 
structures, but are not adequate to ignite heavy 
and medium construction or large equipment. 




Figure 2-12. Smoke Generator 



2-25 



TABLE 2-4 



Properties of Screening Smokes 



Screening 

smoke and 

symbol 


State at 20°C 
(72°F) 


Rate of 
hydrolysis 


Odor 


Toxicity 


Physiological 
action 


Protection 
required 


Stability 


Decontamination 


Munitions 

suitable for 

use 


Means of 
detection 


Titanium 

tetrachloride 

(TiGl 4 FM) 


Heavy, colorless 
liquid 


Hydrolyaes 
instantly 


Acrid 


Smoke not 
toxic 


Liquid corrosive 
to skin; smoke 
causes mild 
burning sensa- 
tion 


None for ordinary 
concentrations ; 
protective mask 
for dense smoke; 
rubber gloves for 
liquid 


Stable in 

absence 

of moisture 


Alkaline solid 
or solution 


Artillery shell, 
mortar shell, 
spray tanks, 
bombs, special 
munitions 


Mil 
smoke 
detector 
kit 


Sulfur 
trioxide- 
chlorosulfonic 
acid Bolution 
(FS) 


Liquid 


Hydrolyzes 
in s tantly 


Acrid 


Smoke not 
toxic 


Similar tD FM, 
but more 
corrosive 


Same as FM 


Stable in 
absence of 
moisture 


Alkaline solid 
or solution 


Same as above 


Same as 
above 


HC mixture 
IHC) 


Solid 


ZaCl 2 
hydra, ten 
very 
rapidly 


Slightly 
acrid 


Not toxic 
except in 
high con- 
centration 


Inhalation of 
dense smoke 
may produce 
symptoms of 
zinc poisoning 


None for ordinary 
c one ent rations ; 
protective masks 
for dense smoke 


Adequate; 
may de- 
compose 
if wet 


None required 


Grenades, 
candles, pots, 
air bombs, 
artillery shell 


Same as 
above 


White 
phosphorus 
(F 4 ,WP, or 
PWP) 


WP, pale 
yellow, 'waxy 
solid PWP, 
finely divided 
WP in gel of 
rubber and 
xylene 


None, 
oxidizes 


Similar 

to 

matches 


Smoke not 
toxic 


Burning WP or 
PWP causes 
slow -healing 
burns; vapors 
(not smoke) 
very poisonous^ 
causes bone 
decay 


None for ordinary 
concentrations; 
flame proof 
clothing for burn- 
ing particles 


Stable in 
absence of 
air 


Water or 
CuSO.^ solution 
stops burning 


Grenades, 
artillery or 
mortar shells, 
bombs 


Same as 
above 


Fog Oil Liquid 


.None 


Similar 
to kero- 
sene 


Nontoxic 


None 


None 


Stable 


None required 


Generators, 

grenades, 

pots 


None 
required 



N 

&• 



c 













Figure 2-13- Fires Produced by Napalm-Filled Incendiary Bombs 






2-27 



TABLE 2-5 
Composition and Symbols of U. S. Incendiary Agents 



o 



Name and symbol 


Use 


Composition 


Incendiary mixture (PT 1) 


Bombs 


Petroleum oil, magnesium 
waste, and isobutyl 
methacrylate polymer 
as a thickener 


Incendiary oil (IM) 


Bombs 


Isobutyl methacrylate 
and gasoline 


Incendiary oil (NP) 


Bombs 

Flame throwers 


Gasoline and (napalm) 
thickener Ml 


Incendiary oil (OT) 


Bombs 

Flame throwers 


Gasoline and (octal) 
thickener M3 


Incendiary oil (NP 2) 


Bombs 


Gasoline and (antiagglom- 
e rated napalm) 
thickener M2 


Thermite (TH 1) 


Bombs 
Grenades 


Thermite 


Thermate (TH2 and TH3) 


Bombs 
Grenades 


Thermate 



o 



2-28 



o 






CHAPTER 3. CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE FROM ABC ATTACK 
PART A. CASUALTIES 

Section I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS 



3A1.01 RESULTS OF BLAST 

1. PRIMARY EFFECTS ON PERSON- 
NEL. In general, a nuclear blast causes un- 
protected personnel in the area to suffer a 
state of shock and injuries that include bruises, 
cuts, fractures, and concussions. The trans- 
lational forces of the blast will throw personnel 
against walls and other objects, thereby caus- 
ing many injuries. An individual who is hurled 
at a velocity of 12 ft per second will receive 
injuries in 50 percent of the instances when 
solid impact occurs. At a velocity of 17 ft per 
second, the individual will be killed in 50 per- 
cent of the instances when solid impact occurs. 

Primary blast injuries are those that 

result from shock wave effects upon the human 
body. Primary blast alone is not likely to be 
a major factor in the production of casualties, 
because of the unusual resistance of the human 
body. 

A blast pressure of about 100 psi is 
required to cause severe injury to the human 
body. At that pressure other effects would al- 
most surely be more damaging to personnel 
unless they were in shelters that provided 
good shielding from the radiation effects. 

The anticipated effects of blast pres- 
sures upon the human body include injuries to 
the eardrums, lungs, stomach, and intestines, 
any one of which might be accompanied by an 
internal hemorrhage. An overpressure of 2 to 
5 psi has been known to rupture eardrums; 
15 to 25 psi, however, is considered the critical 
range for eardrums. 

2. SECONDARY EFFECTS ON PER- 
SONNEL. Many casualties may be expected 
as the result of secondary, or indirect, blast 
effects. These effects are related to struc- 
tural damage, because casualties are often 
caused by the collapse of structures and by 
the missile effects of fragments that are hurled 
about. In fact, missile effects are likely to be 
a principal factor in the production of casual- 
ties, both indoors and outdoors. Appendix E, 
Table E-2» includes data on missile density and 



velocity. Windows, for example, are likely to 
be broken under overpressures of 0.5 to 1.0 
psi, and a pressure range of 2 to 5 psi will 
produce stilettoes of glass that are capable of 
penetrating the abdominal wall. 

Blast effects cause extensive sec- 
ondary fires, thereby creating additional cas- 
ualties. 

Airbursts from nuclear bombs that 
are detonated at optimum altitudes can there- 
fore be expected to produce secondary blast 
casualties at the following ranges from ground 
zero. 





Miles from 


Bomb yield 


ground zero 


20 kiloton 


2.0 


50 kiloton 


2.7 


100 kiloton 


3.4 


160 kiloton 


4.0 


1 megaton 


7.4 


5 megaton 


12.6 


10 megaton 


15.9 


20 megaton 


20.0 



3A1. 



02 CASUALTIES FROM THERMAL 
RADIATION 

1. INJURIES TO EYES. 



The intense flash of light that ac- 
companies a nuclear burst may produce flash 
blindness, even at a range of several miles. 
The condition amounts to only temporary in- 
capacity, because the eye will overcome flash 
blindness in about 15 minutes in the daytime 
and in about 45 minutes at night. Special 
glasses have been developed for the use of 
pilots who are involved in the delivery of nu- 
clear weapons. 

The more serious damage to the eyes 
are retinal burns that are permanent in nature. 
About 3 cal/sq cm of thermal energy on the 
retina will produce severe burn; this effect 
when produced by large -yield weapons will be 
evident for as far as 42 miles. 



3-1 






2. BODY BURNS. Direct burns to 
the body will undoubtedly result in a large 
number of casualties. Not only is the level of 
thermal energy important in the production of 
burns but thelengthof time of exposure is im- 
portant also. For example, a total energy of 
5 cal/sq cm will be received from a kiloton 
weapon in a much shorter period of time than 
the same total energy from a megaton weapon, 
thus causing more severe burns. Figure 3-1 
indicates the distances from ground zero 
versus weapon yield where first-, second-, 
and third- degree burns may be expected to 
unprotected personnel. 

Burns may alsobe classified accord- 
ing to the manner in which they are sustained. 
Thus, primary burns (also called flash burns) 
are the results of direct thermal radiation 
from a bomb explosion, whereas secondary 
burns are produced by fires that follow in the 
wake of an explosion. 

Light- colored, loose-fitting clothing 
provides a highly desirable protection against 
primary burns at moderate and long range, 
and so does any kind of structural shielding. 
But if the shielding is not substantial, casual- 
ties will occur as a result of blast effects that 
cause structural collapse. 

If 10 0-percent- clear atmosphere were 
possible, thermal radiation would travel in 
straight lines, and only surfaces that faced the 
burst would receive primary burns directly. 
For all practical purposes, the atmosphere is 
never perfectly clear. As a result, some re- 
fracted radiation will reach all surfaces. 
Reflected thermal radiation, however, usually 
produces less severe burns than those that 
result from direct exposure. Therefore, a 
part of a body that is shielded by a tree or any 
other solid object might escape burn injuries, 
while an exposed part of the same body might 
be damaged. 

3. SECONDARY FIRES. Fires may 
start as the result of a nuclear detonation, thus 
causing many casualties that are due to sec- 
ondary burns. These fires may spread rapidly 
and develop afire storm. If so, casualties are 
likely to be high in the affected area, because 
the avenues of escape are limited. At Hiro- 
shima and Nagasaki, burns accounted for about 
one half of the fatalities and three fourths of 
the injuries. 

Because secondary burns are incident 
to fires, the range at "which they may occur 
usually coincides with the range at which fires 
are started and structures suffer at least 



moderate damage. In addition, there is the 
possibility of a fire spreading to areas where 
structural damage from the explosion has not 
occurred. 

The scaling rule for direct thermal 
radiation is discussed in paragraph ZB1.03and 
illustrated in Figure 2-2. 

3A1.03 CASUALTIES FROM NUCLEAR 
RADIATION 

1. TYPES AND EFFECTS OF DOSES. 
From a disaster control standpoint, the most 
important nuclear radiation is gamma radia- 
tion. Beta particles and neutrons are likely to 
be much less important. Neutrons, however, 
can be very important near ground zero for 
low-yield weapons. An individual may suffer 
(a) an acute exposure, which means that he 
receives a dose within a short interval of time 
(arbitrarily set at 24 hours) or (b) a chronic 
exposure, which means that he receives a dose 
that is accumulated over a longer interval. 
With regard to chronic exposures, the keyfact 
is that doses of nuclear radiation and their 
effects are cumulative even though there is a 
degree of recovery in time. 

Either type of dose, when of sufficient 
magnitude, produces radiation sickness, with 
effects that range from relatively mild and 
temporary manifestations to fatality. 

2. SOURCES OF NUCLEAR RADIA- 
TION. Doses of nuclear radiation may be re- 
ceived (a) in the form of initial radiation at 
the time of a burst and/ or (b) through exposure 
to residual radiation or radioactive contami- 
nation after a burst. The source of nuclear 
radiation is of concern to the disaster control 
officer, because the dose of initial radiation 
received must be subtracted from the total 
dose that he estimates he can allow his organ- 
ization to receive. All planning and operations 
that follow an attack must be designed to keep 
exposure of personnel to a minimum that is 
consistent with the demands at the time. If 
this is not done, casualties will result, per- 
sonnel will be lost to the recovery effort, and 
an added burden will be placed on medical 
facilities. 

Table 3-1 illustrates the effects upon 
personnel of doses that are received over 
relatively extended periods of time. Note that 
a dose of 45 r received in the course of one 
day produces a probable mortality rate of 50 
percent; but if the dose is accumulated over a 
period of a week, the anticipated mortality 
rate drops to 15 percent. 









3-2 









1,000,000 



£ 100,000 



111 

N 

1 
I 

u. 
iu 
U 

■z. 

< 



10,000 



1,000 




10 



100 
WEAPON YIELD (KT) 



1,000 



10,000 



Figure 3-1. Skin Burns as a Function of Weapon Yield and Distance from an Airburst 



TABLE 3-1 
Effects of Various Doses of Nuclear Radiation Received Over Varying Periods of Time 



Dose 
(r) 






Time 






Late effects 


1 dav 


3 days 


1 week 


1 month 


3 months 


to 75 


0% sick 










None 










100 


2% sick 


0% sick 








None 








125 


15% sick 


2% sick 


0% sick 


None 


150 


25% sick 


10% sick 


2% sick 




None 


200 


50% sick 


25% sick 


1 5% sick 


2% sick 


0% sick 


Some late effects 


300 


100% sick 
20% die 


60% sick 
5% die 


40% sick 


15% sick 


0% sick 


Some late effects 


450 


100% sick 
50% die 


100% sick 
2 5% die 


90% sick 
1 5% die 


50% sick 


5% sick 


Some late effects 


650 


100% sick 
95% die 


100% sick 
90% die 


100% sick 
40% die 


80% sick 
10% die 


10% sick 


Some late effects 



r 



3. INTERNAL RADIATION. Internal 
radiation damage occurs when radioactive 
particles such as plutonium, strontium 90, 
iodine 131, or other fission products enter the 
body. Entry may be by way of the mouth, the 
respiratory passages, or wounds. The radio- 
active substances become deposited in various 
tissues, where they continue to emit radiations 
that continue, in some instances, over long 



periods of time. Plutonium and strontium are 
particularly pernicious, because they tend to 
become concentrated in the bones. The symp- 
toms of radiation sickness from internal 
sources may not be apparent for months or 
even years. For this reason, internal radia- 
tion will not have any direct effect on the re- 
covery effort, but ultimately the injurious 
effects may be expected to manifest themselves. 






3-4 



U 






Section 2. BW AND CW AGENTS 






3A2.01 NATURE OF BW EFFECTS 

Because the effects that are produced 
by different potential BW agents vary consid- 
erably, the enemy has a wide choice of agents 
to produce the desired results, which may 
vary from the creation of widespread incapac- 
ity to the production of fatalities. The BW 
agent that is chosen is not necessarily the one 
that will produce the greatest number of fatal- 
ities. It may be the agent that will present the 
greatest element of surprise and against which 
the opponent's defenses are incomplete or 
nonexistent. A few possibilities are suggested 
here to illustrate this point. 

1. ANTHRAX. Anthrax is normally a 
disease of stock animals, but it can be con- 
tracted by workers who handle infected meat 
and hides. Human susceptibility, however, 
appears to be quite general. There are three 
types of the disease in man: (a) a cutaneous 
(skin) form that has an untreated mortality 
rate of about 25 percent, (b) a pulmonary (lung) 
form, and (c) an intestinal form. Types (b) and 
(c) have an untreated mortality rate of about 
100 percent. Immunization and drug defenses 
do not presently afford a full measure of pro- 
tection. 



2. COCCIDIOIDOMYCOSIS. Coccidi- 
oidomycosis, which is also known as valley 
fever and San Joaquin fever, is a subtle dis- 
ease, and passes unrecognized so often that 
mortality rates are unknown. Sometimes it 
produces infection of the lungs with symptoms 
that are similar to those of influenza, and 
sometimes it becomes a rapidly fatal systemic 
infection. 



rate of 100 percent, while the mortality rate 
in the chronic form is about 50 percent. Ef- 
fective immunization and drug treatment have 
not been developed. 

5. TULAREMIA. Tularemia is a dis- 
ease that does not have a very high untreated 
mortality rate, but it is an effective producer 
of incapacitation. A variety of wild animals 
will act as reservoirs for the infection. Sus- 
ceptibility appears to be general, although an 
attack of the disease confers immunity. Drug 
defenses are reasonably effective against 
tularemia, and without their use, this disease 
is likely to produce a long period of disability. 

6. OTHER DISEASES. Other diseases 
that have relatively high untreated mortality 
rates are cholera (50 percent), bubonic plague 
(30 to 60 percent), pneumonic plague (90 to 
100 percent), Rocky Mountain spotted fever 
(20 to 60 percent), scrub typhus (up to 50 per- 
cent), and typhus (10 to 80 percent). Con- 
versely, infectious hepatitis has an untreated 
mortality rate of less than 0.5 percent, and 
Q-fever a rate of to 4 percent. Agents like 
the last two would be relied upon mainly to 
produce incapacitation of personnel. 



It should be emphasized that the rates 
cited here are untreated mortality rates. Even 
for diseases against which defenses are less 
than satisfactory, it is highly probable that the 
mortality rates would be substantially lower 
under treatment. During a successful BW 
attack, however, sufficient medical personnel, 
drugs, and facilities might not be available for 
adequate treatment. 



3. ENCEPHALITIS. Several types of 
encephalitis are produced by a group of vi- 
ruses, and each type is characteristic of a 
particular area of the earth's surface. Vec- 
tors would normally be essential to the trans- 
mission of encephalitis and already exist in 
some areas. It is possible, of course, to 
transmit this disease in a BW attack in aero- 
sols without the use of vectors. The exact 
mortality figures are not known but are be- 
lieved to be as high as 60 percent in one type 
and as low as 5 percent in another, 

4. GLANDERS. Glanders is another 
animal disease that is communicable to man 
in either acute or chronic form. The chronic 
form can be dealt with by surgical means. 
The acute form has an untreated mortality 



3A2.02 CASUALTIES FROM WAR GASES 

1. CASUALTY RATES. Casualty 
rates from the effects of war gases depend on 
the dose received. This dose, in turn, is rep- 
resented by the concentration of the agent 
multiplied by the length of the exposure; it is 
expressed as Ct, where C is concentration in 
mg/m J and t is time in minutes. Median 
lethal and median incapacitating doses are 
shown in Table 3-2. It is evident that a given 
dose may result from exposure to a high con- 
centration of an agent for a brief interval, or 
to a moderate concentration of the same agent 
for a longer interval. The lethal dose is ex- 
pressed in terms of LCt, and it is sometimes 
given in terms of the concentration that will 
cause death after a one-minute exposure, in 
which event it has the numerical value of one. 



J492M O-60-5 



3-5 



2. MODIFYING FACTORS. Anuraber during exposure. Still another variable is 

of variables are likely to modify casualty ex- the extent to which certain gases that can 

pectations. One of them is the physical condi- be absorbed through the skin are actually per- 

tion of the individual. Another is the amount mitted to come in contact with the skin or 

of physical exertion undergone at the time of remain upon the skin. A further factor is the 

exposure. Such physical exertion increases extent to which the breath has been "held" 

the breathing rate and therefore the amount of during a short exposure before masking could 

gas that is taken into the respiratory passages be effected. 



( 



3-6 



u 












TABLE 3-Z 
Median Lethal and Median Incapacitating Dosages for Selected War Gases 



Name and symbol 


Median lethal dosage 
(mg-min/m3) 


Median incapacitat- 
ing dosage 
(mg-min/m.3) 


Eye and skin toxicity 


Rate of action 


Tabun (GA) 


400 for resting men 


300 for resting men 


Very high 


Very rapid 


Sarin (GB) 


100 for resting men 


75 for resting men 


Very high 


Very rapid 


Soman (GD) 


GB, GA range 


GB, GA range 


Very high 


Very rapid 


Distilled mustard (HD) 


600 to 1,000 by inhalation; 
10,000 by skin exposure 


200 by eye effect; 
2,000 by skin effect 


Eyes very susceptible; 
skin less so 


Delayed hours to days 


Nitrogen mustard (HN-1) 


1,5 00 by inhalation; 

2 0,000 by skin exposure 


200 by eye effect; 
9,000 by skin effect 


Eyes very susceptible; 
skin less so 


Delayed hours to days 


Nitrogen mustard (HN-2) 


3,000 by inhalation 


Le s s than HN - 1 , but 
more than HN-3 


More rapidly toxic to 
eyes than HD, less 

vesicant 


Delayed hours to days 


Nitrogen mustard (HN-3) 


1,5 00 by inhalation; 
10,000 by skin exposure 
(estimated) 


200 by eye effect; 
2,500 by skin effect 
(estimated) 


Eyes very susceptible; 
skin less so 


Serious effects same 
as for HD; minor 
symptoms sooner 


Mustard (H) 


600 to 1,000 by inhalation; 
10,000 by skin exposure 


200 by eye effect; 
2,000 by skin effects 


Eyes very susceptible; 
skin less so 


Delayed hours to days 


Lewisite 


1,200 to 1,500 by inhalation; 
100,000 by skin exposure 


300 by eye effect; 
1,500 by skin effect 


Eyes very susceptible; 
skin less so 


Immediate irritation; 
delayed blistering 


Phosgene (CG) 


3,200 


1,600 


None 


Immediate to 3 hours 


Cyanogen Chloride (CK) 


11,000 


7,000 


Low, irritating to 
eyes and mucous 
membrane 


Rapid 


Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) 


Approximately 2,600 


Approximately 2,600 


Moderate 


Very rapid; fatal 
within a few minutes 






PART B. DAMAGE TO PHYSICAL PROPERTY 

Section 1. STRUCTURES 






3B1.01 STRUCTURAL DAMAGE 

1. BLAST EFFECTS. The general 
effects of blast have been discussed in para- 
graph ZB1. 02. Paragraph E15 of Appendix E 
defines four classes of damage that is appli- 
cable to most structures that are found at 
naval activities, and Table 3-3 shows a range 
of overpressures for damage to various types 
of structures. These ranges are not precise, 
but they will serve for most planning purposes. 

2. DAMAGE TABLES. In Appendix E, 
Table E- 5 shows shatter pressures for various 
types of glass, including safety glass and wired 
glass, and for different thicknesses of acrylic 
plastic. 

Figure E-16 represents damage- 
distance relationship as a function of weapon 
energy yield for diffraction-type structures 
and provides a conversion formula for com- 
putations when yields are in excess of 20 mt. 

Figures E-17 and E-20 are nomo- 
grams and bar charts that (a) show damage to 



be expected at various ranges for drag- 
sensitive targets and (b) provide a scaling 
formula for computing results when weapons 
of other energy yields are employed. 

3B1.02 EFFECTS OF FIRES 

1. FIRE STORMS. The incidence of 
fire storms is dependent on the conditions that 
exist at the time of the attack, including 
weather, wind, types of structures, building 
density, and other material in the area. 

2. TYPES OF STRUCTURES. Many 

reasonably blast-resistant buildings have 
wooden partitions and floors and contain flam- 
mable materials. When these materials burn, 
the result is like that shown in Figure 3-2. 
The walls may still be intact, but the building 
is little more than a shell, and its contents 
are destroyed. When a building of steel-frame 
construction burns, the steel members may 
be weakened by heat from the burning of flam- 
mable stores, and the building may collapse 
or be rendered unsafe for further occupancy. 



TABLE 3-3 
Conditions of Failure for Sensitive Structural Elements 



Structural element 


Failure 


Incident blast overpressure 
(psi) 


Glass panes, large and small 

Corrugated asbestos siding 

Corrugated steel or alumi- 
num paneling 

Brick wall panel, 8 in. or 
12 in. thick (unreinforced) 

Wood siding panels, standard 
house construction 

Concrete or cinder block 
wall panels, 8 in, or 12 in. 
thick (unreinforced) 


Shattering, occasional frame failure 

Shattering 

Connection failure followed by 
buckling 

Shearing and flexure failure 

Usually, failure occurs at the main 
connections, allowing a whole panel 
to blow in 

Shattering of the wall 


0.5 to 1.0 
1.0 to 2.0 
1.0 to 2.0 

7.0 to 8.0 

1.0 to 2.0 

2.0 to 3.0 



3-9 













Figure 3-2. Interior of a Reinforced Concrete Building after a Nuclear Airburst 



3. BUILDING DENSITY. Figure 3-3 
indicates the probability of firespread as a 
function of building density. In this figure, 
building density represents the ratio of roof 
area to the total ground area, and it is ex- 
pressed in percentages, Where building den- 
sity is to 5 percent, fires usually do not 
spread beyond the buildings in which they 
originate. Where the building density is i> to 
20 percent, a mass fire usually will not occur 
unless a number of structures are ignited 
simultaneously. But where the building den- 
sity is over 20 percent, the probability of a 
mass fire is greatly increased when the con- 
struction covers an area of a square mile or 
more. The probability of firespread in relation 
to existing fire gaps is shown in Figure E-18. 



The existence of fire lanes must be 
an important factor in preventing the spread 
of fires, but for fires that are described 
herein, such lanes must be at least 100 ft wide 
to be genuinely useful. The nature of the ter- 
rain may also be significant; streams act as 
barriers to the spread of fires, and hills serve 
to intercept direct thermal radiation. 

Table E-10 gives some data on the 
extent to which various types of window cover- 
ings reduce the hazard of direct thermal 
radiation. 

3B1.03 CONTAMINATION 

Like ground areas, the exteriors and 
interiors of buildings within target areas are 



3-10 












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10 



20 



30 40 50 60 70 

PROBABILITY OF FIRESPREAD (%) 



80 



90 



100 



Figure 3-3. Probability of Firespread as a Function of Building Density 



subject to ABC contamination that will be a 
subsequent hazard to personnel. Even though 
conventional buildings remain largely intact, 
blast will (a) carry away many windows and 
doors, and (b) thus provide access for contam- 
ination through open or broken doors, windows, 



and ventilation systems. In the event of a BW 
or CW attack, interior contamination may 
present more of a problem to recovery oper- 
ations than exterior contamination because 
material -weathering will not be as effective 
and will therefore persist much longer. 






3-11 






Section 2. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS 



3B2.01 EFFECTS OF BLAST ON 
EQUIPMENT 

Various types of equipment are not 
equally resistant to blast effects. Moreover, 
special housing of equipment would reduce the 
anticipated extent of damage. Table 3-4 shows 
damage criteria for parked aircraft and trans- 
mitting towers. In Appendix E, Table E-7 
shows damage criteria for land transportation 
equipment. 

3B2.02 FIRE POTENTIAL 

Serious fires may develop if stored 
containers of gasoline and oil are ruptured. 
Fires in ammunition and ration dumps are a 
possibility, but a somewhat less likely one. 

Secondary fires that develop in dam- 
aged buildings necessarily account for the 



destruction of much equipment, machinery, 
and supply items. 

Critical thermal energies at which 
materials of supply will ignite are shown in 
Appendix E, Table E-ll. 

3B2.03 CONTAMINATION 

In the event of nuclear explosions, 
equipment and material may be beyond the 

range of blast and thermal damage, but still 
within the area of the early fallout pattern. 
Such equipment and material would be undam- 
aged but would be contaminated. As a result, 
a real hazard to personnel would exist during 
recovery operations, and decontamination 
might be necessary before equipment and ma- 
terial could be used again. 






TABLE 3-4 
Damage Criteria for Parked Aircraft and Transmitting Towers 



Parked aircraft 


Damage class 1 


Nature of damage 


Overpressure 
(psi) 


A 
B 
C 

D 


Complete destruction 

Damage beyond economical repair 

Major shop repair required prior 
to flight 

Minor or no repair or replace- 
ment required prior to flight 


6 
4 

3 

1 


Transmitting towers 


Damage class I 


Nature of damage 


A and B 
C 

D 


Towers demolished or flat on ground 

Towers partially buckled but held by guylines; ineffective 
for transmission 

Guylines somewhat slack but tower able to transmit 






^The general degrees of damage that are applicable to structures and equipment are: 
A The structure is virtually completely destroyed. 

B The damage is so severe that complete reconstruction is required prior to reuse. 
C The structural damage is such that major repairs are required before the structure can 

be used for its intended purpose. 
D The structure received light damage so that only minor makeshift repairs (or no repairs 

at all) are required to maintain its usefulness. 



3-13 



Usually, equipment that is operated It is possible to provide someprotec- 
in contaminated areas will itself become con- tion, through the use of masks and protective 
taminated. In order that the contamination on clothing, for personnel who use contami- 
the equipment does not add to the exposure nated materials and equipment. The effective- 
level from the ground (thus reducing the per- ness of personnel who use this gear, however, 
missible stay time of the operators), the will be drastically reduced. The decision on 
equipment should be checked and decontami- the acceptability of this reduction will govern 
nated whenever feasible. The relative hazards the requirements for decontamination, 
of BW and CW contamination depend on the 
persistency and the extent to which personnel 
are susceptible. 












3-14 






Section 3. UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION ROUTES 



3B3.01 POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF BLAST 

1. UTILITIES. Overhead power and 
communication lines maybe expected to suffer 
damage that is similar to damage caused by- 
severe windstorms. Overpressures in the 
order of 5 psi will cause severe damage, but 
in this pressure range the damage to distribu- 
tion systems can be readily repaired. Sources 
of extensive damage will be flying missiles, 
fire, and collapse of structures. At a pressure 
range of 5 psi, steel transmission towers will 
not suffer great damage because of their con- 
struction. 

Underground mains- and powerlines 
are relatively resistant to blast pressures. 
Usually, no damage would be expected at dis- 
tances that are greater than 3 crater radii. 
Damage to water and gas mains may be expected 
at risers that are inside damaged buildings 
and where they enter damaged buildings. 

2. HIGHWAYS AND BRIDGES. Air- 
bursts are not particularly damaging to 



highways and streets, but surface and sub- 
surface bursts will destroy them in the vicinity 
of target center. Steel- girder bridges with 
reinforced concrete decks are remarkably 
resistant to airblast damage, although some of 
the smaller spans may be displaced (Figure 
3-4). More extensive damage and displace- 
ment would be anticipated in an area that is 
affected by the ground shock of a subsurface 
or surface burst. Figure 3-4 shows that the 
plate girders were moved about three feet by 
the blast, but the bridge was left essentially 
intact. 

3. DAMAGE-DISTANCE RELATION- 
SHIPS. Damage-distance relationships as a 
function of a weapon yield for powerlines, 
vehicles, and rolling stock are shown in Ap- 
pendix E, Figure E-17. A scaling formula for 
use with these data will be found in Figure 
E-16. 

The main problem, especially inareas 
of high construction density, will be the removal 
of debris that will block access routes. 







Figure 3-4. Structural Damage from a Nominal Airburst to a Steel Plate Girder Railway Bridge 

Located about 280 Yards from Ground Zero 






3-15 



3B3.02 POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF FIRE 

In an area that has been swept by fire, 
the utilities, services, and transportation 
routes therein will be completely unusable for 
a long period. Secondary fires often cause 
short circuits, which occur when powerlines 
are broken. Gas from ruptured mains may 
be ignited and, in turn, may serve to ignite 
other flammable materials. Secondary fires 
do additional damage, especially to electrical 
equipment, and they delay the initiation of 
recovery measures. Ignition points of various 
types of electrical equipment are shown in 
Table E-ll. The principal problem that re- 
sults from fires after an attack will be the 
strict control of the available water supply. 

3B3.03 CONTAMINATION OF STRUCTURES 
AND AREAS 

ABC contamination, especially re- 
sidual radioactivity, is also a problem with 
regard to utilities and transportation routes. 
After fires have burned themselves out or 
have been extinguished and the work of re- 
habilitation has begun, various areas may still 
be completely denied to work parties or may 
be accessible for only limited periods of time 
because of the radioactive hazard to personnel. 

3B3.04 CONTAMINATION OF WATER 



1. POSSIBILITY OF RADIOAC- 



TIVITY. 



Water in unbroken mains and stor- 
age tanks would probably be safe for use after 
an attack, unless contaminated water has been 
pumped into the system. Although radioactive 
contamination of water is not regarded as one 
of the major hazards that result from nuclear 
attack, danger to personnel would exist and 
should be guarded against by post attack 
monitoring. 



2. SEWAGE. 

When water mains have been dam- 
aged, there is a possibility that damaged sewer 
mains will cause sewage to seep or flow into 
the water mains. This will be serious if it 
occurs in the distribution system beyond the 
purification station. 

Contamination also results from 
back-siphonage from building fixtures when 
pressures are reduced by firefighting demands 
or supply failure. It can occur within build- 
ings when plumbing fixtures are damaged. 

3. BW AGENTS. 

Biological contamination of water 
supplies would probably be the result of covert 
action rather than open attack. It might, how- 
ever, be timed to precede or accompany open 
attack. 

Covert introduction of BW agents 
might be effected in (a) reservoirs, wells, or 
other sources of supply or (b) the distribution 
system at some point beyond the purification 
plant. When used to contaminate reservoirs, 
the agent or agents would have to be types 
against which normal purification defenses are 
not completely effective. However, if the 
agents, together with a chlorine-reducing sub- 
stance, were introduced into the distribution 
system beyond the purification point, this re- 
quirement would not apply. 

4. CW AGENTS. 

Water from any questionable 
source should be tested for chemical contami- 
nation, and such tests should be made before 
chlorination. If the water does not pass the 
test, an effort should be made to locate an un- 
contaminated source, because neutralization 
of certain CW agents is a slow and difficult 
process. The purification of water that has 
been contaminated by CW agents is discussed 
in detail in Appendix C. 



o 






3-16 



c 






Section 4. FOOD SUPPLY 



3B4.01 EFFECT OF ABC WARFARE 
ON FOOD 

The principal effect of ABC warfare 
on food will be contamination. In the event of 
an attack, food contamination will be largely 
confined to food that is not packed in sealed 
containers. The exteriors of packaged foods 
can often be decontaminated and the contents 
salvaged for consumption. Contaminated food 
should be tested, decontaminated, and consumed 
only on the advice of a medical officer. 

3B4.02 RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION 
OF FOOD 

The cooking of foods does not remove 
radioactive contamination, but a certain amount 
of contamination is considered to be acceptable 
for limited periods of time, especially under 
emergency conditions, because (a) ingested 
fission products are subject to radioactive de- 
cay and (b) most ingested fission products are 
eliminated from the body. 

The maximum levels of radioactivity 
that are permissible in food and water during 
an emergency are as follows. 



Consumption 

period 
(day) 


Radioactivity level 


Beta- gamma 

(dps/cc) 


Alpha 
(dps/cc) 


10 
30 


3 x 10 3 
1 x 10 3 


180 

60 



In this tabulation dps/cc means dis- 
integrations per second per cubic centimeter. 
Disintegrations per second are related to a 
unit that is known as the curie, which is equal 
to 3.7 x 10 10 dps. If both the food and water 



ingested are equally contaminated, the values 
shown in the preceding table must be reduced 
by one half. 

When exposed food that is slow to de- 
teriorate is found to be contaminated beyond 
the acceptable level, it need not necessarily 
be destroyed, because radioactive decay may 
solve the problem in time. Foods such as 
meat may be recovered for use by cutting off 
the contaminated outer part. 

3B4.03 BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION 
OF FOOD 

If the use of BW agents is suspected, 
unpackaged foods should not normally be used 
because detection techniques that are suitable 
for quick and accurate determinations are not 
available. If unpackaged food must be used, 
the contamination hazard can be reduced by 
cooking, but the problem would remain for 
foods that are eaten uncooked. 

Covert use of BW agents is possible 
and includes (a) the introduction of agents into 
milk or other substances that are ordinarily 
ingested without having been cooked, (b) the 
introduction of agenLs into foods after they 
have been cooked, and (c) the contamination of 
serving and mess gear. 

3B4.04 CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION 
OF FOOD 

When chemical contamination exists, 
as evidenced by the positive results of a food 
testing and screening kit, a decision must be 
made on whether the food should be destroyed 
or decontaminated. If the agent is in liquid 
form or is a member of the G-series, a de- 
cision to destroy the food should usually be 
made. Otherwise, decontamination may be 
attempted as shown in Table 3-5. Detailed 
discussion of decontamination procedures for 
foods is given in paragraph 4E9.05. 






3-17 



TABLE 3-5 
Disposition of Chemically Contaminated Foods 



o 



Agent 


State 


Disposition 


Phosgene 


Vapor 
Liquid 


Aerate for 24 hr or boil 
Destroy 


Chloropicrin 


Vapor 
Liquid 


Trim contaminated portion 
Destroy 


Mustards 


Vapor 

Light liquid 
Heavy liquid 


Trim fatty part and aerate remainder 
Trim; boil in water and baking soda 
Destroy 


Lewisite 


Vapor 


Aerate and rinse 


Ethyldichloroarsine 


Light liquid 
Heavy liquid 


Trim and peel; otherwise destroy 
Destroy 


G-series gases 


Vapor 
Liquid 


Destroy 
Destroy 


Vomiting gases 


Smokes 


Trim contaminated portions 


Chloroacetophenone 


Vapor 
Liquid 


Aerate 

Trim or destroy 


White phosphorus 


Smoke 

Unburned particles 


None required 
Destroy by burning 



( 



3-18 



O 






Section 5. PROBLEM OF DEBRIS 






3BS.01 DEBRIS AND ACCESS 

Serious problems are created by de- 
bris that impedes mobility and access. Even 
emergency recovery measures, including 
rescue and firefighting operations, can not be 
carried out until roads and streets have been 
cleared sufficiently to permit access to the 
affected areas. 

Estimates indicate that in an average- 
sized American city, the depth of debris in a 
66-ft-wide street would be as follows: 



Distance from ground 


zero 


Depth of debris 


(mile) 




(ft) 


0.0 to 0.7 




4-1/2 


0.7 to 1.4 




4 


1.4 to 2.0 




3-1/2 


2.0 to 2.7 




1-1/2 



Concrete roads and streets that are 
subjected to falling debris will usually sustain 
less damage than other types of roadways. 
In the planning of debris removal operations, 
main arteries that are likely to require little 
or no repair should be selected for initial 
clearance. In the clearing of access roadways, 
care must be exercised not to magnify the 
damage that was caused by the debris. Debris 
will usually be a major problem in built-up 
areas that are subjected to blast pressures in 
excess of 8 to 10 psi. The relative amount of 
debris, rather than the level of contamination, 
may determine the obstruction perimeter after 
a nuclear attack. 

3B5.02 DEBRIS IN STRUCTURES 

Interior debris may be sufficiently 
heavy or concentrated to cause (a) the collapse 



of floors and (b) the total collapse of the struc- 
ture itself. Less severe effects of falling 
debris include damage to the contents of the 
structures, such as materials in warehouse 
storage, machinery in shops and generating 
plants, and vehicles in garages. 

The type of damage that is sustained, 
however, is normally of multiple origin; de- 
bris is usually an aggravating factor in a 
problem that has involved structural collapse 
and widespread secondary fires. Figure 3-5 
shows a situation in which structural collapse, 
debris, and fire are all factors in the resulting 
damage. 



I 




Figure 3-5. Damage Caused by Structural 
Collapse, FiTe, and Debris 



3-19 



< 






o 






CHAPTER 4. REQUIREMENTS FOR ABC DEFENSE 

PART A. WARNING, DETECTION, AND IDENTIFICATION 

Section 1. WARNING SYSTEMS 






4A1.01 PATTERNS OF INTELLIGENCE 

Information on the nature of imp ending 
attack can be obtained from many source b. 
Intelligence may provide warning as a result 
of (a) studies of strategic patterns, (b) reports 
of enemy manufacture of specific weapons and 
agents or concentration of known weapons, (c) 
information on enemy research on new weapons 
and agents, or (d) analysis of other data. Such 
intelligence may relate to nuclear weapons or 
to RW, BW, and CW agents. 

In the area of operations, suspicious 
or warning circumstances that apply particu- 
larly to BW and CW agents may include any of 
the following: 

(1) Smokes or mists that are sprayed 
from enemy airplanes, 

(2) Unusual types of enemy bombs 
and projectiles, and especially those that con- 
tain compressed air or pistons that have been 
adapted for the dissemination of aerosols, 

(3) Parachutes and other devices that 
might be employed to disseminate ampoules, 
gelatinous masses, or insect vectors, 

(4) Any types of weapons that appear 
to have little if any immediate effect, 

(5) Unusual taste or appearance of 
food, water, or beverages, 

(6) Presence of dead or sickanimals 
in unusual numbers, and 

(7) Widespread defoliation of trees 
or withering and destruction of agricultural 
crops. 

4A1.02 CONTROLLED WARNING 
DEVICES 

When air attacks are directed toward 
continental areas of the United States, early 
warning will probably be received from ad- 
vanced radar lines, such as the DEWLINE. By 
these means, military installations and civilian 



defense agencies may receive sufficient ad- 
vance notice to take shelter and exercise other 
protective measures. Personnel will be alerted 
to the impending attack by suitable warning 
devices (OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3440.8). 

4A1.03 WARNING SIGNALS 

The particular sound signals to be 
used by the Navy (Figure 4-1) will depend on 
the type and limitations of the equipment em- 
ployed. It is the Navy's policy to establish 
warning signals that do not conflict with the 
signals of the Office of Civil and Defense 
Mobilization (OCDM) There must be a dis- 
tinction between the "alert" signal and the 
"take cover" signal. It is well established that 
a modulated sound is far more easily recog- 
nized that a steady sound at the same level. 
Accordingly, a modulated sound is usually used 
for the "take cover" signal and a steady sound 
for the "alert" signal. If a rotating beam of 
sound is used, the modulation should occur 
several times per minute, so that a number of 
repetitions of the modulation will take place 
while the beam is passing a given point. The 
most distinctive timing for a series of blasts 
can be determined by trial. Blasts that last 
from one to three seconds with approximately 
equal intervals of silence have been found most 
effective. 

The following types and duration of 
signals are to be used in connection with an 
attack warning. 

(1) Alert signal : a steady blast that 
lasts from three to five minutes. 

(2) Take-cover signal : a wailing 
tone or a series of short blasts that last for 
three minutes. 

The alert signal indicates that an 
attack is anticipated and that recovery teams 
should mobilize immediately and disperse 
according to plan (with equipment if time per- 
mits). The alert signal will also serve to indi- 
cate that nonessential personnel (not assigned 
to recovery forces or required on station) should 
evacuate. The take-cover signal indicates 



549212 O-60-6 



4-1 






es=3 



ALERT 



3-MINUTE BLASTS 



TAKE COVER 

GNSsIj CONTINUOUS WAILING 

OR SERIES OF SHORT BLASTS 



Figure 4-1. Emergency Warning Signals 

that attack is imminent and that all personnel 
should take the best available shelter imme- 
diately. The all-clear will not be given by 
signal but disseminated by other means. 



It is incumbent upon the naval activity 
to make certain that warning signals that per- 
tain to ABC warfare defense are easily identi- 
fiable and well known to all hands. Considera- 
tion must be given to the possibility of conflict 
between warning signals and horns that are in 
regular use in industrial and production areas 
of shore activities. After all such conflicts 
have been satisfactorily resolved, a descrip- 
tion of the approved warning signal shall be 
widely disseminated. 

Design and installation details of 
warning systems are considered to be a matter 
for local decision. However, all signal devices 
that are used shall have sufficient volume and 
shall be located sotheir sound is clearly audi- 
ble to personnel in all buildings, even when 
openings are secured. An indoor signaling 
system may be required when there is a pos- 
sibility that the exterior system can not be 
heard because a structure is closed up. 









4-2 









Section 2. DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION 



4A2.01 RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 

The radioactivity that is considered 
in this paragraph may be residual, induced, 
from unfissioned materials, or from combi- 
nations of the three. Whatever the source, the 
presence of radioactivity can not be detected 
by the human senses. 

Radioactivity detection and measure- 
ment is of prime importance in the protection 
of personnel. "When the dose rate is known, it 
is possible to {a) determine permissible stay 
time for work parties in a contaminated area 
and (b) establish zones and perimeters for the 
area as a whole. 



odors, but instead must depend on devices, 
such as {a) specially prepared crayons and 
papers that are contained in chemical agent 
detector kits and (b) field alarms when G- 
agents are employed. 

It is imperative that G-agents be de- 
tected immediately and that protective meas- 
ures be put into effect at once. The detection 
devices can also be employed to (a) test the 
effectiveness of decontamination measures and 
(b) determine the hazards of operating in an 
area that is suspected of being contaminated. 

4A2.04 ESTABLISHMENT OF 
PERIMETERS 






As far as areas and inanimate objects 
are concerned, detection and measurement of 
radiation are effected through the use of survey 
meters. Various dosimetry devices, however, 
are employed to measure accumulated doses 
of radiation that are received by personnel. 

4A2.02 BW AGENTS 

No equipment is presently available 
for field issue to detect and identify BW agents 
in time for personnel to take protective action, 
such as by the use of masks. 

In fact, it is quite possible that early 
detection may depend in part upon (a) the rec- 
ognition that an enemy is using an unusual type 
of munition or (b) the observation that unusu- 
ally large numbers of personnel have become 
ill. In the latter case, identification of the 
responsible agent would depend upon diagnosis. 

When there is any indication that a 
BW attack has taken place, field sampling and 
subsequent laboratory examinations and tests 
can be used to confirm the fact. Equipment 
and methods that are used in field sampling 
are discussed in paragraph 4A4.01 . 

4A2.03 CW AGENTS 

Detection of war gases now available 
can not be based on the presence of unfamiliar 



After an atomic attack, which may or 
may not be supplemented by use of BW and CW 
agents, the first step toward recovery is re- 
connaissance and survey. As soon as the area 
has been surveyed, the extent of damage may 
be known and the obstruction and support per- 
imeters may be established. 

These perimeters should be properly 
identified and marked, and they should be 
entered on appropriate maps at control cen- 
ters. Particular attention should be given to 
areas in which special hazards exist. Obstruc- 
tion and support perimeters are described in 
paragraph 5C1.01. 

Standard survey markers have been 
adopted, and details concerning them are shown 
inparagraph A20 of Appendix A. These mark- 
ers may be made of wood, plastic, metal, or 
any other rigid material. Standard size is 
11-1/2 in. by 8 in. by 8 in., but these dimen- 
sions may be varied to suit materials that are 
available locally. 

Markers are placed with their apexes 
downward on stakes, fences, trees, rocks, and 
buildings, and facing away from the contami- 
nation so that they may be seen by personnel 
who are approaching the danger area. On the 
inward side of a marker is the date of place- 
ment and any other data that are deemed perti- 
nent, such as the dose rate one hour after a 
nuclear explosion. 






4-3 






Section 3. RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING TECHNIQUES 






4A3.01 INSTRUMENTS 

Radiological monitoring instruments 
that are used are of two types: (a) equipment 
that indicates the intensity of radiation (dose 
rate) at any given instant, and makes up what 
is called "survey meters," and (b) dosimeters 
that indicate the amount of radiation (dose) that 
is accumulated by an individual. 

Different models of survey meters 
and dosimeters are available for measuring 
either high (Hi-R) or low (Lo-R) levels of 
radiation. Radiac equipment in current use is 
described in paragraphs A8 through A14 of 
Appendix A and includes the following types: 
(a) high-range survey meters, (b) low-range 
survey meters, (c) alpha meters, (d) high- 
range, nonindicating dosimeters, (e) high- 
range, self-indicating dosimeters, and (f) low- 
range, self -indicating dosimeters. All survey 
instruments are of the direct-reading type. 
Dosimeters may be either self-indicating or 
non- self- indicating. 

The following general considerations 
are used in the determination of allowances of 
radiological monitoring instruments for shore 
activities . 

1. REQUESTS FOR ALLOWANCES. 
Equipments are provided to outfit passive 
defense teams that are organized in accordance 
with the United States Passive Defense Manual , 
OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3440.6. Information on 
requirements is usually reported to the Chief, 
Bureau of Ships, by the commanding officer of 
the station in the form of a request for the 
establishment or modification of an allowance. 
The request is submitted through the chain of 
command and then via the industrial manager 
to the commandant of the naval district. 

2. BASIS FOR ALLOWANCES, In the 
absence of a request for the establishment of 
an allowance, allowances are based primarily 
on the number of personnel on board at the 
station. Stations that have a population of less 
than 100 are not provided with an allowance 
unless the Bureau of Ships is advised of a 
radiac equipment requirement. The quantities 
of equipment that are required to provide for 
routine maintenance are determined by the 
Bureau of Ships, and these are added to the 
actual usage requirements of the activities. 

3. EQUIPMENT DISTRIBUTION. 
Radiac equipment is not to be requisitioned to 
fill allowances. The equipment is issued by 
the Bureau of Ships as it becomes available. 



Priorities that are established by the 
Chief of Naval Operations are used to deter- 
mine distribution when there is insufficient 
equipment to fill allowances. Equipment is 
issued without cost to the end-user, and when 
end-users are shore activities, the equipment 
is issued without spares. 

Maintenance of monitoring equipment 
is provided free of charge at activities that 
have been established by the Bureau of Ships. 
These facilities are listed in Appendix D. 
Further data on this subject can be obtained 
from Basic ABC Allowance Planning, Conti- 
nental Shore Activities and Outlying Bases , 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-10 (Confidential) , and from 
the facilities that are listed in Appendix D. 

4A3.02 AERIAL MONITORING 

After a nuclear attack, one of the first 
problems will be to determine the level and 
extent of radiation. Usually, a quick, rough 
estimate will suffice to provide the command 
with the data that are necessary to initiate 
recovery operations. These data maybe based 
on an aerial survey of the area, which will also 
serve as a guide for subsequent ground moni- 
toring and initial recovery measures. 

Gamma rays from fission products on 
the surface can be detected by sensitive instru- 
ments at an altitude of several hundred feet. 
From such readings dose rates on the surface 
can be estimated. Figure 4-2 gives correction 
factors for readings that have been taken at 
various altitudes. In addition to the use of this 
correction factor, it is necessary to correct 
for the structure of the aircraft if the instru- 
ment is mounted inside. This correction must 
be determined for each type of aircraft, and it 
may be accomplished with a known source of 
radiation. 

Slow-flying aircraft are desirable for 
aerial surveys, because (a) it is difficult to 
relate a particular reading that was made in 
the air to a limited ground area and (b) the 
instruments do not have immediate response. 
Flying a planned pattern and coordinating 
readings with ground locations will increase 
the probability of accurate coverage, and a 
general picture of radiological conditions may 
be obtained. Readings are usually reported to 
a control center by radio as they are taken in 
the aircraft. A more accurate determination 
of radiological conditions may result when 
helicopters are available for survey duty. 
With these aircrafts it is possible to hover and 
to lower instruments and make readings at 
selected heights. 



4-5 



100,000 
70,000 
50,000 



£0,000 





1 0,0 00 




7,000 




5,000 


111 




Q 




~> 




H 


2,000 


h 




_j 




<t 


1,000 


o 


700 


U_ 


500 


(T 




o 




H 




< 


200 


LL 




~z. 
o 


1 00 


t, 


70 


UJ 


50 


a: 




rv 




o 




a 






20 




10 




7 




5 



I 






1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 



ALTITUDE (FT} 



Figure 4-2. Altitude Correction Factors for Radiac Readings 



4A3.03 DATA ON FALLOUT 

Fallout may be an important after- 
effect of a thermo-nuclear attack. The United 
States Weather Bureau and the Office of Civil 
Defense Mobilization have established a net- 
work of stations throughout the country for 
the purpose of registering and reporting dose 
rates. The information so obtained will indi- 
cate the progress and extent of fallout. Early 



predictions that were made by the use of this 
method (Appendix E) may be verified or mod- 
ified by the data that are collected by these 
stations. 

4A3.04 GROUND MONITORING 

Ground surveys should be delayed as 
long as possible, consistent with emergency 
requirements, to permit as much decay of 



4-6 












radiation as possible, so that the exposure of 
the monitoring personnel will be minimized. 

Either of two schemes of surveying 
may be followed. The first is the predeter- 
mined dose -rate method, in which teams start 
from the boundary of an area and proceed 
toward ground zero until a predetermined dose 
rate is encountered. The second is. the prede- 
termined point method, in which survey parties 
proceed to predetermined points and then 
circle in clockwise direction as they make 
readings. 

ABC survey personnel should wear 
Hi-R, self-indicating dosimeters. Other par- 
ties on emergency missions that relate to 
rescue, first aid, firefighting, and emergency 
repair should also have these dosimeters. 
Such parties should be accompanied by moni- 
tors who use high-level survey meters. The 
readings taken by these monitors should be 
used to (a) expand the data collected by survey 
teams and (b) determine the stay times for 
those parties. The following paragraphs de- 
scribe certain general procedures to be ob- 
served in monitoring. 

1. PROCEDURES. 

Monitors make readings with instru- 
ments that are held at waist height (3 ft) above 
the ground; such readings are considered to 
approximate the average dose-rate delivered 
to a man standing at the spot. Unless other- 
wise directed, monitors should make readings 
in open areas that are 30 to 50 ft away from 
buildings or other large structures. In built-up 
areas, readings should be made in the center 
of the street or the center of street inter- 
section. In making open- area measurements, 
monitors should face all directions while 
reading their instruments and then report the 
highest reading. This procedure assures 
measurement of the maximum intensity in 
locations where a large part of the radiation 
is coming from one direction. 

When making final readings, monitors 
should move away from vehicles a distance of 
at least 20 ft to prevent shielding of the radia- 
tion field by the vehicles. For preliminary 
readings or rapid area- surveys, readings can 
be made while the monitor is in the vehicle and 
is holding the instrument outside the cab, but 
such readings should be so designated in the 
record. 

Monitors should log the location and 
time of each reading. Location should be in 
terms of a uniform plotting system that is de- 
termined in advance. Possible systems include 
a grid coordinate system that uses standard 



maps, street names at intersections, building 
numbers, and odometer readings of distance 
from a known point. Notation of time is re- 
quired by control posts in order to correct 
readings for decay and thus obtain standard 
intensities for plotting purposes. 

2. CALIBRATION AND CARE OF 
INSTRUMENTS. To assure reliable measure- 
ments, radiacs should be properly calibrated 
before they are taken into a contaminated area. 
Upon being removed from the area, they should 
again be given a calibration check and a zero 
setting check to determine the reliability of 
the measurements just taken. 

The monitor shouldprotect his instru- 
ment at all times. Jarring that is produced by 
riding over rough terrain or rubble can disturb 
the calibration. The instrument should never 
be placed on the floor of a moving vehicle; the 
safe practice is to carry the instrument on the 
lap when readings are not being taken. Note 
also that a radiac should not be permitted to 
come in contact with contaminated surfaces be- 
cause of the adverse effect uponits reliability. 

3. DATAPROCESSING. Data obtained 
from monitoring must always be reported back 
to control center , preferably by radio, as soon 
as possible. Such data become the basis for 
the establishment of radiation contours that 
include the general location of "hot spots" and 
the determination of the obstruction perimeter. 

4A3.05 DETAILED RADIOLOGICAL 
SURVEY 

After the initial ground reconnais- 
sance and survey have been effected, a more 
detailed survey is conducted to accomplish the 
following: 

(1) Determine the dose rates at spe- 
cific locations that have special military im- 
portance, especially in areas where work 
parties may be required to operate, 

(2) Locate hot spots, which are lo- 
cations or objects in an area withhigher-than- 
average intensity, and 

(3) Establish the location of the radi- 
ation contours with greater accuracy. 

Radioactive decay proceeds quite rap- 
idly in the hours immediately after a nuclear 
explosion. If the readings that are taken at 
different times after the burst are to represent 
comparable data, they must be reduced to 
some common denominator by the control 
center. Accordingly, the common practice is 
to translate the readings into equivalent rates 






4-7 



for one hour after explosion time. This can be 
done by using the data in Appendix E, Figure 
E-14 and paragraph E14. 

In the course of the detailed radio- 
logical survey, the appropriate markers should 
be set up as described in paragraph 4A2.04. 
In marking the areas, give special attention to 
the location of the danger perimeter, any hot 
spots that may exist, and the designation of 
access routes. 

As time permits, the detailed survey 
monitors specific installations, such as food 



and water 

harbors . 



supplies, reservoirs, bays, and 



o 



4A3.06 MONITORING AFTER AN 

ACCIDENT WITH A PLUTONIUM- 
BEARING WEAPON 

The monitoring technique that is re- 
quired after an accident with a plutonium- 
bearing weapon varies from the normal tech- 
niques that are used for disaster control 
monitoring. These special techniques and the 
equipment that is used are discussed in Ap- 
pendix E . 






4-8 






Section 4. BW SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 






4A4.01 FIELD SAMPLING 

Because no warning device or system 
of rapid detection of BW agents is available, 
monitoring will consist of taking samples of 
materials that are suspected to have BW con- 
tamination.. The samples must be submitted to 
a laboratory for analysis. Specially trained 
personnel and special equipment will be re- 
quired in making the analysis, which is a med- 
ical department responsibility. In an actual 
situation, it is anticipated that the workload of 
the medical department will be severe; there- 
fore, the sampling has been assigned as a 
responsibility of the disaster control organiza- 
tion (ABC Survey Team). 



types: 



Field samples are of the following 



(1) Dud munitions, expended muni- 
tions, and munitions fragments {dozen sam- 
ples) , 

(2) Sampling from air-filtering and 
concentrating devices, 

(3) Swab or wipe samples from con- 
taminated surfaces, and 

(4) Food, water, and possibly soil or 
dust samples. 

Laboratory analysis is slow and re- 
quires large numbers of trained personnel; 
therefore, the number of samples that are 
submitted should be cut to a minimum. Be- 
cause few BW agents are persistent and the 
laboratory's studies may take a week or more 
to complete, the submission of a large number 
of samples to determine the location and extent 
of the contaminated area should be discouraged. 
The passive defense officer should consult with 
the station medical officer regarding the advis- 
ability and extent of effecting decontamination. 

4A4.02 FIELD SAMPLING KITS 

Biological warfare field sampling kits 
are in limited supply, but have not performed 
adequately under field use, and are available 
only at training activities. They may be im- 
provised. One kit is shown in Appendix A, 
Figure A- 19. Complete instructions for the 
operation of the Ml 7 field sampling kit are 
included in the case. All field sampling kits 
must contain the following. 

(1) Containers to (a) protect samples 
from further contamination and (b) facilitate 



handling (for example, plastic bags, sterile 
cap jars, and bottles), 

(2) Sterile cotton swabs, small vials 
of sterile water, and isotonic salt solution or 
"nutrient solution", 

(3) A device to trap and concentrate 
airborne BW agents. Air sampling is usually 
accomplished by drawing air at a rate of ap- 
proximately 0,5 to 1 cu ft per minute (5 to 10 
liters per minute) through water or other 
solution. Many of the airborne BW agents are 
retained in the liquid, and this liquid becomes 
the sample. For air sampling in buildings a 
somewhat lower sampling rate may prove 
feasible because BW agents tend to remain in 
interiors for perhaps 10 to 15 minutes after 
the primary cloud has passed, 

4A4.03 AIR SAMPLING TECHNIQUES 

The BW sampling kit contains ahand- 
driven vacuum pump to draw the air through a 
utensil that contains a special fluid. The op- 
erator must be masked. The fluid, together 
with the entrapped bacteria, is the sample, and 
it is further processed in the field by filtration 
through a membrane filter. The filters are 
placed in a special plastic container with some 
nutrient fluid (bacterial food); the container is 
slipped into a vest worn by a courier. This 
enables partial growth of the bacteria enroute 
to the laboratory. The filtrate (filtered fluid) 
must also be transmitted (because agents that 
are smaller than bacteria (rickettsiae and 
viruses) may slip through the membrane fil- 
ters. The procedure is described in detail in 
the instructions that are contained in the kit. 

1. EXTERIOR AIR SAMPLING, Be- 
cause BW clouds are invisible and last only a 
few minutes, great practical difficulties arise. 
The enemy must be caught in the act. BW air 
sampling should be conducted when the activity 



authority, 



(1) Directed to do so by competent 



(2) Under attack by an aircraft that 
is conducting obvious spray operations, and 

(3) Attacked with unusual muni- 
tions. Air-dropped munitions are usually small 
and designed to give maximum dispersal. They 
may be miniature spray devices or contain 
small explosive charges. Sampling should 
continue for 10 minutes, and the exact time and 
location should be indicated on the sample jar. 



4-9 



2. INTERIOR AIR SAMPLING. BW 
agents may remain suspended in the air in 
protected buildings for 15 to 30 minutes after 
the primary (exterior) cloud has passed. If a 
suspicion exists that a BW attack is underway 
or has taken place, interior air samples should 
be taken as soon as apparatus is available 
(after exterior air sampling is completed). 

4A4.04 WATER SAMPLING 

When water samples are taken, the 
pathogens are already in a fluid medium. Sam- 
ples are taken from the suspected source, 
placed in a filtration unit, and filtered through 
membrane filters that are a part of the Ml 7 
BW sampling kit. Bacteria are trapped on the 
membrane filters, and the filters are then dealt 
with as in the case of air samples. Refriger- 
ated filtrates should be obtained if the presence 
of viruses or rickettsiae is suspected. 

Raw water sources, such as lakes, 
should be sampled as close as possible to the 
intake of the water treatment plant and at sur- 
face level. Three samples of approximately 
1,000 cu cm should be obtained. When the raw 
water source is a stream, similar samples 
should be taken at locations that are 100 and 
1,000 ft upstream from the intake. 

Treated water in storage tanks and 
reservoirs should he sampled at the surface 
and from the discharge pipe. One set of sam- 
ples (1,000 cu cm each) is ordinarily sufficient 
unless the source is unusually large. 

Water in a distribution system is 
checked for BW contamination by taking 1,000 
cu-cm samples from the mains, rather than 
the laterals. Samples should be taken at hy- 
drants or directly connected service locations 
and at one -half mile intervals, or they should 
be taken at key locations. If all samples are 
taken simultaneously, the results may indicate 
the location of the contaminating source. 

4A4.05 SURFACE SAMPLING 

Until continuous operating air sam- 
plers or BW alarms have been perfected, a 
likelihood of obtaining a sample of the primary 
cloud appears small. Probably the next best 
source of samples is contaminated surfaces. 
To take a sample, a moistened cotton swab is 
wiped or rolled over about nine square inches 
of surface. The swab should be placed in a 
sterile bottle that contains a little sterile 
diluting fluid to keep it moist, and it is then 
shipped to the laboratory. 

Samples should preferable be taken 
from smooth surfaces, such as glass, smooth 
metal, painted wood, and smooth concrete or 



asphalt. When samples are taken outdoors, 
the sampling surfaces should be in exposed 
places, and if the path of a pathogenic cloud is 
known, the samples should be taken at 100-ft 
intervals in the mid-path of the cloud. In such 
instances, samples are normally taken from 
vertical surfaces at aheight of four to sixfeet. 
If the path of a BW cloud is not known, it may 
be advisable to sample horizontal surfaces 
also, especially if sometime has elapsed since 
the attack. Care should be taken to avoid sur- 
faces that are protected against deposit of 
germs from the aerosol or subjected to direct 
sunlight or unusual temperatures. Locations 
at which exterior samples are taken must be 
entered on a map, which is sent to the labora- 
tory and used to determine appropriate sam- 
ples for processing. Later, this map becomes 
the basis for plotting the contaminated area. 

4A4.06 SOURCES OF SAMPLES 

The best location from which to take 
samples is near the point of release of bombs 
and other munitions that are suspected to have 
contained BW agents, because obviously the 
concentration of those agents would be greatest 
at and about the point of release. If the sus- 
pected agent has been delivered by airplane 
spray, surfaces that are known to have been 
in the path of the BW cloud are appropriate 
sources of samples. When the direction of a 
cloud path is unknown, one of two sampling 
patterns may be used: (a) four complete sets 
of 12 samples each are taken because four 
possible wind directions are assumed; (b) 
samples are taken in locations where the di- 
rection of the BW cloud path would have little 
or no effect. The latter is considered to be the 
preferred method. 

1. EXTERIOR SAMPLES. When a 
sample is taken to determine the extent of ex- 
terior contamination, a definite sampling pat- 
tern is highly desirable because it minimizes 
the amount of laboratory work that is required 
in processing the samples. One suitable pat- 
tern that consists of a series of concentric 
circles is shown in Figure 4-3. Samples 
should be taken at 400 -ft intervals along the 
circumference of each circle. 

2. INTERIOR SAMPLES. Interior 
samples should represent both vertical and 
horizontal surfaces on every floor of the struc- 
ture. The surfaces should include some that 
have not been cleaned since the suspected BW 
attack. One sample should be taken for every 
1,000 to 1,500 sqft of floor space. An excep- 
tion may be made when a building has an oper- 
ating mechanical ventilation system; then 
samples from surfaces around the intake and 
exhaust vents may indicate the extent of con- 
tamination in the building. 









4-10 



(. 







Figure 4-3. Pattern for BW Exterior Surface Sampling 






4A4.07 SOLID SAMPLES 

Solid samples are objects of conven- 
ient size that are suspected to have received 
BW contamination. They may include debris 
from bomb craters, enemy ammunition com- 
ponents and spray gear, small, dead animals 
the size of rats, and any other unusual objects. 
These samples are used primarily to identify 
BW agents. Armed and unexploded munitions 
must be disarmed before they are sent to the 
laboratory. If dead animals have to be shipped 
any appreciable distance, they should be frozen 
in dry ice or "snow" from carbon dioxide fire 
extinguishers. The field sampling kits contain 
plastic bags for the collection of solid samples. 

In this type of sampling, the field 
work is limited to the collection of materials, 
swab samples from the surfaces of suspected 
objects, and forwarding the materials and 
samples to the laboratory. 

4A4.08 SHIPMENT OF SAMPLES 

Unfortunately, a uniform technique for 
the shipment of samples that have sustained 
BW contamination can not be recommended 



because different types of agents vary in their 
requirements. It is anticipated that the Bureau 
of Medicine and Surgery will is sue instructions 
on this point. After collection, samples should 
be takento a medical officer for recommenda- 
tions regarding the packaging of the shipment. 
Speed is essential. The Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery has already procured special 
shipping containers that ■will facilitate the 
shipment of biological samples. 

4A4.09 LABORATORY STUDIES 

Because a BW agent maybe of a little 
known type and difficult to identify, laborator- 
ies must be well equipped and staffed with 
highly trained personnel. 

It is the responsibility of the labora- 
tory to receive samples and culture any path- 
ogens that are obtained. The pathogens are 
then subjected to biochemical and biological 
tests. In some instances, a presumptive diag- 
nosis or identification can be made in 24 
hours. In others, the time that is required for 
identification may range from two to five days. 
Careful field sampling by trained teams can 



4-11 



materially reduce the amount of laboratory 
work that is required to identify a BW agent. 

When the agents have been identified, 
a further function of laboratory studies is to 



determine the extent and pattern of contami- 
nation. This work is facilitated by mapping, 
which may make it possible to omit the study 
of some samples if it can be established that 
they were taken outside of contaminated areas. 



c 



c 



4-1Z 



o 






Section 5. CW DETECTION TECHNIQUES 






4A5.01 FIELD DETECTION 

In the event of a CW attack, rapid de- 
tection is imperative so that protective meas- 
ures can be taken. The newer gases and other 
new agents act so rapidly, even in minute 
quantities that the only solution is for all per- 
sonnel to don masks at the first suspicion of a 
CW attack. After this has been done, available 
detection devices maybe used to (a) determine 
whether a CW agent has actually been used and 
(b) identify the agent. There is no universal 
detector for all agents and for use under all 
conditions. There is a means of detecting and 
identifying each of the agents that are known to 
be available to a potential enemy. All of the 
available detection devices do give an immed- 
iate reading, and unlike BW detection it is not 
necessary to send samples to the laboratory. 

In addition to the initial detection and 
identification, other detection operations will 
be required. The most important of these sur- 
veys are made on: 

(1) Areas and buildings to determine 
extent and degree of contamination, 

(2) Areas to determine when it is 
safe for personnel to remove masks, 

(3) Areas and equipment to deter- 
mine effectiveness of decontamination, 

(4) Water to determine hazard and 
necessary treatment, and 

(5) Food supplies to determine 
hazard. 

4A5.02 FIELD SAMPLING DEVICES 

Several devices are available for the 
detection of CW agents, and each is designed 
to serve a definite operational requirement. 
All present devices are dependent upon a 
chemical reaction between the gas and the 
indicating material, and the presence of gas is 
manifested by a color change in the material. 
For example, an automatic alarm that operates 
on this color change principle is used to detect 
G-agents. Aphotocell detects changes in color 
on a paper tape and activates an audible warn- 
ing. This alarm operates continuously on an 
intermittent cycle and may be set up to sound 
an alarm even at a remote location. Books of 
specially treated paper that can be exposed 
around an area prior to an attack are also 
available. The paper can be inspected after an 
attack, and a general idea of the extent and 






amount of agent that is used can be quickly 
estimated. All available CW detection devices 
and their most suitable applications are dis- 
cussed in the following paragraphs and in 
paragraphs A3 and A4 of Appendix A. 

4A5.03 AIR SAMPLING DEVICES 

Because almost all CW agents are in 
a gaseous form, the usual method of detection 
is by air sampling. There are three devices 
for this purpose. 

1. AUTOMATIC FIELD ALARM. The 
automatic field alarm, which is used to detect 
dangerous quantities of nerve gaseB, is ex- 
plained in detail in paragraph Al of Appendix 
A. In general, these units should be 

(1) Distributed to monitor the 
entire essential area of a station, with priority 
being given to the most densely populated sec- 
tions . 

(Z) Largely located upwind from 
the area to be protected, if a prevailing wind 
direction exists. 

(3) Located approximately 5 ft 
above the ground. However, if an individual 
building with power ventilation, such as a hos- 
pital, is to be protected, the alarm should be 
installed at the vent intake. 

{4} Located in open areas away 
from forests or other natural shelters and at 
least 6 ft from single -story buildings, 10 ft 
from two- story buildings, and 5 additional ft 
for each story above the second story. 

(5) Conveniently located for daily 
inspection, servicing, and maintenance. 

These alarms can be installed to 
sound a local alarm, give a warning in a central 
control room, or stop mechanical blowers or 
a combination of blowers. 

2. CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR 
KITS MIS and Ml 5. The other air -sampling 
devices are the chemical agent detector kits 
that are described in detail in paragraphs A3 
and A 4 of Appendix A. The principle of opera- 
tion and use of these kits is to draw air through 
small detector tubes with a small hand pump. 
The number of strokes that are required to get 
a color change in the detector tubes indicates 
the concentration of gas present. Each gas 
requires a different tube and treatment. It is 
thereforepossible to identify as -well as detect. 
Initially.it may be necessary to test with each 



4-13 



type of detector tube. When the agent has been 
identified, only tubes for that agent need be 
used thereafter. Two kits are supplied— the 
M18 contains tubes for all known war gases 
and the M15, a so-called simplified kit, con- 
tains only those tests for the most likely agents 
that are expected to be used, namely mustard 
(H), distilled mustard (HD), nerve gases (G), 
and cyanogen, chloride (CK) (Figure 4-4). 

4A5.04 SURFACE SAMPLING 

For surface sampling, a chemical 
agent detector kit can be used in the atmos- 
phere directly above suspected surfaces in the 
same manner that is employed for air sampling. 

Another method of surface sampling 
is through the use of vesicant detector crayons . 



These crayons are sensitive to most mustards 
and are used for sampling on surfaces that are 
suspected to have sustained liquid contamina- 
tion. The crayons can be used like an ordinary 
crayon to mark the suspected surface, or shav- 
ings from them can be spread on suspicious 
droplets of liquid. Details of these crayons 
are contained in paragraph A2 of Appendix A. 

Vesicant detector paper, -which is 
sensitive to most mustards and G-agents in 
liquid form, can also be used for area surface 
surveying. Prior to attack, sheets of this 
paper are mounted throughout the area of 
interest (50 -ft intervals is usually considered 
adequate), so that simple examination will in- 
dicatethe extent of contamination on open sur- 
faces. This paper can also be used like a 
blotter on surfaces that are suspected to be 







QrWniill 
■•-Gfwo blue ring 



E 



COLO* MUST 
APPEAR ID & Mil 



TESTING FOR G AGENTS AND CYANOGEN CHLORIDE (CK) 



dot O 




Tallga 
to *r-*ngo 



■ FNQVE PAD 
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C0L0I MUST 
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TESTING FOR CYANOGEN CHLORIDE (CK) 




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FUNPIrt 



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nro full imr stioiej 



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nkpih 



TESTING FOR HYDROGEN CYANIDE (AC) 




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fukpiij 



S10K.1 THE At LEHIT 
TOO FULL PIMP JTJCIES 



TESTING FOR PHOSGENE (CG) 



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runt ttt 



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ToUo 
dot 







BEFORE SLOWLY TAKE AT LEAST 

PUHPIIfl FIVE FULL PUMP STROKES 




APPLY MOPS una 
dRAIIS ARE KETTC& 



5 TESTING FOR LEWtSITE(L) AND DICHLOROETHYLARSINE(ED) 









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PUMP STROKES 



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PROPS UNTIL Mill! COLOR 
ARE METTED APPEARS 



6 TESTING FOR MUSTARD (Ht AND NITROGEN MUSTARD (HN) 



l3% 




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SEFME 
rUMPIMB 



JUfliLT TIRE AT LEAST 
FIVE FULL PUMP STROKES 



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APPEAR. IH I MIX. 



7. TESTING FOR NITROGEN MUSTARD (HN) 




JL01LT »IE 
IEF0BE 10 FULL FUNP 

FU«M«S STICIE3 



FILL OUT 
tEFOHT CUD 



SAMPLING UNKNOWN GAS 






Figure 4-4. Use of Air -Sampling Pump and Detector Tubes 



4-14 












contaminated. Additional details are contained 
in paragraph A7 of Appendix A. 

4A5.05 WATER TESTING 
AND SCREENING 

The relative solubility and decompo- 
sition of CW agents in water varies. Phosgene 
(CG) and diphosgene (GP) decompose rapidly 
to form nontoxic products. Mustard (HD) is 
slightly soluble in water, although when it is in 
solution.it hydrolyzes readily to form nontoxic 
products. 

Lewisite (L) hydrolyzes almost at 
once to form the toxic lewisite oxide. The 
nitrogen mustards (HN series) eventually hy- 
drolyze to form nontoxic products, but this 
process maytake six or more days. Cyanogen 
chloride (CK) also forms harmless products 
after hydrolysis, but the process of hydrolysis 
is slow. Soman (GD) and sarin (GB) ultimately 
hydrolyze, but their decomposition products 
are toxic and drinking water so contaminated 
may be hazardous. Tabun (GA) is hydrolyzed 
by water to form a toxic cyanide compound. 
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) is highly soluble in 
water and undergoes little change with the 
passage of time. 

Contamination of water supplies is to 
be expected in areas that have been subjected 
to CW attack. The contamination maybe rela- 
tively persistent, and unless proper safeguards 
are observed, it can produce many casualties. 
Mere observation is not a reliable indication 
of contamination, but it can convey certain 
warnings. The presence of wilted vegetation 
along the water's edge, dead fish in the water, 
or discoloration may be regarded as warning 
signs. Suspicion should always be confirmed 
by chemical tests. 

The M2 water testing and screening 
kit {paragraph A23 and Figure A-Z3 of Appendix 
A) has been developed for field detection of 
dangerous contamination in untreated water, 
but it can not be used to test chlorinated water . 
The kit is designed to screen out sources of 
untreated water that are so contaminated that 
they can not be rendered potable by customary 
field methods. If water is tested and found to 
be free of chemical contamination, it may be 
used after chlorination or iodination that will 
render it safe from bacterial contamination. 
When tests are carefully performed, the threat 
of serious casualties that result from the 
presence of known agents is avoided. 

When chemical tests indicate that a 
water source is contaminated, safeguards must 
be extablished to prevent personnel from 
drinking the water. An alternative source of 



uncontaminated water should be sought imme- 
diately. Decontamination is a tedious proce- 
dure, and an uncontaminated source should be 
found if at all possible. 

When it is necessary to use contami- 
nated water, the M4 water testing kit (para- 
graph A24 and Figure A-24 of Appendix A) 
must be employed to determine the specific 
characteristics and degree of contamination, 
so that appropriate treatment equipment and 
techniques can be used (Appendix C). In the 
hands of trained personnel, the water testing 
kit will serve to (a) identify the CW agent and 
(b) carry out quantitative determinations that 
will indicate the amounts of chemicals that are 
necessary for adequate water treatment. 

To detect covert attacks that employ 
chemical agents, some continuous monitoring 
is desirable. A possible technique for this 
purpose is the use of fish (Appendix F) , be- 
cause they are more sensitive to many chem- 
ical constituents than are humans. 

4A5.06 FOOD TESTING AND SCREENING 
KIT, CHEMICAL AGENTS, M2 

Modern methods of packaging and 
stowing foods minimize the danger of contami- 
nation by CW agents. The possibility of con- 
tamination, however, does exist, especially for 
nonpackaged foods. It is a responsibility of the 
medical department to pass on the suitability 
of both foods and water; other personnel, how- 
ever, may be called upon to assist in either or 
both processes. 

The M2 food testing and screening kit 
is shown in Figure A-5 and described in para- 
graph A 6 of Appendix A. The kit is designed 
to detect dangerous concentrations of the nerve 
gases (G-series) mustard (H), nitrogen mus- 
tards (HN-series), arsenical blister gases (L 
and PD), and the arsenical smokes (DA and 
DM) on foods and food packages. 

Any food supplies that have been sub- 
jected to CW attack should be used only after 
careful tests have been made by competent 
personnel. 

The susceptibility of foods to contam- 
ination by CW agents depends upon the agent 
involved, the degree of exposure to the agent, 
and the nature of the food substance itself. 
Fats, for example, absorb blister gases and 
nerve gases readily, and if these agents become 
diffused through foods of high fat content, it 
may be impossible to remove them. Acid- 
forming gases may hydrolyze in foods of high 
water content toproduce end-products that are 
unpalatable. In general, the foods of low fat 
and water content are not easily contaminated 
by known CW agents. 






4-15 



r 









PART B. INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION 
Section 1. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND ACCESSORIES 






4B1.01 CONCEPT OF PROTECTION 

1. GENERAL APPLICATION. In ad- 
dition to personnel shelters, individual protec- 
tive items are required for persons who will 
be unable to remain in shelters. The whole 
concept of individual protection is to keep 
contaminants off the skin and prevent their 
inhalation or ingestion by the individual. It is 
necessary, however, to stock special treat- 
ment kits for use against contamination by 
some of the agents in order to prevent damage 
to the skin, eyes, and nervous system when 
protection fails. The effects and reactions of 
the many possible ABC warfare agents vary 
widely, and therefore no universal individual 
protective system is 100-percent efficient 
against all. The aim in the development and 
selection of protective equipment has been to 
make each item apply as universally as pos- 
sible. This aim has been reached insofar as 
the protective mask is concerned. It provides 
excellent protection against the inhalation of 
all airborne BW and CW agents as well as 
radiological particles. Lacking masks, indi- 
viduals may improvise to secure some pro- 
tection with his own handkerchief or similar 
material against air-spread radioactivity or 
sprayed biological germs. It should be noted 
that this will provide no protection against CW 
agents. Their use in such emergencies could 
reduce casualties from surprise attacks where 
modern protective masks are not immediately 
available. For example tests have shown that: 

a. Eight layers of a man's cotton 
handkerchief is approximately 88.9 percent 
efficient, while 16 layers is approximately 
94.2 percent efficient. 

b. A turkish towel folded once is 
approximately 85.1 percent efficient as a filter. 

c. Three layers of ordinary toilet 
tissue is approximately 91.4 percent efficient. 
However, it cannot be used very long be- 
cause it tears after dampening from breath's 
moisture. 

2. SPECIAL PROTECTION. The de- 
fensive concept for most personnel will be to 
get out of the contaminated area as quickly as 
possible or into protective shelters. For this 



concept, ordinary clothing, protective masks, 
and certain self- aid devices will usually be 
adequate. Conversely, members of disaster 
control teams who are required to work in 
contaminated areas will need more protection 
than most personnel and a different type of 
clothing. A possibility exists that some de- 
contamination personnel may have to work in 
highly contaminated areas such as in a building 
near which a CW bomb has exploded. It should 
be emphasized that no available equipment is 
adequate as a protection against high- intensity 
initial radiation or nuclear fallout. The fol- 
lowing paragraphs and Appendix A describe 
each of the available protective items and indi- 
cate the situations in which they are applicable. 

4B1.02 ORDINARY CLOTHING 

Masks that are used with ordinary 
work clothing, such as underwear, field socks, 
coveralls, field boots, and watch caps, are 
considered to be very limited protection in 
any contaminated area. Such a combination 
provides almost complete protection against 
BW agents and limited protection against CW 
agents. Under most conditions, personnel who 
are wearing this outfit should either leave the 
contaminated area or seek appropriate shelter. 
Protection that is afforded by ordinary clothing 
against blister agents can be improved if the 
clothing is impregnated through the use of the 
field impregnating set that is described in 
paragraph 4B1.12. 

4B1.03 FOUL WEATHER CLOTHING 

Foul weather gear of standard stock 
issue will protect ordinary clothing and the 
skin from direct contact with liquid contami- 
nants and radioactive particles. Although va- 
pors and aerosols will penetrate through the 
closures, the amount of vapor that will pene- 
trate to the skin will be reduced. To minimize 
this effect, masking tape or adhesive tape 
should be used to seal all closures and vents 
snugly. A complete outfit, including a parka, 
trousers, rubber boots, and gloves, provides 
an excellent means of preventing radioactive 
materials from getting on the skin and clothing 
of members of decontamination teams who are 
working in a radiological fallout field. For 
this reason, these outfits should be worn by all 



549252 O-60-7 



4-1? 






members of disaster control teams in such 
areas. Foul weather gear does not provide 
adequate protection against CW agents for 
recovery personnel nor does it provide pro- 
tection from gamma radiation. 

4B1.04 PERMEABLE PROTECTIVE 
CLOTHING 

Permeable protective clothing is spe- 
cial clothing that has been impregnated with 
chemicals that neutralize the vapor and fine 
spray of blister agents. Clothing of this type 
can be impregnated (a) at plants that are op- 
erated by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts 
or (b) in the field through the use of an M3 
clothing impregnating set (paragraph 4B1.12). 
Because the garments are permeable, air will 
pass through the fabrics, and the clothing is 
more comfortable to wear then impermeable 
clothing. Members of disaster control teams 
usually wear permeable clothing when the 
teams are operating in areas that have been 
contaminated with CW agents. Such clothing is 
also adequate protection against any known BW 
agent. The fabric, however, does not protect 
personnel against large drops or splashes of 
blister ag&nts and affords no more protection 
than normal clothing against G-agents. When 
large drops of a blister agent are present, the 
wearer should immediately cut out and discard 
contaminated portions of the fabric and change 
to clean clothing as soon as possible. 

4B1.05 IMPERMEABLE PROTECTIVE 
CLOTHING 

Impermeable protective clothing is 
made of cloth that has been coated on both 
sides with butyl rubber. This clothing does 
not permit the passage of air through its fab- 
ric, and hence it may be worn comfortably for 
only a limited time. Impermeable clothing, 
however, does provide the most complete pro- 
tection that is currently available against BW 
and CW agents. As a rule, it will be required 
only in areas that have received heavy liquid 
contamination. Although resistant to liquid 
CW agents, impermeable protective clothing 
will be penetrated after a few hours of expo- 
sure to heavy concentrations. Therefore, 
liquid contamination on the clothing should be 
neutralized or removed as quickly as possible. 

4B1.06 PROTECTIVE MASKS 

A protective mask will protect the 
wearer against the toxic effects of ABC war- 
fare agents. However, in enclosed spaces that 
contain very high concentrations of a CW 
agent, the life of the canister will be extremely 
short. The mask is not intended for use where 
(a) an insufficient supply of oxygen is in the 



air or (b) for protection against toxic effects 
of carbon monoxide, ammonia, or acid and 
organic vapors that are encountered in the 
handling or manufacture of chemicals. There- 
fore, under these conditions, the oxygen-supply 
type of mask, such as an oxygen breathing 
apparatus (OB A), is recommended, 

1. AVAILABLE MODELS. Two mod- 
els of protective mask are currently avail- 
able for use in the Shore Establishment. The 
ashore masks are the Army M3A1 lightweight 
service mask (LWS) and the M9A1 protec- 
tive field mask. The Army M3A1 mask, be- 
cause of its age, is currently being dropped 
from the system. Both the LWS and the 
M9A1 masks are issued complete with car- 
rier, face piece, canister, protective oint- 
ment kit (paragraph 4B2.02), and an antidim 
material that will prevent fogging in the eye- 
pieces. Masks are required for all personnel 
who must operate in contaminated areas or 
who might be caught in such areas during 
or following an attack. These masks are 
also required for personnel who occupy non- 
pressurized shelters. The effective life of 
a mask is dependent upon the life of the 
canister, which varies with the type and 
concentration of agent in the air, the time 
of exposure to the concentration, and the rate 
of breathing of the wearer. The military can- 
ister rarely breaks down suddenly. Usually, 
it fails gradually, and the wearer is warned of 
the need for replacement by sensory effects, 
such as a slight but persistent odor of gas or 
an irritation that is caused by gas vapors. 
These effects, however , may be due to a poorly 
fitted mask, which is a more common cause 
than an exhausted canister. 

2. HOODS AND EYE GLASSES. Be- 
cause of the variations of the size and shape 
of individual faces, some leakage around the 
edges of a mask facepiece may be expected. 
For protection against some CW agents, this 
leakage is not serious, but for BW and some 
new CW agents it may well be critical. There- 
fore, an additional hood is required to protect 
personnel, such as disaster control teams who 
are exposed for long periods. These hoods 
are discussed in more detail in paragraph 
4B1.07 and also in paragraph A28 of Appen- 
dix A. 

Protective eye glasses are available 
by prescription from the medical officer 
for personnel who must wear glasses with a 
mask. The eye glasses are designed to fit as 
inserts inside the eye pieces of the mask. 
Repair kits for local repair and maintenance 
of masks of both types are furnished. These 
kits are described in detail in paragraph A36 
of Appendix A. 









4-18 












4B1.07 HOODS 

Hoods are essentially an impermeable 
cover for the protective mask and are made of 
butyl rubber-coated cloth; they are designed 
for semipermanent mounting onboth the M3A1 
and M9A1 masks. Hoods are required by 
members of disaster control teams who must 
work for long periods of time in areas that 
are contaminated with BW or CW agents. The 
hoods are designed so that exhaled air will 
maintain a positive pressure inside, thus pre- 
venting agents from entering. The main pur- 
pose of the hoods is to prevent contaminated 
particles from lodging on the periphery of the 
mask and the otherwise exposed areas of the 
neck and face. 

4B1.08 WEARABILITY 

Personnel who are required to work 
while they are wearing protective gear, even 
just masks, must be given periodic rest peri- 
ods so they can maintain work efficiency and 
to drink, eat, and smoke. The length of time 
personnel may be expected to remain in com- 
plete protective gear will depend upon the 
temperature and physical exertion that is 
required. Under average conditions, person- 
nel can reasonably be expected to remain 
protected for several hours in all except the 
impermeable outfit. The following tabulation 
can be used as a guide in the determination of 
the wearability of the impermeable protective 
suit. 



Temperature 


Wearing time 


(T) 


(hr) 


above 90 


1/4 


85-90 


1/2 


70-80 


1-1/2 


60-70 


2 


50-60 


3 


30-50 


5 


below 3 


8 



4B1.09 PRECAUTIONS 

a. Personnel should take the following 
precautions in putting on protective clothing. 

(1) Trouserlegs should be tucked 
inside boot tops; if field shoes are worn, the 
legs should be tucked inside the socks. Any 
excess should be arranged to blouse over the 
tops of socks or boots. 

(2) All buttons and other closures 
should be fastened securely. 



securely. 



(3) All flaps should be interleaved 



(4) Neck closures and cuffs should 
be securely fastened, and gloves should be 
drawn over the sleeve cuffs. 

b. In taking off protective clothing 
particular care should be taken so that con- 
taminated portions will not come in contact 
with the skin. 

4B 1 . 1 STORAGE OF PROTEC TIVE 
CLOTHING 

Certain precautions should be taken 
to prolong the life of impregnite in permeable 
protective clothing that is placed in storage. 
These safeguards are as follows. 

(1) The garments should be stored 
in a cool, dry, well-ventilated place that is 
protected from direct sunlight. 

{Z) The garments should not come 
in contact with organic solvents, such as alco- 
hol, gasoline, dry-cleaning solvents, tetra- 
chloroethane, or similar compounds. Even 
vapors from these substances are detrimental. 

(3) Damp clothing should be dried 
in a cool, shady spot as soon as possible. 

(4) Mothproofing agents should 
not be used on impregnated clothing. 

(5) Deteriorated garments should 
not be placed in contact with serviceable gar- 
ments. Garments that have lost their impreg- 
nite content cause and accelerate deterioration 
in serviceable clothing. 

Before and after use, impermeable 
protective clothing canbe stored uncovered for 
long periods without apparent deterioration. 
Normal storageprocedures are also applicable 
to foul weather gear and ordinary clothing, 

4B1.11 CLOTHING TESTS AND 
TESTING KITS 

No reliable test kit is available to the 
field for use in the determination of the pro- 
tective qualities of impregnated clothing. The 
Ml impregnite-in-clothing test kit has proven 
unreliable in service use and has been with- 
drawn from the supply system. To assure 
protection of personnel, all clothing should be 
impregnated after every laundering or every 
time it has been worn for one week. 

When impregnated clothing is expec- 
ted to remain in storage for longer than three 
months, a swatch of the clothing material 
should be attached to the garment prior to im- 
pregnation. These swatches should be stapled 






4-19 



to the bottom hem of a parka and inside the 
waistband of trousers. The new E14 impreg- 
nate analyzing kit, which destroys the cloth 
being tested, can be used to test the swatches 
and thus determine the suitability of impreg- 
nation after a garment has been in storage. 
This kit is expected to be in the supply system 
in the near future. Swatches should remain 
attached to the clothing until it is worn. A 
visual inspection of each garment should be 
made to discover defects such as rips, tears, 
and worn places that might permit passage of 
war gases. Meanwhile, the clothing should 
be tested for strength. This can be done by 
taking a single layer of cloth in both hands and 
giving it a quick jerk; if the cloth gives way, 
it has rotted and must be discarded. Another 
method is to try to force the thumb or the 
blunt end of a pencil through the cloth; if this 
can be done easily, the clothing must be dis- 
carded. If the first sample quantity does not 
pass the test, the minimum sample quantity 
should be doubled (Table 4-1). 

4B1.12 CLOTHING IMPREGNATING SETS 

In emergency situations, it may be 
desirable to impregnate ordinary clothing. 
The Ml clothing impregnating set will impreg- 
nate 30 two-layer suits and the M 3 (Figure 
4-5) will impregnate 20 two- layer suits of 
clothing. No accessories are needed with the 
M 1 set; however, to use the M 3 set, the fol- 
lowing accessories are required: (a) a 24-gal- 
minimum container , (b) a container to measure 



water, (c) a stirring paddle, (d) a clothesline. 
Freshwater should be used with both sets; salt 
water, however, may be used in emergencies. 



o 




Figure 4-5. Impregnating Set, Clothing, 
Field, M3 

A minimum of three men is required 
to operate either the Ml or the M3 set. The 
vigorous stirring that is required makes it 
necessary for the men to relieve each other 
at short intervals. 

Field impregnation can be accom- 
plished indoors or outdoors. Adequate facil- 
ities for hanging or spreading the clothing so 
it will dry must be provided. Clothing should 
not be exposed to direct sunlight while it ia 
drying, because this will cause decomposition 
of the impregnite and also result in discolor- 
ation of the fabric. 






TABLE 4-1 
Schedule of Tests for Protective Clothing 



Condition of 
clothing 


Climate 


Reimpregnation 
intervals 


Minimum 

amount of issue 

visually inspected 

(%) 


Being worn; not con- 
taminated 


Tropical, temperate, 
or cold 


1 week's wear or one 
laundering 


10.0 


In storage; not con- 
taminated 


Tropical 


3-month maximum 


0.5 


In storage; not con- 
taminated 


Temperate to cold 


6 -month maximum 


0.5 


Garments exposed 

to blister gas 
vapor 


All 


Immediately upon ex- 
posure or as soon 
as practicable 


All exposed clothing 
must be reimpreg- 
nated 



4-20 



o 






Section 2. MISCELLANEOUS PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 



4B2.01 SPECIAL SITUATIONS 

The materials that are described in 
the preceding section provide adequate phys- 
ical protection for the individual. It is neces- 
sary, however, to have some supplementary 
items for self-aid and for special operating 
conditions such as amphibious landings. These 
items are discussed in the following para- 
graphs and in Appendix A, as referenced. 

4B2.02 PROTECTION AND TREATMENT 
SET, CHEMICAL WARFARE 
AGENTS, M5A1 

The M5A1 protection and treatment 
set is a kit that is carried in the protective 
maskcarrier. Itprovides necessary materials 
for self-aid against CW agents. As shown in 
paragraph A35 of Appendix A, the kit contains 
three tubes of M5 protective ointment, one tube 
of BAL eye ointment, and one atropine tartrate 
injection that is packaged in a waterproof, metal 
container. The uses of these materials areas 
follows. 

1. PROTECTIVE OINTMENT. The 
M5 protective ointment neutralizes blister gas. 
Precautions must be taken to keep the ointment 
out of the eyes. It may be applied to any other 
area of the body before exposure to blister 
gases, and it is effective against contamination 
of the skin by G- agents. For example, the 
ointment may be applied to exposed areas of 
the face and neck. It may be applied to areas 
of the skin that are exposed by torn or improp- 
erly fitting clothing. It is also used for (a) 
first-aid in the decontamination of any area of 
the body surface (except the eyes) after expo- 
sure to blister gases and (b) emergency decon- 
tamination of small areas on clothing and items 
of individual equipment such as weapons. To 
be effective on the skin, the M5 ointment must 
be applied within two minutes after exposure. 

In the treatment of an area of the skin 
that has been splashed with a blister agent, the 
first step is to pinch-blot the CW agent from 
the skin with cloth or absorbent paper. Then, 
M5 ointment is rubbed vigorously on the skin, 
and after 30 seconds, the excess is removed, 
A final coating of the ointment is then applied 
and allowed to remain. 

2. BAL EYE OINTMENT. BAL oint- 
ment is suitable for use in the eyes to counter- 
act the effects of arsenical agents (L,ED,MD, 
and PD). When using the ointment, the indi- 
vidual's hands should be free of contamination. 
The eyes should first be flushed with water for 



about 30 seconds, but if there is eye pain, the 
BAL ointment should be used immediately. 
This is done by squeezing a small amount of 
ointment into a corner of each eye, and spread- 
ing it under the eyelids by gentle massage. 
Eyelids and eyelashes can be treated by blot- 
ting off the agent, spreading BAL over the 
area, and wiping off the BAL at once with a 
clean cloth. 

3. ATROPINE TARTRATE INJEC- 
TION. An atropine tartrate injection consists 
of a sterile, collapsible tube that has aneedle at- 
tached. The tube contains a solution of atropine 
tartrate. The assembly comes with a wire that 
is inserted in the tube of the needle. When the 
wire is pushed inward, it punctures the seal 
at the top of the tube. The wire is then with- 
drawn, and the injection is made. This unit is 
provided for self-aid against G-agents only. 
Symptoms such as an unexplained running 
nose, tightness in the chest, or pinpoint eyes, 
(dimming vision) call for an injection of one 
shot. The injection should be made deep into 
a large muscle of the thigh, buttock, or upper 
arm. After injection, massage the area to 
speed the action of the drug. About eight to 
ten minutes are required for the atropine tar- 
trate to take complete effect. After the first 
shot, two additional shots may be given by a 
hospital corpsman as a first-aid measure. 
More than 3 shots should be administered only 
under the supervision of a medical officer. 
The empty tubes should be attached to the 
patient's label to avoid overdoses. Dryness in 
the mouth indicates that enough atropine tar- 
trate has been injected. Other details con- 
cerning first-aid procedures will be found in 
paragraph A35 of Appendix A. 

4B2.03 PROTECTIVE MASK 

WATERPROOFING SETS 

During landing operations, personnel 
who are going ashore will require some pro- 
tection of their masks against water. Two 
waterproofing sets (paragraph A25 of Appendix 
A), one for each type of mask, are available. 
For the M9A1 mask, the designation is "Bag, 
Waterproofing, M 1," and for the LWS mask, 
the designation is "Waterproofing Set, C 3." 
For details see Appendix A. 

4B2.04 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE 
COVERS 

In addition to the protective clothing 
that is described in the preceding section, a 
special cover is provided. This is described 
in detail in paragraph A27 of Appendix A. It 






4-21 



is designed to protect the head and body from gases such as the mustards. For this purpose, 

liquid spray contamination. Personnel of the a 2-oz can (M 1) or a 4-oz can (M 2) of 

Shore Establishment are not expected to be in dressing (paragraph A32 of Appendix A) that 

the open during a CW attack; but, because this is known as "leather dressing, gas-resistant," 

item can also be used as a bag to hold contam- is required. The material is rubbed by hand 

inated clothing for transport and decontamina- into the leather of shoes. One treatment will 

tion, it is maintained in present allowances. resist aliquid mustard agent for approximately 

4B2.05 PROTECTIVE DRESSING 

FOR SHOES 

A special dressing is provided for 
treatment of shoes to make them resistant to 



2-1 /2 hours. 






4-22 









Section 3. PRECAUTIONARY AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES 






4B3.01 SELF-PRESERVATION DURING 
A NUCLEAR ATTACK 

When an advance warning of a nuclear 
attack is given, the beat procedure is to go to 
specified shelters without v delay and remain 
there until proper authority has indicated that 
it is safe to emerge. Full protection against 
radiation may not be readily available (except 
when special underground shelters are pro- 
vided), but even partial protection will reduce 
the number of casualties. 



If no warning is given, the first indi- 
cation of an attack may be a bright flash of 
light, ground shock or tremor, or a rising 
column of dirt or water. Almost instant reac- 
tion by individuals may be required to assure 
self-preservation. Ducking under a table or 
some other cover indoors, or into a trench or 
ditch if out-of-doors, provides shelter against 
some of the thermal radiation, reduces some- 
what the dose of initial nuclear radiation 
received, and protects personnel against flying 
missiles. Even getting behind a pile of earth 
or a stone wall provides some sheltering. If 
no better opportunities offer , per sonnel should 
drop to the ground face down and cover their 
faces and hands as completely as possible. 
The hazard from flying missiles that accom- 
pany the blast wave may persist for ten sec- 
onds or more. 

Residual radioactivity after an AW or 
RW attack can produce many more casualties 
if necessary precautions are not observed. 
Things to do and things to avoid may be sum- 
marized as follows. 

1 . THINGS TO DO . 

(1) When an alarm is sounded, 
personnel shall get their masks ready and 
proceed to a designated station or shelter. 

(2) When an attack occurs without 
warning, each individual shall throw himself 
face down against a bulkhead or wall; under a 
table, desk, or bench; in a ravine, ditch, or 
vehicle. He must cover himself with anything 
at hand and remain shielded until heavy debris 
has stopped falling. 

(3) If not a casualty, each individ- 
ual shall report (a) to his duty station or (b) fox 
decontamination if so ordered. 



(4) Personnel 
self-aid and give first aid. 



shall administei 



(5) If injured, an individual shall 
report to a first-aid station. 

(6) Personnel who are in the open 
subsequent to an attack shall don masks, adjust 
clothing, and, if possible, keep upwind from the 
possible fallout. If not in the immediate blast 
area, personnel will have some time to either 
get out of the path of the fallout or seek a 
shelter that provides radiation shielding. 

2. THINGS TO AVOID. 

(1) Avoid eating, drinking, smok- 
ing, chewing gum, or doing anything else that 
requires putting the hands to the mouth. 

(2) Refrain from eating foods or 
drinking water from sources that have not been 
approved by competent authority. 

(3) Avoid stirring up dust unnec- 
essarily in contaminated areas. 

(4) Avoid entering hazardous 
areas when not required to do so by duty assign- 
ment. 

4B3.02 SELF-PRESERVATION DURING 
A BW ATTACK 

Organized countermeasures against 
BW attack are based on decisions that are 
made by trained medical personnel. Self- 
preservation is largely a matter of compliance 
with orders and instructions, including special 
sanitary precautions and programs of inocu- 
lation and therapy. In addition, the individual 
must observe various safeguards in order to 
achieve a higher degree of safety. A few of 
these safeguards are summarized as follows. 

(1) Masks shall be worn until an 
order is received for their removal, and per- 
sonnel shall remain in shelters as directed. 
Personnel must keep upwind from suspected 
BW clouds as much as possible. 

(2) Personnel shall report for BW 
decontamination when directed and have cuts 
and wounds treated as promptly as possible. 
They shall change to clothing that is known to 
be noncontaminated as soon as possible. 

(3) Personnel shall keep out of con- 
taminated buildings and areas unless entry is 
required by duty assignment. 

(4) Subsequent to attack, personnel 
shall eat only approved foods, if such limitation 
is possible. Packaged foods will be safe to 






4-23 



use provided the outer surfaces have been de- 
contaminated. This may be done by washing 
the package in a chlorine solution that is made 
by dissolving a handful of bleach in a half 
gallon of water. 

(5) Personnel shall drink water only 
from approved sources. If the only available 
source is suspected to be contaminated, the 
water shall be boiled for 10 minutes and de- 
contaminated by the addition of three iodine 
tablets per quart. If iodine odor is strong after 
10 minutes, another 20 minutes must elapse 
before the water is drunk; if iodine odor is 
weak or absent, the water must be discarded 
and the process repeated with more than three 
tablets. It possible water should be boiled 
prior to treatment with iodine as an additional 
safety precaution. 

4B3.03 SELF-PRESERVATION DURING 
A CW ATTACK 

During a CW attack, the relative 
effectiveness of self-aid and first aid depends 
on (a) prompt recognition of the attack; (b) 
rapid institution of protective measures; and 
(c) knowledge of, and ability to use, available 
protective equipment and facilities. A few 
precautionary measures that must be followed 
in the advent of a CW attack are listed below. 

(1) Masks shall be put on immedi- 
ately after the warning has been sounded and 
kept on until the "all clear" has been given. 
This is the first line of defense. It is unsafe 
to rely upon odor to detect CW agents. When 
in doubt, masks must be donned. 

(2) Unless under special assignment, 
personnel shall proceed to the shelter upon 
warning and shall remain there until the "all 
clear" has been given. 

(3) When the eyes, face, and neck 
are contaminated by a liquid CW agent, indi- 
viduals shall hold their breath and decontami- 
nate and treat their eyes before donning 
masks. However, if considerable time will be 
required to decontaminate the face (more than 
a minute), it is better to don masks immedi- 
ately and proceed to an area where masks can 
be removed and decontamination procedures 
can be undertaken. 

(4) Personnel shall effect self-aid 
and first aid and continue duties when possible. 
Contaminated clothing shall be cut away and 
discarded. The skin must be decontaminated 
and treated. 



smoke. 



(5) Masks shall be worn in enemy 



(6) Until medical aid arrives, casu- 
alties must be made comfortable, kept warm 
and quiet, and, if necessary, given artificial 
respiration. 

(7) During and subsequent to an 
attack, only approved foods shall be eaten. 
When the outer coverings of packaged food are 
suspected to be contaminated, they must be 
decontaminated by washing them in chlorine 
solution. Only approved water shall be used 
for drinking. It may be necessary to bring 
pure water supplies into the contaminated area. 

(8) Unless entry is required by duty 
assignment subsequent to attack, personnel 
shall stay out of contaminated areas. 

Self-aid differs somewhat according 
to the various CW agents that are employed. 
First aid consists of (a) assisting others in 
carrying out self-aid measures, (b) adminis- 
tering artificial respiration and treatment for 
shock, and (c) removing casualties from con- 
taminated areas -as required. Recommended 
procedures may be summarized as follows. 

1. BLISTER GASES. Self -aid pro- 
cedures include (a) flushing out the eyes with 
water when necessary; (b) using BAL eye oint- 
ment if there is eye pain; (c) decontaminating 
the face, ears, and neck when necessary, and 
putting protective ointment on exposed areas 
of the skin; (d) removing droplets of agents 
from the skin, and applying M5 ointment; and 
(f) decontaminating or discarding contaminated 
clothing. 

2. NERVE GASES. Speed is the first 
essential step for self-preservation, and self- 
aid must be accomplished within five minutes. 
Self-aid includes (a) flushing liquid from the 
eyes with water; (b) decontaminating the face, 
ears, and neck with soap and water if avail- 
able, and using protective ointment; (c) remov- 
ing droplets of the agent from the skin; (d) 
taking one or more atropine shots when early 
symptoms develop as described in paragraph 
4B2.02; and (e) decontaminating or discarding 
contaminated clothing. 

3. BLOOD GASES. Self-aid includes 
(a) moving to a place where the air is not con- 
taminated, (b) blotting off any droplets that 
have made contact with the skin, and (c) re- 
moving and airing clothes that have come in 
contact with the liquid agent. 

4. CHOKING GASES. Self- aid in- 
cludes (a) assuring that the mask is worn 
properly, (b) loosening the clothing, (c) keeping 
warm, and (d) taking nonalcoholic stimulating 
drinks when the mask can be removed. No 



r 






4-24 



o 






special self-aid should be necessary if masking 
has been prompt. 

5. VOMITING GASES. Self- aid in- 
cludes (a) wearing the mask in spite of cough- 
ing, sneezing, and salivation, and (b) lifting the 
mask only to vomit. If these precautions are 
observed, recovery should be prompt. 

6. TEAR GASES. Self-aid includes 
assuring that the protective mask is properly 
worn. After the attack (gas cloud) has passed, 
the procedure is to unmask, face the wind, 
loosen clothing, blot (not rub) the eyes, use 
water to wash contamination from the eyes, 
and use soap and water to wash contamination 
from the skin. 

7. SCREENING SMOKES. Self-aid, 
after unmasking has become possible, includes 
the use of water to remove such agents as 
sulfur trioxide and titanium from the body; the 
eyes should be irrigated if necessary. If white 
phosphorus has been employed, those areas 
where particles of the agent have lodged should 
be kept wet with water, mud, or wet cloths, 
and the particles should be removed while they 
are still wet. 

8. INCENDIARIES. Self-aid includes 

(a) using a first-aid dressing to cover any area 
of the skin that has been burned or broken and 

(b) dealing with white phosphorus particles in 
the manner that is described in the preceding 
paragraph. 

All of the preceding self-aid and first- 
aid measures are concerned with personnel in 
the field. When personnel come in contact 
with CW agents, it is desirable that they be 
processed through decontamination stations 
as soon as possible. Casualties "will be decon- 
taminated at the aid station. When personnel 
are more seriously injured, first aid and de- 
contamination will be provided, pending the 
time that they can be removed to hospitals for 
further treatment. 

4B3.04 PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY 

Personnel dosimetry is important at 
the time of attack as a means of checking on 
dosages of total radiation, including initial 
radiation that is received by individuals. After 



attack, dosimetry is important as a means of 
determining doses of radiation that have been 
accumulated by individuals at all stages. 

During recovery operations, person- 
nel dosimetry is of great importance regard- 
less of the calculated risks that may be 
assumed. It is the basis for making estimates 
and decisions of the following types. 

(1) After a nuclear burst has taken 
place, dosimeter readings will provide a basis 
for the estimation of probable casualties and a 
determination of the personnel who should be 
evacuated immediately. 

(2) Dosimeter readings are also the 
key that is used in the determination of (a) the 
permissible stay times of work parties in 
areas where residual radiation is present, (b) 
the individuals who have received the maxi- 
mum acceptable dosages, and (c) the individ- 
uals who may be safely assigned to further 
stay times in contaminated areas. 

4B3.05 MEDICAL AID AND 
EXAMINATIONS 

Whether an attack ip- made with AW, 
BW, or CW agents, or acornbination of all three, 
the importance of dispersed medical facilities 
to the individual is paramount. First-aid teams 
and stations on, and about, the rescue perimeter 
provide for early emergency treatment and 
evacuation. Personnel may be monitored, and 
decontaminated when necessary. Person- 
nel who require further medical aid may then 
be sent to emergency hospitals or permanent 
hospitals that are beyond the supportperimeter. 

The medical support groups will pro- 
vide for medical treatment and arrange for 
evacuation. In the event of a nuclear attack, 
the surviving medical personnel will be so 
overwhelmed with casualties that evacuation of 
wounded will of necessity be delegated to less 
burdened personnel under the supervision of 
the medical department. 

Regular and special medical exami- 
nations become increasingly important after 
an ABC attack. If BW agents of known identity 
have been employed, programs of inoculation 
maybe required in some instances and pro- 
grams of drug therapy in others. 



4-25 






PART C. GROUP PROTECTION 

Section 1. SELECTION, PLACEMENT, AND ALTERATION OF STRUCTURES 






4C1.01 GENERAL POLICIES 

Because protection of personnel is of 
paramount importance, the policy of the Navy- 
is to plan protective shelters that will be func- 
tional to the highest degree. To accomplish 
this objective, the plans must be based not only 
on a recognition and understanding of ideal 
protection, but on methods and techniques that 
are practical and feasible. The degree of pro- 
tection to be provided depends on factors that 
vary with the type, size, location, and cost of 
individual structures. 

1. EXTENT OF PROTECTION. Al- 
though complete protection for all personnel 
is not feasible, the policy is to plan some pro- 
tection, within budget limits, for all personnel 
at every activity. Thus, defense measures are 
intended to reduce to a practical minimum 
those personnel risks that can not be elimi- 
nated. Because it is impossible to determine 
in advance the exact type of attack that might 
be launched against a shore activity, all prob- 
able types must be considered, and an all- 
purpose protection must be designed. It is 
possible to evaluate a potential threat by a 
target analysis of the area and determine the 
critical weapon effects. When this has been 
completed, major efforts should be directed 
toward the reduction of hazards. For example, 
an activity, because of its location in relation 
to a potential target, might be undamaged by 
blast or fire and yet heavily contaminated by 
fallout. Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8, presents 
composite criteria for the provision of maxi- 
mum protection within established limits. 

The practical degree or maximum 
feasible protection for most personnel would 
include: 

(1) Partial or complete shielding 
of personnel from contamination by CW and BW 
agents, and from heat and nuclear radiation; 

(2) Limited protection from flying 
shrapnel; 

(3) Limited protection from flying 
debris; and 

(4) Limited blast protection. It 
will not be possible to provide everyone with 
the same degree of blast protection, because of 
the wide variation in types of structures at the 
various shore activities. It will be possible 
by prudent planning to considerably reduce the 



risks to which personnel would otherwise be 
exposed. 

2. ASSUMPTIONS. The following 
assumptions are the basis for planning. 

(1) An enemy may use AW, RW, 
BW, CW, or HE weapons, or any combination 

thereof. 

( 2) Sufficient advance warning will 
be given so that personnel can be evacuated 
or can take refuge in shelters. If they enter 
shelters, sufficient space will be available for 
each person. 

(3) The entire activity or local 
area will be affected by the attack, and no area 
in the immediate vicinity will be left uncon- 
taminated. 

(4) Full protection against BW 
and CW agents will be provided only for com- 
mand and emergency operations teams. Full 
protection means that the air will be filtered 
and masks need not be worn in shelters. Per- 
sonnel may have to remain in shelters for 
extended periods of time. 

(5) Partial protection against BW 
and CW agents will be provided for all other 
personnel. Partial protection means that the 
air in shelters will not be filtered and masks 
will be required. The personnel involved will 
be unable to leave the shelters during or im- 
mediately after an attack; they may have to 
remain in the shelters for three hours or more. 
In fact, in the event of an AW attack, personnel 
may not be able to leave the shelters at the 
end of three hours because of radiological 
contamination. The shelters, however, can be 
opened for ventilation. 

Shelters should be located as close as 
possible to points where personnel are likely 
to be at the time of warning. Routes to shelters 
should be clear of obstructions and should not 
run through narrow passageways or other 
potential bottlenecks. 

4C1.02 PRINCIPLE OF DISPERSAL 

Dispersal is one of the most effective 
means of reducing vulnerability to enemy 
attack. The two forms in which dispersal may 
be utilized are dispersal in space and dispersal 
in time. A detailed treatment of this subject 
will be found in Personnel Shelters and Pro- 
tective Construction, NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8. 






4-27 







-5 SAYS (SI 4'C=20'O - 
-12 BATS gt 4<0" = 48'D"- 



GRAPHIC SCALE 

10' 



I I I I I 3Z 



LEGEND 

CC = CONTAMINATED CLOTHING 
CP=COLLECTIVE PROTECTOR (600 CFM! 
OAL=OUTER AW LOCK 
IAL=tNNER AIR LOCK 
CT = CHEMICAL TOILET 



NOTE - ALL DOORS, 
LOUVERS, AMD OTHER 
OPENINGS MUST HAVE 
BLAST PROTECTION. 



Figure 4-6. A Typical Single -Purpose Shelter 



c 



o 









4- 
I 




SUPPORTING 
PLATFORM 



CONVERTED STRUCTURE 
THAT PROVIDES PERSONNEL 
SHELTER 



LEGEND 

FOB CONVERTED CONSTRUCTION 

SDWG-X-EX1STING DOOR WEATHERSTR1PPED AND EQUIPPED 

WITH AIR REGULATORS 

SDWG-T-EXISTING DOOR [SEALED GAS TIGHT! 

EH-ELECTRIC SPACE HEATER 

FAO-FRE5H AIR OPENING (SEALED) 

PEG-PORTABLE ELECTRIC GENERATOR 

CP-COLLECTIVE PROTECTOR 

"A"~PRES5U«E RELlff VALVES 

"»"— AIR REGULATORS 

CT-CHEMICAL TOILET 

PAL-PORTASLE AIR LOCK ANO SUPPORT 



SYMBOLS FOR PRESSURIZED AREAS 



AIR PRESSURE EQUALS 0.6" WATER 



AIR PRESSURE EQUALS 0.4" WATER 



AIR PRESSURE EQUALS 0.3" WATES 



Figure 4-7. A Typical Multipurpose Shelter 



1. DISPERSAL IN SPACE, Dispersal 
in space (decentralization) is the act of sepa- 
rating personnel, materials, equipment, or 
facilities from each other, or from a probable 
target area, for the purpose of reducing vul- 
nerability to enemy action. During World War 
II, adequate dispersal could be achieved by 
separating structures within a single activity. 
This degree of dispersal, however, is no longer 
adequate because newer weapons require a 
dispersal of several miles. 

2. DISPERSAL IN TIME. Dispersal 
in time may be regarded as split, alternate, 
or successive work shifts that are arranged so 
that only a fraction of the entire work force 
will be in an area at any one time. This type 
of dispersal may be particularly useful when 
protection of personnel is the principal con- 
sideration. Dispersal in time can increase 
the effectiveness of dispersal in space when 
protection of facilities is equally critical. 
Personnel who are not on duty must be in ade- 
quate shelters or must be dispersed in spaces 
as discussed above. 

4C1.03 PRINCIPLE OF DUPLICATION 

By the principle of duplication, dupli- 
cate facilities are provided, thus increasing 
the chances that vital functions will be carried 
on if one facility is destroyed or disabled by 
enemy action. If duplication is impracticable, 
plans should be made for the work of certain 
vital facilities to be carried on by other facil- 
ities that are located at another activity. 
Because of cost, duplication must be confined 
to the most vital facilities. 

4C1.04 PERSONNEL PROTECTIVE 
SHELTERS 

1, SINGLE-PURPOSE SHELTERS. 
Single-purpose shelters (Figure 4-6) are espe- 
cially designed to resist ABC attack. Shelter 
is the primary purpose that these structures 
serve. Areas in existing reinforced concrete 
or steel frame buildings should be developed 
for protective shelters whenever possible, 
because they offer the most economical solu- 
tion to the problem of collective protection. 
Single-purpose shelters, however, will be re- 
quired when existing facilities are inadequate 
or can not be readily altered to include per- 
sonnel shelters. 

Single-purpose shelters are ideal 
bases of operation for command center per- 
sonnel, control posts, decontamination teams, 
and other emergency recovery personnel. The 
ready availability of essential equipment and 
gear within the shelters is likely to result in 
important savings in time and less possibility 



of confusion in emergency situations. The 
types of construction that are suitable for 
single-purpose shelters include: (a) earth- 
covered, prefabricated ammunition storage 
magazines with reinforced end walls; (b) earth- 
covered, prefabricated buildings with precast 
concrete panels; and (c) poured-in-place 
concrete, blast-resistant personnel shelters. 
Large corrugated steel or reinforced concrete 
culverts with proper entrances and an earth 
cover may also be used to provide a substan- 
tial degree of blast and radiation protection. 

2. MULTIPURPOSE SHELTERS. 
Multipurpose shelters (Figure 4-7) are espe- 
cially prepared and designated areas that are 
located within selected reinforced concrete or 
steel frame buildings. Such a shelter should 
not interfere with the normal uses of the build- 
ings, but in the event of attack it should be 
immediately usable as a personnel shelter. 
Therefore, a portion of each suitable building 
at naval shore activities should be designed or 
altered to provide protection for the personnel 
who occupy the building. 

These conversions will usually cost 
considerably less than the construction of 

single-purpose shelters. When a new building 
is being designed, consideration should be 
given to the special requirements that are nec- 
essary for the protection of personnel during 
an ABC attack. For details, see Personnel 
Shelters and Protective Construction , NAV- 
DOCKS TP-PL-8, 

4C1.05 PROBLEMS OF ACCESS 

Accessibility is one of the most im- 
portant considerations in the planning and 
designing of per sonnel shelters . Because large 
groups of personnel usually can not assemble 
quickly, protective shelters should be located 
near the places where personnel ordinarily 
work or are housed. Access routes to shelters 
should be as direct as possible. Potential 
bottlenecks, such as narrow passageways, long 
flights of stairs, stacks of stored materials, 
and long rows of parked vehicles, should be 
avoided. Access routes should be clearly 
marked, and diagrams of marked routes should 
be posted in all working or living areas. 

4C1.06 SHIELDING AGAINST RADIATION 

In the selection and construction of 
personnel shelters, the problem of shielding 
the occupants against radiation is of primary 
importance. Good shielding is achieved when 
a thickness of material that is sufficient to 
reduce the gamma- radiation dose rate to 
acceptable proportions is interposed between 
the individual and the source of radiation. 



o 



( 



4-30 



c 






A variety of materials will provide the desired 
protection. Each of themhas a half-thickness, 
which is that thickness of absorbing material 
necessary to reduce the dose rate of the radi- 
ation by one half. 

Figure 4-8 illustrates the shielding 
effect of three half- thicknesses of material. 
The initial gamma- radiation dose rate is 400 r. 
Upon passing through the first half-thickness, 
this dose rate is reduced to 200 r; it becomes 
100 r after passing through the second half- 
thickness; and it is reduced to 50 r after pass- 
ing through the third half-thickness. 



400 r 



I5™7 



► 




¥ 


















; 


► 

» 








■ > 








^> 




200 r 


► 


■> 










-► 




* 








» 






» 


■ — ■* 




»• 





100 r 



Figure 4-8. Reduction in Dose Rate of Gamma 

Radiation Provided by ThreeHalf-Thicknesses 
of Shielding Material 

Half-thicknesses vary among materi- 
als that are often used for shielding purposes. 
For initial gamma radiation, half-thicknesses 
have been estimated as follows. 



Material 

Steel 
Concrete 
Earth 
Water 



The thicknesses that are necessary to 
provide varying degrees of protection against 
fixed amounts of initial gamma radiation can 
be readily computed. The shielding proper- 
ties of any material are directly proportional 
to its density. 

The half-thicknesses that were previ- 
ously discussed apply to initial gamma radia- 
tion rather than residual radiation. In general, 



Thickne 


is 


( 


in.) 




1- 


1/2 




6 






7- 


1/2 




13 







half-thicknesses are less for residual radia- 
tion because gamma radiation from fallout is 
not as penetrating as the initial gamma radia- 
tion from a burst. More detailed discussion 
on half-thicknesses is contained in Effects of 
Nuclear Weapons , which was prepared by the 
Department of Defense and published in June 
1957 by the Atomic Energy Commission. 

The estimation of the shelter that a 
building will provide is rather complicated and 
depends on several factors, including (a) the 
number of building openings, (b) whether the 
area is above or below ground, and (c) the type 
of roof. Radiological Recovery of Fixed Mili- 
tary Installations , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-13, 
presents a procedure for the estimation of the 
sheltering capacities of buildings. 

4C1.07 SPECIAL MARKING OF AREAS 

Locations of, and directions to, shel- 
ter areas and locations of fire alarms, fire 
stations, warden posts, and first-aid stations 
should be indicated by special markings. Shel- 
ter areas should be clearly marked so that 
occupants will have no doubt concerning the 
area limits. Directional signs should indicate 
clearly to all persons the routes of travel to 
the nearest shelter area. Building entrances 
should be appropriately marked so that the on- 
street population will know how to get to the 
shelter areas that have been reserved for its 
protection. 

Examples of typical signs that are 
used for the aforementioned purposes are 
shown in Figure 4-9. The type of materials 
and the color of the paint that are used in the 
construction of the signs are optional. For 
indoor use, any durable material with white 
letters on a dark background is suitable. Signs 
that are made of weather-resistant material 
with high-visibility yellow or luminescent 
yellow letters on a dark background are rec- 
ommended for outdoor use. Stencils and /or 
decalcomanias may also be used. 

4C1.08 ALTERATION OF STRUCTURES 

Many existing buildings must be 
altered for use as personnelprotective shelters 
to meet the shelter requirements. Because of 
the differences in construction, geographical 
location, environmental factors, and other con- 
siderations, each building must be studied 
from an engineering standpoint, using criteria 
that are presented in Personnel Shelters and 
Protective Construction , NAVDOCKS TP- 
PL-8. 






4-31 









.^1 



SHELTER AREA 
BEGINS 



HERE 






SIGN No. I 



'•';' 
«- 



9 Ift" 



-ft" 4- 



SHELTER 
AREA 


I V 

v 

1 • 

•V 

1 - 
s * 


S 


INSIDE 



■+ 




20 





WARDEN 
POST 


I'V 

iV 
i ' 




l T VJ 


| 




HERE 


i - 
J- 

iV 


1 


SIGN Not 2 
12" 





74 



STAIRWAY 
NO. 



SIGN No 13 

isV 



SHELTER AREA 
BEGINS 



HERE 



SIGN No.2 



SIGN No.4 



SIGN N0.6 



1 1? 






F) 


FiRE ALARM 




SIGN No ,4 



o 






Figure 4-9. Special Signs 



4-32 



O 






Section 2. PERSONNEL, SHELTERS 






4C2.01 REQUIREMENTS 

The number and types of personnel 
shelters will vary from activity to activity. 
This does not mean that every activity will 
require all of the types that are discussed. 
These types are mentioned as the types of 
facilities that will be required by recovery 
forces. If they are not available, it will be 
necessary to improvise at the scene of the dis- 
aster either in existing buildings or at loca- 
tions that are outside of the contaminated areas . 



4C2.02 COMMAND AND 

COMMUNICATION 



CENTERS 



The command and communication 
center, when used in ABC warfare defense, will 
be the nerve center for all emergency opera- 
tions. Properly equipped, it should provide 
complete command facilities, including shel- 
ter, subsistence supplies, and facilities for 
decontaminating personnel. In general, it will 
be the focal point for direction and control of 
the entire recovery force. 

To enable key personnel to exercise 
command effectively, the center must be set 
up to facilitate rapid and correct evaluation of 
the emergency situation. To make such an 
evaluation will require an adequate means of 
acquiring information. The communications 
system must therefore be an integral part of 
the center, and should be tied in with all shel- 
ter areas—the mobile defense force (both while 
in the field and at a control point) and the 
district control center. The use of communi- 
cations equipment will require that the center 
be pressurized and sealed so that masks will 
not be needed. 

4C2.03 DISASTER CONTROL CENTERS 

The disaster control center will pro- 
vide complete support for teams of the disaster 
control organization. Devices to permit rapid 
display and evaluation of information that per- 
tains to the emergency situation should be 
included. Such equipment will include devices 
that display the distribution, strength, and use 
of disaster control forces, a graphic plot, 
message control, and a summary status board. 
The center should also include a shelter area, 
subsistence food and water, supplies, and 
equipment. This center must be equipped with 
adequate storage space for the supplies, tools, 
and equipment that are necessary for its 
proper functioning. To facilitate ready issue, 
storage must be well organized, 



4C2.04 FIRST-AID CENTERS 

The first-aid center will provide 
facilities for treatment, registration of survi- 
vors, and evacuation of casualties from the 
area. Support that will be provided by the 
first-aid center will include shelter, subsist- 
ence supplies, decontamination materiels, and 
complete medical supplies. In addition, it will 
contain hospital equipment such as beds, treat- 
ment tables, sterilizers, and other medical 
equipment that is necessary for emergency 
treatment of the wounded. The first-aid center 
is not to be considered a hospital, because 
casualties that are brought to the center will 
be held and cared for only until they can be 
transferred to hospitals for further treatment. 

4C2.05 MASK-TYPE SHELTERS 

General-purpose shelters are those 
facilities that are assigned to provide protec- 
tion for all personnel who are not a part of the 
emergency recovery forces. These shelters 
do not have air filtering or pressurization 
equipment to provide protection against BW or 
CW attacks; therefore occupants must wear 
masks. They are usually designed for three- 
hour occupancy without outside sources of air 
after which time outside unfiltered air can be 
used. Shielding for these shelters, however, 
should be the best that is obtainable, because 
long periods of occupancy may be required if 
fallout occurs. These structures will provide 
shelter for personnel and standby use for emer- 
gency crews. Storage space should be provided 
and stocked with limited amounts of first-aid 
supplies and emergency rations. Minimum 
cubage requirements of unventilated shelters 
for three-hour occupancy are discussed in Per- 
sonnel Shelters and Protective Construction , 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8. 

4C2.06 SPECIAL SHELTER EQUIPMENT 

Several special items for use in the 
construction or alteration of a building for 
personnel shelters are described in detail in 
paragraphs A40 through A49 of Appendix A. 
The requirements for each varies with the 
type of shelter to be provided and with the 
operational function of the shelter. 

4C2.07 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
FOR SHELTERS 

1. HEAT, VENTILATION, AND AIR 
FILTRATION. When ambient temperatures 
require, provision must be made to heat shel- 
ters. Heating capacity must be sufficient to 



549252 O-60-8 



4-33 



maintain a minimum operating temperature of 
60° F. Ventilation mustprovide at least 5 cfm 
of filtered air for each operating person as 
well as sufficient air to cleanse the airlocks, 

2. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES. 
Communications facilities in personnel shel- 
ters must be connected to the regular telephone 
system so that communications can be main- 
tained with the command posts. Two-way radio 
equipment is desirable if the shelter is to 
house operating personnel. 

4C2.08 FOOD AND POTABLE WATER 

Emergency field rations must be pro- 
vided for personnel during an attack. Drinking 
water must be furnished either through the 
normal system, a supply of bottled drinking 
water, or an emergency water system. 

4C2.09 LIGHTING AND POWER 

An emergency generator must be 
selected to supply emergency power. It must 
be one that will (a) respond quickly to demand 
and (b) have sufficient capacity to carry the 
entire essential electrical load of the shelter, 
including the load of ventilating and heating 
equipment, water pumps, and lighting circuits. 



4C2.10 FUNCTIONAL SUPPLIES 

Among the functional supplies that are 
required in personnel shelters are: 

(1) Field rations and drinking water 

(2) Chemical toilets 
{3) Soap 

(4) Paper towels 

(5) Toilet tissue 

(b) Fuel and lubricants for generators 

(7) First-aid supplies 

(8) Battle lanterns, flashlights, and 
batteries 

(9) Coveralls (not used in unpressur- 
ized shelters) 

(10) Emergency tool kits (includes 
shovels, crowbars, etc.) 

(11) Masks (only if masks have not 
been issued to personnel) 






ment 



(12) Nontoxic hand firefighting equip- 



(13) Radiac gear. 






4-34 









Section 3. DESIGNATED SPECIAL AREAS 



'4C3.01 ASSEMBLY AREAS 

An assembly area is an area that is 
specially designated as a rallying point from 
which controlled and orderly evacuation of 
nonessential personnel can take place. An 
adequate number of assembly areas must be 
planned and established, and each must be 
large enough for the assembly of approximately 
one hundred persons. The locations of the 
nearest assembly area and alternate assembly 
areas must be posted in all personnel protec- 
tive shelters. Among the locations that are 
suitable for assembly areas are lobbies of 
large buildings, theaters, gymnasiums, and 
cleared areas outside of buildings. Monitoring 
teams must make certain that the level of con- 
tamination at an outside area is within allow- 
able limits before permitting it to be used as 
an assembly area. It is important to select 
assembly areas that can be reached readily by 
transportation equipment. 

4C3.0 2 EVACUATION ROUTES 



that 



A system 
lead from the 



of evacuation routes 
assembly areas must be 



established as a part of the evacuation plan. 
These routes must be well known to all who are 
involved in furnishing transportation services. 
However, because preselected routes may be 
damaged or blocked by debris, it may be nec- 
essary for reconnaissance and monitoring 
teams to select and mark alternate routes. 

4C3.03 SPECIAL DANGER AREAS 

Special danger areas are isolated 
areas that have been determined to be too 
dangerous for the entry of nonoperating per- 
sonnel. Such areas are highly contaminated, 
contain structures that are in imminent danger 
of collapse, or are particularly hazardous for 
other reasons. 

Areas that have been determined to be 
special danger areas must be marked accord- 
ingly by monitoring and damage survey teams. 
The necessity for policing these areas depends 
on the urgency of such action and the avail- 
ability of personnel for that purpose. 









4-35 



o 






o 






PART D. FACILITIES, SERVICES, AND MATERIALS 



Section 1. WATER SUPPLIES 






4D1.01 SURVEY OF FACILITIES 

Water supplies may become contami- 
nated either as a result of overt attack or 
covert action. Contamination may radiological, 
biological, chemical, or some combination 
thereof. In the event of an AW attack, contam- 
ination may result from the introduction of 
sewage into water mains. 

Because decontamination of water 
may be difficult and perhaps impossible under 
existing circumstances (paragraphs 4A4.04 
and 4A5. 05) alternate sources of potable water 
should be located in anticipation of future need. 
Such sources may include wells, reservoirs, 
streams, and the water supply systems of 
nearby communities. The following general 
considerations apply to the use of water and 
water sources. 

(1) If storage tanks are tightly cov- 
ered, the water will generally be safe. 

{2} Water in Lyster bags is safe if 
the bags are correctly closed and spigots are 
not contaminated. Individual protective covers 
that are drawn over the bag from the bottom 
and tied at the top will protect the spigot. 

(3) Spring water should be protected 
by placing protective covers over the springs. 
With an average flow, springs should purify 
themselves in a short time. 

(4) Well water is unlikely to become 
contaminated, except as a result of covert 
action. 

(5) Protection for water in open 
streams, ponds, and lakes is not feasible. 
Large bodies of water are not likely to become 
heavily contaminated; the possibility of heavy 
local contamination, however, should not be 
overlooked. 

Water supply systems should be 
mapped to show the location of filtration and 
pumping plants, mains, hydrants, pipes, and 
cutoff valves. Mapping will facilitate emer- 
gency repairs or bypassing when a portion of 
the system is damaged. 

4D1.02 DAMAGE PROBLEMS 

During an AW attack, serious disrup- 
tion of distribution systems may be anticipated. 
Filtration, purification, and pumping facilities 



are almost certain to be impaired or destroyed. 
Because many pipes and mains will have been 
ruptured and some pumping facilities lost, 
water pressure may be seriously affected. In 
such an event, closing appropriate valves may 
restore pressures in parts of the distribution 
system that are still in operating condition. 

Provision of special equipment for the 
maintenance of water supplies is an important 
phase of preparation to withstand a nuclear 
attack. The following items can be used to good 
effect where their employment is applicable. 

1. POWER AND PUMPING EQUIP- 
MENT. Auxiliary equipment will be required 
where pumping plants are electrically operated 
and would be out of commission if a general 
power failure occurred. The effects of such 
a failure can be forestalled by the provision 
of portable, auxiliary power generating and 
pumping equipment that is driven by a gasoline 
or diesel engine. 

2. PIPE LOCATORS AND LEAK DE- 
TECTORS. Pipe locators and leak detectors 

have obvious uses whenever elements of a 
distribution system are damaged by bomb 
explosions. A properly dispersed emergency 
supply of these devices should be available. 

3. PIPE AND FITTINGS. Supplies 
of pipe for temporary emergency repairs, 
together with standard couplings and fittings, 
should be provided at properly dispersed 
points. Special fittings, clamps, and couplings 
should also be provided. 

4. FIRE HOSE. A limited supply of 
fire hose is necessary for firefighting and for 
installation between special fittings to connect 
still usable portions of a damaged distribution 
system. 

4D1.03 CONTAMINATION PROBLEMS 

The types of water supply contamina- 
tion that may be anticipated are discussed in 
paragraph 3B3. 04. Safeguarding against covert 
contamination is largely dependent upon the 
efficiency of the security system. Contamina- 
tion that is due to overt action, however, must 
be anticipated. In either event, the first 
recourse is to draw upon outlying sources of 
uncontaminated water if available. Decontam- 
ination of water is discussed in Chapter 4, 
Part E, Section 10, and in Appendix C. 






4-37 



4D1.04 EMERGENCY WATER 
REQUIREMENTS 

Emergency requirements for potable 
water for drinking and cooking are about one 
gallon per person per day. However, an addi- 
tional and much heavier demand may be made 
for noncontaminated water that will be used in 
the decontamination of personnel, The mini- 
mum requirement for this purpose is approxi- 
mately eight gallons per person per decon- 
tamination. 

Contaminated water may be used for 
firefighting; therefore, firefighting capability 
will be limited by supply and pressure. 

4D1.05 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 

In ABC defense, loop systems and 
gridiron systems are recommended for the 
distribution of water, as well as for fuels and 
steam. The general nature of such systems is 



shown in Figure 4-10. The loop system and 
gridiron system, through suitable valving, is 
advantageous because they make possible the 
continued use of a distribution system, even 
though a portion of the system has been 
damaged. 

Increased use and improvement of 
loop and gridiron distribution systems are 
considered to be essential to ABC warfare 
defense. Both planned and existing systems 
should be examined critically to determine 
whether adequate loop or bypass lines are 
available. These should be provided in new 
systems, and in existing systems insofar as 
practicable. Systems should also be examined 
to determine the existence of adequate numbers 
of easily accessible and clearly marked valves 
with which damaged sections of the main or 
service connections can be isolated from the 
system. Valves should be installed and/or 
marked to provide for such isolation. 






f source j— 



USER [— 




(4) LOOP SYSTEM 




SOURCE 



USER 



IB) GRIOIRON SYSTEM 



( 



Figure 4-10. Loop and Gridiron Distribution Systems 



4-38 









Automatic sprinkler systems are 
widely and effectively used to extinguish 
"normal" fires that originate within structures. 
A special problem, however, would be posed 
by an AW attack because it is possible, if not 
probable, that a great many sprinkler heads 
might be activated at the same time. As a 
result, heavy demands would be placed upon 
the distribution system, and water pressure 
needed by firefighting teams might be reduced 
or lost. The capacity of the water system at a 
naval activity is rarely large enough to permit 



operation of all sprinkler heads at the same 
time. The water supply system of each activity 
must be evaluated against the possible de- 
mands, and decisions must be made on which 
portions of an existing sprinkler system should 
be inactivated, upon receipt of an alert, to 
preserve the usefulness of the system as a 
whole. Naval activities that are adjacent to 
water will have an unlimited source if pumping 
equipment is available. Every effort should be 
made to exploit this possibility. 









4-39 



r 



( 



o 






Section 2. POWER SUPPLIES 






4D2.01 GENERAL 

Adequate power supplies are vital to 
the effective operation of naval shore activ- 
ities. They are especially necessary during 
emergency operations subsequent to major 
disasters. Three principal methods might be 
used to assure adequate power supplies during 
emergencies; theyare (a) provision of multiple 
independent systems, (b) duplication of facili- 
ties, and (c) mobile emergency plants. If the 
first two methods are employed solely for 
disaster control, they are impractical because 
of their extremely high cost and the possibility 
that even the additional systems or facilities 
will also be damaged. Therefore, they will 
not be further discussed in this publication. 
Mobile emergency plants are advantageous 
because they can be put into operation on short 
notice. 

4D2.02 RAILWAY STEAM- 
ELECTRIC PLANTS 

The largest mobile plants that are 
operated by the Navy are 10,000-kw, railway 
steam-electric generating plants. Each is 
made up of six cars and may be set up for 
operation on any level stretch of track 386 feet 
long that will support a. wheel loading of 55,000 
lb per axle. The cars that comprise the plant 
are a boiler car, turbine car, switchgear car, 
transformer car, gondola car, and boxcar. 

4D2.03 MOBILE POWER UNITS 

One type of mobile generating plant 
operated by the Navy is mounted on a steel 



railway car (Figure 4-11), which houses a 
supercharged, 3-phase, 60-cycle generator 
that is rated at 600 kw and 480 volts. Each 
unit is a complete plant with all the necessary 
auxiliaries, such as pumps, fuel and lube oil 
tanks, a starting air compressor, oil and 
water cooling radiators, an auxiliary engine 
generator, car heating equipment, and a main 
switchboard. 

Other types of mobile equipment are 
shown in Figures 4-12 and 4-13. BUDOCKS 
Instruction 11310.2 includes a list of all 
mobile power units that are under the control 
of the Navy. This instruction also lists home 
ports, methods of securing, and operating 
characteristics of each unit. 

4D2.04 SHIPBOARD DIESEL- 
ELECTRIC UNITS 

The Navy YFP 10 floating power plant 
(Figure 4-14) was first conceived (a) as an 
emergency electric generating plant that would 
be adaptable for use by the maximum possible 
number of waterfront shore installations and 
(b) for use in occupied areas. The plant was 
built to operate independently or in parallel 
with the various Navy-owned electric power 
generating facilities. It may be used on occa- 
sions to (a) supplement the power that is sup- 
plied by public utilities or (b) deliver power to 
public utility electric transmission or distri- 
bution systems. 

The plant has a normal rated net out- 
put of 33,120 kw (39,000 kva) at the switchboard 







Figure 4-11. Rail-Mounted Gas Turbine Plant 



4-41 







Figure 4-1Z. Mobile Diesel- Electric Plant, Heavyweight, 600 KW 



./K v V \ 







Figure 4-13. Portable Diesel-Electric Plant, Lightweight, 600 KW 



with three turbogenerators operating. The 
maximum net output is 36,570 kw at the switch- 
board for a period of not more than two hours 
with three machines operating. With two 
machines operating, the normal net output at 



the switchboard is 22,080 kw (26,000 kva). The 
maximum net output at the switchboard is 
24,380 kw (28,700 kva) for a two-hour period 
with two machines operating. 



4-42 













Figure 4-14. Floating Power Plant, YFP 10 






4-43 



r 



c 






Section 3. FOOD SUPPLIES 






4D3.01 PACKAGED FOODS 

An emergency supply of packaged 
foods, or foods in sealed containers, is essen- 
tial to ABC warfare defense. The advantage 
of using sealed containers is that contamination 
of the food by alpha or beta emitters or by BW 
or CW agents is not likely to take place as long 
as the containers remain intact. Gamma rays 
maypass through the containers and their con- 
tents, but their passage introduces no hazard 
to human health. Supplies of drinking water in 
sealed containers should also be on hand for 
the same reason. 

1. TYPES OF CONTAINERS. Good 
protection may be provided by well- sealed 
wooden barrels, waxed paper cartons that are 
sealed to exclude air, or foil and cellophane 
wrappings that are similarly sealed. Unsealed 
wooden boxes or crates, untreated wrapping 
paper, and coverings of fabric give much less 
protection, especially against certain CW and 
BW agents. 

2. CONTAMINATION. Contamination 
by ABC agents may be present on the outer 
surfaces of containers after an attack. If such 
contamination is suspected, the containers 
must be monitored for radioactivity and tested 
for CW agents. If neither procedure is possi- 
ble or if contamination is verified, packages 
and containers must be carefully decontami- 
nated before their seals are broken. A discus- 
sion of food decontamination will be found in 
Chapter 4, Part E. 

4D3.02 DISPERSAL 

Decentralization of emergency food 
storage facilities is a potential defense against 
loss of food supplies in ABC warfare attacks. 



This means of protection is particularly appli- 
cable to large stations occupying an extensive 
area. When food supplies have been destroyed 
or are too highly contaminated for immediate 
use, the most desirable alternative is to bring 
in additional supplies from outside areas. As 
a last resort, food may be decontaminated if 
no food replacements are available (Chapter 
4, Part E, Section 9). 

Emergency food service will be re- 
quired by the end of the first 12 hours after 
an attack and will be required for another 24 
to 48 hours. This phase of the emergency 
recovery operation is assigned to emergency 
messing teams of the supply element (para- 
graph 5C2.07). Such teams may be based at 
the affected activity or may be mobile units 
from another activity. Food may be stored in 
shelters as one means of achieving protection. 

4D3.03 STOWAGE 

Food supplies and facilities are sub- 
ject to the same general hazards that threaten 
all material when it is under ABC attack. 
These hazards are not limited to the possibility 
of contamination, but also include the risk of 
physical destruction by blast or fire. Hence, 
emergency food supplies must be stowed as 
securely as circumstances will permit, but 
they must not be stockpiled and left in storage 
indefinitely. A system of regular and progres- 
sive use and replacement must be instituted. 

Buildings that are reasonably blast- 
resistant will provide acceptable protection 
for food supplies that are in storage. Such 
buildings, however, will not exclude aerosols 
or radioactive dusts, although the foods will 
be protected if they are in tightly sealed 
containers. 






4-45 






PART E. DECONTAMINATION 

Section 1. PURPOSES, PROBLEMS, AND PRIORITIES 






4E1.01 PURPOSES 

The basic purpose of decontamination 
is to remove or neutralize ABC warfare agents 
so the mission of the activity can be carried 
out without endangering the life or health of 
assigned personnel. 

The purpose of radiological decon- 
tamination is to remove or shield the contam- 
inant from personnel who are required to work 
in contaminated areas. On the other hand CW 
agents must be neutralized so they will no 
longer be a hazard to personnel, and BW agents 
must either be killed or sealed to surfaces. 

4E1.02 PROBLEMS 

Because decontamination requires 
considerable personnel, material, and equip- 
ment, the appropriate command must weigh 
the advantage to be gained against other re- 
quirements. Only the most urgently needed 
areas and equipment should be considered for 
decontamination, because personnel will be 
required for other duties, especially during 
the emergency phase of recovery. The longer 
decontamination can be delayed, the less 
severe the problem will be, because all ABC 
agents decay naturally. Exceptions to this 
rule are the surfaces that absorb the liquid of 
CW agents. It is doubtful, however, that such 
surfaces would ever be a critical factor in 
recovery operations. 

Some of the special problems and 
conditions that are involved in decontamination 
are listed as follows. 

(1) Removal of dry particles is rela- 
tively easy when they are retained on a smooth 
surface by the action of gravity alone. 

(2) Removal of particles becomes 
difficult when they are retained on a surface 
owing to adsorption, or the action of forces 
between atoms or molecules. 

(3) Given enough time, particles of a 
radiological contaminant may enter into chem- 
ical combination with the material that is con- 
taminated, thus forming compounds that are 
analogous to rust on an iron surface. When 
this occurs, decontamination becomes more 
difficult. 

(4) Porous materials, such as ropes, 
fabrics, and rough surfaces, absorb contami- 
nants. Decontamination of such surfaces and 
materials is relatively difficult. 



{5) Neutron-induced radioactivity 
differs from other types of radioactivity be- 
cause it affects the interior as "well as the 
exterior of a substance. It is usually conceded 
to be useless to attempt decontamination of 
materials that contain sodium or copper if the 
radioactivity of such materials is neutron- 
induced. The preferred procedure is to put 
such materials aside for a time and allow the 
radioactivity to decay naturally. 

4E1.03 PRIORITIES 

After an attack, data from ABC sur- 
veys will be used to determine the extent and 
degree of contamination. Contaminated per- 
sonnel must be decontaminated as soon as 
possible; otherwise, additional casualties will 
probably be incurred. Before decontamination 
of installations, machinery, gear, access 
routes, and ground areas is undertaken, an 
appraisal of urgency must be made in the 
light of immediate and projected military 
requirements. 

Decision as to the degree of decon- 
tamination that will be attempted must depend 
on circumstances and need. A contaminated 
bridge that is used only for the rapid passage 
of occasional vehicles might, for example, 
have a rather low priority as a structure to be 
decontaminated. If the same bridge is to be 
required by work parties, a rough decontami- 
nation should be undertaken as an initial step. 

Because of differences in the missions 
of activities, no specific list of priorities is 
applicable to all activities. The following list 
is a possible priority order: 

(1) Personnel, 

(2) Active defense installations, 

(3) Equipment that is used in recov- 
ery operations, 

(4) Access routes, 

(5) Areas around personnel shelters 
or living areas for personnel who are required 
to stay in a large contaminated area, 

(6) Communication facilities, 

(7) Taxiways and operations facili- 
ties on airfields, 






4-47 



(8) Messing facilities in support of (11) Dock and waterfront areas, and 

facilities that are needed to complete recovery ..-,, _, , .. . , , t .... 

, .: . (12) Shops and industrial buildings. 

operations, such as transportation equipment r B 

pools, first-aid stations, and fire stations, Both the priority for decontamination 

and the level of decontamination to be at- 

(9) Operational areas that are re- tempted must be given consideration For 
, . ,. -. .,_ example, only rough decontamination of vital 

quired to accomplish the mission, ■ \. , j- .-,.,.. ,_ 

equipment and facilities may be necessary 

or advisable during emergency recovery 

(10) Water-treatment facilities, operations. 









4-48 









Section 2. DEGREE OF CONTAMINATION 






4E2.01 GENERAL 

The definitions of the levels of con- 
tamination vary with the types of agents that 
have been used. Radiological contamination is 
defined in terms of the dose rate in the area in 
roentgens per hour (r/hr). No precise defini- 
tion of CW contamination is available, except 
to describe it as "very heavy," "heavy," 
"moderate," or "light." For BW contamination 
no qualitative or quantitative criteria have 
been developed, and an area is either consid- 
ered to be contaminated or not contaminated. 

Specification of a level of contami- 
nation provides a basis for the estimation of 
the decontamination effort that is required. It 
also indicates the time that personnel can 
remain in a contaminated area without becom- 
ing casualties. 

4E2.02 RADIOLOGICAL 

CONTAMINATION 

The level, or dose rate, of radiolog- 
ical contamination, measured in r/hr, dimin- 
ishes with the passage of time. Therefore, 
countermeasures against radiological contam- 
ination might not be necessary, and a decision 
might be made to wait until natural decay has 
reduced radioactivity to an acceptable level. 

The effectiveness of countermeasures 
against radiological contamination is expressed 
in terms of a residual number. This residual 
number is the decimal fraction of the radiation 
intensity that remains after countermeasures 
have been applied. Such countermeasures may 
consist of decontamination or the provision of 
shielding between personnel and the contami- 
nant. Thus, if firehosing reduces radiation 
intensity from 100 to 15 r/hr, its residual num- 
ber as a countermeasure is 15/100, or 0.15. 

Obviously, the most effective counter- 
measure is the one that has the smallest 
residual number; however, securing smaller 
numbers may require excessive effort. Table 
4-2showsthe relative effectiveness of various 
radiological countermeasures that can be taken 
in the reclamation of buildings andpaved areas 
when no prepreparation of surfaces has been 
made. Table 4-3 gives the anticipated residual 
numbers when preparation of various surfaces 
has been effected. 



measurement of the degree of this type of con- 
tamination is not feasible. The practical cri- 
terion is whether contamination does or does 
not exist. This criterion is not unrealistic 
because some infections can be caused by the 
presence of only a few organisms. As long 
as any positive evidence of contamination is 
indicated by field sampling, all personnel 
must wear masks and take other protective 
measures. 

4E2.04 CW CONTAMINATION 

The degrees of chemical contamina- 
tion are designated as very heavy, heavy, mod- 
erate, and light; they are defined as follows. 

(1) Very Heavy . Very heavy contam- 
ination exists when pools of the contaminating 
agent are present on a surface. 

{2) Heavy . Heavy contamination is 
present when an almost continuous film of the 
contaminating agent is present on a surface. 

(3) Moderate . Moderate contamina- 
tion exists when numerous patches or droplets 
of the contaminating agent are present on a 
surface. 

(4) Light . Light contamination is 
present when a few patches or droplets of the 
contaminating agent are widely scattered on a 
surface. 

Chemical warfare contamination can 
be classified according to the three general 
types given below. 

(1)' Vapor and Aerosol Contamination . 
True vapors do not affect surfaces and there- 
fore do not pose a decontamination problem. 
Conversely, aerosols will settle on surfaces 
and thus cause a light contamination that may 
require decontamination. 

(2) Liquid Contamination . Contami- 
nating agents xn the form oT droplets or 
splashes produce liquid contamination. If the 
surfaces that are subjected to contamination 
are made of porous materials, decontamination 
is difficult, because the agents will penetrate 
porous substances until they are beyond 
the reach of decontamination materials and 
methods . 






4E2.03 BW CONTAMINATION 

Because no rapid field method for 
the detection of BW agents is available, the 



(3) Particle Contamination . Parti- 
cles of such agents as Adamsite (DM) and 
chlorocetophenone (CN) or hydrolyzed arsen- 
icals are extremely small. These particles 



549252 O-60-9 4-49 



TABLE 4-2 

Effectiveness of Various Countermeasures on Unprotected Materials 
Subjected to RW Contamination 



o 



Building surfaces 

or 

paved areas 


Radiation 

dose rate 

(r/hr) 


Residual numbers for methods 


Firehosing or 
street flushing 


Firehosing 

plus scrubbing 


Hot liquid 
cleaning 


Asphaltic 
concrete 


300 
1,000 
3,000 


0.07 
0.03 
0.01 


0.05 
0.02 
0.008 


0.02 
0.01 
0.004 


Portland 

cement 
concrete 


300 
1,000 
3,000 


0.04 
0.02 
0.008 


0.03 
0.02 

0.006 


0.02 

0.008 

0.003 


Tar-and- gravel 

roofing 


300 
1,000 
3,000 


0.03 
0.02 
0.01 


0.03 
0.02 
0.01 


0.01 

0.009 

0.004 


Composition 
roofing 


300 
1,000 
3,000 


0.04 
0.03 
0.01 


0.04 
0.02 
0.01 


0.02 
0.01 
0.005 


Wood 

shingle 


300 
1,000 
3,000 


0.17 
0.10 
0.04 


0.13 

0.08 
0.03 


0.06 
0.04 
0.01 


Galvanized 
corrugated 
steel 


300 
1,000 
3,000 


0.05 
0.02 
0.006 


0.04 
0.01 
0.005 


0.02 

0.006 

0.002 


Smooth painted 

surface 


300 
1,000 
3,000 


0.04 
0.01 
0.004 


0.03 

0.008 

0.003 


0.01 

0.004 

0.001 



c 



can penetrate textiles, or adhere to various 
irregular surfaces, where they remain for a 
long time unless they are removed mechan- 
ically or neutralized. 

The level to which the contamination 
must be reduced depends on the CW agent that 
is employed and the type of protective gear 
that is provided. For example, the Let 50 
respiratory dose from GB is 100 mg-min/m^, 
while the Let 50 dose through the skin of an 
unclothed person is 12,000 mg-min/m3, and 
the Let 50 dose through the skin of a person 
wearing ordinary clothing is 15,000 mg- 
min/m3. Thus, if personnel can wear masks 
and still carry out their mission, decontami- 
nation need not be as complete as if they did 
not wear masks. 

4E2.05 STAY TIME 

In areas contaminated with radio- 
active material, for a given permissible dose, 



the only way stay time may be increased is by 
reducing residual numbers by decontamination, 
natural decay, or shielding. The smaller the 
dose rate to which personnel are exposed, the 
longer they will be available for duty. A de- 
tailed method for relating all of the stay time 
factors is contained in Radiological Recovery 
of Fixed Military Installations , NAVDOCKS 
TP-PL-13. 

The acceptable dose, or command 
dose, results from a command decision, which 
is based upon the number of casualties the 
command is willing to accept. The expected 
number of casualties, however, can be reduced 
by delaying entry into a contaminated area, 
because intensity of radiation will decline in 
time as a result of natural decay. Figure 4-15 
is a nomograph that is used to (a) determine 
dose rates and (b) provide useful data for the 
computation of stay time. If the dose rate at 
1 hour is 200 r/hr, the dose rate at 72 hours 
is determined by entering the "Time" column 



4-50 



o 






TABLE 4-3 

Effectiveness of Various Countermeasures on Preprotected Materials 
Subjected to RW Contamination 






Building surfaces 

or 

paved areas 


Residual numbers for methods of decontamination 


Firehosing 


Firehosing 
and scrubbing 


Hot liquid 
cleaning 


1 Pass 


2 Passes 


1 Pass 


2 Passes 


1 Pass 


2 Passes 


Alphaltic or tar- 
and-gravel 
roofing 


N.A.* 


N.A. 


N.A. 


N.A. 


N.A. 


N.A. 


Prepared roll or 
composition 
roofing 


N.A. 


N.A. 


N.A. 


N.A. 


N.A. 


N.A. 


Metal surface 


0.03 


0.01 


0.01 


0.003 


0.01 


0.003 


Wood surface 


0,03 


0.01 


0.01 


0.003 


0.01 


0.003 


Asphaltic concrete 


0.10 


0.03 


0.03 


0.01 


0.03 


0.01 


Portland cement 
concrete 


0.10 


0.03 


0.03 


0.01 


0.03 


0.01 



i'N.A. means "not applicable 1 



in Figure 4-15 at 72 hours and projecting a 
straight line through 200 r/hr in the middle 
column until the line intersects the "Dose 
Rate" column. Thus, the dose rate at 72 hours 
is found to be 1.16 r/hr. (See also Appendix E, 
Figure E-21.) Further information on stay 
time will be found in Appendix E, Figure E- 19. 

Stay time in an area that has been 
contaminated by BW or CW agents can not be 
estimated as precisely as staytime in an area 
that has been contaminated by RW agents. The 
reason is that BW and CW hazards can be sub- 
stantially reduced by the wearing of protective 
clothing and masks. In general, stay time will 
be limited only by the ability of personnel to 
wear protective gear. When an area has been 
contaminated by CW agents, a careful obser- 
vation for symptoms of the effects of these 
agents will enable personnel to determine when 
their protective clothing and masks are reach- 
ing the end of their safe lives. 

4E2.06 NATURAL DECONTAMINATION 

After an attack, relative hazards are 
determined and perimeters are established in 



the light of data that are obtained by ABC 
survey teams. In all instances, the passage of 
time works in favor of decontamination teams. 
The longer it is possible to wait, the greater 
will be the extent of natural decontamination. 

Figure 4-16 shows that radiological 
decay takes place at a relatively precise rate. 
It should be noted that after the first few hours 
following an attack, the advantage that is 
gained by waiting for further decay is reduced. 

BW and CW agents also decay natu- 
rally, although their rates of decay may not be 
predicted as precisely as the decay rates of 
radiological substances. The following factors 
affect the rate of decay of BW and CW agents: 

(1) Persistence of agent, 

(2) Temperature, 

(3) Winds, 

(4) Moisture, and 

(5) Sunlight. 






4-51 



DOSE RATE DOSE RATE AT 1 HOUR TIME 




(r/rir) ( r /t,r) (hr) 




100 




100 








-r 








10,000 = 


- /- 






50 


~ 5,000- 

1,000- 
500- 


- / _ 

- / 
/ 

/ 
/ 

- / 
/ 

- / 


50 




10 


7 

— / 

_ 100- 

/ = 

/ 50 = 




10 




5 


/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 

/ 

/ 




5 




1.0 


1.0- 
0.5- 


- 


1.0 




0.5 






0.5 






0.1 = 




















0.05- 










0.02- 








0.1 


- 


- 


0.1 





Figure 4-15. Nomograph for Determination of Relative Dose Rates 
From Residual {Fallout) Nuclear Radiation 



4-52 



<J 










Figure 4-16. Shrinkage of a Contaminated 
Area For a Given Dose Rate 






4-53 






: 









Section 3. SELECTION OF DECONTAMINATION MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT 



4E3.01 MATERIALS 

Decontamination materials have been 
selected on a basis of applicability for as many 
ABC countermeasures as possible. For ex- 
ample, bleach is effective against several CW 
agents and against all known BW agents. Citric 
acid that is used in bleach solution is also use- 
ful in the removal of radiological contamina- 
tion. Refer to paragraphs A50 through A60 of 
Appendix A for data on all special decontam- 
ination materials, including the packaging, 
uses, applications, effectiveness, and limita- 
tions thereof. 



4E3.02 EQUIPMENT 

Decontamination equipment has been 
selected because it can be used in a variety of 
decontamination procedures. Special items for 
ABC warfare decontamination are discussed 
in paragraphs A6l through A66 of Appendix 
A. Although not included in these paragraphs 
of Appendix A, many standard items of equip- 
ment that are available at most naval activities 
will not only be useful, but in some instances 
will be necessary in decontamination opera- 
tions. Among these are bulldozers, fire hose, 
steam- cleaning rigs, laundry equipment, 
sprinkler trucks, brooms, and brushes. 









4-55 






I 






Section 4. DECONTAMINATION OF TERRAIN 









4E4.01 RADIOLOGICAL AGENTS 

Ordinarily, efforts to effect radio- 
logical decontamination of terrain are limited 
to vital access routes and localized areas that 
must be used by personnel. The methods that 
are employed in the decontamination of paved 
and unpaved areas are discussed below, {For 
details of these methods, see Radiological 
Recovery of Fixed Military Installations , NAV- 
DOCKS TP-PL-13, Revised.) 

1. PAVED AREAS. After an area has 
been contaminated by RW agents, one of the 
first decontamination requirements is that 
access routes be cleared for the passage of 
workparties , the evacuation of casualties, and 
other requirements of an emergency nature. 
Access routes are likely to be littered with 
debris that is contaminated. The routes can 
best be cleared by the use of a crawler or a 
wheeled tractor with a bulldozer or angledozer 
attachment that can be used to push the debris 
into piles or windrows. 

The further the contaminated material 
is moved from the access route, the less the 
subsequent radiation hazard. If water is avail- 
able for ftrehosing, paved access routes should 
be hosed down, working from high to low 
points, and from noncontaminated to contami- 
nated areas. Provision should be made in 
advance for the disposal of the runoff of the 
water that is used. This water must not be 
permitted to drain into an area where it will 
constitute a hazard. After access routes have 
been cleared and rough decontamination has 
been effected, relative freedom of the routes 
from residual radioactivity can be determined 
-by monitoring. 

2. UNPAVED AREAS. Radiological 
contamination on unpaved areas can best be 
dealt with either by removing or covering the 
contaminated soil. The following precautions 
must be observed regardless of the technique 
that is employed: (a) equipment operators 
must wear masks and remain on their equip- 
ment as much as possible while they are in 
contaminated areas, (b) before the soil is 
disturbed it should be wetted down to settle the 
dust, and (c) radioactive soil that is removed 
must be disposed of in a safe manner. 

The various techniques that may be 
employed include the following. 

(1) Blading, Blading is accomplished 
by a crawler or a wheeled tractor with an 
angledozer or bulldozer blade. The angledozer 
blade is preferred because it is more flexible 



and provides better directional control of the 
soil. The blade removes the top layer of con- 
taminated soil and pushes it away from the 
scraped area. This technique can be used in 
scraping roadways or unpaved areas with firm 
cohesive soils. The removal rate varies from 
2,000 to 12,000 sq ft per hour, depending on 
the size of the equipment and the nature of the 
soil and terrain. 

(2) Grading . The use of a motor 
grader for soil removal involves the same 
principle of operation that is employed by the 
crawler or wheeled tractor with a dozer blade. 
The motor grader is more effective on road- 
ways or long, narrow areas than it is on large, 
open areas. The removal rate is approximately 
4,000 lineal feet per hour on a roadway that is 
16 feet wide. 

(3) Plowing , The military type of 
plow can be used as an attachment for, or can 
be drawn by, a tractor to turn contaminated 
soil over so that it will be covered with several 
inches of noncontaminated soil } which may 
reduce the dose rate as much as 85%. Plowing 
may be done in noncohesive and moderately 
cohesive soil that is relatively free from 
rocks, routs, and other obstructions. Plowing 
is not a preferred method of decontamination 
for well-traveled areas, becausepassage over 
the roughly plowed terrain •will be difficult for 
pedestrians and vehicles unless the soil is 
subsequently rolled. The use of the plow should 
be confined to less traveled areas or to the 
creation of buffer zones around a working area 
that has been scraped or filled. The average 
plowing rate under normal operating conditions 
is 35,000 square feet per hour. 

(4) Scraping , Contaminated soil can 
be removed by scraping with self-propelled or 
drawn-type equipment. In general, the tech- 
nique that is used in the removal of soil with a 
scraper is the same as that used with a tractor 
dozer or a motor grader, but a more effective 
surface removal is achieved. Both cohesive 
and noncohesive materials can be removed by 
scraping. The outstanding advantage of the 
scraper is its range of operations. It can dig 
and haul in one pass, and if necessary carry 
the full load for miles. The rate of soil re- 
moval is approximately 5,000 sq ft per hour 
for an 8-cu-yd scraper, and up to 14,000 sq ft 
per hour for a 12-cu-yd scraper. 

(5) Scraping and plowing . A greater 
depth of penetration, and consequently a greater 
reduction in contamination, can be achieved by 
first scraping away the top layer of soil and 
then plowing. 



4-57 



(6) Filling . Filling involves the 4E4.02 BW AGENTS 



placement and spreading of clean soil over 
contaminated soil. Availability of clean soil 
in the area will govern the feasibility of this 
method of decontamination. The use of scrap- 
ers is recommended for filling and scraping 
in one operation. In addition, scrapers can be 
used to transport clean soil over considerable 
distances. 

The foregoing techniques are rapid 
and effective means for the decontamination of 
unpaved areas. The following data indicate the 
relative effectiveness of the various methods. 
When additional passes are required to further 
reduce residual numbers, they should be made 
at right angles to the previous passes. 






Soil removal technique 

Filling (6 -in. depth) 
Grading, motor grader 

(2-4 in. cut) 
Scraper, motorized 

(2-6 in. cut) 
Plowing, (8-10 in. deep) 
Grading, with 2-4 in. cut 

and plowing at 8-10 in. 

depth 



Residual number 
after one pass 

0.15 
0.07 

0.15 

0.15 



0.02 



3. AGING AND SEALING AS AN AL- 
TERNATE TECHNIQUE. The use of the aging 
and sealing technique in radiological decon- 
tamination is relatively simple, and this 
method is suitable for large-scale operations 
on grounds, roads, taxiways, and runways. 

Because alpha particles are an inha- 
lation hazard and usuallyhave a long half-life, 
sealing may be desirable when they are pres- 
ent. In general, alpha particles will be a 
problem only after an accident has occurred 
in which a weapon containing plutonium was 
involved (Appendix B). Under such circum- 
stances, the general procedure is to wait until 
gamma activity is down to a relatively low 
level and then seal in the alpha contamination. 
Sealing could be accomplished before the 
gamma decay has taken place, but in so doing 
operating personnel would be subjected to 
greater hazards. 

The most suitable material for this 
type of sealing is asphalt. A standard bitum- 
inous liquid distributor sprayer may be used 
for application of the asphalt to the surface. 
The amount of asphalt that is required will 
depend on the surface. Areas that are used 
for traffic, such as roads, runways, and taxi- 
ways, should be given coatings that are suffi- 
ciently thick to withstand the expected use. A 
lighter application will suffice for other areas. 



Disinfection of extensive outdoor 
areas is not usually a practicable means of 
nullifying the effects of BW agents, nor would 
it be justified if the agents had relatively low 
viability and might be expected to succumb 
rapidly to sunlight, temperature changes, and 
other physical factors of environment. In fact, 
the time that would be required for the detec- 
tion and identification of a particular BW agent 
might exceed the anticipated period of its via- 
bility. However, evidence in the literature 
indicates that this assumption is not always 
valid. For some unknown reason, micro- 
organisms have the ability to survive on dust 
or on bedding for long periods of time. Blan- 
kets that contained streptococci were found to 
hold viable organisms after more than three 
months 1 storage. Tests on dust that was 
collected from hospitals, houses, schools, 
dormitories, and similar buildings gave posi- 
tive results. 

Land surfaces, streets, and sidewalks 
that have been contaminated by BW agents can 
often be ruled out of bounds to personnel and 
vehicles. The resulting cessation of traffic 
will considerably reduce secondary infectious 
aerosols, and the BW agents will lose their 
viability in time. It may not be possible, how- 
ever, to restrict some areas, and solar radia- 
tion and aeration may decontaminate them only 
to a limited extent. In such instances, decon- 
tamination procedures and/or the use of sup- 
pressants may be necessary. 

1. DECONTAMINATION. The two 
classes of materials that are most suitable for 
exterior BW contamination are those that (a) 
act by release of chlorine and (b) have a caustic 
action. Materials that are usually available 
include solutions of calcium hypochlorite 
(HTH), chloride of lime (bleach STB or Grade 
3), sodium hypochlorite (ordinary household 
bleach), and sodium hydroxide (caustic soda or 
lye). Any solution that contains approximately 
2 percent of available chlorine and 1/2 of 1 
percent of an anionic detergent suchasNacco- 
nol or any other anionic detergent is effective 
on surfaces. Mixtures that contain more than 
2 percent of available chlorine may be diluted 
to give the desired concentration. For details 
concerning the foregoing materials, see para- 
graphs A50 through A60 of Appendix A. 

Mixes that are used for horizontal 
surfaces can be applied with any spray equip- 
ment of suitable capacity. For large areas, 
the appropriate equipment is the standard 
M3A2 or M6 400-gal decontaminating appa- 
ratus. For small areas, the standard CW 3-gal 
Ml decontaminating apparatus may be used. 






« 



4-58 









The current model of the Ml, however, is not 
designed for use with highly corrosive mate- 
rials; therefore, toprevent serious damage, it 
must be thoroughly cleaned immediately after 
use. 



^formaldehyd 
is (a) 



:ompound 

tigation 

is currently "fiem 
beta-propiolacti 
ted as a substitut 
phase disinfectant bee* 
than formaldehyde and 
persistent. Beta-propiola 1 
rently available but is menf 
the trend in research on 
chemical is characteriz 
ish odor that is irritati 
atory properties even 
the chemical vapor 



that is undei 



invars - 
BW decontamina/ion 
rdized. It is called 



ical 



a sli 
and it has '. 
concentre 



ges- 
vapor 
active 
y less 
s not cur- 
d to indicate 
ect. This 
sweet- 



lrym- 
tons of 



It now appears that beta-p ropiolactc 
in the 

for BW decontamination, 
metals or ha\ 
rials. Beta-projuolactone was successfully 
used at Fort Dersick to decontaminate (a) 
chambers with a vmume that ranged up to 
3,000 ft 3 and (b) buildings with a yflume that 
ranged up to 75,000 ft 3 . ^The temoerature was 
maintained at 24° C, and tfre relative humidity 
was raised to 80 percent. ^Sixteen liters of 
beta-propiolactone were disseminated by a 
fogger into a building. An average of about 5 
mg of beta-propiolactone o4r litersof air was 
maintained throughout the/period of treatment . 
After a two-hour exposv 
no viable spores were Recovered. The, build- 
ing was habitable after two days of formal 
aeration, that is, with/doors and windows open. 
No damage to pain/ed surfaces or metal fix- 
tures in the building was noted. 

Beta-propiolactone is not flammabVe 
in air concentrations that can theoretically 
exist under normal atmospheric conditions. 
Available information on toxicity is somewhat 
limited. ^Indications are that hujsnans can 
detect odor« at a concentration of/0. 05 mg of 
lactone per liter of air. Becaus/ of the lach- 
rymatory properties of beta'-propiolactone, 
humans can not tolerate concentrations that 
are greater than O.lNqag qi^lactone per liter of 
air for longer than 5 mifiutes. Undiluted beta- 
propiolactone produces fto harmful effect on 
skin if it is washed/off immadiately; however, 
if it is held in cojrfact with the sfcia^for/4 period 
in excess of/T72 hour, blisters ar^Cformed. 

linary data show /that beta 
vapor, when empT5ysd_under propor conditions, 
is approximately 25 tim5s-<no)re active than 
formaldehyde . 



The one "TJi-g^jiisadvantag 
beta-propiolactone is 
while it is in storage in o 
ably long shelf life-^Ct 4° C it 
at least 3 years^-^xthout appre 



sing 
pt cold 
obtain reason- 
be stored 
e change . 



However, 

wi thi#4~to 



8 weeks . 



it undergoes polymerization 



a. Application . An operating crew of 
four men is required for efficient use of the 
400-gallon sprayer, while only one man (in 
addition to the mixing crew) is required for 
the 3-gallon unit. Because the 3-gallon unit is 
used to decontaminate relatively small articles 
and areas, no estimate of cycle time of filling 
and spraying is possible. For the 400-gallon 
apparatus, the time that is required for various 
operations is as follows. 



Operation 

Filling with water 
Charging with bleach 
Mixing 
Spraying 

Hauling 



Time 
(min) 

10 
20 

15 

20 (varies with rate of 

application) 
Varies with distance to 

water point 



Table 4-4 shows the recommended 
mix and rate of application for the chlorine 
compounds. The mixture is sprayed at the 
rate that is indicated for the particular type of 
surface; and to assure complete decontamina- 
tion, it is allowed to remain on the surface at 
least one hour. To provide complete wetting 
of the surface, a suitable powder or liquid 
detergent should be added to all solutions at 
the rate of 1/2 of 1 percent by weight. The 
effectiveness of the procedure may be greatly 
increased by a thorough scrubbing with either 
hand or power brooms. 

Sodium hydroxide solution is a highly 
effective decontarninant for flat surfaces. Such 
solutions, however, are extremely hazardous, 
and personnel who use them should keep all 
parts of their bodies covered. A ten-percent 
solution (by weight) of lye and water, when 
sprayed on a surface, will almost completely 
sterilize the area within an hour. On sloping 
surfaces, however, this solution, as well as 
the chlorine solutions, tend to run off before 
decontamination is complete. No specific 
application rate is recommended for sodium 
hydroxide solution, except to thoroughly wet 
the surface. This usually means about 1/8 gal 
per sq yd on smooth concrete and 1/2 gal per 
sq yd on compacted earth. Mechanical agita- 
tion, such as brooming, will increase the 
coverage and improve the effectiveness of the 
procedure. 



4-59 



TABLE 4-4 
Chlorine Compounds Used as BW De contaminants 



o 



Decontaminant 


Conventional 

use 


Approxi- 
mate 
available 
chlorine 
as pack- 
aged 
(%) 


Recommended 

mix {parts of 

decontaminant 

to parts of 

water by 

weight) 


Type of sur- 
face to be 
treated 


Recom- 
mended 
rate of 
appli- 
cation 
(gal/sq 
yd) 


Conventional 

packaging 


Calcium hypo- 
chlorite 
(HTH) 


Water puri- 
fication 


70 


3/97 


Horizontal 
concrete 

Horizontal 
packed 
earth 


1/8 
1/2 


Powder; 

Navy stocks 
6-oz cans 
5-lb cans, 
100-lb 
drums 


Chloride of 
lime (bleach 
STB or 
Grade 3) 1 


Chemical 
warfare 
decon- 
tamination 


30 


7/93 2 1,300 lb 
of bleach 
and 225 gal 
of water 
make 30 5 
gal 
40/60 3 


Horizontal 

concrete 
Horizontal 

packed 

earth 
Vertical 

concrete 


1/8 

1/2 

1/8 


Powder; 
Navy stocks 
50-lb 
drums 


Sodium hypo- 
chlorite 
{commer- 
cially avail- 
able as 
household 
bleach) 


Bleaching 


5-10 


Reduce to 2% 
available 
chlorine 


Horizontal 
concrete 


1/8 


Liquid, Navy 
stocks 1-qt 
jars and 5- 
gal carboys. 
Commer- 
cially avail- 
able in pint, 
quart, and 
gallon jars. 






Bleach that has been in storage for extendedperiods of time will lose some available chlorine. 

As a result, the concentration of the mix must be increased proportionately. 
^Clear solution for BW only (Appendix A). 
^Antiset M-l (chemical warfare) should be added at the rate of 1/2 lb of antiset per 100 lb of 

bleach when the slurry ia used in the 400-gal decontaminating apparatus. Antiset must be 

added to the water before the bleach. 



b. Protection of Operating Crews . 
Because the decontamination process may dis- 
lodge pathogens from contaminated surfaces, 
operating crews should be equipped with 
masks, hoods, rubber gloves, rubber boots, 
and two layers of clothing. For additional 
protection against the decontaminant, other 
items of protective gear should be added or 
substituted as necessary. Persons who handle 
decontaminants should avoid getting the solu- 
tions on the skin, in the eyes, or in the mask 
canister. If the decontaminant does come in 
contact with the skin, it should be washed off 
with water immediately. Men who handle and 
mix decontaminants outside of contaminated 



areas should be equipped with goggles, rubber 
gloves, boots, and slickers. 

Particular care should be exercised 
in handling lye, because both solid and liquid 
forms attack the skin, eyes, and clothing. Lye 
does not give off a poisonous vapor, but it is 
poisonous if swallowed; therefore, goggles, 
rain gear, rubber gloves, and boots should be 
used during all operations with this chemical. 
Spillage may be neutralized by a weak acid 
such as citric acid or acetic acid (vinegar). 
Heat is liberated when lye solutions are pre- 
pared, so containers should not be handled with 
the bare hands. 



4-60 









2. SUPPRESSANTS. The techniques 
that are used in the decontamination of unpaved 
surfaces (paragraph 4E4.01) have value in the 
suppression of pathogens. 

In addition, the following suppressant 
techniques can be employed against pathogens. 

(1) Water can be applied carefully 
and directly downward to prevent the forma- 
tion of secondary aerosols; high-pressure 
spraying is not satisfactory. Tank trucks that 
are equipped with spray bars, a hose attached 
to a water hydrant, or a sprinkling cart can 
be used. Enough water should be applied to 
thoroughly wet the surface and vegetation. 
Water does not killpathogens, but merely seals 
them to the surface; therefore, spraying must 
be repeated. This technique is not efficient in 
climates where drying is rapid. 

(Z) Fuel or lubricating oil can be 
used as a suppressant to prevent theformation 
of secondary aerosols for limited periods. 
Enough oil should be used to completely wet 
the surface, plus some for subsequent pene- 
tration. If the first treatment does not provide 
sufficient protection, it may be necessary to 
repeat the process within 24 hours after the 
first application has cured. Oil has a slightly 
more permanent effect than water, but even 
oil will be eventually drawn into the soil, leav- 
ing the surface dry. Salvaged crankcase oil, 
Navy Special, Bunker C, or diesel fuel oils can 
be used with bituminous distributors or tank 
trucks that are equipped with spray bars for 
treating large areas. The Ml sprayer appa- 
ratus can be used on small areas. 

(3) Asphalt and tar are the most 
effective suppressants. In addition to their use 
as sealants, they can also be applied hot to kill 
many pathogens. They are especially effective 
for small, heavily contaminated areas. 

(4) Burning vegetated areas also 
destroys many pathogens. 

4E4.03 CW AGENTS 

The hazards from CW agents on paved 
and unpaved surfaces maybe controlled in part 
by establishing out-of-bounds areas and wait- 
ing for natural decay to occur. Persistent 
agents, however, may present a problem when 
they arepresent on access routes and localized 
areas that are used by personnel. 

Decontamination of areas that have 
been subjected to CW agents involves the use 
of various materials, equipment, and tech- 
niques that are also involved in countermeas- 
ures against radiological and BW contaminants. 



Existing recommendations for procedures in 
CW decontamination of outdoor areas are 
detailed in Table 4-5. 

Reference to Table 4-5 will show that 
bleach, dry-mix bleach, slurry, and DANC 
solution are approved for use on various out- 
door surfaces. -It is clear that impossibly 
large quantities of chemical de contaminants 
would be required for complete treatment of 
extensive areas. These materials are as 
follows. 

(1) Dry Bleach . Dry bleach is spread 
by hand or by a dry-agent decontaminating 
apparatus; desirable coverage is about 1 lb per 
sq yd. This material is extremely corrosive 
to metals. A suitable dry mix consists of two 
parts of bleach and three parts of earth or 
sand. This mix may be spread on appropriate 
surfaces. In the dry form it may ignite when it 
is spread on liquid mustard agents. Dry bleach 
is not effective at temperatures that are below 
20° F. 

(2) Slurry . A slurry is a wet mix 
that can be applied with a broom, swab, or a 
400 -gal sprayer (paragraph A6 2 of Appendix A). 
When the slurry is to be applied with a swab 
or broom, equal weights of bleach and water 
are mixed. When the application is to be made 
with a power sprayer, four parts of bleach are 
mixed with six parts of water, and one -half 
pound of Ml antiset is added for each 100 lb of 
bleach. Antiset must be added and mixed in 
the water before addition of the bleach. 

Bleach slurry should be used at the 
rate of 1 qt per sq yd on concrete and up to 1 
gal per sq yd on tall grass. 

The apparatus that are used in CW 
decontamination include the following special 
items, which are discussed in detail in Appen- 
dix A, as referenced. 

1. DECONTAMINATING APPARA- 
TUS, M6 AND M3A3. The M6 and M3A3 decon- 
taminating apparatus (paragraph A62 of Appen- 
dix A) are modified orchard sprayers that have 
been adapted to handle bleach slurry. Average 
coverage per filling for a smooth surface is 
1,300 sq yd. Antiset is required in the slurry 
mixture, but the slurry should not be used even 
with winterized equipment if the temperature 
has dropped to 20° F. However, other chemi- 
cals, such as organic solvents, can be used at 
temperatures that are down to 0° F. When 
bleach slurry is being used at temperatures 
between 40° F and 20° F,the following proced- 
ure should be employed. 

(1) Operate engine until tempera- 
ture rises to 40° F. 






4-61 



TABLE 4-5 
CW Decontamination of Outdoor Areas 






Basic 
material 


Area 


Primary 
method 


Secondary 

method 


Field expedient 


Remarks 


Earth 


Roads, 

bivouacs , 
pathways 


Dry-mix 

bleach 


Slurry 


Plowing under, cover- 
ing with earth, re- 
moving top layer of 
soil, weathering, fire 




Concrete 


Roads 


Dry- mix 
bleach 
or 
slurry 


DANC 
solution 


Covering with earth 


Allow slurry to re- 
main 24 hr, and 
reapply as neces- 
sary. Do not use 
DANC solution 
for G-gases. 


Brick, 
stone 


Roads 


Dry-mix 
bleach 


Slurry 


Covering with earth 


Allow slurry to re- 
main 24 hr, and 
reapply as neces- 
sary 


Asphalt 


Roads 


Dry-mix 
bleach 


Slurry 


Covering with earth 




Grass 


Fields 


Slurry 


Fire 


Covering with earth, 
removing top layer 
of soil, weathering 




Sand 


Fields, 

beaches 


Dry -mix 
bleach 


Slurry 


Covering with earth, 
removing top layer 
of soil, weathering, 
fire 


Most chemical 
agents penetrate 
more than 2 in. 


Tall 

grass, 
under- 
growth 


Meadows, 
jungles, 
forests 


Slurry 


Fire, ex- 
ploding 
bleach 
drums 


Weathering 


Extensive areas 
should be decon- 
taminated only if 
vital to mission 






(2) Fill tank with hot water, add 
antiset, and mix two minutes; then add bleach. 

(3) Circulate mixture between 
tank and pump to prevent freezing. 

(4) Spray mixtu r e continuously 
until tank is empty; otherwise, spray hose may 
freeze. 

(5) When tank is empty, discon- 
nect hose and place it where it will not freeze. 

2. DECONTAMINATING APPARA- 
TUS, Ml. The 3-gallon Ml decontaminating 
apparatus (paragraph A61 of Appendix A) is 
intended primarily for use with DANC solu- 
tion, but it may also be employed to spray hot, 



soapy water or organic solvents. After each 
period of use, it should be drained and washed 
thoroughly to prevent corrosion and nozzle 
clogging. 

One DANC solution unit fills the appa- 
ratus and is enough to decontaminate a truck 
or 50 sq yd of surface under average condi- 
tions. The Ml apparatus will function in ex- 
tremely cold weather provided that it is not 
filled until immediately before use. 

In addition to the countermeasures 
that depend on the use of chemical neutral- 
izes, outdoor CW decontamination may be 
accomplished by plowing under the surface 
layer of earth, covering the surface with un- 
contaminated earth, or by burning over the 
surface, where applicable. 



4-62 



t 






Section 5, DECONTAMINATION OF STRUCTURAL EXTERIORS 






4E5.01 RADIOLOGICAL 

D EC ON T AMINA TION 

It should again be emphasized that 
radioactive decay proceeds rapidlyinthe early 
hours after a nuclear burst. Therefore, if the 
situation permits, the hazards to decontami- 
nation personnel can be reduced by delaying 
decontamination operations for a few hours 
until natural decay has reduced radioactivity 
to a safer level. 

When active countermeaaures are 
necessary, however, decontamination of build- 
ing exteriors can be carried out by hosing the 
roofs and outer walls. In most instances the 
major portion of radiological contamination 
can be removed by such simple methods. Care 
should be exercised, however, that wash water 
containing contaminants is carried off by the 
storm sewers or otherwise diverted into safe 
channels for disposal. 

4E5.02 BW AGENTS 

Because exteriors of structures pre- 
sent vertical as well as horizontal surfaces, 
thin decontaminating solutions are not suitable 
because they will run off vertical or inclined 
surfaces before decontamination has been 
completed. A thick slurry is required on such 
surfaces so that the mixture will adhere. 
Bleach that is mixed with water inthe propor- 
tion of 40 parts of decontaminant to 60 parts 
of water {by weight) forms a satisfactory 
slurry for walls. If sodium hypochlorite and 



similar solutions are employed, it may be 

desirable to form a slurry by the use of some 
inert material such as lime or diatomaceous 
earth. 

"When a slurry is to be sprayed on a 
vertical surface, a high-pressure device will 
be required to supply enough pressure so that 
the viscous material will reach the tops of the 
walls. The best equipment for this purpose is 
the 400-gal decontaminating apparatus that is 
described in paragraph A62 of Appendix A, 
The 3 -gal decontaminating apparatus can be 
used on limited areas. 

4E5.03 CW AGENTS 

The decontamination of persistent CW 
agents on structural exteriors involves coun- 
termeasures that are similar to those employed 
in- BW decontamination. The problem of de- 
contaminating both horizontal and vertical 
surfaces also exists. Materials and devices 
that are recommended for CW decontamination 
of exterior surfaces are included in Table 4-6. 
From this table it can be seen that the principal 
countermeaaures involve the use of bleach on 
horizontal surfaces and slurry on vertical or 
sloping surfaces. 

DANC solution has special utility in 
the decontamination of glass surfaces and as 
an alternate spray to be used on concrete and 
wooden walls that are out-of-doors. DANC 
solution, however, is unsuitable for G-agent 
decontamination, and it should not be used 
indoors because of its toxicity. 






4-63 



TABLE 4-6 (1 of 2} 
Decontamination of Persistent War Gas 






Basic 

material 


Area 


Primary method 


Secondary method 


Field 

expedient 


Remarks 


Concrete 


Walls, 

floors, 
pillboxes, 

gun 

emplace- 
ments 


Slurry 


DANC solution 


Covering 
with earth 


Allow slurry to 
remain 24 
hr, and re- 
apply as 
necessary 


Brick, 
stone 


Walls, 
floors 


Dry -mix bleach 


Slurry 


Covering 
■with earth 


Same as con- 
crete 


Painted 
surfaces 


Walls, 
floors, 
vehicles, 
equipmeat 


DANC solution 


Slurry, washing 
solvent 


Blotting off 
surface 
and 
aerating 


DANC will 
soften or re- 
move paint. 
Slurry should 
remain 6-24 
hr 


Wood 


Walls, 
floors, 
boxes, 

crates, 
apparatus 


Slurry and aera- 
tion, or im- 
merse in boiling 
water for 1/2 to 
1 hr 


DANC solution, 
but not for G- 
series gases 


Fire, where 
applicable 


Allow decon- 
taminant to 
remain on 
surface to 
neutralize 
escaping 
vapors 


Plaster 

and 
op aqu e 

plastics 


Interiors, 
apparatus 


Slurry 


Aerating, washing, 
weathering 


Weathering 


Plastics vary, 

but usually 
can not be 
steamed 


Asphalt 


Roofing 


Dry-mix bleach 


Slurry 


Covering 
with earth 




Glass 


Windows 


DANC solution 


Washing and 
aerating 


Blotting off 
surface 




Metal 


Equipment, 
metal 
containers 


Washing and 
aerating 


DANC solution 
(except G-gases); 

then cleaning and 
oiling, solvents 


Aeration 


Bleach and 
slurry effec- 
tive, but will 
severely 
corrode most 
metals 


Canvas 


Tents, 
apparatus, 
gear 


Boil in water 
{with washing 
soda) for 1 /2 
to 1 hr 


Slurry; then wash- 
ing with DANC 
solution (except 
G-gases) 


Aeration 




Cotton and 
wool 


Clothing 
gear 


Boil in water 
(with washing 
soda) for 1/2 
to 1 hr 


Laundering, dry 
cleaning 


Protective 
ointment, 
aeration 


Wool garments 
will shrink if 
boiled or 
washed 



4-64 






TABLE 4-6 (2 of 2) 
Decontamination of Persistent War Gas 






Basic 
material 


Area 


Primary method 


Secondary method 


Field 
expedient 


Remarks 


Imperme- 


Imperme- 


Boil in water for 


Slurry, washing 


Weathering 




able 


able 


1/2 to 1 hr 








fabrics 


clothing, 
gasproof 

curtains 










Leather 


Sho e s , 


Immerse in water 


Aeration, DANC 


Blotting off 


Decontamina- 




belts, 


at 120° F for 4 


solution (except 


surface 


tion not 




gear 


hr 


G-gases) 




always com- 
plete. Do not 
wear next to 
skin. Use 
neat 1 s-foot 
oil or protec- 
tive dubbing 


Trans- 


Eyepieces, 


Washing 


Solvent 


Blotting off 




parent 


airplane 






surface 




plastics 


canopies, 












gear 










Rubber: 


Tires, 


Boil in water 2-8 


Slurry 


Protective 


For gas masks, 


natural 


gloves, 


hr, depending 




ointment 


use protec- 


and 


boots. 


upon contami- 






tive ointment 


synthetic 


hose, 


nation and 






outside and 




insulation 


future use 






inside at 
once. Wash 
eyepieces 
with GI soap. 
If heavily 
contaminated, 
burn or bury 






4-65 






Section 6. DECONTAMINATION OF STRUCTURAL INTERIORS 






4E6.01 RADIOLOGICAL 

DECONTAMINATION 

Radiological decontamination of 
structural interiors is effected by systematic 
vacuum sweeping and vacuum cleaning. Most 
standard vacuum equipment will not retain 
extremely fine particles, and for this reason, 
an inhalation hazard may result. Particles of 
the contaminant are small but can ordinarily 
be removed by mechanical means. 

After countermeasures have been 
carried out, their relative effectiveness can 
be tested by monitoring. If unacceptable radi- 
ation levels persist, it may be desirable to 
wash floors with detergent solutions or employ 
abrasive treatment. 

Ordinarily, most of the radiological 
contaminant comes to rest on horizontal rather 
than vertical surfaces. Thehorizontal surfaces 
should, therefore, receive special attention. 

4E6.02 BW AGENTS 

When BW decontamination is neces- 
sary for the structural interiors of shelters, 
warehouses, or similar structures, one of the 
most practical fumigants is formalin. Navy 
stock formalin is a solution of water , methanol, 
and 3 7 -percent formaldehyde. For effective 
decontamination, the formalin vapor should 
remain in contact with the area for at least 
8 hours at a relative humidity of at least 65 
percent. 

The building to be fumigated need not 
be sealed tight, but windows and doors must 
be closed, and large openings shut off from 



the outside. Drawers and cabinets within the 
structure should be opened. The decontami- 
nant can be vaporized with fog generators 
(paragraph A64 of Appendix A) or by bubbling 
steam through an open container of the forma- 
lin solution. If steam is used, it must be led 
into the building through a hose, because 
formalin gas must not come in contact with an 
openflame. Another method is to use ordinary 
paint spray equipment that will develop 50 psi 
of pressure. The mixture and precautions to 
be followed and the details of application are 
described in paragraph 57 of Appendix A. 

For disinfection of limited surfaces, 
swabbing with a mixture of one part of formalin 
stock solution and nine parts of water can be 
employed. Rubber gloves should be worn, 
because formalin is a strong skin irritant. It 
has a corrosive action on metals and may dam- 
age delicate instruments. 

After formalin fumigation, cleanup 
operations must be undertaken and must in- 
clude the use of forced ventilation and the 
heating of interiors for 48 hours before occu- 
pancy. Washing surfaces with hot water is the 
best method of removing formalin residues. 

4E6.03 GW AGENTS 

Contamination of structural interiors 
by CW agents is subject to the normal proc- 
esses of decay, and especially so when the 
structures are opened to permit maximum 
ventilation. Under special circumstances, 
however, it may prove desirable to effect CW 
decontamination of interiors. In that event, 
available techniques will include the use of 
bleach and bleach slurry on various surfaces 
as indicated in Table 4-6 and the washing of 
surfaces with detergent solutions. 






4-67 









c 






Section 7. DECONTAMINATION OF EQUIPMENT 






4E7.01 RADIOLOGICAL 

DECONTAMINATION 

Radiological decontamination of 
equipment is ordinarily confined to items that 
are required for emergency recovery opera- 
tions. Contaminated equipment that is not 
required for recovery operations should be 
segregated in an out-of-bounds area until 
natural decontamination has taken place. 

Decontamination of vehicles, heavy 
weapons, and equipment of a similar nature 
can best be achieved by complete cleaning in 
the conventional way. The effectiveness of 
decontamination depends on the completeness 
of cleaning- Greasy metal surfaces can best 
be cleaned by the use of steam combined with 
a detergent. 

4E7.02 BW AGENTS 

BW decontamination of equipment is 
effected by the use of a gasproof space or 
chamber into which ethylene oxide-Freon gas 
(ETO-freon) is introduced. Data on ETO- 
Freon gas will be found in paragraph A55 of 
Appendix A. Steps to be taken in the decon- 
tamination procedure are as follows. 

(1) Selection of Chamber . Initially, 

the chamber may be any space in a permanent 
or temporary building that is (a) reasonably 
tight and (b) large enough to permit entry of 
the equipment to be decontaminated. The 
chamber, however, should be as small as 
possible, considering the job to be done, and 
should have no air ducts, power panels, roof 
ventilators, or utility control valves that affect 
other parts of the building. 

(2) Preliminary Steps . All cracks 
that are larger than 1/8 in. must be sealed 
with calking compound or adhesive tape. 
Vents, floor drains, and other openings must 
be fitted with wood, canvas, or metal covers. 

(3) Gasproofing the Chamber . The 
chamber can be gasproofed by spraying the in- 
terior, including the walls and all doors except 
the access door, with a strippable plastic 
coating. Concrete floors need not be sprayed. 

A paint spray apparatus with a nozzle 
that will spray a 6 to 8 in. band at 1 2 inches 
should be used. The coating should be applied 
as heavily as possible without causing exces- 
sive running. One pass builds up an average 
thickness of 0.01 inch, and passes should be 
repeated until the average thickness is 0.04 



inch. About 16 gallons of coating per 100 sq ft 
are required to produce the requisite thickness. 
The coating will dry in 16 hours at 70" F. As 
an extra precaution, an additional coating can be 
sprayed over cracks. 

(4) Installation of Piping . A 1-in. 
pipe inlet must be provided near the floor. The 
pipe must have an adapter so that it can be 
connected to the gas cylinder. A 2-in. outlet 
pipe must be installed close to the highest point 
in the chamber for the release of air as the 
ETO-Freon gas enters. The outlet pipe should 
be threaded for an ordinary pipe cap. 

(5) Operation . When the interior of 
the chamber is dry, decontamination can be 
begun. The equipment should be arranged 
within the enclosure. The access door should 
be closed, sealed on the outside with tape, and 
sprayed with a coating of plastic film. Gas is 
then admitted to the chamber through the lower 
pipe, and when it begins to escape through the 
2-in. outlet pipe, that pipe is capped. The 
desired amount of gas is introduced into the 
chamber. When the equipment is ready to be 
removed, the plastic film is stripped from the 
access door. The process should be repeated 
until all equipment is decontaminated. 

(6) Precautions . Operating person- 
nel must be masked and must wear protective 
clothing. Before any personnel enter after 
decontamination, the interior of the chamber 
must be aerated until the gas odor can no 
longer be detected. Items of decontaminated 
equipment must be aerated until they are free 
of gas odor; this precaution may require sev- 
eral hours for rubber or leather items. 

4E7.03 CW AGENTS 

Neutralization and removal of CW 

agents from equipment involves the use of 
bleach, bleach slurry, DANC solution, solvents, 
and washing and aerating, as specified for dif- 
ferent types of surfaces in Table 4-6. 

For example, emergency decontam- 
ination of a vehicle can be effected by spraying 
(3 -gallon apparatus) or swabbing it with DANC 
solution. Gasoline from the tank of the vehicle 
can also be used to dissolve many war gases 
on metal surfaces. When circumstances per- 
mit, the vehicle can be decontaminated more 
effectively by the following procedure, 

(1) The ground where the decontam- 
ination is to be effected should be covered with 
slurry or earth-bleach mixture. 






4-69 



(2) Dust and mud should be removed 
from the vehicle or equipment by scraping, 
and then the vehicle should be washed with soap 
and water. The contaminant will come off with 
the dirt. 

(3) DANC solution should be used to 
spray areas that remain contaminated; then 
they should be scraped and repainted or oiled. 
If the contaminant is a G-series gas, an alkali, 
such as caustic soda, lime, or soda ash, should 
be used rather than DANC solution. GUNK, 
which is a mixture of alcohol, pine oil, naphtha, 
soap, and sulfonated castor oils, is useful in 
removing greasy, contaminated deposits. It 
can be used as a 10 -percent mixture with water 
or as a 20-percent mixture with kerosene. 

(4) The Ml apparatus should be used 
to spray tarpaulins with DANC solution. 

(5) Contaminated wood surfaces 
should be treated with slurry, which is left on 



for 6 to 24 hours; the surfaces should then be 
washed down with soap and water. 

(6) Little war gas will remain upon 
engine surfaces that become heated. Surfaces 
that remain relatively cool may be swabbed 
several times with gasoline. 

(7) If standard decontamination ma- 
terials and equipment are not available, re- 
peated scrubbing 'with mud and hosing down 
will remove almost all war gases. Dry sand 
or earth will absorb considerable amounts 
of war gases. The use of these materials, 
followed by aeration and weathering, will even- 
tually free equipment of contaminants, 

(8) When decontamination is believed 
to be complete, tests should be conducted to 
confirm the fact. Lewisite (L), in particular, 
is likely to leave residual contamination. 

For additional details concerning po- 
tentially useful decontaminants, see Table 4-7. 









4-70 



( 






TABLE 4-7 
Decontamination of War Gases 



Rating 


Mustard 
gases 


Nitrogen 
mustard gases 


Lewisite 


G- series 
nerve gases 


Chloroaceto- 

phenone 


Very 


Bleach 




Bleach 


Caustic soda 


Alcoholic 


good 


DANC solution 




DANC solution 


Caustic potash 


caustic soda 




protective 




protective 


Lime 


Alcoholic 




ointment 




ointment 


Washing soda 


caustic 




HTH 




BAL 


Slurry 


potash 




Chloro- 




Chloroamine-T 




Washing soda 




amine-T 




Dichloro- 




Aeration 




Dichloro- 




amine-T 








amine -T 










Good 


BAL 


Bleach 


Caustic soda 


HTH 






Household 


DANC solution 


Household 


Household 






bleach 
GUNK 2 


Caustic soda 


bleach 


bleach 






Chloroamine-T 


Soap 


Ammonia 








Dichloroamine-T 


Chlorine 


Baking soda 








GUNK 


Lime 
GUNK 






Fair 


Chlorine 


Household bleach 


Washing soda 


Baking soda 


Organic 




Caustic soda 


Lime 


Baking soda 


GUNK 


solvents 




Lime 


Washing soda 


Organic 


Soap and water 






Washing soda 


Soap 


solvents 


Aeration 






Soap 


Chlorine 


Aeration 








Organic 


Sodium bisulfite 










solvents 


Aeration 




* 






Aeration 










Poor 


Ammonia 
Baking soda 


Baking soda 
Organic solvents 
Ammonia 


Ammonia 







^The residuefrom decontaminated arsenical war gases is poisonous, but it can be neutralized 

by BAL or caustic soda solution. 
^GUNK is a mixture of alcohol, pine oil, naphtha, soap, and sulfonated castor oil that is used 

as 10-percent mixture with water or 20-percent mixture with kerosene. GUNK is provided 

by the Air Force for decontamination of airplanes but may be used on other motorized 

equipment. 






4-71 



i 



r 



< 



o 









Section 8. DECONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL 



4E8.01 RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAM- 
INATION 

During an atomic attack, personnel 
may become contaminated with radioactive 
substances; they may also become contami- 
nated after an attack while carrying out their 
duties as members of reconnaissance and 
survey groups or work parties. Contamination 
occurs largely in the form of fission products. 
These exist as small and sometimes hard-to- 
remove particles that come to rest upon the 
surface of the body, in the hair, under the 
nails, in folds of the skin, and in or on cloth- 
ing. The sooner they are disposed of, the 
smaller the radiation dose that is received by 
the individual. 



Personnel decontamination is, there- 
fore, a vital factor in radiological defense. A 
suggested arrangement of a personnel decon- 
tamination station is shown in Figures 4-17 
and 4-18. Personnel who use the station 
progress through rooms for undressing, show- 
ering, drying, monitoring, and dressing. 

1. PERSONNEL DECONTAMINA- 
TION PROCEDURES. The following proce- 
dures should be used in personnel decontami- 
nation. 

(1) In the undressing room con- 
taminated clothing should be removed and 
placed in containers (G. I. trash cans). 







CONTAMINATED 



• AITINGAREA 



CONTAMINATED 



CLOTHING RM 



CAS ENGINE EXHAUST -1 (J) (V) 

DRYING i CLOTHES EQUIPMENT RM 



n.l IN 




PRESSURE ZONE 

0.3 IN. PRESSURE ZONE 

0.4 IN. PRESSURE ZONE 

' 0.3 1H. PRESSURE ZONE 

■ 0.3 IN. PRESSURE ZONE 

ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE 



© 




© 
© 



DRESSING RM I ISSUE 

LEGEND 

FILTER UNIT, GAS-P ARTICULATE 
REPLACEMENT FILTER FOB (1) 



ANTIBACX DRAFT VALVE 



AIR PRESSURE REGULATOR 



BLAST CLOSURE INTAKE 



BLAST CLOSURE EXHAUST 




© 


® 

© 
© 



CLOTHES CHUTE 



MANOMETER 



PREFILTER 



G1 CANS FOR CONTAMINATED CLOTHING 



01 CANS FOR CONTAMINATED MASKS 



BLAST DOOR 






Figure 4-17. Suggested Arrangement of a Personnel Decontamination Station 



4-73 



RADIOLOGICAL 
DEFENSE MONITOR 
* FIRST AID 



CLOTHING* EQUIPMENT 
ISSUED HERE 







SHUFFLE BOX 



GAS MASKS 

UNIFORMS OK 
COVERALLS 



Figure 4-18. Improvised Personnel Decontamination Station 



(2) In the shower room, the indi- 
vidual should wash down thoroughly, scrub 
with soap and water, but avoid any abrasion of 
the skin. Special attention should be given to 
the hair, the nails, and skin folds, because of 
the relative difficulty of removing small radio- 
active particles from such areas. 

(3) After passing through the dry- 
ing room, the individual should enter the mon- 
itoring room, where he will be monitored. If 
contamination has not been reduced to an ac- 
ceptable level, the individual should return to 
the shower room for another round of scrub- 
bing. 

(4) Persistent contamination, es- 
pecially in wounds, represents a special case. 
Cleaning of such wounds should be effected 
under supervision of medical personnel. 

(5) When the individual has been 
monitored and declared free of contamination, 
he should proceed to the clean section of the 
decontamination station and receive clean 
clothing. 



2. EMERGENCY DECONTAMINA- 
TION OF PERSONNEL. If personnel become 
contaminated with fission products and decon- 
tamination stations are not available or water 
supplies have failed, certain emergency meas- 
ures can be employed to effect partial decon- 
tamination. Exposed skin areas may be wiped 
with clean fabric or any similar material to 
remove at least some of the radioactive par- 
ticles, but great care must be exercised to 
assure that the materials that are used in 
wiping are not themselves contaminated. In 
similar fashion, clothing can be partially freed 
of radioactive contamination by vigorous shak- 
ing or brushing. It must be recognized, how- 
ever, that such measures are emergency 
measures only and are not substitutes for the 
standard decontamination process. 

4E8.02 BW AGENTS 

When pathogens are disseminated in 
aerosol sprays, exposed clothing and body 
surfaces will become contaminated. Such 
contamination should be removed as soon as 
possible by a thorough scrubbing of the body 
with soap and water. The general procedure 






4-74 












and technique to be used is similar to that em- 
ployed in radiological decontamination, with 
one exception. In lieu of the procedure that is 
outlined in item (2) of paragraph 1 of 4E8.01, 
a rubdown with 70-percent ethyl alcohol or 
80-percent isopropyl alcohol is recommended 
if showers are not available. All parts of the 
body should be treated with the alcohol. The 
mask is then removed and placed in a covered 
G. I. can. Because no rapid means of detecting 
BW contamination is available, it will be nec- 
essary for personnel to be extremely thorough 
in the decontamination process. 

4E8.03 CW AGENTS 

Personnel who have been contami- 
nated by CW agents should report to decon- 
tamination stations as soon as practicable. To 
forestall the injurious effects of contamination, 
they should dispose of their clothing, bathe 
thoroughly with water and soap or detergents 
as soon as possible, and receive clean clothing. 
The general procedure is the same as that 
employed in r ad i o 1 o g i c a 1 decontamination 
{paragraph 4E8.01). Contaminated clothing 
and personal gear should be placed in closed 
metal cans for disposal or decontamination. 

4E8.04 DECONTAMINATION OF CLOTHING 

Special waterproof clothing should be 
hosed down while it is still worn by the indi- 
vidual. Ordinarily, this process will remove 
enough surface radioactive contamination to 
make the clothing suitable for reissue. This 
treatment will also reduce the BW and CW 
contamination, thus decreasing the hazards 
that will be incurred in later handling. 

The disposition of ordinary clothing 
that has become contaminated depends on the 
degree of contamination and the facilities that 
are available. The following procedures shall 
be used in the disposition or treatment of 
ordinary clothing. 



(1) Worn garments that are replac- 
able and highly contaminated shall be destroyed. 

(2) Potentially useful garments that 
are highly contaminated shall be retained so 
that radioactive decay can take place. Aging 
has a beneficial effect for both BW and CW 
agents that are not highly persistent. 

{3) Potentially useful garments that 
exhibit a minor degree of initial contamination 
shall be laundered. 

In general, the proper method for the 
decontamination of clothing depends on the 
type of attack to which the clothing has been 
exposed. Clothing that has been subjected to 
radioactive contamination should be laundered 
to remove as much of the radioactive material 
as possible. If the level of radioactivity of 
laundered clothing IB still high, the clothing 
should be disposed of. Safe disposal of water 
that has been used in the laundering process 
must be assured. 

Clothing that has been used as a pro- 
tection against biological agents can be decon- 
taminated best by the use of ethylene oxide- 
Freon gas in a gasproof chamber. If such a 
chamber is not available, ethylene oxide am- 
poules can be used in a gas bag (paragraph 
A27 of Appendix A). However, care must be 
exercised in using ethylene oxide because this 
gas is highly toxic. After decontamination, 
the clothing should be hung in the open air and 
should remain there as long as the odor of the 
gas can be detected. Clothing may also be 
decontaminated effectively by laundering it in 
a solution that contains 2 percent of chlorine 
and 1/2 percent of a wetting agent. Clothing 
that has been used as a protection against 
chemical agents can be decontaminated by 
(a) washing it to remove and/or hydrolyze the 
agent and (b) exposing it to bright sunlight to 
hasten the evaporation and decomposition of 
the agent. 






4-75 



p 









Section 9. DECONTAMINATION OF FOOD 






4E9.01 APPROVAL FOR CONSUMPTION 

Foods that are suspected of any con- 
tamination should be inspected and approved 
for consumption by the medical department. 



4E9.02 



RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAM- 
INATION 



When foods are in cans, bottles, or 
dustproof containers, contaminating particles 
on the outside are the only hazard. These 
particles can be removed by thorough washing, 
and the packages can be monitored to assure 
that the decontaminating process has been 
effective. Even unpackaged vegetables can be 
decontaminated in this manner, especially if 
washing is followed by peeling off the outer 
surfaces. 

4E9.03 BW AGENTS 

Foods in sealed containers are rela- 
tively secure against BW contamination, pro- 
vided that the seals remain intact. Such foods, 
however, can be contaminated by saboteurs. 

If only the exteriors of cans and bot- 
tles that containfoods have been contaminated, 
it is usually safe to use the contents, provided 
that the containers have been decontaminated 
before they are opened. This may be done by 
soaking the containers for 30 minutes in a 
solution of 2-percent available chlorine and 
0.5-percent anionic detergent. 

Unpackaged or bulk foods may be 
sterilized by heat application, provided that 
this is appropriate for the foods in question. 
Although heat penetration varies according to 
the type and bulk of foods, average processing 
may be accomplished by: 

(1 ) Low-pressure cooking (5 lb/sq in) 
at 228 °F for one hour, 

(2) Oven cooking at 250"Fto 300°F 
for 40 minutes, 

(3) Boiling in water for 20 minutes, or 

(4) Boiling liquids or foods that will 
melt under heat (for example, butter) for 15 
minutes. 

Foods that are packaged in cardboard 
or similar material should be decontaminated 
by (a) wiping the outer surfaces of the con- 
tainers with a cloth that has been moistened 
with chlorine and detergent solution and 



(b) allowing the containers to dry for 30 min- 
utes before they have been opened. 

4E9.04 CW AGENTS 

The disposition of foods that have 
been contaminated with CW agents is discussed 
briefly in paragraph 4EI2.02. Food-testing 
kits are described in paragraph 4A5.06. Some 
additional considerations that are worthy of 
special emphasis are as follows. 

(1) Well-packaged rations that are 
otherwise undamaged may frequently be sal- 
vaged by washing the contamination from their 
exteriors. 

(2) Food that can not be reclaimed 
should be destroyed by burning or burying. 

4E9.05 RECLAMATION OF FOODS CON- 
TAMINATED BY CW AGENTS 

Food supplies that have been contam- 
inated by CW agents should be handled only by 
personnel who are (a) trained in decontamina- 
tion methods and (b) equipped with proper 
protective clothing and masks. Before any 
decontamination procedure is undertaken, a 
careful survey should be made to determine 
the extent of contamination. From informa- 
tion that is gained on this survey, the exposed 
items should be divided into three groups for 
separate treatment as described below. 

1. GROUP I. Group I will consist of 
packaged items that have been exposed only to 
the vapors of the agent. A consideration of the 
factors that are outlined above will serve as a 
basis for the evaluation of the seriousness of 
contamination. In general, it will be unsafe to 
issue items in this group to personnel until 
the items have been briefly aired to remove 
clinging vapors. 

2. GROUP II. Group II will consist 
of packaged items, the outsides of which have 
been contaminated with the liquid agent. At- 
tempts to decontaminate porous packaging ma- 
terials, such as cardboard or wood, are likely 
to be unsuccessful and may actually result in 
the spreading of contamination. The best pro- 
cedure in the handling of such items is to strip 
off the outer contaminated coverings and ex- 
amine the inner layer to see if the agent has 
penetrated them. If it has, additional layers 
should be stripped off until an uncontaminated 
layer is reached. Items that are packed for 
military operations are usually packaged in 
boxes within boxes; such a procedure is 






4-77 



therefore feasible. When an inner uncontami- 
nated package is reached, it should be placed 
in Group I. If the agent has penetrated to the 
food itself, it should be placed in Group III. 
When food supplies have been subjected to 
liquid contamination by the nerve gases, it is 
imperative that the outer contaminated cover- 
ings be decontaminated as soon as possible 
after stripping. The liquid nerve gases evap- 
orate slowly from fiber board and may present 
a vapor hazard to personnel for long periods 
of time. Canned goods can be decontaminated 
by any of the usual chemical methods such as 
the use of bleach slurry, soda ash, or non- 
corrosive decontaminating solution (DANC), 
followed by washing in water. Outer coverings 
that have been contaminated with nerve gases 
should be immersed in a solution of soda ash 
and water. 

3. GROUP III. Group III will consist 
of unpackaged or poorly packaged items that 



have been exposed to a vapor or liquid agent. 
The general decontamination procedure to be 
followed in order is: (a) trimming of surface 
fat and grossly contaminated areas, (b) washing 
with water or a 2-percent sodium bicarbonate 
solution, and (c) boiling in water. Boiling in 
water may be eliminated when the contamination 
has been only with the vapors of lacrimators. 
When such an exposure has been light, aeration 
for a short time may be effective for decon- 
tamination. Frying, roasting, or broiling will 
not remove traces of vesicants from meats. 
In general, salvage of foods that have been 
heavily contaminated with droplets of the vesi- 
cants, especially the arsenical vesicants, is 
not practicable. 

Further details concerning food de- 
contamination may be found in Appendix III of 
Treatment of Chemical Warfare Casualties, 
NAVMED P-5041. 



o 



c 



4-78 



o 






Section 10. DECONTAMINATION OF WATER 






4E10.01 RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAM- 
INATION 

Conventional water treatment proc- 
esses are a relatively inefficient means of 
removing those soluble radioactive isotopes 
that present the greatest hazard when ingested. 
Conversely, however, they do effectively re- 
move the insoluble particulate matter. If fur- 
ther decontamination is required, the only 
processes that are worthy of serious consid- 
eration are ion- exchange and distillation. A 
mixed cation-anion exchange resin is needed. 
Such a column will remove 99 percent of the 
radionuclides that remain after normal water 
plant treatment. The usual mixed-bed de- 
miner alizers are available commercially; they 
are similar to those used in laboratories and 
are equipped with disposable cartridges that 
contain the ion-exchange resins. These de- 
mineralizers may be used to meet the emer- 
gency requirements if the level after normal 
treatment exceeds the energy limit. This 
limit is 9 x 10~2 microcuries per cu cm 
(3 x 103 disintegrations per sec per cu cm) 
when the consumption period is 10 days, and 
3 x 10"^ microcuries per cu cm (I x 103 dis- 
integrations per sec per cu cm) when the con- 
sumption period is 30 days. Distillation is 
effective in the removal of radioactivity from 
water, but it is limited by the relatively low 
capacity of units that are available through the 
Shore Establishment. 

4E10.02 BW AGENTS 

Chlorine treatment with an adjust- 
ment of pH value (6.0 to 7.0) is most effective 
for the decontamination of water that contains 
BW agents. Water supplies that have been 
contaminated by BW agents may be made 
potable in a number of ways, including the 
following countermeasures. 

1. RAPID SAND FILTRATION. Rapid 
sand filtration is a conventional treatment, but 
more chlorine is required than in the routine 
process. The water is prechlorinated to effect 
a free available chlorine residual of about 0.6 
ppm after a contact period of 15 minutes or 
more. It is postchlorinated to produce a free 
available residual after 30 minutes to 5 ppm 
as the water leaves the plant and 1 ppm in the 
most distant part of the distribution system. 
The normal rate of flow through the sand 
filters should be cut in half if possible. 

2. SLOW SAND FILTRATION. When 
the slow sand filtration method is used, pre- 
chlorination should be employed to the fullest 



extent short of effecting a residual. Rate of 
flow through the filters should remain standard. 
The postchlorination procedure is the same as 
in rapid sand filtration, but if the presence of 
botulinum toxin is suspected, the postchlorina- 
tion contact period should be increased from 
30 minutes to one hour. 

3. IMPROVISED METHODS. The use 
of improvised methods is recommended when 
regular water treatment facilities are not 
available. Some of these are listed below: 

(1) Boiling for 20 minutes, 

(2) Distillation, if equipment is 
available, and 

(3) Improvised chlorination. to 
effect a free available chlorine residual of 5 
ppm after 30 minutes (60 minutes if the pres- 
ence of botulinum toxin is suspected). 

4. FIELD TREATMENT. Iodine tab- 
lets can be used to sterilize water in small 
containers such as canteens. Three iodine 
tablets should be added to a quart of water; if 
a strong iodine odor is still present after 10 
minutes, it is best to wait another 20 minutes 
before drinking the water. If the iodine odor is 
weak or absent after 10 minutes, the water 
should be discarded and4 or 5 tablets should be 
tried in the next batch. Boiling for 30 minutes 
in addition to the iodine treatment is recom- 
mended if conditions permit. 

5. CHLOR-DECHLOR PROCESS. The 

chlor-dechlor process is a highly effective 
variation of normal purification procedures, 
but because of the long contact period that is 
involved, it is not operationally possible in 
some plants, Chlorination is effected so that 
a free available residual of 1 5 ppm is present 
after the 2-hour contact period. Then a de- 
chlorinating agent is employed to lower the 
residual to 0.5 ppm and make the water palat- 
able. 

The chlorine residual maybe lowered 
by employing one of the following methods. 

(1) Sulfur dioxide gas can be intro- 
duced into the water by a sulfonator, ■which is 
similar to a vacuum-solution-feed chlorinator 
except for the metering component. The sul- 
fonator is best adapted to the dechlorination 
of large flows of water such as those of a reg- 
ular treatment plant. In an emergency, a chlo- 
rinator could be used as a sulfonator. 






4-79 



(2) Sodium bisulfite or sodium meta- 
bisulfite can be introduced either by a dry- 
feed- solution device or directly, as in the 
batch-method employment. Solutions that 
contain these substances can also be fed with 
standard chlorinators. 

(3) Sodium thiosulfate (hypo) can be 
used but it is not recommended' because of the 
cost factor. The amount that is required can 
be established by a trial-and-error process, 
using orthotolidine solution to determine the 
desired residual. 

The approximate theoretical amount 
of various agents that are required to de- 
chlorinate 1 ppm of chlorine is as follows. 



Agent 

Sulfur dioxide 
Sodium bisulfite 
Sodium meta- bisulfite 
Sodium thiosulfate 

4E10.03 CW AGENTS 



Amount 

(ppm) 

1 
2 
1.3 

7 



When positive tests result from the 
use of the water testing and screening kit 
(paragraph 4A5.05), the water is considered 
to be contaminated. Tests must be made when 
r&sidual chlorine is near zero. If supplies are 
found to be contaminated and no uncontaminated 
supplies can be obtained, decontamination on a 
large scale may prove to be desirable provided 
intact treatment plants and trained water- 
purification personnel are available. Under 
such circumstances, the intake pump that is 
used to withdraw water from the source should 
be placed at an intermediate level, so that only 
a minimum disturbance will occur in surface 



and bottom waters. The methods of treatment 
employed for relatively large volumes of water 
that have been contaminated by various agents 
and the permissible standards therefor are 
outlined in Appendix C. For emergency decon- 
tamination of small volumes of water, the 
following treatment, which involves the use of 
two Lyster bags, is recommended. 

(1) Depending upon the agent that is 
present, dosages of activated carbon or soda 
ash as prescribed in Appendix C should be 
added to water in one Lyster bag. If identities 
and concentrations of contaminants are un- 
known, 2 lb of activated carbon and 2 oz of 
soda ash should be added. 

(2) A wooden paddle should be used 
to stir the mixture for 20 minutes. 

(3) An ounce or more of alum should 
be dissolved in a small amount of water, and 
this solution should be added to the water in 
the Lyster bag to effect coagulation. 

(4) After thorough but gentle stir- 
ring, the mixture should be allowed to coagulate 
and clarify by sedimentation for 30 minutes. 

(5) The supernatant water should 
then be siphoned to another Lyster bag, pref- 
erably through a filter. 

(6) The water is now ready for test, 
and if it meets the standards that are set forth 
in Appendix C, it is ready for chlorination or 
iodination. 

For information on the monitoring of 
CW agents by means of fish, refer to Appen- 
dix; F. 



r 






4-80 



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Section 11. DECONTAMINATION OF STORES AND SUPPLIES 






4E11.01 RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAM- 
INATION 

Because of the variety of materials 
and surfaces that are present in stores and 
supplies, many decontamination problems are 
encountered. If the immediate use of stores 
and supplies is not required, it is desirable to 
segregate them and allow the natural decay 
process to take place. 

When the immediate use of stores and 
supplies is anticipated, securely packaged 
items present a minor decontamination prob- 
lem. For example, radiological contamination 
is limited to external surfaces, and decontam- 
ination is largely a matter of vacuum cleaning 
and/ or washing down the packages. 

Stores and supplies that are not pack- 
aged at the time of attack may present a more 
difficult problem. In some instances, rough 
decontamination by washing down may be ef- 
fected. In other instances, the use of water 
and steam combined with a detergent may be 
effective in removing more closely held par- 
ticles from surfaces that can stand this type 
of treatment. The effectiveness of any pro- 
cedure that is employed may be checked by 
monitoring. Perishable items should usually 
be destroyed without effort of salvage. 

4E11.02 BW AGENTS 

For many potential BW agents, natural 
loss of viability can be anticipated within a 



relatively short period of time. Stores and 
supplies that are not immediately required 
may therefore be segregated temporarily. 

Stores and supplies that are in sealed 
containers will have the contamination on their 
exteriors. Some containers can be decontam- 
inated by swabbing them with a chlorine and 
detergent solution and then aerating them. 
Other items, packaged or unpackaged, can be 
decontaminated by immersing themin (a) boil- 
ing water for 20 minutes or (b) a solution of 
2-percent available chlorine and 0.5-percent 
anionic detergent. 

When necessary, stores and supplies 
except food can be decontaminated by the ETO- 
Freon process that is described in paragraph 
4E7.02. 



4E11.03 CW AGENTS 

Natural decay will solve the problem 
of CW contamination if sufficient time can be 
allowed. Packaged items constitute a smaller 
decontamination problem than unpackaged 
items, provided the contaminating agent has 
not been absorbed through the packaging. 

When decontamination must be em- 
ployed, the techniques that are described in 
paragraph 4E7.03 are applicable. Attention is 
also directed to Table 4-6, which outlines the 
processes that are appropriate for use on 
various surfaces. 






549252 Q-60-l; 



4-81 






Section 12. DISPOSAL OF CONTAMINATED MATERIEL 






4E12.0I RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAM- 
INATION 

After a nuclear attack, various items 
of equipment and material are likely to be in 
one of the following categories. 

(1) Equipment or material that is so 
contaminated and so badly damaged by blast or 
thermal effects that repair efforts are not 
worthwhile. 

(2) Porous materials that can not be 
decontaminated successfully. 

(3) Contaminated equipment that is 
so delicate it can not be recovered by employ- 
ing normal decontamination or sealing proce- 
dures. 

Equipment and materials in the fore- 
going categories present no immediate prob- 
lem if the area in which they are located is not 
to be occupied after an attack. If the material 
and/or equipment can not be left in its area of 
location, it must be collected and stored in an 
area that is not occupied by personnel. 

In the accomplishment of this objec- 
tive, the amount of handling that will be re- 
quired should be reduced to a minimum and 
the spreading of radioactive dust should be 
avoided. It may be possible to destroy com- 
bustible materials by a controlled burning 
process. Here again, the amount of handling 
by personnel is likely to be a critical factor, 
and radioactive smoke and ash must not be 
permitted to blow into occupied areas. 

Final disposition of radioactive wastes 
can be accomplished in three ways. 



1. BURIAL ON LAND. Burial on land 
can be employed when entombment on land or 
burial at sea are not practicable. For per- 
manent disposal, an underground cell that is 
lined with concrete and waterproofed with 
grout is recommended to prevent subsequent 
seepage. Care should be exercised in the 
selection of a burial site so that nearby sources 
of water will not become contaminated. The 
cell should be filled with the contaminated ma- 
terial and then covered with at least six feet 
of earth. Its position should be marked above 
ground and permanently recorded. 

2. ENTOMBMENT. Entombment is a 
simplified type of land burial in caves or 
abandoned mines. After the contaminated ma- 
terials have been put into place, the entrances 
to the caves or mines must be sealed, and the 
locations must be marked and recorded as in 
procedure 1. 

3. BURIAL AT SEA. When contami- 
nated materials are to be buried at sea, they 
should be sealed in drums or caissons that 
are strong and reasonably leakproof. The 
drums should then be dropped into deep water 
where no strong currents occur. The peace- 
time requirements for the disposal of radio- 
active wastes are covered in Radioactive -Waste 
Disposal in the Ocean , Handbook 58, National 
Bureau of Standards. Insofar as practicable, 
the same requirements should apply after a 
nuclear attack. 

4E12.02 BW AND CW AGENTS 

When BW and CW agents are the only 
sources of contamination, most contaminated 
items of equipment and supply will be subject 
to ultimate reclamation. 






4-83 



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PART F. FACILITIES FOR DECONTAMINATION AND RECOVERY 
Section 1. DECONTAMINATION FACILITIES 






4F1.01 DESIGN OF A DECONTAM- 
INATION CENTER 

To serve as a base of operations for 
recovery teams, a decontamination center 
should be a gasproof and windowless structure 
that is located so it will be easily accessible 
to personnel. Such a facility will constitute 
{a) a place where personnel can eat and rest, 
(b) a control point for teams, and (c) a reissue 
station for clothing and equipment. Provision 
should also be made for the establishment of 
emergency decontamination stations in the 
event that the decontamination center is ren- 
dered inoperative. The plan of a decontamina- 
tion center for recovery team personnel is 
shown in Figure 4-17. Its basic components 
consist of an unclean area, a washing area, 
and a clean area. 

Pressurization of the various rooms 
andareas of the decontamination center should 
be as follows; 



Area 


Pressurization 
{in, of water) 


Outer dressing and 
equipment room 





Contaminated clothing 
room 


0.3 


Air locks 


0.4 


Inner dressing and 
washing area 


0.5 


Clean area 


0.6 



The unclean area includes an outer 
undressing room, contaminated clothing room, 
inner undressing room, and shower room. 
The shower room has drains thatassure rapid 
removal of contaminated water. 

The clean area for drying, monitoring, 
and dressing also provides for the storage and 
issue of clean clothing and protective gear, 
including masks. Masks must be ready for 
issue if the area outside the decontamination 



center is still contaminated. The clean area 
also includes space for toilet facilities, stor- 
age of decontamination team equipment, sleep- 
ing quarters for the decontamination team, and 
food storage and issue. Air locks must be 
providedat the entrance to the inside undress- 
ing area and at the exit of the clean area. A 
special equipment room should be provided to 
house the collective protector, space heaters, 
and water heaters. 

4F1.02 IMPROVISED PERSONNEL 

DECONTAMINATION STATIONS 

Improvised personnel decontamina- 
tion stations can be set up in the field, and 
they will require only a small quantity of spe- 
cial equipment. The plan for such a station 
is shown in Figure 4-18. A lane approximately 
6 ft wide is laid out along the course that per- 
sonnel will follow through the decontamination 
station. Posts should be driven into the ground 
and ropes strung between them to mark the 
boundaries of the lane. The first portion of 
the lane is the unclean area, which is to be 
used for undressing. GI cans, open packing 
crates, or boxes should be placed outside the 
ropes for disposal of contaminated equipment 
and clothing. 

After undressing, personnel should 
proceed along the lane to the washing area, 
where a truck-mounted water tank is located. 
Here the personnel should wash down and dry. 
The remainder of the lane is the clean area. 
Duckboards are laid in the clean area to pre- 
vent recontamination from the ground. Tents 
should be erected along this portion of the 
lane for the storage and issue of clean clothing 
and equipment. Benches should be provided 
for use in dressing. Any power-driven decon- 
taminating apparatus can be used as the shower 
unit. 

4F1.03 STORAGE FACILITIES FOR CON- 
TAMINATED MATERIAL AND 
EQUIPMENT 

Storage facilities for contaminated 
material and equipment should be provided in 
a remote part of the shore station where it 
will not be a hazard to personnel. In general, 
the area that is selected should be an open one 



4-85 



on the leeward side of the shore station. The oils and paint in drums, and construction ma- 
area should be devoid of trees so that the full terials. 

effects of the weather can be utilized for nat- Contaminated material that requires 

ural decontamination of BW and CW agents. protection from moisture can be covered with 

tarpaulins or stored in an isolated building or 

All materials and equipment that are shed. Complete covering of contaminated ma- 

not adversely affected by the weather should terial, however, will delay natural decay of 

be stored in the open. Such items include auto- BW and CW agents, although it will have no 

motive and construction equipment, lumber, effect upon the natural decay of RW agents. 









4-86 






Section 2. FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES 






4F2.01 FIREFIGHTING EQUIPMENT 

Firefighting equipment that is used 
for recovery consists of the usual equipment 
of this type that is found on most naval stations. 
Such equipment, however, should be outfitted 
with communication and radiac sets. In addi- 
tion, it will be necessary to implement with 
improvised equipment to the maximum extent 
possible. In the event of an attack, most ac- 
tivities will require more firefighting equip- 
ment than is usually assigned. For this reason, 
joint agreements for mutual support should be 
arranged with other fire departments in ad- 
vance so that all will have ready access to 
equipment when it is needed. Decontaminating 
apparatus of all types can be adapted as fire- 
fighting equipment by simply adding firefighting 
guns of appropriate types and capacities. The 
capability of firefighting equipment may be 
limited by the availability of water supplies 
rather than the quantity of equipment. 

4F2.02 DECENTRALIZATION AND 
DISPERSAL 

When conditions ■warrant, it may be 
desirable to have two or more fire houses on 
the station to lessen the possibility of complete 
immobilization of the fire department. Such 
added installations, however, may be too ex- 
pensive. As a minimum requirement, emer- 
gency facilities should be provided to house 



or contain trailer -mounted pumpers, extin- 
guishers, and other portable firefighting 
equipment and tools. These emergency fire- 
fighting posts should be established at various 
locations on the perimeter of the station and 
at other locations on the station where the risk 
of fire is great. In any event, when a warning 
is sounded, firefighting equipment should be 
relocated at various predetermined dispersal 
points on the station. 

4F2.03 FIREBREAKS 

Firebreaks are open places such as 
streets, parks, bodies of water, cleared land, 
and specially designated areas that are in- 
tended to limit or stop the spread of mass 
fires. They are most important in an AW 
attack because of the size of fires that may 
occur. As a controlling measure against the 
effects of an AW attack, the accepted peace- 
time criteria for the spacing of new construc- 
tion should be doubled. 



Firebreaks should be kept clear of 
timber, brush, and any other combustible ma- 
terial. They should not be employed as vehicle 
parking lots, open storage areas, or for any 
other purpose that would prevent their imme- 
diate use as firebreaks. They may be em- 
ployed, however, as drill grounds and recre- 
ational or sports areas. 






4-87 



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Section 3. CLEARING AND REPAIR EQUIPMENT 






4F3.01 GENERAL TYPES 

The following paragraphs give the 
general types of equipment that should be 
used for demolition, earthmoving, mate rials - 
handling, transportation, and repair. This 
functional listing does not follow precise defi- 
nitions as to category. For example, earth- 
moving equipment can also be used for demo- 
lition work. Also, no attempt has been made 
to list the sizes and capacities of the various 
items of equipment. Details on sizes and the 
proper application of construction and weight- 
handling equipment can be found in Part H of 
Administration and Operation of Transporta- 
tion Equipment , NAVDOCKS TP-TR-1 (Revised 
July 1957). 

The amount of equipment that will be 
required will depend on the local situation and 
will probably exceed the amount on hand. 
However, purchase of additional equipment for 
this purpose is not contemplated. Joint agree- 
ments that involve mutual support should be 
arranged to provide for the availability of 
equipment in time of need. The use of con- 
tractors' equipment in the vicinity is a possi- 
bility that should be investigated. 

4F3.02 DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT 

The demolition equipment that is 
listed below should be used primarily for re- 
moval of hazards suchas collapsed structures, 
structures that are in imminent danger of 
collapse, piled equipment wreckage, and other 
obstacles. 

(1) Cranes (truck, wheel, or crawler- 
mounted), with such working tools as skull 
crackers, hooks, orange-peel buckets, slings, 
and similar items. 

(2) Crawler and wheeled tractors 
with angledozer or bulldozer attachments. 

(3) Air compressors (engine-driven), 
with such working tools as hammers, drills, 
drivers, and breakers. 

(4) Acetylene-burning equipment. 

(5) Winches. 

(6) Chain saws. 

(7) Pulley block sets. 

(8) Explosives and related items. 

(9) Wire cable. 



4F3.03 EARTHMOVING EQUIPMENT 

The following essential earthmoving 
equipment and material is used primarily in 
clearing obstructions and hazards. 

(1) Shovels (crawler. -mounted). 

(2) Cranes (crawler or truck- 
mounted) with clamshell or dragline attach- 
ments. The dragline has the greatest reach 
of any type of earthmoving equipment. This 
consideration may be most important when 
access is a problem. 

(3) Crawler and wheeled tractors 
with angledozer of bulldozer attachments. 

(4) Road graders. 

(5) Carryall scrapers. Carryall 
scrapers have the greatest working range of 
any digging and hauling equipment. 

(6) Bucket loaders. 

(7) Ditchers and trenchers. 

(8) Back hoes. Back hoes are the 
most powerful and accurate tools for excava- 
tion work when a great width of cut is not 
important. 

(9) Explosives and related items. 



4F3.04 MATERIALS- HANDLING 
EQUIPMENT 

Essential equipment for handling ma- 
terials in clearing and repair work is as 
follows. 

(1) Cranes (truck or crawler- 
mounted), with slings, platforms, buckets, and 
similar working tools. 

(2) Fork-lift trucks. . 

(3) Side-loader trucks. 

(4) Straddle-carry trucks. 

(5) Skip loaders. 

4F3.05 REPAIR EQUIPMENT 

Essential repair equipment that is 
used in clearing and repair operations includes 
the following. 



4-89 



driven) . 



(1) Arc welders (engine-driven). 

(2) Acetylene welders and cutters. 

(3) Air compressors (engine-driven). 

(4) Electric generators (engine- 

(5) Machine shop trucks or trailers. 



(6) Pumps (diaphragm, rotary, and 
centrifugal). 

(7) Telephone and powerline con- 
struction or maintenance trucks. 



(8) Miscellaneous hand and power 
tools. 

4F3.06 AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES 

Automotive vehicles that are required 
for clearing and repair work are listed below. 
Passenger-carrying vehicles are not ■work 
vehicles and are therefore not included in this 
list. 

(1) Dump trucks. 

(2) Pick-up trucks. 

(3) Low-bed trailers. 

(4) Tank trucks. 









4-90 






CHAPTER 5. PLANS AND OPERATIONS 

PART A. READINESS PLANNING 

Section 1. CONCEPT 






5A1.01 IMPORTANCE OF PLANNING 

ABC warfare defense involves meas- 
ures that are taken to prepare for, and mini- 
mize the effects of, atomic, biological, and 
chemical attacks. Insofar as Navy shore sta- 
tions are concerned, the primary objective is 
to (a) maintain their operational status to the 
greatest degree possible in the face of an at- 
tack or disaster and (b) assure the accom- 
plishment of their mission at all times. 

The effectiveness of ABC warfare 
defense depends to a great extent on the plan- 
ning, construction, and training that are car- 
ried on before actual attack. Planning must 
include provisions for early warning and in- 
telligence, mutual aid, mobile support, and 
fixed support, and it requires effective liaison 
with other commands and agencies. Planning 
must provide for dispersal of installations, 
equipment, and personnel, both in space and in 
time. It must embrace strong elements of 
security against observation, espionage, sab- 
otage, annoyance, and surprise; at the same 
time it must attain a condition of physical se- 
curity that will assure a state of inviolability 
fromhostile acts or influences. Planning must 
give careful attention to new protective con- 
struction or the alteration of existing construc- 
tion, and it must provide special facilities 
such as control centers, decontamination cen- 
ters, and emergency recovery stations. It 
must provide a basic indoctrination training 
program for all personnel, both military and 
civilian. Planning must include a continuous 
program for the training and retraining of per- 
sonnel who make up the various elements and 
teams upon which recovery depends. It must 
provide for the availability of the various spe- 
cial materials and equipment that will be re- 
quired for ABC warfare defense. 

Effective planning and preparation, 
including training, is the very essence of ABC 
warfare defense. It serves to minimize losses 
under attack and facilitates rapid return to 
full operational efficiency. 



5A1.02 PHASES IN PLANNING 

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3440.6 sets 
forth in detail the following five phases that 
must be planned for in passive defense: 



(1) Long-range development meas- 



ures, 



(Z) Normal peacetime fire protection 
and security measures of a continuing nature, 

(3) Measures that must be effected 
upon receipt of a warning, 

(4) Immediate post-attack or emer- 
gency recovery measures to save lives and 
minimize progressive or secondary damage, 
and 

(5) Operational recovery measures, 

5A1.03 PROBLEMS OF COORDINATED 
PLANNING 

The broad potential effects of an ABC 
attack have made coordination of planning a 
factor of first-rank importance. Extensive 
areas are likely to be affected by an ABC 
attack — areas that include establishments of 
various branches of the Armed Forces, indus- 
trial installations, and elements of the civilian 
population. Effective mutual aid will depend 
on the degree of planning and coordination that 
have been achieved among the various military 
and civilian agencies. This is top-level plan- 
ning, but the need for coordination extends 
down the chain of command to the smallest 
and most isolated activity. 

An ABC attack could result in the 
temporary paralysis of extensive areas. In 
such an event, the problem of debris might 
create extremely serious, although temporary, 
transportation difficulties at a time when food 
and clothing, emergency hospitalization, ma- 
terials for repair and reconstruction, and 
other essential supplies were urgently needed. 
In addition, contamination from radiological 



5-1 



fallout might prevent transportation facilities 
from operating in or through certain areas. 

The aforementioned considerations 
emphasize the need for logistic planning as a 
part of overall planning for defense. The 
equipment and materials that are necessary 
for the accomplishment of missions of the 
various elements and their component teams 
must be providedin realistic quantities. More- 
over, provision must be made for adequate 
stock levels, dispersal, and safe stowage of 
such materials. 

5 A 1 . 4 C ALC U L ATED RISK 

Large-scale ABC warfare attack, like 
any other form of enemy action, is certain to 
necessitate the taking of certain calculated 
risks. Moreover, strategic and tactical situ- 
ations frequently demand the assumption of 
such risks, although every effort must be made 
to avoid them. 

The decision to assume a calculated 
risk is a command decision that may be made 
at various levels. Thus, the commanding offi- 
cer of anaval activity, faced with the necessity 
of providing for emergency rescue after an 
attack, may be called upon to decide ■whether 
an engineering rescue team should be sent into 
an area that is known to be contaminated. 
Fundamentally, this decision differs in no way 
from the decision to order a vessel to press 
home an attack even though it is outgunned. 



5A1.05 CHARACTERISTICS OF A NAVAL 
SHORE ACTIVITY 

Characteristics of a naval activity 
with respect to geographical location, terrain, 
size, importance, relative permanence, and 
mission all have some bearing on defense 
planning. The following paragraphs contain a 
general analysis of these factors and their 
effects. 

1. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AND 
IMPORTANCE. With the advent of intercon- 
tinental bombers and long-range missiles, 
advantages that were formerly derived from 
geographical isolation have diminished appre- 
ciably. Whether or not a proposed target is 
worth the military effort that will be required 
to destroy it is likely to be a more important 
factor of consideration. Thus, a relatively 
small shore station that is situated in a critical 
target area might be more likely to suffer 
attack than a large isolated naval activity al- 
though the small station might not be the pri- 
mary objective of such an attack. 

2. TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION. The 
type of construction that is used at naval ac- 
tivities will influence readiness planning. 
Buildings at many activities were constructed 
before ABC warfare was known. In such in- 
stances, planning for defense will be concerned 
with the effective adaptation and modification 
of existing structures to meet modern needs. 
A newly constructed shore station, planned for 
long-time use, may have protective construc- 
tion incorporated in the design. 



o 



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5-2 



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Section 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL CONTROL 



5A2.01 IMPLEMENTATION BY DIS- 
TRICTS AND BUREAUS 

The establishment of a functional 
central control is essential to the operational 
efficiency of a coordinated defense plan. Usu- 
ally, the overall plans of higher authority first 
become implemented at bureau and district 
levels. From these levels actual implementa- 
tion of specific tasks continues on down the 
chain of command until all individuals in the 
Naval Establishment are involved. 



administrative organization and the composition 
of its command is detailed in Chapter 3 of the 
United States Navy Passive Defense Manual , 
OFNAV INSTRUCTION 3440.6. The outline of 
the disaster control organization is shown in 
Figure 5-1 and described briefly as follows. 

1. DISASTER CONTROL FORCE. 
Under command of the district commandant, it 
is composed of disaster control groups desig- 
nated as area commands and so designated by 
the commandant. 



The bureaus are involved in defense 
planning because of (a) their relationship to 
bureau-managed field activities and (b} their 
responsibility to develop protective measures 
that are commensurate with the strategic and 
logistic importance of individual activities. 

At the district level, the first step in 
the preparation for ABC warfare defense is to 
establish an administrative organization that 
will designate, equip, and train disaster con- 
trol forces. The designation of such an 



2. DISASTER CONTROL GROUP. 
Under command of a group commander so 
designated by the commandant. The area 
command is composed of units that are or- 
ganized within its geographical limits. 

3. DISASTER CONTROL UNIT. The 
disaster control unit is under the command of 
an officer who is designated by the disaster 
control group commander. Some of the larger 
naval stations may be able to orgpnize com- 
plete units. Smaller stations, however, may 






ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 
ESTABLISHES. EQUIPS. AND TRAINS 
PASSIVE DEFENSE FORCES 



PASSIVE DEFENSE FORCE (PDF7) 



TACTICAL ORGANIZATION 
OPERATES ON OCCASION OF 
ATTACK, WARNING,OR DISASTER. 



AREA COMMANDS 



PDG 7.1 
ASH AREA 



PDG 7.2 
CHERRY AREA 



PDG 7 5 

SPRUCE AREA 



POG 7.4 
HICKORY AREA 



EMERGENCY RECOVERY GROUP 
[ ERG I ) 
(SOP IN EMERGENCY SCENE ) 



UNrr COMMANDS AS DESIGNATED 
BY GROUP COMMANDER 



CORRESPONDS TO PDU 
1 



EMERGENCY RECOVERY 
UNIT (ERUH) 




EMERGENCY RECOVERY 
UNIT [ ERU 1-2 ) 



EMERGENCY RECOVERY SECTIONS 











ERS -1.2.1 


ER3^.2 


ERS-I.2.3 



Figure 5-1. Outline of the Disaster Control Organization 






5-3 



be limited to one or more elements, or even 
a few teams. In all instances, it will be pos- 
sible to combine the forces of several stations 
to form an integrated unit. 

4. DISASTER CONTROL ELEMENT. 
The disaster control element is usually under 
the command of the department head who has 
cognizance over the particular element's func- 
tion. The element commander is appointed by 
the unit commander. 

5A2.02 COMMAND COMPOSITION AND 
DESIGNATION OF TACTICAL 
DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS 

The tactical disaster control organi- 
zation is activated at the scene of attack or 
disaster, or on receipt of a warning. It con- 
sists of the following components. 

1. EMERGENCY RECOVERY GROUP. 
The emergency recovery group (ERG) is under 
the command of the senior officer present 
(SOP) at the emergency scene. This group 
consists of one or more emergency recovery 
units that are deployed to the scene of attack, 
and it comes into existence at the scene of 
attack. 

2. EMERGENCY RECOVERY UNIT. 
The emergency recovery unit (ERU) is com- 
posed of the same teams as the disaster con- 
trol units that are described in paragraph 3 
of 5A2.01. The elements, however, cease to 
exist when the organization becomes opera- 
tional; the teams are then assigned to three 
emergency recovery sections, and the previous 
element commanders become ERU staff offi- 
cers. The ERU designation is given when this 
unit forms a part of the ERG. 

3. EMERGENCY RECOVERY SEC- 
TION. Each of the three emergency recovery 
sections (ERS) that compose an ERU is com- 
manded by an officer who is designated by the 
ERU commander. Each section is composed 
of several disaster control teams that are de- 
scribed in the United States Naval Passive 
Defense Manual , OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3440.6, 
and listed as follows, 

(1) Control Element (PDE1) 



ment (PDE2) 



(2) Personnel and Welfare Ele- 



(3) Security Element (PDE3) 

(4) Engineer Element (PDE4) 

(5) Fire Element (PDE5) 



(PDE8) 



(6) Ordnance Element (PDE6) 

(7) Medical Element (PDE7) 

(8) Transportation Element 

(9) Supply Element (PDE9) 

(10) ABC Element (PDE10) 

(11) Helicopter (PDE11) 



5A2.03 RESPONSIBILITIES 

Disaster control responsibilities at 
the operational level may be analyzed as fol- 
lows. 

1. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBIL- 
ITIES. District commandants and naval force 
commanders are responsible for the readiness 
of their defense forces, and subordinate com- 
manders are responsible for their assigned 
groups, units, and elements. 

2. TACTICAL RESPONSIBILITIES. 
Tactical responsibilities are as follows. 

(1) District commandants and 
naval force commanders are responsible for 
naval emergency recovery operations within 
the geographical limits of their commands, 

(2) ERG commanders are respon- 
sible for conducting emergency recovery oper- 
ations at the sites of such emergencies. 

(3) ERU commanders are respon- 
sible for the operations of their units. The 
first ERU commander to arrive at an emer- 
gency scene will assume ERG command until 
he is relieved by higher authority or by a 
senior commander of another ERU. 

(4) ERS commanders are respon- 
sible for (a) the deployment of their sections 
from the assembly point to the scene of oper- 
ations and (b) emergency recovery operations 
by their sections. 

3. TACTICAL ORGANIZATION 
STAFFS. No special staff will be assigned to 
the ERG commander, who employs the staff 
and recovery control post of an ERU. The 
staff of an ERS consists of an ERS control 
team. The following specialists will be re- 
quired on an ERU staff. 

(1) Communications officer. 

(2) ABC control officer. 









5-4 









(3) Engineering and rescue officer. 

(4) Medical officer. 

(5) Public information officer. 

(6) Fire officer . 

(7) Security officer. 

(8) Liaison officer to effect liaison 
and coordination of the naval effort with that of 
other armed services, federal agencies, and 
municipal and civilian organizations. 

(9) Personnel officer, who will 
be responsible for survivor registration, 



evacuation, assignment, and welfare of per- 
sonnel. He will also be required to advise 
staff on the availability of additional personnel 
for recovery operations. 



f ic e r , 



(10) Transportation and routing of- 



(11) Supply officer. 

The foregoing officers of the emer- 
gency recovery unit should be selected from 
appropriate disaster control element com- 
manders and departmental officers of activi- 
ties that are represented. Alternates should 
be designated in all instances. 









5-5 



r 



< 



u 






PART B. ORGANIZATION FOR ABC DEFENSE 
Section 1. ACTIVITY BILLS AND EQUIPMENT 






5B1.01 NATURE AND CONTENT OF 
ACTIVITY PLANS AND BILLS 

The administrative organization es- 
tablishes, equips, and trains the various ele- 
ments and their component teams. It is the 
responsibility of the commanding officer of the 
individual activity to make certain that an ade- 
quate activity bill and/or mobile support bill 
ia prepared for any unit of the ERO that is 
assigned to his activity. 

For example, assume that activity X 
has been assigned responsibility for the es- 
tablishment, equipment, and training of a per- 
sonnel decontamination team that is to function 
as one team of an ABC element. In this event 
the bill should contain the following informa- 
tion. 

{1} Missions of ABC element, and 
chain of command. 

(2) Missions of personnel decontam- 
ination team, 

(3} Number and classification of 
personnel assigned to personnel decontamina- 
tion team and their specific tasks. 

(4) Identity and location of items of 
equipment and supply assigned to use by per- 
sonnel decontamination team. 

(5) Plan and schedule for training of 
personnel decontamination team. 

(6) Plan for tactical deployment of 
personnel decontamination team. 

In addition to the special bills that 
are made necessary by specific assignments, 
each naval activity must incorporate into its 
disaster control recovery plan specific func- 
tions, personnel assignments, and procedures 
to be employed for the following contingencies. 



(1) Enemy attack 

(a) Attack warning 



evacuation 



settings 



(c) Dispersal and/or preattack 

(d) Material readiness condition 

(e) Self aid 

(f) Fire detection 

(g) Ground-air observation 



(h) Activation and operation of 
control center 



nications 



operations 



(i) Internal emergency commu- 



(j) Local emergency recovery 



shelters 



(b) Warden assignments and 



(k) Assembly and dispatch of 
teams to ERU assembly points 

(2) Natural disasters and othe r 
emergencies 

(a) Signals for fire and accidents 

(b) Natural disaster procedures, 
including team assignments (for those types of 
natural disasters that may be expected in the 
locality). 

5 B 1.0 2 PROMULGATION OF ACTIVITY 
PLANS 

Station plans or mobile support plans 
that are prepared by a naval activity normally 
pass through the designated disaster control 
group commander to the commandant of the 
naval district for review and approval. When 
approved, they are returned through channels 
to the commanding officer of the naval activity 
with any required special directions for their 
implementation. 

The naval activity must put the ap- 
proved plans into effect. This involves notifi- 
cation of personnel who are concerned and 
any desirable indoctrination, if applicable. 
Indoctrination may be incorporated in the 
training program (paragraph 5B2.02). 



549252 O-60-12 



5-7 






5B1.03 ALLOWANCE LISTS 

Each naval district has the responsi- 
bility for planning and organizing logistic 
support of its defense organization. The au- 
thority to work out the details that are con- 
cerned with organizational implementation, 
training, and planning may be delegated to 
disaster control group commanders who are in 
charge of district area subdivisions. These 
group commanders may, in turn, call upon the 
various individual activities to submit appro- 
priate requests for equipment and supplies that 
are needed to equip the planned recovery 
forces. 

1. PRINCIPLES FOR PREPARATION 
OF ALLOWANCE LISTS. In the preparation of 
requests for equipment and supplies, the fol- 
lowing general principles should be considered. 

a. Actual Requirements . Requests 
for special items of equipment, and particu- 
larly for individual protective items of equip- 
ment, must be based on actual requirements 
of elements and teams that have been brought 
into existence or provided for by station bills 
or mobile support bills. 

b. Filling in to Standard Require- 
ments . Many items of equipment and supply 
that are required by elements and teams of 
the ERO are items ordinarily on board at most 
naval activities. Conversely, various items of 
special equipment and supply are essential or 
useful in ABC warfare defense but are not 
ordinarily available at a naval activity. 

Standard equipment and supply re- 
quirements for all standard ERU teams are 
listed in Appendix I of the United States Navy 
Pass ive Defense Manual , OPNAV INSTRUC- 
TION 3440,6. To determine the actual equip- 
ment and supply needs of an individual activity, 
a list of the equipment and supplies that are 
on hand at the activity should be compared 
with the requirements that are listed in the 
aforementioned reference. 



2. STATION REQUIREMENTS FAC- 
TOR. An exact determination of station re- 
quirements for items other than individual 
protective equipment is not easily made. The 
requirements of a station are believed to be a 
function of (a) the number of personnel on 
board and (b) the area that is covered by the 



station. A method of establishing a station 
requirements factor " F"is used on the basis of 

1 1 

F = A + P 

50 10,000 * 

where 

A = functional area of the station in 
acres and an additional 300-ft 
safety zone, 
P = number of personnel on board, and 
F = station factor, which, when multi- 
plied by a "C" factor, the value 
of which is determined for each 
item of special ABC warfare 
defense material, indicates the 
requirement of an activity for 
that item. 

For additional information, refer to 

Basic ABC Allowance Planning ( CONUS) .NAV- 
DOCKS TP-PL-10 {Confidential) for the "C" 
coefficient values of all special ABC warfare 
defense material. 

EXAMPLE 

If a station has 1,000 personnel and 
200 acres, of which 50 acres are functional, 






1 1 

lo" x 50 pUls ToMo 



x 1,000 = 1.1. 



The "C" value for bleach is 2.0 tons. 
Therefore, this station's requirement will be 
1.1 x 2.0 = 2.2 tons. 

5B1.04 PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT 
AND MATERIAL 

Each applicable bureau has estab- 
lished, by special instruction, the procedure to 
be followed in the procurement of special ABC 
warfare defense material. Requests should 
be made in accordance with those instructions. 

5B1.05 CARE OF EQUIPMENT AND 
MATERIAL 

Special equipment and material that 
are necessary to provide a state of readiness 
in ABC warfare defense should, like any other 
equipment and material, be the object of regu- 
lar periodic inspection, testing, and inventory. 
For additional information, see ABC Warfare 
Defense Material, Inspection and Storage , 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-19. 



5-8 









Section 2. TRAINING FOR ABC DEFENSE 






5B2.01 DEFENSE PREPARATION 

In conformance with the requirements 
of United States Navy Regulations , the com- 
manding officer of a naval activity must take 
all practicable steps to maintain his command 
in a state of readiness to perform its mission. 
After an ABC warfare attack on a shore sta- 
tion, the immediate mission is to restore the 
essential function of that station. Readiness, 
in this event, is a product of planning, organi- 
zation, procurement of necessary equipment 
and supplies, and training. Training is of 
special importance in ABC warfare defense 
because of new weapons and agents involved 
and because new psychological reactions have 
been evoked. 

5B2.02 BASIC INDOCTRINATION 
AND TRAINING 

All naval activity personnel, both 
military and civilian, shall receive basic in- 
doctrination and training in disaster control. 
The purpose of this phase of training is to 
gain familiarity with the nature and effects of 
ABC weapons and agents. More particularly, 
this basic phase of training should present the 
following: 

(1) The dimension and character of 

disaster effects, 

(2) The consequent need for defense 
measures and emergency recovery operations , 
and 

(3) The primary means of self-help 
and survival. 

The content of this basic indoctrina- 
tion and training lends itself well to mass- 
training techniques, which involve the use of 
lectures, motion pictures, demonstrations, 
posters, pamphlets, and magazine articles. 
Industrial relations components of activities 
can often conduct this type of training effec- 
tively. 

5B2.03 TRAINING OF DEFENSE 
COMPONENTS 

Training of the teams that make up 
defense components is highly specialized and 
does not lend itself to mass -training tech- 
niques. Essentially, this specialized training 
is training in operational procedures as dic- 
tated by the missions of the teams and ele- 
ments concerned. The disaster control officer , 
who is one of the key figures in this training 
program, must perform the following functions . 



(1) Coordinate various training spec- 
ifications and assist element commanders in 
the development of training objectives. 

{2) Train team leaders so they will 
be able to train the personnel of their teams 
effectively. 

(3) Act as liaison between element 
commanders and the industrial relations offi- 
cer. 

The other key figure in the training 
program at the activity level is the industrial 
relations officer, whose training mission is to: 

(1) Furnish the disaster control offi- 
cer with information regarding training prob- 
lems, 

(2) Conduct all mass training (basic 
indoctrination and training), 

(3) Program the training of all types 
in accordance with specifications, 

(4) Conduct team and element train- 
ing where organic training resources will 
permit, and 

(5) Maintain records of all training 
and render reports on training as required. 

Specialized personnel of some teams 
are selected because they already possess 
certain basic skills, for example, personnel 
on ordnance disposal (OB) teams who have 
completed an explosive ordnance disposal 
course. Enrollment in courses that will be 
made available by the District Director of 
Training, for example, rescue and fire fighting 
courses, will provide other types of personnel 
with an opportunity to acquire special skills. 

5B2.04 DRILLS AND TESTS 

In accordance with district instruc- 
tions, the commanding officer of a naval shore 
station must schedule and conduct periodic 
tests of the mechanics of assembly, dispersal, 
evacuation, and abandonment. Personnel of 
the entire station will be involved. In addition, 
the officers in charge in the control center 
(which includes communications and wardens) 
will conduct exercises and drills, in accord- 
ance with programmed area or building- 
readiness tests, for personnel under their 
commands. 

Periodic critiques or other evalua- 
tions should be made on the station's disaster 






5-9 



control readiness, the effectiveness of its 
training programs, and its efficiency in con- 
ducting exercises. The entire tactical disaster 
control organization should be subject to these 
critical estimates. As a result, all phases of 
defense readiness can be accurately evaluated 
and appropriate modifications can be inaugu- 
rated. 

5B2.05 RETRAINING 

The need for retraining, including 
drills and tests, is well known. Skills that 
are not exercised over long periods tend to 
become lost. Furthermore, personnel at naval 



activities, both military and civilian, are sub- 
ject to change, which is accelerated after an 
emergency or enemy attack. 

The schedule for retraining should 
therefore meet the following needs. 

(1) Indoctrination and basic training 
of new personnel. 

(2) Induction of new personnel into 
the ranks of appropriate ERU teams, and 
training in their duties. 

(3) Refresher training of personnel 
who have already received training. 



o 



( 



5-10 



U 






PART C. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 
Section 1. INITIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEY 






5C1.01 ESTABLISHMENT OF PERIMETERS 

In the emergency recovery operations 
that follow an ABC attack, the establishment 
of an obstruction perimeter and a support 
perimeter should be one of the first steps 
taken. Realinement of boundaries, however, 
may later become necessary when more com- 
plete data are available as a result of ABC 
and damage reconnaissance. 

The obstruction perimeter is the 
boundary of the target area; it is established 
by points at which further progress toward 
ground zero is impeded by (a) debris that 
blocks access, (b) unacceptable contamination, 
or (c) fire. The support perimeter is the outer 
boundary of the target area; it is established 
by points within which either (a) debris is 
found in streets or (b) the "stay time" is es- 
tablished at one week. 

5C1.0 2 DESIGNATION OF SECTIONS 

The establishment of perimeters 
makes possible the designation of three sec- 
tions, which become the area bases for emer- 
gency recovery operations. These sections 
are shown in Figure 5-2 and are described as 
follows. 



1. SECTION I. Section I is repre- 
sented by the area within the obstruction per- 
imeter. An organized recovery effort can not 
be expected from installations in this area. 
After an atomic attack, structural damage will 
be severe, fires are likely to be raging, the 
radiological hazard will be high, communica- 
tions will be nonfunctioning, and many sur- 
vivors are likely to be injured in some manner. 

2. SECTION II. Section II is the area 

between the obstruction perimeter and the 
support perimeter as shown in Figure 5-2. 
Moderate to light damage will occur in this 
section; most personnel will survive, although 
many will be injured, A tendency to panic and 
effect spontaneous evacuation probably will be 
exhibited by personnel who are not well trained 
and organized into teams. 

3. SECTION III. Section IE is outside 
the support perimeter and is occupied by- 
emergency recovery forces in direct support 
of components that operate in Sections I and II. 
Structural damage in this section will be 
minor, and all facilities should remain opera- 
tional except those that are in the path of an 
early fallout hazard. Emergency recovery 
forces should move into this area as soon as 
possible after an attack. 







UNDAMAGED *HE* 



LlfMT TO MODERATE DAMAGE 



Figure 5-2. Tactical Distribution Pattern of Naval Emergency Recovery Forces 



5-11 



5C1.03 ABC AND DAMAGE RECON- 
NAISSANCE 

It is necessary that ABC and damage 
reconnaissance be instituted as one of the first 
phases of the emergency recovery operation. 
These early surveys, insofar as possible, 
must be conducted in all three sections. It is 
possible that portions of Section I may be so 
highly contaminated that they can not be sur- 
veyed except by aerial reconnaissance. 

The teams that are primarily con- 
cerned in these early surveys are the damage 
survey team, aerial survey team, and route 
survey and communication team of the ABC 
element. The general mission of these teams 
is to (a) establish the location and extent of the 
emergency and (b) identify its hazards. The 
intelligence so provided forms the basis for 
the determination of the boundaries of perim- 
eters and sections. Skill in the identification 
of locations is essential to this mission. Mat- 
ters of general importance that should be 
reported include the location and extent of 
structural damage, personnel casualties and 
rescue requirements, route conditions, and 
radiation intensities. 

1. ABC AND DAMAGE SURVEY 
TEAMS. ABC survey teams should be the 
first ground teams to enter an emergency area. 
Their /specific task is to determine and report 
the location and intensity of radiological, bio- 
logical, and chemical hazards. Damage survey 
teams should closely follow the ABC survey 
teams into the emergency area. 

2. AERIAL SURVEY TEAMS. If an 
extensive and damaging attack occurs, the 
first reports on structural damage, fire con- 
ditions, and radiological contamination within 



the disaster area may come from the aerial 
survey teams. These teams report by voice 
radio, and the control center monitors and 
plots survey reports. The control center 
furnishes the ERG and/or the ERU commander 
with information. Aerial survey teams are 
particularly useful in coordinating the efforts 
of firefighters, because the members of these 
teams are able to evaluate overall fire condi- 
tions better than ground parties. For this 
reason, a professional firefighter should be 
included as a member of this team, 

3. ROUTE SURVEY AND COMMUNI- 
CATIONS TEAMS. The route survey and 
communications team is also airborne and 
performs the important function of reporting 
on the possibility of access routes from as- 
sembly points to the emergency scene, as well 
as traffic, fire, and flood conditions. In addi- 
tion, this team relays messages from mobile 
high-frequency radios on the ground, which 
would otherwise have a limited range of trans- 
mission. 

5C1.04 SUBSEQUENT SURVEYS 

ABC surveys and damage surveys do 
not end with the initial reconnaissance, although 
this is the first available basis for delineating 
perimeters and sectors. Later, and as time 
permits, further andmore comprehensive sur- 
veys will provide additional information about 
the changing disaster scene. This information 
may call for modifications in the locations of 
perimeters. In addition, the detailed surveys 
will provide data concerning particular objects 
or areas that exhibit an unusually high degree 
of contamination. Information of this type is 
important, inasmuch as A, B, and C contami- 
nations will tend to be "spotty" rather than 
uniform. 









5-12 









Section 2. MEDICAL AID AND WELFARE 






5C2.01 MEDICAL AID 

The field- aid station is the base for 
first-echelon medical service and should nor- 
mally be located in Emergency Recovery Op- 
erations Section II. This station will be used 
to resupply field first-aid teams, which move 
forward into Section I if conditions permit; 
they will be accompanied by litter-bearing 
teams. It is recommended that first-echelon 
medical service teams be moved in as units, 
each unit to consist of three field first-aid 
teams, four litter-bearer teams, one field-aid- 
station team, four ambulance teams, and, if 
necessary, two medical holding teams and two 
casualty decontamination teams. The relation- 
ship of the field-aid station to first-echelon 
teams is shown in Figure 5-3, 




Figure 5-3. First-Echelon Medical Service 
Deployment 

Second- echelon medical service is 
supplied by holding teams, improvised hos- 
pitals, and ambulance teams. Third-echelon 
medical service consist of (a) fixed medical 
installations and (b) specialized components 
such as the ABC health hazards team and the 
radiation sickness team. 

5C2.02 EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES 

By segregation of casualties accord- 
ing to the type and degree of their injuries, 
medical personnel will be able to provide the 
maximum amount of treatment for the largest 
number. The sorting begins with the field 
first-aid team, which directs ambulatory cas- 
ualties to the field-aid station and provides 
first aid for nonambulatory cases. 



At the field- aid station, diagnostic 
sorting of casualties takes place. Personnel 
with minor or moderate injuries are given 
primary treatment and eliminated from the 
chain of medical service. Those with more 
serious injuries are provided with supportive 
treatment and evacuated to second- echelon or 
third- echelon facilities. 

5C2.03 PERSONNEL DECONTAMINATION 

Contaminated personnel who have be- 
come casualties are decontaminated by cas- 
ualty decontamination teams. To this end, 
some of these teams are assigned to field-aid 
stations in forward positions because, for 
radioactive substances and CW agentB, early 
decontamination may be important. Medical 
personnel, however, will not decontaminate 
individuals who are not casualties. 



Decontamination of noncasualty per- 
sonnel is accomplished by the personnel de- 
contamination (AB) and clothing decontamina- 
tion (AF) teams of the welfare element in 
Section III and by the engineer station super- 
visors of Sections I and II. In the early stages 
of recovery operations, several AB and AF 
teams may be required. The resupply of de- 
contaminated clothing may continue to be a 
major task for some time. This decontami- 
nated clothing will be delivered to the clothing 
supply team or the special supply team for 
reissue. 

5C2.04 PERSONNEL DOSIMETRY 

The function of personnel dosimetry 
is accomplished by dosimetry teams (AE) of 
the ABC element. At the outset of operations, 
these teams should be assigned to field-aid 
stations and personnel and welfare stations in 
Sections I and II. 

Personnel of dosimetry teams read 
nonindicating dosimeters and may be assigned 
the task of recharging self- indicating dosim- 
eters for the various members of the recovery 
organization. This service is provided to both 
recovery team personnel and survivors of the 
attack. Readings will be used to help control 
stay times and assure that proper entries are 
made in medical records. The reading of the 
dosimeters is a continuing service that must 
be maintained as long as work parties operate 
in areas where residual radioactivity is 
present. 






5-13 



5C2.05 SURVIVOR CLASSIFICATION 
AND REGISTRATION 

The personnel and welfare station is 
normally located in Section HI in a position 
that will facilitate access by evacuation routes. 
Screening and disposition of survivors are 
accomplished at this station. Operations of 
the personnel and ■welfare element, as part of 
the emergency recovery operations, are likely 
to extend over several days. 

Survivors, while being processed 
through the personnel and welfare station, are 
monitored, decontaminated if necessary, given 
first aid as required, and given dosimeter 
services and medical examinations. They are 
then classified, registered, and evacuated, as 
appropriate, to (a) civilian authorities, (b) mil- 
itary facilities, or (c) ERU pools. 

5C2.06 EMERGENCY HOUSING 

Emergency housing maybe an imme- 
diate need during emergency recovery opera- 
tions, and this requirement may continue to 
be essential for some time after the emer- 
gency stage. 

This need is related not only to sur- 
vivors, but also to off-duty teams of the ERU. 
The mission of providing shelter, sustenance, 
and sanitary facilities for such personnel is a 
mission for the rest and housing team of the 
personnel and welfare element. It is estimated 
that each team can provide facilities for about 
400 persons. 

5C2.07 EMERGENCY FEEDING 

The provision of emergency messing 
facilities is the mission of the emergency 
messing team of the supply element. This 
team is provided with food supplies and equip- 
ment that will be necessary in setting up a 
field kitchen facility and messing facility. 

One standard emergency messing 
team with standard equipment and supply is 
capable of providing for thefoodneeds of 1,000 
ERU members and survivors. Steps should be 
taken toward the rehabilitation and repair of 
mess halls. Equipment such as refrigerators, 



ranges, and steam tables should be repaired 
or replaced as necessary, and at least one 
cafeteria-type line should be opened for oper- 
ation. All articles for food preparation and 
serving, such as pots, pans, dishes, and silver- 
ware, should be replaced or determined to be 
free from contamination. Arrangements should 
be made for (a) restocking the kitchen and 
(b) daily deliveries of food from outside the 
disaster area. 

5C2.08 SANITATION 

The provision of emergency sanita- 
tion facilities is a responsibility of the sani- 
tary facilities team of the personnel and 
welfare element. To prevent the spread of 
disease, this team is equipped to haul and 
heat water, build field latrines and washing 
facilities, and supervise the policing of the 
area. Sanitary facilities should ordinarily be 
provided in the vicinity of resting and housing 
facilities. It is estimated that one sanitary 
facilities team can provide for the needs of 
about 400 persons on a 24- hour basis. 

5C2.09 REFUSE DISPOSAL 

A sufficient quantity of G. I. cans with 
lids should be provided for all mess halls, 
hospitals, first-aid stations, housing facilities, 
and operational buildings, and schedules should 
be established for the collection of refuse. 
Dump trucks, and/or dumpsters if available, 
should be used for collection service. Refuse 
should be taken to an isolated part of the sta- 
tion for disposal in sanitary land fill as an 
expedient measure, burning, or burial, or 
loaded aboard barges and dumped at sea. 

5C2.I0 PEST CONTROL 

Strict rodent control measures should 
be instituted under the supervision of a pest 
and rodent control specialist. Food in galleys 
and mess halls should be properly safeguarded, 
and garbage cans should be kept tightly covered 
at all times. Refuse in dumps should be buried 
or burned. All possible sources of entry for 
rodents into food storage or preparation areas 
should be sealed. Fly and mosquito control 
should be effected. If window or door screens 
are damaged, they should be repaired as soon 
as practicable. 



o 



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5-14 






Section 3. EMERGENCY REPAIR OF UTILITIES 






5C3.01 COMMUNICATIONS AND ELEC- 
TRICAL SYSTEMS 

Immediate repair of damaged com- 
munications systems is one of the most vital 
emergency measures because it directly af- 
fects control of emergency operations. Such 
control will not be effective unless contact is 
maintained between the command post, emer- 
gency recovery stations, and the commanders 
of emergency recovery units and sections. At 
the same time, power from normal or auxiliary 
sources must be supplied to first-aid stations, 
emergency hospitals, and decontamination 
centers as rapidly as possible. 

1. REPAIRS TO POWERLINES. Dam- 
age to poles and overhead lines will be caused 
principally by blast and falling debris. Tele- 
phone circuits between control points should 
be traced and all breaks spliced. Lines, after 
splicing, should be kept at least 16 feet above 
the ground and may be attached to buildings, 
stubs of poles, or improvised poles that are 
made from available lumber. Although under- 
ground lines are less likely to be damaged, 
underground vaults should be located and 
opened, and emergency repairs should be made 
if damage has occurred. Generating plants 
may be out of commission aa a result of blast, 
in which event available auxiliary generators 
are the remaining recourse. 

Extreme caution must be exercised 
in the repair of powerlines because of the 
hazard of live wires. In addition, electric 
service to damaged buildings should be shut 
off or cut off temporarily to avoid the possi- 
bility of secondary fires as a result of short 
circuits. As a fire-prevention measure, 
transformers and transformer vaults must be 
checked and spilled oil must be removed. 
Leaks must then be repaired and the trans- 
formers refilled. 

2. EMERGENCY UNITS. If extensive 
damage has occurred to central power plants, 
their complexity may preclude repair during 
the emergency operation phase. Under such 
circumstances, emergency standby generators 
should be connected to the line and used until 
the central plant has been restored to operating 
condition. 

After communications facilities have 
been restored among the command post and 



the control centers, the next operation to be 
undertaken is the emergency repair of the 
communications lines between the activity 
command post and the communications systems 
of other military commands and civilian de- 
fense agencies that are outside the disaster 
area. 

5C3.02 WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS 

If the water supply system is dam- 
aged, it must be repaired immediately so that 
firefighting operations can be carried on effec- 
tively. An additional early hazard is the pos- 
sibility that water from broken pipes may 
drown persons who are trapped in flooded 
basements or other low areas. Leakage must 
first be stopped to the maximum extent pos sible. 

Water service to all damaged build- 
ings should be shut off either at the street 
valves or at the water meters, whichever are 
more easily accessible, but water service to 
sprinkler-protected buildings that are in or 
near the fire area should be left on. The prin- 
cipal water mains should then be checked for 
breakage. If breaks are found in the mains, 
the water should be shut off at the nearest 
valve in the direction of the water supply and 
the break should be exposed by excavating. 
After the break has been exposed, it may be 
repaired by welding or other conventional 
methods, depending on ■whether the pipe is 
steel, cast iron, or asbestos fiber. Severe 
breaks may necessitate the replacement of 
entire sections of pipe. Quick coupling pipe 
can be used to accomplish the rapid replace- 
ment of damaged sections. Lengths of fire 
hose can be temporarily used to bridge breaks 
in mains. Local conditions will determine the 
most effective way to repair damage. The 
grasshopper technique of pipe laying, in which 
4 to 6 joint sections are assembled ahead of 
the coupling crew, permits the effective use of 
the greatest number of repairmen at a time. 

While emergency repair of pipelines 
is under way, an inspection of the pumping 
station should be made to determine the extent 
of damage. Inoperative pumps should be re- 
placed with standby pumps, and necessary 
repairs and replacement should be made in the 
piping. If electrical power has not been re- 
stored, standby gasoline or diesel engines for 
driving the pumps should be readied and set 
in operation. 






5-15 






Section 4. REMOVAL OF DEBRIS 









5C4.01 REESTABLISHMENT OF ACCESS 

The plan for the removal of debris 
should provide for the opening of emergency 
access routes to a terminal point that is as 
close as possible to the area of virtually com- 
plete destruction. Operations should be car- 
ried out simultaneously on all of the selected 
routes. The initial objective should be the 
establishment of a trail that will be wide enough 
for two vehicles to pass. As time permits, 
the route may be widened and the surface 
leveled. After the arterials have been opened, 
access routes to personnel shelters and com- 
mand posts and the peripheral roads can be 
cleared. Unless it is absolutely necessary, 
no attempt should be made to remove large 
quantities of debris from the site at this time. 
However, if the debris occurs in such quan- 
tities that its removal is essential, a suitable 
dumping site should be located nearby so that 
trucks can easily deposit the material. 

5C4.02 DEBRIS CLEARANCE 

In general, debris clearance during 
emergency operations should be confined to 
the work that is necessary for the removal of 
trapped personnel and the establishment of 
access routes to (a) the emergency scene and 

(b) areas within the station where firefighting 
is required. Access and rescue operations 
should be started simultaneously. 

In the removal of debris for the res- 
cue of personnel, only shovels, picks, and 
other standard handtools should be used. Be- 
cause it is difficult to recognize a human body 
that is covered with debris, tools — especially 
picks-- should be used with great care so that 
casualties will not sustain further injuries 
during rescue operations. Debris should be 
removed in baskets, buckets, and wheelbarrows 
to areas that are clear of the damaged build- 
ings. Only when it is reasonably certain that 
no casualties are buried in the debris should 
cranes, power shovels, and bulldozers be put 
into action. All debris that has been moved in 
a rescue operation should be marked so that 
some other group will not handle it again in a 
search for casualties. 

Access routes that are known to be 
free of casualties should be cleared of debris 
with power equipment so that firefighting 
apparatus and ambulances can be operated 
thereon as soon as possible. 

5C4.03 ENGINEERING RESCUE 

Rescue procedures consist of four 
phases: (a) immediate rescue, (b) exploration, 

(c) selected rescue, (d) and general rescue. 



Immediate rescue is a rescue that can be 
quickly accomplished or a rescue of injured 
persons who are not trapped. Exploration is 
the process of locating casualties who are 
trapped. Selected rescue is the rescue of 
casualties who have been located. General 
rescue is a systematic search that is made by 
stripping the area or building of debris so that 
missing persons can be located and rescued. 

Engineering rescue includes cate- 
gories (c) and (d); it requires the use of engi- 
neering methods and equipment to reach and 
rescue trapped personnel. Some of the methods 
used are tunneling, shafting, breaching walls, 
shoring walls and floors, trenching, raising 
and supporting structural members, removing 
walls and other hazards, and capping pipelines. 
To be effective, team members must be trained 
in first aid and must be well equipped with all 
the tools and safety gear that are required to 
accomplish their mission. Technical details 
concerning the engineering techniques involved 
are discussed in Rescue Skills and Techniques , 
Federal Civil Defense Administration, TM 
14-1, Revised 1957. 

5C4.04 REMOVAL OF HAZARDS 

The partial destruction of buildings 
and industrial facilities produces many haz- 
ards that must be removed during emergency 
operations. Hazards are usually of two types: 
(a) structural hazards and (b) utility hazards. 
Structural hazards mainly consist of walls, 
floors, and roofs that are in imminent danger 
of collapse. Before remedial measures can 
be taken, it must be ascertained that all trapped 
persons have been removed. The partially 
destroyed buildings or industrial facilities can 
then be demolished by trained crews through 
the use of cranes and other power equipment. 
Utility hazards consist of (a) ruptured elec- 
trical, water, gas, and sewer lines and (b) es- 
caping gases and chemicals that were used in 
refrigeration units and in certain industrial 
operations. Live wires present a serious 
hazard to trapped casualties and rescue per- 
sonnel, and they are an ever-present possible 
cause of additional fires. Their removal 
should be attempted only by trained electrical 
linesmen. Water from ruptured mains may 
flood basements and endanger the lives of 
personnel. Rescue crews should shut off the 
water at the meters or the street shutoff 
valves. Gas lines should be shut off at the 
meters when a leak is known or suspected, 
because leaking gas can cause asphyxiation, 
explosion, and fire. Broken sewers may create 
problems of flooding and escaping gas. The 
use of open flames should be avoided when 



5-17 



sewer gas is present. Dams can be improvised 
to divert the flow of broken sewers away from 
trapped casualties. 

5C4.05 CLEARING AND REPAIRING 
OF WHARVES 

Wharves should first be inspected to 
determine whether they are structurally able 
to carry heavy debris -clearing equipment. If 
they are found to be in a safe condition, debris- 
removal crews should move in and clear them 
completely. After the debris has been removed, 
a further inspection should be made to deter- 
mine the extent of structural damage. Dam- 
aged decking or deck slabs should then be 
removed, after which broken wood piling and/ 
or sheet steel piling should be pulled. 

5C4.06 CLEARING OF CHANNELS 
AND HARBORS 

Major obstacles to navigation, such 
as damaged vessels and email craft, should 



be the first obstructions to be removed, and 
experienced salvage crews should be used in 
these operations. Priority should be given to 
channels and berthing areas, after which turn- 
ing basins and anchorages should be cleared. 
After the major obstacles have been removed, 
floating cranes that are equipped with clam- 
shell buckets can be used to clear sunken 
debris to the depth that is required for navi- 
gation. 



5C4.07 CONTAMINATION PROBLEM 
IN HARBORS 

The contamination of harbors is due 
chiefly to the presence of contaminated ves- 
sels and debris. The removal of these ob- 
structions will, to a great extent, alleviate the 
problem. Changing tides and currents will 
further reduce the contamination to an insig- 
nificant level within a relatively short time. 



r 



( 



o 



5-18 



Section 5. REPAIR OF STRUCTURES 






5C5.01 RESTORATION OF STRUCTURAL 
SAFETY 

To prevent buildings and structures 
from collapsing during recovery operations, 
temporary bracing and shoring will be neces- 
sary in many instances. If a wall is bulging 
or out of plumb, bracing, pushing, or raking 
shores should be used (Figure 5-4). A flying 
shore may be used when a sound adjacent 
wall is available as a means of support (Figure 
5-5). Shores should be placed along a wall at 
intervals of 8 to 1Z feet, depending on the sit- 
uation, type of wall, and the extent of damage. 
Flying shores are not recommended for use 
between two walls that are separated by more 
than 25 feet. 




WALL PLATE 



ifiAKE 



SOLE PLATE 



Figure 5-4. A Raking Shore 

Frequently, a weakened foundation or 
damage to the lower part of a wall makes the 
wall unstable. Because each damaged wall 
presents a separate and distinct problem, the 
method of shoring must be carefully planned 
and accomplished. In wall-bearing structures, 
the lower part of a wall and its footing, or 
foundation, must carry the entire weight of the 
structure above it. If the wall is damaged by 
blast or the removal of an adjacent supporting 
structure, it may buckle or crumble. There- 
fore, the bracing or shoring on lower parts of 
the wall should be stronger than corresponding 
work on the upper portions. Sagging floors 
and roofs should be supported by use of a dead, 
or vertical, shore, which is used to carry 
vertical dead loads (Figure 5-6). Strutting 
should be employed to strengthen window and 





PACKING 



a 0R i z EA^^i^i^ EDGE ' 




NOT TO EXCEED 25 FEET 




CLEAT 

NOT TO EXCEED 20 FEET 



Figure 5-5. Flying Shores 

door frames that have been made unsafe by 
cracked or damaged walls (Figure 5-7), 

5C5.02 RESTORATION OF WEATHER- 
TIGHTNESS 

As a temporary measure, weather- 
tightness can be restored by the use of an ex- 
terior grade of plywood. All holes in roofs 
and walls, and other openings, should be closed 
by nailing plywood panels over them. Clear 
plastic sheets should be used to cover damaged 
window and door openings so that light will 
enter, 

5C5.03 CONSERVATION OF EQUIPMENT 
AND SUPPLIES 

Because the repair of structures will 
require large quantities of critical materials 



5-19 




^UUUUJXUU, l 1. 1 ii. rrfhz 



i-,— i^ j_^j 



J — ' — L-^rn^wjzia 





Figure 5-7. Window Struts 

and supplies that may not be available, a 
priority system for their most economical use 
must be established and carried out. To this 
end, skillful planning and the efficient use of 
salvaged materials are important considera- 
tions. 






Figure 5-6. A Dead or Vertical Shore 






5-20 



c 



Section 6. FIREFIGHTING 






5C6.01 CONVENTIONAL METHODS 

Fires that are caused by an atomic 
explosion are both primary and secondary. 
After a large thermonuclear burst, a confla- 
gration, that is, a great mass of fire that leaps 
barriers and frequently rages beyond control, 
will most likely result. The following general 
technique shouldbe used to restrict the spread 
of a potential conflagration. 

(1) All available firefighting forces 
and equipment are mobilized. Reserve appa- 
ratus is put into service, and auxiliary per- 
sonnel and volunteers are utilized, 

(Z) Firefighting equipment is placed 
on the front quarter of the fire in an attempt 
to channel the path of the conflagration. This 
may bring the fire under control even when it 
is not feasible to apply water at a sufficient 
rate to absorb all the heat and extinguish the 
main fire. If possible, water barriers should 
be used in channelizing. 

(3} Attempts are made to flank the 
fire and follow up the rear. 

(4) Auxiliary units are deployed to 
patrol ahead and prevent the spread of fires 
by flying brands. 

(5) Incoming engine equipment from 
surrounding communities is employed to bol- 
ster the existing water supplies either by the 
use of normal water sources or by relay pump- 
ing from distant points. 



(6) When an attempt is being made to 
put out a fire in an individual structure, the 
building should be ventilated, the source of the 
fire located, the fire isolated if possible, and 
the flames extinguished. 

5C6.02 FIREFIGHTING TEAMS 

Six types of firefighting teams should 
be used to fight conflagrations; they are 

(1) Firebreak supervision teams 

(2) Engine teams 

{3) Auxiliary hose teams 

(4) Foam truck teams 

(5) Portable pump teams 

(6) Fire boat teams. 

5C6.03 EMPLOYMENT OF FIREBREAKS 

Firebreaks (paragraph 4F2.03) and 
alternate firebreaks are normally fire preven- 
tion measures that should be planned before 
the outbreak of fires. It is possible, however, 
that a conflagration may leap existing fire- 
breaks and cause serious fires on both sides. 
The value of existing firebreaks must be de- 
termined on an individual basis and in terms 
of surrounding conditions at the time of the 
fire. It may be necessary to prepare additional 
perimeter firebreaks so that the spread of the 
conflagration will be limited. 






5-21 






Section 7. SECURITY AND TRAFFIC CONTROL 






5C7.01 MAINTENANCE OF ORDER 

Maintenance of order is of prime im- 
portance if emergency operations are to be 
carried out efficiently and expeditiously. 
Maintaining order is a police function. All 
personnel who have not been assigned to oper- 
ating crews or pressed into service must be 
kept clear of recovery operations. Noncasual- 
ties should be assembled in evacuation areas 
and kept there until access roads have been 
cleared and transportation is available for 
their removal. Control of noncasualties is a 
primary responsibility of the security element 
in the defense organization. It is important to 
prevent hysteria among the personnel who are 
awaiting evacuation so that uncontrolled mass 
movement out of the devastated area on foot 
does not take place. 



5C7.02 PREVENTION OF LOOTING 

The assembly of personnel in evacu- 
ation areas for systematic mass removal will, 
to a large extent, prevent looting. Guards 
should be placed at food supply warehouses 
and armories, and roving patrols should cover 
other areas where looting might take place. 

5C7.03 TRAFFIC CONTROL ON EVAC- 
UATION AND ACCESS ROUTES 

Members of security teams, aided by 
traffic patrolmen and civil defense workers 
who have been trained in traffic operations, 
should be stationed at strategic points along 
evacuation and access routes to assure an 
orderly flow of traffic into and out of the dev- 
asted area. Priority of travel should be given 
to firefighting equipment, ambulances, and 
mobile support crews. All unauthorized ve- 
hicles must be kept out of the disaster area. 






549252 O-60-1J 



5-23 






Section 8. RECLAMATION OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 






5C8.01 SALVAGE OF EQUIPMENT 

In the course of the recovery, a con- 
siderable amount of equipment will be salvaged 
or reclaimed and put back into an operational 
status. In part, this process of reclamation 
depends upon the decontamination processes 
that are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, 
Part E. 

Decontamination, however, is not the 
only factor that is involved in the reclamation 
of equipment. Some equipment -will have sus- 
tained physical damage as a result of fire and 
blast effects. Metal parts of equipment that is 
housed in damaged buildings may be deterior- 
ated and corroded. A decision on whether 
attempts at reclamation are justified must be 
made in the light of several considerations, 
including the following: 

(1) The nature and extent of the im- 
pairment, 

(2) The extent to which the equipment 
is of importance to operational recovery, and 

(3) The degree to which the equip- 
ment is readily replaceable. 

5C8.02 SALVAGE OF STORES 

The salvage of stores presents a 
problem that is not unlike the problem of sal- 
vaging equipment. Some stores, including 
foods, can undoubtedly be salvaged in the 
course of the operational recovery phase. The 
nature of damage will vary greatly, but in the 
main will be the result of primary or secondary 
blast effects, fire, and contamination. 

The same factors that are weighed in 
a determination of whether attempts at recla- 
mation of equipment are justified should be 
considered for supplies. 

Equipment and supplies that are ad- 
judged to be unworthy of reclamation efforts 
because of persistent contamination should be 
buried on land or in the sea, destroyed by fire, 
or entombed. 

A normal complement of stores, in- 
cluding special surpluses for defense use in 
the event of another attack, should be built up 
as rapidly as possible. 



5C8.03 CRITERIA FOR DECONTAMINA- 
TION DURING RECOVERY 

The v process of decontamination, which 
may apply to AW, BW, or CW products and 
agents, will necessarily be in progress to 
some extent during the emergency recovery 
phase. However, in the early hours and days 
after an ABC warfare attack, decontamination 
will be largely limited to (a) acces,s and evac- 
uation routes and (b) structures anij equipment 
that will be needed in recovery operations. 

As recovery operations proceed, the 
situation will change materially, owing in part 
to the passage of time and in part to the effects 
of weathering. Radioactive decay, for example, 
will have been in progress continuously. Some 
BW agents may no longer be viable; others 
may remain hazardous and may even be on the 
increase. Certain CW agents will no longer 
persist, and others will remain active. The 
actual state of affairs can only be determined 
by monitoring, sampling, and testing. When 
contamination hazards remain, a decision must 
be made as to the feasibility and desirability 
of attempting decontamination measures, es- 
pecially measures of a detailed nature that 
involve the expenditure of many man-hours. 
The factors that should be considered in reach- 
ing a decision and establishing priorities for 
decontamination efforts include the following: 

(1) The extent to which materiel is 
vital to the process of regaining operational 
efficiency, 

(2) The extent to which materiel can 
be readily replaced, 

(3) The extent to which the use of 
areas is essential to recovery, 

(4) The comparative difficulty of ef- 
fecting decontamination, which varies consid- 
erably among different materials, and 

(5) Condition of decontamination ma- 
teriel after attack. 

Discussion of methods and materials 
that can be used will be found in Chapter 4, 
Part E of this publication. 






5-25 






PART D. OPERATIONAL AND FINAL RECOVERY PHASES 
Section 1. OPERATIONAL RECOVERY 



5D1.01 INITIATION 

By definition, the emergency recovery 
phase consists of actions that will be taken 
immediately after an attack or disaster to keep 
the loss of life and property at a minimum. 
This phase of operations usually ends when 
the emergency group commander has deter- 
mined that (a) all post-attack fires have been 
extinguished and (b) casualties are no longer 
being incurred to any considerable extent. 

The operational recovery phase then 
begins. All efforts are directed toward the 
reestablishment of the station's normal func- 
tion and capacity for performing its mission. 
At this stage, the ERU components normally 
cease to function as such, and the regular 
work organization of the station takes over. 



5D1.02 



FURTHER SURVEYS OF DAMAGE 
AND CONTAMINATION 



Transition to the operational recovery 
phase does not mean that surveys and analyses 
of structural damage and ABC contamination 
come to a stop. In fact, they become more 
detailed and provide a more accurate picture 
of recovery requirements. 



At this point, time is available for 
(a) the extended monitoring of structures, 
equipment, and supplies, (b) a determination 
of the feasibility of reclamation efforts, and 
(c) the location of radioactive hot spots. A 
decision is made on the abandonment or dis- 
posal of materials, and it is possible to begin 
to assemble estimates of reconstruction and 
replacement requirements. 

5D1.03 CHANGES IN PERIMETERS 

Detailed ABC monitoring also pro- 
vides data on (a) the progress of neutralization 
or natural decay of contamination and (b) the 
effectiveness of decontamination measures 
that have already been taken. At the same 
time, it may be assumed that emergency re- 
covery efforts have been successful in clearing 
certain access routes. 

The initial situation with respect to 
access and contamination no longer exists, 
and a more accurate estimate of the damage 
has been obtained. Fires have been extin- 
guished, and the situation with respect to ac- 
cess has been improved. It may therefore be 
desirable at this stage to change the locations 
of both the obstruction and the support perim- 
eters. 






5-27 






Section 2. FINAL RECOVERY 



5D2.01 RELATIONSHIP TO INITIAL 
DAMAGE 

Actually, no break occurs between 
the operational recovery stage and the final 
recovery stage. Final recovery operations 
are largely a continuation and refinement of 
operations that were begun in the preceding 
stage. They may be defined as steps taken to 
restore all facilities that are required to ac- 
complish the complete mission assignment of 
the station. At the end of the final recovery 
stage, the station must be as well or better 
prepared to carry out its mission than it was 
initially. 

5D2.02 RELATIONSHIP TO PERSISTENCY 
OF CONTAMINATION 

Some phases of organization and op- 
eration of a naval activity probably will be 
restored to full efficiency during the opera- 
tional recovery stage. Other phases will be 
more difficult to reestablish for a variety of 
reasons, including the persistency of some 
types of contamination. Radiological contam- 
ination of a crater area, for example, may 



initially be at a high level. Although the radio- 
activity decays as time goes on, the area that 
is concerned may be something of an obstacle 
to recovery measures for a longer period than 
is tolerable. In such an event it may prove 
expedient to abandon the contaminated area 
and reestablish a portion of the station in areas 
that are not so affected. 

5D2.03 DEGREE OF PERSONNEL CONTROL 

In the course of the final recovery 
phase, personnel who have suffered relatively 
minor injuries will be restored to full duty. 
Replacement personnel will come on board to 
take the places of the dead and those who have 
been incapacitated. This necessitates a pro- 
gram of indoctrination and training in individual 
tasks that are necessary to the accomplishment 
of the mission of the activity. But it also 
means that ail personnel must be indoctrinated 
and trained or retrained in the processes of 
ABC warfare defense. Final operational effi- 
ciency will not be achieved until the state of 
material readiness of the activity to resist 
ABC warfare attack equals the initial capacity 
of the activity. 









5-29 



Section 3. FINAL REPAIR AND RECLAMATION 






5D3.01 RECLAMATION OF BYPASSED 
AREAS 

In the process of the recovery and 
reclamation that has been described thus far, 
efforts have been concentrated on the rehabili- 
tation and repair of administrative, operational, 
and housing facilities. Storage areas, parking 
areas, recreational facilities, theaters, and 
similar facilities have been bypassed. The 
debris removal crews should now be deployed 
to clear these bypassed areas. After the 
clearing operation has been completed, repair 
of utilities and structures should be under- 
taken, decontamination effected, and the areas 
gradually brought up to the state of repair of 
the remainder of the station. Operations for 
the reclamation of the bypassed areas, how- 
ever, should be so scheduled that they do not 
interfere in any way with the final repair of 
vital facilities. 

5D3.0Z FINAL REPAIR OF ACCESS ROUTES 

The final repair of access routes con- 
sists of finished grading, drainage, and repay- 
ing in accordance with existing criteria. 

5D3.03 FINAL DECONTAMINATION 

A final check should be made of all 
areas, buildings, facilities, stores, and 



equipment to determine whether any further 
decontamination is necessary. Those that are 
not within the allowable limits should be marked 
and charted, and decontamination squads should 
be dispatched to complete the work. 

5D3.04 RESTORATION OF HARBORS 
AND CHANNELS 

In the final phase, harbors and chan- 
nels should be dredged to their original depths 
and widths. Underwater areas that are not in 
the path of navigation should be cleared of all 
sunken debris so it will not be a menace to 
small craft. Channel markers, buoys, and 
their chains and sinkers should be repaired 
and replaced as necessary. 

5D3.05 NEW CONSTRUCTION 

Many important buildings may have 
been entirely demolished by the blast. The 
local Shore Station Development Board should 
be convened to make a determination on which 
of these structures will require replacement. 
Priorities on the order of reconstruction should 
be established, and construction should be 
started as soon as practicable. It is advisable 
to make the greatest possible use of Bureau 
standard plans so that the time and cost of re- 
designing the structures will be reduced to a 
minimum. 






5-31 






APPENDIX A 
ABC WARFARE DEFENSE MATERIEL 



Appendix A contains a list of various items of equipment and material, 
arranged alphabetically under the following groupings, and paragraphs 
containing a description and pertinent information on most of the 
materiel. 






Materiel 
Detection Equipment 
Personnel Protection 
Group Protection 
Decontaminating Material 
Decontaminating Equipment 



Items 
1 - 27 
28 - 67 
68 - 78 
79 - 91 
92 - 101 



Par agraphs 
Al - A24 
A25 - A39 
A40 - A49 
A50 - A60 
A61 - A65 



A-l 






ABC Warfare Defense Materiel (1 of 7) 



Item 
no. 


Type of equipment Individual items 


Federal stock no. 


Cognizant 
bureau 


Figure 


Par. 




Detection Equipment 










1 


Alarm, G-agent, automatic, field, M6 


C6665-339-5269 


BuDocks 


A-l 


Al 


2 


Alarm, G-agent, automatic, field 
M6A1 


C6665-572-5126 


BuDocks 




Al 


3 


Crayon, vesicant detector, M7 


C6665-641-4231 


BuDocks 




A2 


4 


Crayon, vesicant detector, M7A1 


C6665-112-9405 


BuDocks 


A-2 


A2 


5 


Detector kit, chemical agent, M15 


C6665-563-4145 


BuDocks 


A-3 


A3 


6 


Detector kit, chemical agent, M18 


C6665-551-1285 


BuDocks 


A-4 


A4 


7 


Dosimeter, high-dose, indicating, 
IM-107( )/PD 




BuShips 




A5 


8 


Food testing and screening kit, 
chemical agents, M2 


L6665-171-8945 


BuMed 


A-5 


A6 


9 


Paper, liquid vesicant detector, M6 


C6665-251-8358 


BuDocks 


A-6 


A7 


10 


Paper, liquid vesicant detector, 
M6A1 


C6665-285-6175 


BuDocks 


A-6 


A7 


1 1 


Radiac computer-indicator, 
CP-95/PD 


F6665-171-9566 


BuShips 


A-7 


A8 


12 


Radiac detector, DT-60/PD 


F6665-171-7970 


BuShips 


A-8 


A9 


13 


Radiac detector charger, 
PP-345C/PD 


F6665-599-9799 


BuShips 


A-9 


A10 


14 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-10 


F6665-318-3366 


BuShips 


A-10 


All 


14a 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-10A 


F6665-286-1020 


BuShips 






14b 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-10B 


F6665-414-0856 


BuShips 






14c 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-10C 


F6665-286-0995 


BuShips 






14d 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-10D 


F6665-599-6290 


BuShips 






15 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-18 


F6665-355-5320 


BuShips 


A-ll 


A12 


15a 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-18A 


F6665-355-5321 


BuShips 






15b 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-18B 


F6665-286-1003 


BuShips 






16 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-27 


F6665-263-3788 


BuShips 


A-12 


A13 


16a 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-27A 


F6665-17I-8225 


BuShips 






16b 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-27C 


F6665-286-1008 


BuShips 






16c 


Radiac set, AN/PDR-27D 


F6665-286-1005 


BuShips 










A-3 



ABC Warfare Defense Materiel (2 of 7) 






Item 
no. 



16d 
16e 
17 

18 

18a 
19 

20 

2: 

22 
23 
23a 

23b 

24 

25 
26 
27 

28 
29 



Type of equipment Individual items 



Detection Equipment 

Radiac set, AN/PDRSZ7F 
Radiac set, AN/PDR-27G 
Radiacmeter, IM-9( )/PD 



Reagent kit, M25, for M6 series 
G-agent alarm 

Reagent kit, low -temperature 

*Refill kit, biological agent, CI7, 
for Ml 7 sampling kit 

Refill kit, chemical agent detector, 
CI 5, for M15 kit 

Refill kit, chemical agent detector, 
CI 8, for M18 kit 

^Sampling kit, biological agent, Ml 7 

Sign, atomic warfare contamination 

Sign, biological warfare 
contamination 

Sign, chemical warfare 
contamination 

Spare parts kit, M24, for M6 series 
G-agent alarm 

Transformer -rectifier, M2, for M6 
and M6A1 G-agent alarms 

Water testing kit, chemical agents, 
screening, M2 

Water testing kit, poisons, M4 

Personnel Protection 

Bag, waterproofing, Ml, for M9A1 
mask 

Boots, knee, rubber 



Federal stock no. 



F6665-641-0228 
F6665-599-7799 
F6665-263-3941 

C6665-339-5271 

L6665-299-9815 
C6665-5S1-2160 
C6665-543-6642 
L6665-299-9814 



C6665-339-5270 



C6130-660-8083 



L6665-171-9747 



L6665-599-8919 



C4240-377-9401 



D8430-147-1018/ 
1026 

D8430-299-0340/ 
0341 



Cognizant 
bureau 



BuShips 
BuShips 
BuShips 

BuDocks 



BuMed 

BuDocks 

BuDocks 

BuMed 

BuSandA 

BuSandA 

BuSandA 

BuDocks 

BuDocks 

BuMed 

BuMed 

BuDocks 

BuSandA 
BuSandA 



Figure 



A-13, 

A-14 

A - 1 5 



A-16 
A-17 

A-18 

A-19 
A-20 
A-21 

A-22 



A-23 



A-24 



A-25 



Par. 



A 14 

A15 

A15 
A16 

A17 

A18 

A19 
A20 

A20 

A20 

A21 
A22 
A23 

A24 

A25 



^Distribution will be made in accordance with training program that is established bythe Bureau 
of Medicine and Surgery. 

A-4 









ABC Warfare Defense Materiel (3 of 7) 



Item 
no. 


Type of equipment Individual items 


Federal stock no. 


Cognizant 
bureau 


Figure 


Par. 


30 


Personnel Protection 


C4240-127-7186 


BuDocks 


A-27 


A26 


Canister, spare, M10A1, for LWS 
mask, M3A1-I0A1-6 


31 


Canister, spare, Mil, for M9A1 
mask 


C4240-112-9365 


BuDocks 


A-26 


A26 


32 


Cover, protective, individual 
(northern) 


C8465-164-0512 


BuDocks 


A-28 


A27 


33 


Cover, protective, individual 
(tropical) 


C8465-164-0511 


BuDocks 






34 


Gloves, knitted, chemical warfare 
defense 


D8415-268-7905 


BuSandA 






35 


Gloves, rubber 


D8415-266-8686/ 
8688 


BuSandA 






36 


Hood, gas mask, toxicological 
agents, protective, M4 


C8415-281-2258 


BuDocks 


A-29 


A28 




Impermeable protective clothing 

outfit, M3, (including the following 
items) 




BuSandA 


A-30 


A29 


37 


Boots, knee, rubber 


D8430-147-1018/ 
1026 








38 


Cover, boot, toxicological agents, 
protective, M3 


D8430-262-5295/ 
5297 








39 


Cover, cooling, toxicological 

agents, protective, gas mask hood 


DB415-261-6443 








40 


Coveralls, toxicological agents, 
protective, M3 


D8415-272-3022/ 
3024 








41 


Gloves, toxicological agents, protec- 
tive, M3 


D8415-261-6661 








42 


Hood, protective mask, toxicological 
agents, M3 


D8415-261-6690 








43 


Suit, cooling, toxicological agents, 
protective coveralls 


D8415-264-2929 








44 


Impregnating outfit, clothing, field, 
Ml 


D4230-269-2908 


BuSandA 




A30 


45 


Impregnating set, clothing, field, M3 


D4230-368-6145 


BuSandA 




A30 


46 


Isopropyl alcohol, NF, 5-gal 


L6505-299-8095 


BuMed 




A31 






A-5 



ABC Warfare Defense Materiel (4 of 7) 



c 



Item 
no. 



47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 

55 
56 
57 
58 

59 

60 
61 

62 



Type of equipment Individual items 



Personnel Protection 

Leather dressing, vesicant gas • 
resistant, Ml 

Leather dressing, vesicant gas ■ 
resistant, M2 

Mask, protective, field, M9A1 



Mask, protective, LWS, 
M3A1-10A1-6 

**Medical supply set, gas-casualty 
treatment, No. 1 

**Medical supply set, gas -casualty 
treatment, No. 2 

**Medical supply set, gas -casualty 
treatment, for small units 

Overalls, men's, wet weather 



Overshoes, rubber, arctic, N-2 



Parka, man's, chemical warfare 
defense 

Parka, man's, wet weather 



Permeable protective clothing 
Five -man outfit 
Ten-man outfit 

Protection and treatment set, 
chemical agents, M5A1 

♦♦Protective clothing set, chemical 
agents 

Repair kit, field, M19, for M9A1 
protective mask 

Repair kit for LWS mask, 
M3A1-10A1-6 



Federal stock no. 



Cognizant 
bureau 



G8030-174-3241 



G8030-273-8719 



C4240-368-6093/ 
6098 

C4240-288-6854 



L6545-924-8125 



L6545-924-9675 



L6 545-924-4825 



D8405-268-8038/ 
8039 
8048/ 
8049 

D8430-144-1640/ 
1650 

D8405-268-7972/ 
7975 

D8405-171-1419/ 
1421 



G8405-261-6668 
G8405-261-6667 

L6505-368-6152 



L6 545-925-1695 



C4240-574-2385 



C4240-289-2052 



BuSandA 



BuSandA 



BuDocks 



BuDocks 



BuMed 



BuMed 



BuMed 



BuSandA 



BuSandA 



BuSandA 



BuSandA 



BuSandA 



BuMed 



BuMed 



BuDocks 



BuDocks 



Figure 



A-31 



A -32 



A-33 



A-34 



A-35 



Par. 



A32 



A32 



A33 



A33 



A34 



A35 



A36 



A36 



**Sets containing all items are furnished under a single stock number, FSN 6545-924-5675. 

A-6 



L 






ABC Warfare Defense Materiel ( 5 of 7) 



Item 
no. 


Type of equipment Individual items 


Federal stock no. 


Cognizant 
bureau 


Figure 


Par. 




Personnel Protection 










63 


Soap, surgical, 4-oz, with hexa- 
chlorophene 


L6505-141-1900 


BuMed 




A37 


64 


Socks, men's, chemical warfare 
defense 


D8440-177-8042/ 
8046 


BuSandA 






65 


Trousers, men's, chemical warfare 
defense 


D8405-266-8406/ 
8409 


BuSandA 






66 


Water -purification tablet, iodine 


G6850-250-2620 


BuSandA 




A38 


67 


Waterproofing set, C3, for LWS 
mask 

Group Protection 


C4240-287-4696 


BuDocks 


A-36 


A39 


68 


Air lock, portable 


C5410-272-9265 


BuDocks 


A-37 


A40 


69 


Closure, protective shelter, anti- 
blast, Ml 


C4240-606-7584 


BuDocks 


A-38 


A41 


70 


Filter, gas, 150-cfm, M10, for M6 
filter unit 


C4240-203-8033 


BuDocks 


A-39 


A42 


71 


Filter, gas -particulate, 600-cfm, 
M14, for M9 filter unit 


C4240-300-6385 


BuDocks 


A-40 


A43 


72 


Filter, particulate, 150-cfm, M9, for 
M6 filter unit 


C4240-203-8018 


BuDocks 


A -41 


A44 


73 


Filter unit, gas-particulate, M7A1 


L4240-203-3999 


BuMed 






74 


Filter unit, gas-particulate, GED, 
3O0-cfm, ABC, M6 (formerly 
collective protector) 


C4240-203-0345 


BuDocks 


A-42 


A45 


75 


Filter unit, gas-particulate, GED, 
600-cfm, M9 (collective 

protector) 


C4240-601-9612 


BuDocks 


A-43 


A46 


76 


Manometer 


C6685-273-7007 


BuDocks 


A-44 


A47 


77 


Regulator, air pressure, Ml 


C5670-378-9876 


BuDocks 


A-45 


A48 


78 


Valve, antibackdraft, Ml 
Decontaminating Material 


C5670-378-9875 


BuDocks 


A-46 


A49 


79 


Citric acid, commercial grade, 
50 -lb container 


C68I0-273-8696 


BuDocks 




A50 


80 


Citric acid, monohydrate, technical, 
(antiset Ml), 6-1/2-lb container 


C6810-663-3144 


BuDocks 




A51 






■S49252 O-60-14 



A-7 



ABC Warfare Defense Materiel (6 of 7) 






Item 
no. 


Type of equipment Individual items 


Federal stock no. 


Cognizant 
bureau 


Figure 


Par. 




Decontaminating Material 










81 


DANC solution unit, 3-gal, M4 


C6850-276-7342 


BuDocks 




A52 


82 


Decontaminating agent, STB 


C6810-297-6653 


BuDocks 




A53 


83 


Detergent, wetting agent (liquid) 


G7930-282-9699 


BuSandA 




A54 


84 


Detergent, wetting agent (powder) 


G6850-249-8021 


BuSandA 




A 54 


85 


ETO Freon dispenser, 50-ml, 
12-oz, Ml 


C6810-664-0382 


BuDocks 


A-47 


A55 


86 


Ethylene oxide gas in 15-lb 
cylinder 


G6830-291-5007 


BuSandA 




A56 


87 


Formalin (formaldehyde solution) 


G6810-291-8392 


BuSandA 




A57 


88 


Methanol (methyl alcohol) 


G6810-275-6010 


BuSandA 




A58 


89 


Plastic coating, strippable 


G8030-275-8094 


BuSanrlA 




A59 


90 


Sodium metabisulfite 


G6810-281-4255 


BuSandA 






91 


Tape, adhesive, pressure-sensitive 
Decontaminating Equipment 


G8135-266-5026 


BuSandA 




A60 


92 


Decontaminating apparatus, 
portable, 3-gal, Ml 


C4230-272-3312 


BuDocks 


A-48 


A61 


93 


Decontaminating apparatus, power - 
driven, skid-mounted, 400-gal, 
M4 


C4230-142-2740 


BuDocks 


A-49 


A62 


94 


Decontaminating apparatus, power - 
driven, skid-mounted, 400-gal, 
M6 


C4230-142-2739 


BuDocks 


A-50 


A62 


95 


Decontaminating apparatus, power - 
driven, trailer-mounted, 200 -gal, 
M8 


C4230-347-2436 


BuDocks 


A-52 


A62 


96 


Decontaminating apparatus, power - 
driven, truck-mounted, 400-gal, 
M3A2 


C4230-276-8930 


BuDocks 


A-51 


A62 



A-8 






ABC Warfare Defense Materiel (7 of 7) 






Item 

no. 


Type of equipment Individual items 


Federal stock No. 


Cognizant 
bureau 


Figure 


Far. 




Decontaminating Equipment 










97 


Decontaminating apparatus, power - 
driven, truck-mounted, 400 -gal, 
M3A3 


C4230-276-7341 


BuDocks 




A62 


98 


Dispenser, simulant agent, BGI, 
Ml 


6910-025-3274 


BuWeps 


A-53 


A63 


99 


Generator, fog, insecticidal, 40-gph 


C3740-132-8330 


BuDocks 


A-54 


A64 


100 


Hypochlor ination unit, water - 
purification, w/comparator 


C4610-132-5453 


BuDocks 


A-55 


A65 


101 


Portable fumigant atomizer, 3-gph 


C3740-202-3093 


BuDocks 


A-56 


A66 



NOTE: The following publications provide information for determining allowances, inspection, 
and storage of special ABC warfare defense material. 

ABC Warfare Defense Materiel Inspection and Storage , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-19, January 
1959- 

Basic ABC Allowance Planning (Continental Shore Activities and Outlying Bases) , NAV- 
DOCKS TP-PL-10 (Confidential), I960. 

Basic ABC Allowance Planning (Functional Components and Systems ), NAVDOCKS TP- 
PL-11 (Confidential), 1960. 






A-9 









e 






DETECTION EQUIPMENT 

Items 1-27 

Paragraphs Al - A24 



A- 11 



Al. ALARM, G-AGENT, AUTOMATIC, FIELD, M6 and M6A1 






a. Description . The field automatic G- 
agent alarm is supplied in two models: M6 
and M6A1 (Figure A-l). Both are similar in 
appearance, size, and operation. Each is 
housed in an aluminum case that is 17 in. long, 
16 in. wide, and 7 in. deep and weighs 24 lb. 
The case has removable front and rear covers, 
each of which is held in place by six snap 
catches. The complete operating unit com- 
prises three separate packages: the alarm 
itself; a 24-volt storage battery or an M2 
transformer-rectifier for connection to a 115- 
volt ac power line; and an M25 reagent kit, 
which contains the tape and chemicals. (See 
paragraph A15.) Each alarm must be serviced 
every 12 hours. One spare parts kit is furn- 
ished with every five alarms. (See paragraph 
A21.) 

b. Use . The alarm is designed to sound 
a buzzer and light a warning light automatically 
when G-agents are present in the immediate 
vicinity to warn personnel to take protective 
measures. This alarm may be adapted also to 
activate local warning systems and controls of 
mechanical ventilation equipment. 

c. Application , The field alarm must be 
placed on level ground or on a level platform. 
If the alarm is not level, the gravity feed of 
the chemical solution to the liquid pump will be 
affected. The normal operating temperature 
ranges from 32 q F to 100° F. The following 
preparations are required prior to operation. 

(1) Mix chemicals from the M25 re- 
agent kit and pour them into the liquid tank of 
the field alarm. 

(2) Bleed air from the liquid line to 
prevent an air lock. 

(3) Install tape reel and filter disk. 

(4) Connect to a power source of 24- 
volt dc or 1 1 5-volt ac through the transformer- 
rectifier . 

Principles of operation are as follows. The 
paper tape, which is transported periodically 
through the alarm head, is wetted by a drop of 
the chemical solution. Air from outside the 
alarm is drawn first through a dust filter and 
then through part of the wetted spot on the tape. 
If G-agents are present in the air that is drawn 
through the tape, the chemical reaction of the 
G-agent with the solution on the tape causes 
the solution to turn pink. Light from an illu- 
minating lamp shines onto the wetted spot on 
the tape and is reflected to two photoelectric 



cells. Light that is reflected from the pink 
portion of the spot is of lesser intensity than 
that from the white portion, which causes an 
unbalance between the photoelectric cells. 
This results in the sounding of abuzzer and the 
lighting of a light. The warning is continued 
until the alarm is reset by hand. 

d. Effective Detection . This alarm de- 
tects G-agents in the surrounding air. 

e. Limitations. This alarm has the fol- 
lowing limitations. 

(1) G-agents must be inducted into 
the alarm case to be detected. 

(2) It detects only G-agents. 

(3) Freezing temperature requires 
the use of isopropyl alcohol as an antifreeze. 

(4) Chemicals must be added every 
12 hours. 

(5) The battery must be recharged 
periodically (for the M6 alarm). 

(6) Nitrogen dioxide and chlorine 
substances produce false alarms. 

f. Shipment . The M6 or M6A1 alarm is 
packed in a fiberboard box that weighs 41 lb 
and occupies 3.2 cu ft. The transformer- 
rectifier, the reagent kit, and the spare parts 
kit are packaged separately. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Instruction Book for Alarm, Field, 
Automatic, M6A1 (E21R2), 

Department of the Army Chemical 
Corps, EP-14-R2, 1958. 

Instruction Book for Alarm, Field, 

Automatic, M6 (E21), 
Department of the Army Chemical 

Corps, EP-14, 1955. 

h, New Alarm, G-agent, Automatic , 
Field, E41 . A new alarm is being developed 
to replace the M6A1. If it is successful, this 
alarm will have the following advantages. 

(1) The E41 will employ an insulated 
case in lieu of the bulky external heating jacket. 

(2) The E41 is being designed to 
permit operation at ambient temperatures of 
-25° F or lower as compared with 0° F for the 
M6. 






A-13 




Figure A-l. Alarm, G-Agent, Automatic, 
Field, M6A1 

(3) It has a self-contained power 
source, and it is thus not dependent on the 
availability of battery sources in the field. 

(4) The unit that includes the integral 
power source is lighter than that of the M6A1 
with its heavy external battery (that is, an 
estimated 25 to 30 lb compared with 100 lb). 
This is accomplished by the use of fewer and 
miniaturized components and the employment 
of transistorized circuity. 

(5) The reduction and relocation of 
components will result in simplified mainte- 
nance procedures. 

(6) The new E41 will operate for 24 
hours without being serviced, as compared 
with 12 hours for the M6A1. 



(7) Controls are on the outside of the 
alarm, which permits the operator to make 
adjustments without removing the covers. 
Adjustments are simpler and less critical than 
those of the M6A1. 

(8) The E41 is less subject to faulty 
operation when it is tilted. 

(9) The E41 is less susceptible to 
possible faulty operation under tropical condi- 
tions that effect electrical leakage caused by 
moisture. 






(10) Light source in the E41 
much longer life than that of the M6A1. 



has a 



(a) The E41 uses a cadmium 
sulfide cell that is smaller and more sensitive 
than the photocell that is used in the M6. 

(b) The battery that is being con- 
sidered for use in the E41 (see item (3) above) 
is a zinc -silver oxide electrode type. Itweighs 
about 12 lb. It can be charged about 40 times 
and has a life of 24 hours per charge. In cold 
weather this life is only 12 hours per charge. 

(c) Work is currently under way 
to develop a transformer-rectifier as a source 
of power. 

It appears that the E41 will not be standardized 
in the near future because there is a current 
requirement that CW alarms must be capable 
of detecting V -agents. This will delay the 
standardization. 



< 



A- 14 









A2. CRAYON, VESICANT DETECTOR, M7A1 and M7 






a. Description . Vesicant detector cray- 
ons (Figure A- 2) are pink, chalklike crayons 
that are used to detect the presence of liquid 
blister gases of vesicants and G-agents. De- 
tails concerning these crayons are as follows. 

1. M7A1 Vesicant Detector Crayon. 
The M7A1 crayon is 2-3/4 in. in length and 
0.44 in. in diameter. It is wrapped in water- 
proof paper for a length of 2-1/2 in. and is 
sealed in a plastic bag. Three bags, each con- 
taining one crayon, are packaged in an alumi- 
num can that is 3-1/16 in. long. The can has 
a screw-on cap with a gasket to provide an 
airtight seal. Instructions for use are printed 
on the outside of each can. 

2. M7 Vesicant Detector Crayon. 
The M7 crayon is 3-1/4 in. in length and 0.44 
in. in diameter. It is wrapped in waterproof 
paper for a length of 3 in. and is packaged with 
1 2 in a cardboard box. Instructions for use 
are printed on each box. 

b. Use . When these crayons are rubbed 
on a surface, they produce a pink color, which 
changes to blue on contact with liquid vesicants 
or the concentrated vapors of vesicants. When 
a more positive identification of CW agents is 
required, the M18 or M15 chemical agent de- 
tector kit should be used. When drops of liquid 
G-agents are present, crayon markings or 
powder turn from pink to yellow. 

c. Application . Crayons may be rubbed 
directly on firm surfaces. Crayon marks on 
white paper may be held against a suspected 
surface for five minutes. Dust from scraping 
or crumbling the crayons may be spread over 
a suspected surface. 

d. Limitations . The M7A1 and M7 cray- 
ons have the following limitations. 

(1) These crayons are not affected 
by the nitrogen mustards. 

(2) They do not have high sensitivity 
and should not be used to test for the presence 
of CW agents in vapor form. 



(3) They can not be relied upon en- 
tirely when they are used on recently decon- 
taminated surfaces because they are affected 
by bleach, DANC solution, and M5 protective 
ointment. 

(4) They are also affected by strong 
acids that maybe formed when harmless com- 
pounds hydrolyze, 

(5) Chlorine and phosgene in high 
concentrations turn the crayons blue. 

e. Shipment . Both the M7A1 and M7 
crayons are packaged in wooden boxes. Each 
box contains 372 crayons (or 124 cans), weighs 
35 lb, and occupies 0.6 cu ft. 

f. Reference Publications - 
Individual Protective and Detection 

Equipment , TM 3-290, Department 
of the Army. 

Military Chemistry and Chemical 
Agents , TP 3-215, Department of 
the Army. 




Figure A-2. Crayon, Vesicant Detector, 
M7A1 



A-15 



A3. DETECTOR KIT, CHEMICAL AGENT, Ml 5 



a. Description . The M15 detector kit 
(Figure A-3) is furnished in a carrier that is 
5 in. by 3-3/4 in. by 2 in. and weighs 14 oz 
when filled. It is a simplified M18 detector kit. 

It is procured with the deteriorating (dated) 
chemical components furnished in the form 
of a C15 refill kit, which contains one set of 
chemicals for initial outfitting or for replace- 
ment. (See paragraph A17.) 

b. Use . The M15 detector kit is designed 
to detect dangerous concentrations of G-agents 
and mustards. Air samples are drawn through 
detector tubes by an air-sampling bulb, as is 
done with the M18 kit. The details of the op- 
eration are the same as for the Ml 8 kit, and 
instructions are included with each kit. 

c. Effectiveness . The Ml 5 kit will detect 
dangerous concentrations of mustard gases (H) 
and nerve gases (G). 

d. Limitations . The M15 kit has the fol- 
lowing limitations. 

(1) It may be used to detect H, HD, 
and G-agents only. 

(2) It is limited to fifty G orH tests. 

e. Shipment . Each kit (minus the ex- 
pendable chemicals) is packaged in a fiber- 
board box. Fifty packaged kits are then packed 
in a wooden box that weighs about 50 lb and 
occupies 2.1 cu ft. 

f. Reference Publications . 

Detector -Kits, Chemical Agent, M18 , 
M9A2,and M15 , TM 3-306, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 










Military Chemistry and Chemical 
Agents , TM 3-215, Department of 
the Army, 1956. 



Figure A-3. Detector Kit, Chemical Agent, 
M15 



A-16 



A4. DETECTOR KIT, CHEMICAL AGENT, M18, and M9A2 






a. Description . The M18 detector kit 
(Figure A-4) measures 8-1 /2 in. by 5-1 /Z in. 
by 3 in. and weighs 2-1/2 lb. It is packaged in 
a canvas carrier that contains a sampling bulb 
and accessories, less deteriorative supplies. 
A C18 refill kit (see paragraph A18) is pro- 
vided to outfit and to replace dated chemicals. 
The M9A2 kit is substantially the same as the 
M18 kit. 

b. Use . The M18 kit is used for recon- 
naissance in areas that are suspected to be 
contaminated with CW agents, for testing the 
presence of gas after decontamination opera- 
tions, and for indicating when masks maybe 
safely removed. 

c. Application . The sampling bulb is 
used to draw vapors of CW agents through the 
detector tubes. Tests may be made also with 
the detector crayons and paper. Figure 4-4 
describes the tests and contains instructions 
for reading the results. 

d. Eff ectivene s s ■ The Ml 8 detector kit 
will detect dangerous vapor concentrations of 
the following agents: cyanogen chloride (CK), 
ethyl dichloroarsine (ED), hydrogen cyanide 
(AC), Lewisite (L), mustards (H) , nerve gases 
(G), phosgene (CG), and phosgene oxime (CX). 
Vapors of all the agents listed above, except 
CX.are detected by the M9A2 kit. 

e. Limitations . The M18 kit has thefol- 
lowing limitations. 

(1) Tests are not sufficiently rapid 
to be a guide in donning gas masks; therefore, 
if the presence of CW agents is suspected, 
masks should be donned prior to the use of the 
kits. 

(2) A flashlight is necessary to iden- 
tify colors at night. 

(3) The M9A2 kit does not detect CX. 



Detector tubes 


3 years 


Detector crayons 


3 years 


Indole 


2 years 


Pyrophosphate 


2 years, and 


peroxide 


perhaps as 




much as 3 




years in 




some cases 



f. Shipment. Each Ml 8 and M9A2 detec- 
tor kit (minus the expendable chemicals) is 
packaged individually in a fiberboard box. 
Eight kits are packed for shipment in a wooden 
box that weighs approximately 50 lb and occu- 
pies 2. 1 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Detector Kits, Chemical Agent, M18 , 
M9A2, and M15 , TM 3-306, Depart- 
ment of the Army, 1958. 

Military Chemistry and Chemical 
Agents , TM 3-215, Department of 
the Army, 1956. 




(4) The storage life of the reagents Figure A-4. 

is six years, with the following exceptions. 



Detector Kit, Chemical Agent, 
M18 






A-17 



A5. DOSIMETER, HIGH-DOSE, INDICATING, IM-107( )/PD 



o 



a. De sc ription . The IM-107( )/PD 
radiacmeter consists of a watertight black 
barrel unit with a fountain pen clip that is 
located near the top. 

b. Use . This dosimeter is designed to 
detect and indicate integrated doses of X and 
gamma radiation. 

c. Application . These dosimeters are 
intended to be used by team members when 
they are operating in areas of high-level 
radiation. 

d. Effectiveness . This high-dose dosi- 
meter measures large increments of X or 
gamma radiation with an accuracy of ± 15 
percent. 

e. Limitations. The IM-107{ ) /PD has 
the following limitations. 



(1) It will measure X or gamma dos- 
age only up to 200 r. 

(2) Light is required to read the 
radiation dosage, and the radiac detector 
charger, PP-354C/PD, is necessary to re- 
charge, or rezero, the dosimeter. 

f. Shipment . Depending on the model 
issue, the shipping size and weight will vary. 
It is shipped in a cardboard box that is 7/8 in. 
by 7/8 in. by 4-1/2 in. and the maximum weight 
is about 6 oz. 



g. Reference Publication - 
See NAVSHIPS 93268 Instruction 
Sheet, Radiacmeter-Dosimeter IM- 
107( )/PD. 






o 



A-18 






A6. FOOD TESTING AND SCREENING KIT, CHEMICAL AGENTS, M2 






a. Description . Analytical procedures 
have been developed to employ, as far as pos- 
sible, dry, solid reagents and test papers to 
render the tests as simple as possible. The 
reagents are packed in a pocket-size trans- 
parent plastic container that is 6-1/4 in, by 
3-3/4 in. by 2-7/8 in. and weighs 2-1/2 lb. 
The kit contains reagents for the detection of 
the nerve gases, mustards, arsenicals, and 
cyanogen chloride. 

b. Use . The M2 kit (Figure A- 5) is used 
to detect dangerous concentrations of the nerve 
gases (G series), mustard (H) , nitrogen mus- 
tards (HN series), arsenical blister gases (L 
and HD), and the arsenical smokes (DA and 
DMO) on foods and food packages. 

c. Application . A booklet that is issued 
yith the M2 kit gives specific directions for 
making each test. These directions must be 
followed exactly. Briefly, the tests involve the 
following chemical processes. 

(1) Arsenicals are identified by their 
ability to react with a special dye and to pro- 
duce a red spot on the green paper. 

(2) The mustards, both sulfur and 
nitrogen, are detected by means of a reagent 
impregnated in silica gel and bound to a test 
paper. A distinction between the sulfur and 
nitrogen mustards is made because of the fact 
that sulfur mustard will readily chlorinate and 
simultaneously liberate acid to change the 
color of a detector crayon from pink to blue. 
Nitrogen mustards do not change the color of 
the detector crayon. 

(3) The nerve gases are identified 
by their reaction with two special chemicals to 
produce an orange or yellow color, 

(4) The reactions may be summa- 
rized as follows. 

Arsenicals Red spot on green 

paper 

Mustards Blue or purple 

color 

Nerve gases Yellow or orange 
color 



d. Limitations. The M2 food testing and 
screening kit has the following limitations. 

(1) The test papers are packed to 
protect thern against accidental contamination 
under normal circumstances; however, long 
exposure of an open kit to concentrations of 
mustards or arsenicals may result in contam- 
ination. 

(2) The test papers should be exam- 
ined critically, in accordance -with the direc- 
tions in the instruction booklet, prior to their 
use. 

e. Shipment. Twenty-four kits are 
packed in a box that weighs about 45 lb and 
occupies 0.8 cu ft. 

f. Reference Publications . 

Food Testing and Screening Kit, ABC- 
MS , TB CML 41, Department of the 
Army. 

Treatment of Chemical Warfare Cas- 
alties, NAVMED F-5041, 1956. 




Figure A-5. Food Testing and Screening Kit, 
Chemical Agents, M2 



A-19 



A7. PAPER, LIQUID VESICANT DETECTOR, M6 and M6A1 



a. Description . The M6 liquid vesicant 
detector paper (Figure A-6) is coated on one 
side with a special indicating paint. The paper 
is issued in booklets of 25 sheets, which are 
5-1/2 in. by 5 in., with a 1/8-in. diameter 
hole in one corner. Because drops of certain 
chemical agents that are sometimes larger 
than 1/8 in. will penetrate permeable protec- 
tive clothing, this hole is provided to assist 
in measuring the size of drops that fall on the 
paper. The M6A1 liquid vesicant detector 
paper is the same as the M6 paper except that 
each sheet is 2-1/2 in. by 4 in. 

b. Use. The M6 and M6A1 papers are 
used to detect the presence of certain chemical 
agents that cause a change in color of the paper 
from olive green to red on contact with liquid 
or concentrated vapors of chemical agents. 

c. Application . Sheets of paper are 
fastened, with the coated side upward, on hori- 
zontal surfaces in exposed locations at about 
20-yard intervals. 



stains or large splashes of the contaminant. 
Vapors of blister gas and G-agents are detec- 
ted by changes in color from olive green to 
various shades of red, depending on the con- 
centration of vapors. 

e. Limitations. The M6 and M6A1 pa- 
pers have the following limitations. 

(1) The paper has an outdoor sensi- 
tive life of about 3 months, 

(2) Strong acids (HCL and H2SO4) 
and decontaminants (bleach, DANC, and M5) 
will affect the paper. 

f. Shipment. One hundred booklets of 
the M6 paper are sealed in a waterproof enve- 
lope and packed in a wooden box that weighs 45 
lb and occupies 1.0 cu ft. Two hundred book- 
lets of the M6A1 paper are sealed in a water- 
proof envelope and packed in a wooden box that 
weighs 45 lb and occupies 1.0 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 



d. Effective Detection . Liquid blister 
gas and G-agents are detected by a reddish 
fringe that will show around the edges of dark 




Individual Protective and Detection 
Equipment , TM 3-290, Department 
of the Army. 

Kit, Chemical Agent Detector, MI 8 , 
M9A2,and M15 , TM 3-306, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 





I BOOK, TAPER 
LIQUID. VEaCANT-DETECTC 
MSA I. 






Figure A-6. Paper, Liquid Vesicant Detector, M6 and M6A1. 



A-20 






A8. RADIAC COMPUTOR-INDICATOR, CP-95/PD 






a. Description . The CP-95/PD radiac 
computor-indicator (Figure A-7) consists of 
one basic unit, the front panel of which contains 
a cover assembly. This assembly contains a 
line cord and plug, plus miscellaneous spare 
parts. 

b. Purpose. This computor-indicator is 
designed to be used to read the amount of radi- 
ation to which a DT-60/PD detector has been 
exposed. 

c. Application. These indicators are for 
use primarily by dosimetry teams that are 
responsible for reading the DT-60/PD radiac 
detectors. 

d. Effectiveness, Under normal condi- 
tions this indicator, which has a range of to 
600 r, is used to read the radiac detector DT- 
60/ PD with an accuracy of ± 7 percent. 

e. Limitation. One limitation of this 
radiac indicator is that it requires external 
power source (100 to 130 volts, 60 cps). 

f. Shipment . The packaged weight of the 
equipment is 50 lb. Its shipping crate meas- 
ures 13-1/2 in. by 27-15/16 in. by 13-5/8 in. 
These shipping data are for domestic shipment 
and include equipment spares. 



Refer to the publication that is issued 
with the equipment, Instruction Book 
for Radiac Computor-indicator , 
C P-95/PD , NAVSHIPS 92146. This 
book is for the model shown. Re- 
quests should be made for instruc- 
tion book that describes the model 
at hand. 




g- 



Reference Publication. 



Figure A-7. Radiac Computer -Indicator 
CP-95/PD 



A-21 



A9. RADIAC DETECTOR, DT-60/PD 






a. Description . The DT-60/PD radiac 
detector (Figure A-8) is a high-range, phos- 
phor glass, nons elf -indicating, watertight, 
circular device that is worn around the neck 
like a pendant. 

b. Purpose . This instrument provides 
an economical means of determining the 
amount of X or gamma radiation, from r to 
600 r, that its wearer has accumulated. 

c. Application . The detector will be 
issued to all personnel who are engaged in 
disaster control operations. 

d. Effectiveness . This instrument 
measures large increments of X or gamma 
radiation with an accuracy of ± 20 percent 
above a dosage of 10 r. 



e. Limitation. 



One limitation of the ra- 
it requires the use of a 



diac detector is that 

CP-95/PD radiac computer -indicator to read 
and indicate the amount of radiation to which 
the detector has been subjected. 

f. Shipment. The detector is 1-1/2 in. 
in diameter, 3/8 in. in thickness, and weighs 
about 1 oz. 



g. Reference Publication. 

Radiac Detector, DT-60/PD, NAV- 
SmPS 91609A. 




•j..- 





Figure A-8. Radiac Detector, DT- 60/PD 






A-22 






A10. RADIAC DETECTOR CHARGER, PP-354C/PD 



a. Description . The PP-354C/PD radiac 
detector charger (Figure A-9) is contained in 
a watertight metal case that measures 2-7/16 
in. by 1 in. by 2 in. The charger has a hinged 
top, a removable plug on a metal chain, a bar- 
type knob, and a small window on the bottom. 

b. Purpose . This instrument is designed 
to charge all self-indicating dosimeters. 

c. Application. The charger is used to 
electrostatically charge self-indicating dosi- 
meters before each use. 

d. Effectiveness . This charger is effec- 
tively used with all self-indicating dosimeters. 

e. Limitations . This detector charger 
has the following limitations. 

(1) Light is required to illuminate 
the scale on quartz fiber dosimeters to permit 
the proper setting of the fiber. 

(2) It is not feasible to repair the 
charger. 

f. Reference Publication. 



Instruction Book for Radiac Detector 
Charger, PP-354C/PD , NAVSHIP5 
91432. 




Figure A-9. Radiac Detector Charger, 
PP-354C/PD 






549252 O-60-15 



A-23 



All. RADIAC SET, AN/PDR-10( ) 






a. Description. The AN/PDR-1 0( ) 
radiac set (Figure A- 10) consists of a radiac- 
meter, carrying case with radioactive source, 
a headset, instruction books, and a maintenance 
parts kit that contains a limited number of 
parts. The radiacmeter is a portable, water- 
tight, battery-operated alpha radiation detector 
and indicator. It contains a meter that is 
calibrated in disintegrations per minute per 
150 sq cm, knobs for making external adjust- 
ments, a carrying handle, and a phone jack. 

b. Purpose . The radiacmeter is designed 
to provide a portable means of indicating rela- 
tive alpha surface contamination in disintegra- 
tions per minute (dpm) per 150 sq cm. This 
instrument is used principally in monitoring 
food and water. It can be used also in the event 
of accidents that involve plutonium weapons; 
however, because of the high intensities that 
are encountered in an accident, it is necessary 
to modify the window opening to convert the 
present instrument to higher readings. 

c. Application . The headset of the set 
responds more rapidly to a change in radiation 
than does the meter. To locate the direction 
of increase of radioactive radiation, or the 
center of radioactivity, the headset indications 
must be utilized. When an absolute measure- 
ment of radiation is desired, the radiacmeter 
must be held still for a few minutes until the 
meter pointer reaches a maximum indication 
(it will oscillate about this point). A radio- 
active test source is mounted in the case of 
the radiac sets for quick operational checking. 

d. Effectiveness . This radiac set is 
extremely sensitive to alpha radiation up to 
10,000 dpm per 150 sq cm. 

e. Limitations . The AN/PDR-I0( ) 
radiac set has the following limitations. 

(1) A few minutes are required to 
attain the correct scale indication. 

(Z) Repeated charging of the ioniza- 
tion chamber is required. 

(3) The entrance window is covered 
with very thin aluminum foil that is easily 
punctured. 

(4) This equipment is not recom- 
mended for use in measuring alpha contamina- 
tion below 200 dpm per 150 sq cm. 

(5) The instrument must be held 
within 1-1/2 in. of the source of the activity. 

(6) Modification of the entrance win - 
dowis necessary to measure dpm above 10,000 
per 150 sq cm, 



f. Shipment. The radiacmeter weighs 
between 8 and 9 lb and measures about 13 in. 
by 4-1/2 in, by 2 in., excluding the handle. 
The shipping weight of the radiac set varies, de- 
pending on the model. The maximum size is 
about 11-1/2 in. by 14 in. by 2-1/2 in, and the 
maximum shipping weight is 29 lb. 

g. Reference Publication. 

Instruction Book for Radiac Set. AN/ 
PDR-XOD. NAVSHIPS 92162. Re- 
quests should be made for the in- 
struction book that describes the 
model at hand. 

NOTE: The AN/PDR-I0D may be jury- rigged 
to indicate an approximate hazard level of 
14,000 dpm/sq cm, or 1,000 Mg/sq m of Pu02 
at the top of the scale (reading of "10") by 
covering with masking tape all except two of 
the 172 grid holes. The two holes that are left 
open should be near the center of the entrance 
window (bottom grid). This is only an expedient 
and will not improve the low reliability and 
accuracy of this instrument. One or more 
correlation checks should be made with more 
accurate instruments. Efforts are under way to 
provide abetter alpha radiacmeter for general 
Navy use. Also, efforts are underway to make 
an appropriate modification to the AN/PDR- 
10D radiacmeter s to expand their reading level 
to meet the requirements indicated herein. 



CAM 

"Ofl-lOA 




•fa «rJ 







Figure A- 10, Radiac Set, AN/PDR-10 



A-24 



A12. RADIAC SET, AN/PDR-18 






a. Description. The AN/PDR-18 radiac 
set (Figure A-ll) consists of a radiacmeter 
with a built-in radioactive test sample, a 
shoulder strap harness, a carrying case, 
instruction books, and miscellaneous spare 
parts. The radiacmeter is a portable, water- 
tight, battery-operated gamma radiation detec- 
tor and indicator. It contains an r/hr meter, 
knobs for making external adjustments, a 
carrying handle, and brackets for attaching the 
shoulder harness. The radiacmeter weighs 
between 8 and 9 lb and is about 1 1 in. by 5 in. 
by 4-1/2 in. in size, excluding the handle. 

b. Purpose . This radiac equipment pro- 
vides a portable means of detecting and meas- 
uring high-intensity gamma radiation of inten- 
sities up to 500 r/hr. 

c. Application . The radiac set will be 
used by personnel to measure high levels of 
gamma radiation. The equipment is carried 
by means of the handle or the shoulder harness 
rather than by being mounted in fixed locations. 
It can be used for either ground or aerial sur- 
veys, which become the basis for locating 
radiation hazards and for determining the time 
that it is permissible to stay within an area. 

d. Effectiveness . The radiac equipment 
is designed to measure high-intensity gamma 
radiation with an accuracy of ± 20 percent. 

e. Limitations . The AN/ FDR- 18 radiac 
equipment has the following limitations. 

(1) It requires the replacement of the 
batteries after about 40 hours of continuous 
operation. 

(2) It can not be maintained in the 
field except for battery replacement. 



f. Shipment. The shipping weight of the 
radiac set varies, depending on the specific 
model. The maximum shipping weight is about 
35 lb. The maximum size of the box is about 18 
in. by 1 1 in. by 12 in. and it occupies 1.4 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publication. 



Instruction Book for Radiac Set, AN/ 
PDR-18B. NAVSHIPS 91662. This 
book is for the model shown. Re- 
quests should be made for the in- 
struction book that describes the 
model at hand. 




Figure A- 1 1 . Radiac Set, AN/PDR-18 






A-25 



A13. RADIAC SET, AN/PDR-27( 






a. De sc ription . The AN/PDR-27( ) 
radiac set (Figure A- 12) consists of a radiac- 
meter, a radioactive test sample, a shoulder 
strap harness, a headset, a carrying case, a 
probe, instruction books, and miscellaneous 
spare parts. It is a portable, watertight, 
battery-operated, radiation detector and indi- 
cator. The set contains a meter that gives a 
reading in mr/hr, knobs for making external 
adjustments, and a carrying handle and studs 
for attaching the shoulder strap harness. 

b. Purpose . This radiac set provides a 
portable means of detecting beta radiation and 
of detecting and measuring gamma radiation 
for low intensities from to 500 mr/hr. 



f. Shipment. The equipment weighs 
approximately 10 lb and measures about 12 in. 
by 6 in. by 4-1/2 in., excluding the handle. 
The shipping weight varies, depending on the 
model. The maximum size of the box is about 
28-1/2 in. by 21 in. by 28-1/2 in., and the 
maximum shipping weight is about 66 lb. 

g. Reference Publication . 

Instruction Book for Radiac Set, AN/ 
PDR-27F, NAVSHIPS 91856. -This 
book is for the model shown. Re- 
quests should be made for the book 
that describes the model at hand. 



c. Application . The equipment will be 
used by personnel who are measuring and 
detecting low-intensity beta and gamma radi- 
ation. The equipment is carried by means of 
the handle rather than by being mounted in a 
fixed location. This type of instrument is most 
useful for the detailed monitoring of clothing, 
personnel, interior spaces, and gear of various 
types. 

d. Effectiveness . This radiac equipment 
is designed to measure low intensities with an 
accuracy of ±20 percent. 

e. Limitation s . The AN/PDR-27( > 
radiac set has the following limitations. 

(1) It requires the replacement of the 
batteries after about 40 hours of continuous 
operation. 

(2) It can not be maintained in the 
field except for battery replacement. 

(3) Beta radiations can be detected 
only when the detector is removed from the 
well and the beta shield on the end of the probe 
is moved aside. 







Figure A- 12. Radiac Set, AN/PDR-27( ) 



A-26 






A14. RADIACMETER, IM-9( )/PD 



a. Description . The IM-9( )/PDradiac- 
meter (Figure A- 13) consists of a low-range, 
self-indicating, watertight, black barrel unit 
with a fountain pen clip located near the top. 

b. Purpose . This radiacmeter is de- 
signed to detect and indicate integrated doses 
of X and gamma radiation to a total capacity 
of 200 mr. (See Figure A-14.) 

c. Application . The radiacmeter is used 
for training purposes and in hospitals and 
laboratories to measure the amount of X or 
gamma radiation that has been accumulated by- 
personnel who are wearing the equipment. 



d. Ef f e cti yen ess , 
sensitive 



This instrument is 



to X or gamma radiation with an 
accuracy of ±15 percent. 

e. Limitations . The IM-9( )/PD radi- 
acmeter has the following limitations. 

(1) It will measure X and gamma 
dosage only up to ZOO mr. 

(2) Light is required to read the ra- 
diation dosage, and the PP-354C/PD radiac 
detector charger is necessary to recharge, or 
rezero, the radiacmeter. 

f. Shipment. The shipping size and 
weight of the radiacmeter will vary, depending 




on the model issued. It is shipped in a card- 
board box that is 7/8 in. by 7/8 in. by 4-1/2 
in., and the maximum weight is 6 oz. 

g. Reference Publication . 

Instruction Sheet, Radiac -Dosimeter , 
IM-9C/PD , NAVSHIPS 91698. This 
instruction sheet is for the model 
shown. Requests should be made 
for the instruction sheet that de- 
scribes the model at hand. 



QUARTZ FIBER 

ELECTROSCOPE 
EYEPIECE RETICLE OBJECTIVE \ 

COLLECTING ELECTRODE 



/ / \ ?\ : 

W_XVH U 



>1 a ' 



OUTER ELECTRODE 



INSULATOR 



CHARGING 

DIAPHRAGM 

CAP 




Figure A-13. Radiacmeter, IM-9( )/PD 



Figure A-14. Reading a Low-Range Pocket 
Dosimeter 






A-27 



A15. REAGENT KIT, M25 






a. Description . The M25 reagent kit 
(Figure A- 15) is supplied for the M6 and the 
M6A1 automatic G-agent alarms. It is pack- 
aged in a separate fiberboard carton that is 
20-1/2 in. long, 6-1/8 in. high, and 17 in. wide. 
It contains 60 clear plastic packages of chem- 
ical powder, 60 aluminum foil packages of 
chemical powder, 60 paper filter discs, 60 
reels of paper tape, a brown mixing bottle, and 
one color simulant spot. 

b. Application , The M25 reagent kit is 
used to furnish the necessary expendable 
chemicals for the maintenance of the automatic 
alarms. The prepared chemical solution (100 
milliliters) is placed in the liquid tank of the 
automatic G-agent alarm. G-agervts react 
with the chemical solution, causing the wet 
spot on the tape, through which air passes, to 
turn pink, while the adjacent section of the 
wetted tape remains white. The differences in 
light intensities are detected by the photocells 
and cause a warning lamp to light and an alarm 
buzzer to sound in the alarm. There is also a 
low-temperature reagent kit for the M6 and 
M6A1 field automatic G-agent alarm, which is 
intended for use when the G-agent alarm must 
operate at temperatures between 32° and 0° F 
or lower. The low-temperature kit contains 
sufficient antifreezing chemical components 
for continuous operation for sixty 12-hr peri- 
ods, or one month's supply. The component 
system is based on a 90-day resupply; there- 
fore, sufficient chemicals are provided for a 
90 -day period of continuous operation. 

c. Limitations . TheM25 reagent kit has 
the following limitations. 

(1) The chemical must be prepared 
and used immediately and should not be pre- 
pared in large batches for several days' use. 

(2) The 50-foot tapes must be re- 
placed every 12 hours. 



(3) Because the reagent kit is syn- 
chronized with the alarm mechanism, it is 
necessary to add i sop ropyl alcohol to the mix- 
ture for low-temperature operation. 

d. Shipment. The M25 reagent kit is 
shipped in a fiberboard carton that weighs 14 
lb and occupies 1.4 cu ft. 

e. Reference Publications . 

Instruction Book for Alarm, Field , 
Automatic (E21R2) M6A1 , EP 14- 
R2, April 1958. 

Instruction Book for Alarm, Field , 
Automatic (E21) M6, EP 14, March 
1955. 




P* 

mt ^ 











M, 



Figure A-15. Reagent Kit, M25, for M6 and 
M6A1 G-Agent Alarms 



A-28 






A16. REFILL KIT, BIOLOGICAL AGENT, C17, FOR M17 SAMPLING KIT 



a. Description , One CI 7 biological agent 
refill kit (Figure A-16) contains all the expend- 
able items that are necessary to completely 
reoutfit one Ml 7 biological agent field sam- 
pling kit, (see paragraph A19) including a petri 
dish and a filter package assembly, broth, 
vials with swab fluid, impinger fluid, empty 
vials, swabs, plastic bags, and pencil lead. 

b. Use . The C17 refill kit provides ma- 
terial for additional sampling that is beyond 
the capability of the MI 7 biological agent field 
sampling kit. 




c. Shipment. The C17 kit is packaged in 
a fiberboard box that measures 5 in. by 13 in. 
by 6-1/2 in., occupies 0.25 cu ft, and weighs 
5-1/2 lb. 



Figure A-16. Refill Kit, Biological Agent, 
CI 7, for M17 Sampling Kit 






A-29 



A17. REFILL KIT, CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR, C15, FOR M15 KIT 



■ 



a. Description. The C15 chemical agent 
detector refill kit (Figure A-17) is a compo- 
nent part of the basic Ml 5 chemical agent de- 
tector kit. It consists of the reagents and de- 
tector tubes that are required to fill or refill 
one detector kit. 

b. Use . The CI 5 refill kit is used to 
outfit initially or to replenish one Ml 5 chemi- 
cal agent detector kit. 

c. Limitation . One limitation of the CI 5 
refill kit is that its storage life is about 3 
years. 

d. Shipment . Each refill kit is packaged 
in a fiberboard box that is about 4-3/8 in. by 
3-1/2 in. by 2-1/2 in. One hundred packaged 
kits are shipped in a wooden box that weighs 
about 70 lb and occupies 2.2 cu ft. 




I 










Figure A-17. Refill Kit, Chemical Agent De- 
tector, CIS, for M15 Kit 



A-30 






A18. REFILL KIT, CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR, C18, FOR M18 KIT 



a. Description . The C18 chemical agent 
detector refill kit (Figure A-18) is a component 
part of the basic chemical agent detector kit. 
It consists of the reagents, detector tubes, and 
M7A1 crayons that are required to fill or refill 
one detector kit. 

b. Use . The CI 8 refill kit is used to out- 
fit initially or to replenish one Ml 8 chemical 
agent detector kit. 

c. Limitation . One limitation of the C18 
refill kit is that its storage life is approxi- 
mately 3 years. 

d. Shipment . Each C18 refill kit is pack- 
aged individually in a fiberboard box that is 
approximately 5 in. by 3 in. by 2-1/2 in. Ten 
packaged refill kits are shipped in a wooden 
box that weighs about 25 lb and occupies 0.7 
cu ft. 

e. Reference Publication. 






Detector Kits, Chemical Agents, Ml 8 , 
M9A2, and M15 , TM 3-306, Depart- 
ment of the Army, 1958. 




Figure A-18. Refill Kit, Chemical Agent De- 
tector, C18, for Ml 8 Kit 






A-31 



A19. SAMPLING KIT, BIOLOGICAL AGENT, M17 






a. Description , The Ml 7 biological agent 
sampling kit (Figure A- 19) is packed in a 
plastic carrying case that measures 13- 5/8 in. 
by 10-3/4 in. by 6-1/4 in. and weighs 20 lb. It 
contains a vacuum pump, membrane filters, 
an impinger, a plastic dish and blotter, nutri- 
ent syrettes, impinger fluid and antifoam solu- 
tion, a sump tank, cotton swabs, gelatin diluent, 
filter holders, an incubation vest, plastic bags, 
hydro sol filtration units, decontamination 
equipment, rubber gloves, and miscellaneous 
equipment and instructions. 

b. Use . TheMl? sampling kit is for use 
by ABC Survey Team personnel in the collec- 
tion of samples of materials for transportation 
to laboratories for identification. 

c. Application. A vacuum pump is used 
to draw organisms into the impinger fluid and 
to transfer organisms to membrane filter by 
simple filtration. Filters are placed in plastic 
dishes with a suitable nutrient; or, if virus is 
suspected, the filtrate is refrigerated, prefer- 
ably with dry ice, for transporting to the lab- 
oratory for identification. 



d. Effectiveness 



The Ml 7 sampling kit 
preserve most of the known 
for subsequent detection or 



will collect and 

BW organisms 

identification at a laboratory. The nutrient in 

the Ml 7 sampling kit supports most natural 

organisms as well as the BW agents. 

e. Limitations . The M17 sampling kit 

has the following limitations. 

(1) The sampling kit is used to 
collect samples for laboratories only, and it 
is not used to identify organisms on the spot. 

(2) The sampling kit will process 
about 20 samples, after which it is necessary 
to replenish the expendable items from the 
refill kit. 

f. Shipment . The Ml 7 kit is shipped in 
a wooden box that weighs 39 lb and occupies 
1.4 cu ft. 



g. Reference Publications . 

Military Biology and Biological War- 
fare Agents , TM 3-216, Department 
of the Army. 

Tactics and Techniques of Chemical , 
Biological, and Radiological War- 
fare, FM 3-5, Department of the 
Army. 

CBR Training Exercises, FM 21-48, 
Department of the Army. 

Chemical and Biological Warfare De- 
fense , NAVPERS 10098, Depart- 
ment of the Navy. 







Figure A-19. Sampling Kit, Biological Agent, 
M17 






A-32 






A20. SIGNS; ATOMIC, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE CONTAMINATION 



a. Description . 

(1) The atomic warfare contamina- 
tion marker (Figure A-20) is a right-angled 
isosceles triangle that is made of paperboard, 
with 8-in. sides, 11-1/2-in. base, and 1/16-in. 
thickness. Both sides have the word 'ATOM" 
printed in three positions, in l/2-in. upper- 
case black gothic type on a white background, 
parallel with each side. A 3/4-in. black stripe 
runs from the center to each corner on the 
front side only. 

(2) The biological warfare contami- 
nation marker (Figure A-21) is the same size 
and shape as the AW sign and made of the same 
material. Both sides have the work "GERMS" 
printed in three positions, in 1/2-in. upper- 
case black gothic type on a red background on 
the front only, and on a white background on 
the reverse side, or back. A 3/4-in. yellow 
stripe runs from the center to each corner on 
the front side only. 

(3) The chemical warfare contami- 
nation marker (Figure A-22) is the same size 



and shape as the AW and BW signs and made 
of the same material. Both sides have the 
word "GAS" printed in three positions, in 1/2- 
in. upper-case black gothic type on a yellow 
background on the front side only, and on a 
white background on the reverse side, or back. 

b. Use. These markers are used to de- 
fine the boundaries of contaminated areas. 



c. Application. The markers are nailed 
to short posts that are driven into the ground 
at approximately 100-ft centers with the front 
side facing away from the contaminated area. 
Markers are spaced close together enough for 
personnel who are approaching a contaminated 
area to see them and determine the boundary 
and to recognize the type of contamination. 

d. Limitation . One limitation is that 
these signs can not be seen at night. 



e. Shipment . Each type of sign 
wrapped with 50 to a package. 






■ MV2 IMCHES 




SURFACE OF MARKER FACING AWAY FROM CONTAMINATION 

j- II '/j INCHES 




SURFACE OF MARKER FACING CONTAMINATION 




SURFACE OF MARKER FACING AWAY FROM CONTAMINATION 

I 11 '/j IHCHES 




SURFACE OF MARKER FACING CONTAMINATION 



Figure A-20. Sign, Atomic Warfare Contami- 
nati on 



Figure A-21. Sign, Biological Warfare Con- 
tamination 






A-33 



f. Reference Publication . 

Defense Against CBR Attack , FM 
21-40, 1954, Department of the 
Army. 

NOTE: Contamination markers are no longer 
furnished by the Bureau of Yards and 
Docks, but they shall be procured 
from BuSandA, Forms and Publica- 
tions Supply Distribution Points, Nor- 
folk, Virginia; Oakland, California; 
and the Naval Weapons Plant, Wash- 
ington, D. C; in accordance with Bu- 
SandA Manual, Volume II, Chapter 3. 



n'/2 IKCHES ■ 







SURFACE OF MARKER FACING AWAY FROM CONTAMINATION 

|- 




SURFACE OF MARKER FACING CONTAMINATION 



Figure A-22. Sign, Chemical Warfare Con- 
tamination 






A-34 









A21. SPARE PARTS KIT, M24, FOR Mb G-AGENT ALARM 



a. Description . The M24A1 and the M24 
G-agent alarm spare parts kits contain ap- 
proximately 287 spare parts each to be used 
in making major repairs to the M6A1 and the 
M6 G-agent alarms. 



b. Use . These kits contain spare parts 
for the M6A1 and the M6 automatic field G- 
agent alarms. 

c. Effectiveness . The spare parts kit 
provides the necessary spare parts for five 
M6 or M6A1 operating alarms for a period of 
one year. 



d. Shipment . The spare parts are pack- 
aged in a fiberboard box that weighs 135 lb 
and occupies 14.0 cu ft. For the list of items, 
refer to the instruction manual that is provided 
with the alarm. 

e. Reference Publications . 

Alarm, Field, G-Agents, M — (E21) , 
TM 3-351 , Department of the Army. 

Instruction Book for Alarm, Field , 
Automatic, E21R2 , Department of 
the Army, Chemical Corps, EP- 
14-R2. 









A-35 



A22. TRANSFORMER-RECTIFIER UNIT, MZ 



a. Description. The M2 transformer - 
rectifier unit is housed in an aluminum case 
that is 11-3/16 in. by 9 in. by 6-1/8 in. The 
unpacked unit weighs 13 lb. It is designed to 
provide 24 volts of direct current from any 
115-volt, 60-cycle alternating current line. 
The unit is provided instead of a 24-volt dc 
battery or two 12-volt batteries. 

b. Use . The MZ transformer-rectifier 
unit is a portable power supply for the M6A1 
or M6 automatic G-agent alarm, 

c. Effectiveness . The M2 transformer- 
rectifier provides a 24-volt power supply for 
the automatic G-agent alarms. 

d. Limitations. The M2 transformer- 
rectifier has the following limitations. 



(1) A 115-volt ac power source must 
be available. 

(2) Where power is not available, 24- 
volt dc batteries must be used. 

e. Shipment. Each M2 unit is packed in 
a fiberboard carton and shipped in a wooden 
box that is 20 in. long, 10 in. high, and 13 in. 
wide, weighs 31 lb, and occupies 1.6 cu ft. 

f . Reference Publications ■ 

Instruction Book for Alarm, Field , 
Automatic, (E21R2) , EP-14-R2, 
April 1958. 

Instruction Book for Alarm, Field , 
Automatic, E21, (M6) , EP-14, 
March 1955. 






L 



A-36 



A23. WATER TESTING KIT, CHEMICAL AGENTS, SCREENING, M2 



a. Description . Each M2 water testing 
kit (Figure A-23) contains equipment and ma- 
terials for testing 15 samples of water. The 
reagents and equipment are packed in a pocket - 
sized, transparent plastic container that is 
about 6 in. by 3-1/2 in. by 2-1/2 in. The kit 
contains two test tubes, a chlorine demand 
assembly, a bottle and tube for the detection of 
arsenicals by a modified Gutzeit method (this 
bottle is also used in the nerve gas detection 
test), and nine vials that contain reagents and 
test papers. A test tube brush and a pipe 
cleaner are provided for cleaning the appa- 
ratus. The kit contains four reagent chemicals 
that are packaged in screw-cap vials, a grad- 
uated medicine dropper, and two aluminum 
measuring scoops. 

b. Use. The M2 kit is designed for 
reconnaissance, use. It is used to screen out 
sources of water that are so contaminated that 
they can not be rendered potable by the cus- 
tomary field methods, such as chlorination in 
the lyster bag. Negative tests indicate that the 
water is suitable for chlorination oriodination 
and that it maybe used by personnel within the 
limits outlined below. If any of the tests 
are positive , the water should not be used until 
a more complete analysis can be made. 

c . Application and Effectiveness . The 
booklets that are issued with the M2 testing kit 
give specific directions for each test. The 
directions must be followed exactly. The tests 
give the folio-wing effective results. 

(1) Arsenicals are converted to 
arsines by hydrogen, which is produced by the 
action of sodium acid sulfate on zinc. The 
arsines react with a sensitized paper to pro- 
duce a stain. This test is sensitive to 5 ppm. 

(2) The indicator paper determines 
the pH. 

(3) The kit can test for mustards as 
low as 5 ppm of unhydrolyzed sulfur mustard. 
This mustard test also indicates the presence 
of cyanogen chloride by a change in the color 
of the reagent to yellow. 

(4) The chlorine demand is deter- 
mined by means of halazone tablets and an 
orthotolidine testing assembly. This test de- 
tects the presence of other agents, such as the 
cyanides, for which a test is not specifically 
made. 

(5) The nerve gases are detected by 
a color reaction. One-half ppm of unhydro- 
lyzed nerve gas can be detected. 



(6) If no evidence of contamination is 
found, the odor and taste of the water can be 
safely tested. 

d. Limitations . The M2 water testing kit 
has the following limitations, 

(1) The kit is designed for use only 
on raw (untreated) water because the chemicals 
used in water treatment invalidates the inter- 
pretations. 

(2) Individuals who perform the tests 
must have normal color vision. 

(3) The tests will not detect traces 
of toxic agents that are harmless when the 
water is used for short periods of time. When 
arsenic is detected, even though the water has 
beenpassedas safe by the kit, the water should 
not be used for drinking or cooking purposes 
for any period that exceeds one week because 
of the possible cumulative effects. 

(4) Water may give a negative test 
for nitrogen mustards and stillproduce symp- 
toms if it is consumed in large quantities; 
therefore the water should not be used without 
special purification if even the faintest blue 
color develops in the test for mustards. 

(5) A false positive result for the 
nerve gas test may be obtained if an appreci- 
able quantity of ferrous iron is present in the 
water. Large quantities of reducing agents, 
such as hydrolyzed mustard (H), will lessen 
the intensity of the color. 




Figure A-23. Water Testing Kit, Chemical 
Warfare Agents, Screening, M2 



A-37 



(6) The tests that are provided by the wooden box that weighs about 50 lb and occu- 

kit are not quantitative and therefore will not pies 1.0 cu.ft. 

serve as a guide for the purification of field , ._ , _ ,, . 

, P . ,f ., j f. Reference Publications, 

water supplies. More elaborate methods are 

provided by the M4 water testing kit for poi- Treatment of Chemical Warfare Cas- 

sons to be used by the water-supply units. ualties , NAVMED P-5041, 1956, 

Department of the Navy. 

e. Shipment. The M2 water testing kits Water Testing and Screening Kit, AN- 

are packaged individually in a fiberboard box. M2 , Army Technical Bulletin TP 

Twenty-four packaged kits are shipped in a CML 40, 1955. 









A-38 












A24. WATER TESTING KIT, POISONS, M4 



a. Description . The M4 water testing kit 
for poisons (Figure A-24) is a small, portable 
laboratory. It is packed in a metal chest that 
is 31-1/2 in. by 19-1/2 in. by 6 in. and weighs 
55 lb -when fully supplied. 

b. Use . The M4 kit is used to identify 
the CW agent in a suspected water source and 
to determine the amount of the agent that is 
present. 

c. Application . This kit requires the 
use of elaborate methods and the services of 
trained medical personnel to detect the pres- 
ence of the CW agent. Quantitative determi- 
nations can be made of chlorine demand, mus- 
tards, arsenicals, cyanides, and pH. As far 
as possible, standard tests are employed with 
little or no modification. These tests include 

(a) the identification of the CW contaminants, 

(b) the quantities of the CW contaminants that 
are present, (c) the feasibility of purification 
of the water, (d) the methods to be employed 
in the treatment of the water, and (e) the quan- 
tities of the chemicals that are required for 
adequate treatment. 

d. Limitations . The M4 water testing 
kit has the following limitations. 



(1) The tests that are made with this 
kit are specific for active toxic agents, but 
they will not detect the nontoxic hydrolysis 
products of these agents. 

(2) All tests must be made under 
rigidly controlled conditions by a trained 



technician, following explicit instructions for 
testing and making interpretations. 

e. Shipment . One kit is packed in each 
chest, which weighs about 55 lb and occupies 

4.3 cu ft. 

f. Reference Publication . 

Treatment of Chemical Warfare Cas - 
ualties , NAVMED P-5041, Depart- 
ment of the Navy, 1956. 




Figure A-24. Water Testing Kit, Poisons, M4 






549252 0-60-16 



A-39 









PERSONNEL PROTECTION 



Items 28 - 67 

Paragraphs A25 - A39 






A-41 






A25. BAG, WATERPROOFING, Ml, FOR M9A1 MASK 






a. Description . The Ml waterproofing 
bag (Figure A-25) is 19 in. by 13 in. and is 
made of polyvinyl chloride film. It folds to a 
4-1/2 in. by 2-1/2 in. size for insertion in a 5 
in. by 6 in. polyethylene carrying pouch. A 
small separate pouch contains three rubber 
bands that are used to seal the waterproofing 
bag after the mask has been inserted. 

b. Use. The Ml protective mask water- 
proofing bag is used to keep the M9A1 mask 
dry during an amphibious operation or any 
other known exposure to water. One bag is 
issued to each individual and is carried in a 
pocket at the bottom of the mask carrier. 

c. Application . The protective mask is 
removed from the carrier and placed in the 
waterproofing bag in accordance with instruc- 
tions that are printed on the bag. Because of 
the possibility that the bag may have to be re- 
used in combat, the used bag should be folded 
and returned to the carrier for later use. 

d. Effectiveness . The Ml waterproofing 
bag keeps the protective mask dry. 

e. Limitations . The Ml waterproofing 
bag has the following limitations. 

(1) The mask should not be stored in 
the bag for more than 24 hours. 

(2) The bag should not be placed in 
contact with foodstuffs because of its toxic 
effects. 



f. Shipment . Two hundred and fifty bags 
are packaged in a wooden box that weighs 50 
lb and occupies 1.5 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Mask, Protective, Field, M9, and 
Mask, Protective, Field, M9A1 , TM 
3-522-15, Department of the Army. 

Protective Masks and Accessories , 
TM 3-205, Department of the Army. 




(3) The pointed ends of gear may 
make holes in the bag. 



Figure A-25. Bag, Waterproofing, Ml, for 
M9A1 Mask 



A-43 



A26. CANISTER, SPARE, FOR PROTECTIVE MASKS 






a. Description . 

1. Mil Spare Canister for M9A1 
Mask . The Mil canister is made of sheet alu- 
minum alloy or sheet steel, is cylindrical in 
shape, 4-1/2 in. in diameter and 2 in. thick, 
and painted dark gray. A metal closure cap 
and a rubber plug are provided to waterproof 
the canister whenit is not in use. Each canis- 
ter is sealed in a metal container that is sim- 
ilar to a coffee can with a key. The canister 
consists of a gas (chemical) filter and a par- 
ticulate (aerosol) filter that are housed in a 
metal body. The particulate filter is made of 
fluted, or folded, asbestos -bearing paper that 
removes toxic liquid and solid particles from 
the influent air; the gas filter consists of ASC 
activated charcoal. The charcoal is held in 
place by the body of the canister between two 
fine filters, which consist of felted cotton cloth 
between disks of plastic netting. Perforated 
metal disks protect the felting. The canisters 
are packaged in hermetically sealed contain- 
ers. (See Figure A-26.) 

Spare Canister for LWS 



M3A1 



2. M10A1 
■10A1 



-6 Mask. 



The M10A1 canister is 
made of smooth sheet steel that is 3-1/4 in. in 
diameter and 5-1/2 in. long. It has a straight 
nozzle at the top, to which a hose is attached, 
and an inlet valve at the bottom, through which 
air enters. Most units now in the supply sys- 
tem are sealed in metal containers. (See 
Figure A-27.) 

b. Use . The spare canister is used to 
replace the canister on the gas mask when the 



INLET PLUG 



CLOSURE CAP 




MECHANICAL FILTER 



CHEMICAL FILLING 



existing canister is considered unsafe after it 
has been exposed to CW agents. 

c. Application . The Mil canister is re- 
placed simply by unscrewing the old canister 
and attaching a new one to the M9A1 mask. To 
replace the M10A1 canister on the LWS mask 
an LWS mask repair kit should be used by 
authorized personnel in the following manner. 
Remove the wire clamp and tape from the 
hose, insert the straight nozzle of the canister 
intothehose, and apply 1 - 1 /4 turns of adhesive 
tape over the hose. Use the wire clamp over 
the adhesive tape and securely bind the hose to 
the nozzle. 

d. Effectiveness . The canister offers 
protection against all toxicological agents, 

e. Limitations . These canisters have 
the following limitations, which are also in- 
cluded as limitations of the protective mask. 

(1) Oxygen Supply . Mask canisters 
only purify air; they do not manufacture oxygen. 
Therefore, when air is deficient in oxygen, no 
canister is effective in supplying air that is 
suitable for breathing. 

(2) Ineffective under Certain Con - 
ditions . Military canisters are not for fire- 
fighting use, neither do they protect against 
carbon monoxide gases. They are designed 
for concentrations that are not greater than 
one percent by volume, and they do not provide 
extended protection against the high concen- 
trations of war gases that may result from 
spillage or explosion in enclosed places. 





■ 



( 



Figure A-26. Canister, Spare, Ml 1 , for M9A1 Figure A-27. Canister, Spare, M10A1, for 

Mask LWS Mask 



A-44 









(3) Life Expectancy of Canisters . 

The effective life of any individual canister 
varies with the type and concentration of the 
agent in the air, the number of minutes of 
exposure to the concentration, and the rate of 
breathing of the wearer. The military canister 
rarely breaks down suddenly. Usually it fails 
gradually and the wearer is warned of the need 
for replacement by minor sensory effects, such 
as a slight but persistent odor of gas, persist- 
ent lacrimation, or failing sight. However, 
when canisters are exposed to heavy concen- 
trations of CW agents from 15 to 50 minutes, 
they should be replaced after each exposure. 

f. Shipment . The two types of canisters 
are shipped in the following manner. 



(1) Eighteen Ml 1 canisters arepack- 
aged in a wooden box that weighs 46 lb and 
occupies 1.6 cu ft. 

(2) Eighteen M10A1 canisters are 
packaged in a wooden box that weighs 44 lb and 
occupies 1.3 cu ft. 



g. Reference Publications . 

Protective Masks and Accessories , 
TM 3-205, Department of the Army. 

Mask, Protective, Field, M9, and 
Mask, Protective, Field, M9A1 , TM 
3-522-15, Department of theArmy. 






A-45 



A27. COVER, PROTECTIVE, INDIVIDUAL 






a. Description . The individual protec- 
tive cover (Figure A-28) is an envelope of 
impermeable material with a transparent head 
section. The wrapper for the cover has a tear- 
tape device to provide a positive and quick 
opening. 

b. Use . The cover is used to protect 
the head and body against sprays of chemical 
agents. The cover is also used as a bag to 
hold contaminated clothing either while a per- 
son is awaiting decontamination or, in the case 
of BW contamination, during decontamination 
with ethylene oxide. 

c. Application . The cover, -which is 
usually carried in a gas mask carrier, is taken 
out of the wrapper, opened, and thrown over the 
head; or clothing that is contaminated withBW 
agents is placed in a bag with ETO dispenser. 

d. Effectiveness . The cover willprovide 
protection against liquid blister gas for a 
period of several hours. 

e. Limitations , The individual protec- 
tive cover has the following limitations. 

(1) The cover will not protect against 
vapors of blister gas. 

(2) Newer covers, wrapped in alumi- 
num foil, will not offer protection below 0° F. 

(3) The present cellophane-wrapped 
covers will not offer protection below 32° F. 



f. Shipment. The covers are packed 
with 100 in a wooden box that weighs 83 lb and 
occupies 2.1 cu ft. 







Figure A-28. Cover, Protective, individual 



A-46 









A28. HOOD, GAS MASK, TOXICOLOGICAL. AGENTS, PROTECTIVE, M4 






a. Description . The M4 protective hood 
(Figure A-29) is made of butyl-rubber-coated, 
cloth with adjustable openings. It completely 
covers the head and neck of the wearer and 
has fasteners to keep the hood down on the 
wearer's shoulders. 

h. Use . This hood is used in conjunction 
with other clothing when a person is engaged in 
performing BW decontamination work or other 
operations that involve danger from spillage 
or splashes in handling large quantities of 
liquid chemical agents. 

c. Application. . The protective hood 
should be fitted to the mask prior to donning 
the mask, and it is the last item of clothing to 
be donned. 

d. Effectiveness . The hood is resistant 
to chemical agent vapors and provides adequate 
protection against biological agents and keeps 
radioactive dust off the head and neck. Be- 
cause drops of C"W contaminants that may fall 
on the hood may possibly penetrate the cloth, 
the contaminant should be either neutralized 
or removed from the hood as soon as possible. 

e. Limitation. One limitation of the M4 
protective hood is that it can only be used with 
the M9A1 and LWS protective masks. 

f. Shipment . Sixty hoods are packed and 
shipped in a wooden box that weighs 60 lb and 
occupies 2.6 cu ft. 



g. Reference Publication - 
Protective Masks and Accessories , 
TM 3-205, Department of the Army. 




Figure A-29. Hood, Gas Mask, Toxicological 
Agents, Protective, M4 






A-47 



A29. IMPERMEABLE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING OUTFIT, M3 






a. Description . The M3 impermeable 
protective clothing outfit (Figure A- 30) is made 
of cloth that is coated on both sides with butyl 
rubber, which does not allow the passage of 
air through the fabric. The outfit includes the 
following items. 

Boots, knee, rubber 

Cover, boot, protective 

Cover, cooling, hood, gas mask 

Coveralls, protective, one-piece 

Gloves, protective 

Hood, protective mask 

Suit, cooling, two-piece 

b. Use . Impermeable clothing is in- 
tended primarily for the protection of military 
personnel who are engaged in extremely haz- 
ardous decontamination work or in other oper- 
ations that involve danger from the spilling or 
splashing of liquid chemical agents. 

c. Application. The personnel to whom 
this clothing is issued are those who work in 
toxic plants and with toxic munitions and those 
who are engaged in the decontamination of 
heavily contaminated areas. The material of 
the protective clothing outfit is resistant to 
liquid chemical agents and it also provides 
adequate protection against biological agents. 



d 
tective 



clothing 

limitations. 



Limitations . The impermeable pro- 
outfit has the following 



(1) Although the protective outfit is 
resistant to liquid" chemical agents, the liquid 
may penetrate the impermeable clothing; 
therefore, the liquid contaminant should be 
either neutralized or removed from the cloth- 
ing as quickly as possible. 

(2) This clothing may be worn for a 
limited time only. (See paragraph 4B1.05.) 

e. Shipment . Because of the limited 
number of outfits that may be required at any 
activity, each item will be packaged individ- 
ually and may be ordered individually. 

f. Reference Publications . 

Protective Cl 'jl bin g and Accessories , 
TM 3-304, Department of the Army, 
1957. 







Decontamination , TM 3-220, Depart- 
ment of the Army, 1953. 



Figure A-30. Impermeable Protective Cloth- 
ing Outfit, M3 



A-48 









A30. IMPREGNATING SET, CLOTHING, FIELD, M3, and IMPREGNATING OUTFIT, 
CLOTHING, FIELD, Ml 






a. Description . 



1. The M3 Set . The M3 field cloth- 
ing impregnating set contains a 16.5-pound 
container of impregnite (XXCC3), a 4.3-pound 
container of chlorinated paraffin (a binder), a 
1.7 -pound can of wetting compound, and a 1.0- 
pound can of dye mix. (See Figure 4-5.) 



2. The Ml Outfit . The Ml field im- 
pregnating outfit consists of 4 containers of 
chemicals, one mixing bag with staves, one 
paddle, one clothesline rope, and one instruc- 
tion card. The chemical containers are num- 
bered consecutively from 1 through 4 for 
identification purposes. 



b. Use. The M3 set and the Ml outfit 
are designed for field impregnation or reim- 
pregnation of permeable protective clothing. 
Ordinary issue clothing may be impregnated to 
increase resistance to blister agents. 



c. Application . The materials that are 
contained in the outfit or set are mixed in 
suitable containers in accordance with the 
instruction in, the box. A suitable site should 
be selected, either indoors or outdoors, but it 
must be large enough to dry 20 to 25 sets of 
clothing; and if the space is outdoors, it must 
be in the shade. Because constant mixing of 
the materials is necessary, three men are 
required. The clothing is soaked and kneaded 
in the solution until all parts are wetted, then 
they are wrung out lightly and hung up to dry. 



d. Effectiveness . The mix in the M3 set 
will make sufficient solution for impregnating 
20 to 2 5 sets of clothing, and it will be as 
effective as clothing that is treated in a fixed 
plant. The mix in the Ml outfit will make 
sufficient solution for impregnating approxi- 
mately 30 to 38 sets of clothing. 

e. Limitations . The limitations of the 
M3 set and the Ml outfit are as follows. 

(1) The mix may not be used in tem- 
peratures below 32° F. 

(2) Continual stirring of the solution 
is required. 

(3) Direct sunlight hastens decompo- 
sition of the impregnite. 

(4) The impregnite that is applied 
from the outfit or set washes out when the 
clothing is laundered. 

f. Shipment. Components of the M3 set 
are packed in a wooden box that weighs approx- 
imately 53 lb and occupies 1.7 cu ft. Compo- 
nents of the Ml outfit are packed in a wooden 
box that weighs approximately 72 lb and occu- 
pies 2.9 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publication . 

Impregnating Set, Clothing, Field, 
M3; Impregnating Outfit, Clothing , 
Field, Ml; Kit, Testing, Impregnite - 
in- Clothing, Ml , TM 3-303, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 






A-49 



A31. ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL, NF, 5-GAL 



r 



a. Description , NF isopropyl alcohol is 
ordinary rubbing alcohol, 

b. Use . Alcohol is used to decontaminate 
personnel who have been exposed to BW agents 
when showering facilities (soap and water) are 
not available, 

c - Application . Isopropyl alcohol is used 
for a complete rubdown of the body and for 
treatment of the hair. 



d. Ef f e ctivene s s . Alcohol is effective 
for most BW agents. 

e. Limitation. One limitation of alcohol 
is that it is not generally as effective as 
showers with soap and water. 

f. Shipment. Alcohol is shipped in a 5- 
gal can that weighs 39 lb and occupies 1,0 cu ft. 



( 



A-50 



(J 






A32. LEATHER DRESSING, VESICANT GAS -RESISTANT 



a. Description . The gas-resistant vesi- 
cant leather dressing is a mixture of animal 
oil (similar to neat's -foot oil), ester gum, 
paraffin wax, microcrystalline petroleum wax, 
Stoddard solvent, and aluminum stearate. 

b. Use . Gas -resistant vesicant leather 
dressing is used for the rapid treatment of 
leather shoes as a prevention against liquid 
vesicant agents. 

c. Application . This dressing is applied 
by hand-rubbing at temperatures above 20° F. 

d. Effectiveness . Gas -resistant vesicant 
leather dressing will resist liquid mustard for 
a period of approximately 2-1/2 hr. 



e. Limitation . One limitation of the 
leather dressing is that it is difficult to apply 
it in temperatures below 20° F. 



f. Shipment. The Ml leather dressing 
is shipped in 50 eight-oz cans in a wooden box 
that weighs 63 lb and occupies 3.4 cu ft. The 
M2 leather dressing is shipped in 96 four-oz 
cans in a wooden box that weighs 43 lb and 
occupies 1.1 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publication . 

Individual Protective and Detection 
Equipment, TM 3-290, Department 
of the Army. 






A-51 



A33. MASK, PROTECTIVE, FIELD 






a. Description. 

1. M9A1, Field Protective Mask. 
The M9A1 mask is one of the two masks that 
are supplied for use ashore. It consists of a 
facepiece with a canister attachedto either the 
right or left side. The mask is issued to per- 
sonnel complete with the carrier and antidim. 
This mask is available in large, medium, and 
small sizes with a choice of the left- or right- 
cheek-mounted canisters. Each mask is her- 
metically sealed in a metal container. (See 
Figure A-31.) 



Mask. 



Z. M3A1-10A1-6 Lightweight Service 
The LWS mask consists of a face- 



piece and a cylindrical canister that is con- 
nected to the facepiece by a hose. This mask 
also is issued to personnel complete with the 
carrier and antidim. This mask is available 
in the universal and small sizes. (See Figure 
A-32.) All LWS masks in supply systems are 
no longer considered satisfactory. Direc- 
tives are currently being issued to survey all 
existing LWS masks and associated acces- 
sories. M9A1 masks are being issued as 
available to meet requirements. The acces- 
sories being deleted include the M10A1 spare 
canister repair kit for LWS M3A1-10A1 mask 
and the waterproofing set, C3. 

b. Use . These two masks are used to 
protect the wearers by purifying the air that is 
suspected to be contaminated with ABC agents, 

c. Application. Protective masks must 
be donned when the possibility of an ABC attack 
is suspected. Masks must not be removed until 
tests have proved that there is no contamina- 
tion present. These masks provide efficient 




Figure A-31. Mask, Protective, Field, M9A1 



inhalation protection against hazards of all 
ABC warfare agents. 

d. Limitations . The M9A1 and the LWS 
masks have the following limitations. 

(1) Leakage. Because of the varia- 
tion in the size and shape of individual faces, 
some leakage may be expected around the 
edges of the facepiece of a mask. This leakage 
does not seriously affect the protection given 
against some CW agents, but it may critically 
affect the protection against BW agents. 
Therefore, an additional hood is required to 
protect personnel, such as decontamination 
crews, who are exposed for long periods of 
time. 

(2) Eyeglasses . Ordinary eyeglasses 
can not be used with the M9A1 and the M3A1 - 
10A1-6 masks. The Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery is planning to provide the individual 
who requires eyeglasses with special spec- 
tacles that will snap on the interior of the 
mask eye lens. 

(3) Oxygen Supply. Mask canisters 
only purify air; they do not manufacture oxygen. 
Therefore, when air is deficient in oxygen, no 
canister is effective in supplying air that is 
suitable for breathing. 

(4) Ineffective Under Certain Condi- 
tions . Military canisters are not for fire- 
fighting use, neither do they protect against 
carbon monoxide gases. They are designed for 
concentrations that are not greater than one 
percent by volume, and they do not provide 




Figure A-32. Mask, Protective, LWS, 
M3A1-10A1-6 






A-52 









extended protection against the high concen- 
trations of war gases that may result from 
spillage or explosion in enclosed places. 

(5) Life Expectancy of Canisters . 
The effective life of any individual canister 
varies with the type and concentration of the 
agent in the air, the number of minutes of 
exposure to the concentration, and the rate of 
breathing of the wearer. The military canister 
rarely breaks down suddenly. Usually it fails 
gradually and the wearer is warned of the need 
for replacement by minor sensory effects, 
such as a slight but persistent odor of gas, 
persistent lacrimation, or failing sight. How- 
ever, when canisters are exposed to heavy 
concentrations of CW agents from 15 to 50 
minutes, they should be replaced after each 
exposure. 

e. Shipment. The two types of masks 
are shipped in the following manner. 

(1) One M9A1 protective mask is 
packed in a sealed metal container, and six 
containers are packaged in a wooden box that 
weighs 55 lb and occupies 3.3 cu ft. 

(2) Six LWS masks (M3A1-10A1 -6) 
are packed in a wooden box that weighs 56 lb 
and occupies 3.3 cu ft. 

f. Distribution By Size . The normal 
distribution of protective masks by size is 
shown in table: 



M9A1 Field Protective 


Mask 


Mask 
size 


Canister 
mounting 


Normal 
Issue 

(%) 


Large 

Large 

Medium 

Medium 

Small 

Small 


Left 
Right 

Left 
Right 
Left 
Right 


5 
1 

63 
5 

24 
2 



M3A1-10A1-6 LWS Mask 


Mask 
size 


Canister 
mounting 


No rmal 

Issue 

(%) 


Small 
Universal 




5 
95 



g. Reference Publications . 

Protective Masks and Accessories , 
TM 3-205, Department of the Army. 

Mask, Protective, Field, M9, and 
Mask, Protective, Field, M9A1 , TM 
3-522-15, Department of the Army, 

h. Mask, Protective, Field, New M17 . 

(1) The Ml 7 mask has been developed 
as a replacement for the M9A1. It was devel- 
oped to provide a very high order of respira- 
tory protection against all CW agents and to 
obtain better speech transmission, vision, 
compactness, wearability, and comfort. 

(2) The final engineering tests show 
that this mask meets the design criteria in 
most respects. It has greater wearer accept- 
ance because it is more comfortable and has 
reduced inhalation breathing resistance. Bet- 
ter vision is obtained in the field and it has 
considerable gain in speech intelligibility over 
the M9A1, It also fits better, is easier to put 
on, and is less susceptible to damage than is 
the M9A1 mask. 

(3) The M17 mask provides adequate 
protection against simulated V-aerosols and 
GB agents. Improvements are being made to 
obtain better protection against some of the 
other agents. One disadvantage appears to be 
that it requires from 3 to 5 minutes for a 
trained man to change the filter elements. 

(4) It is anticipated that this M17 
mask will be standardized in the near future. 






A-53 



A34. PERMEABLE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING 



a. Description . The permeable protec- 
tive clothing outfit (Figure A-33) consists of 
an undershirt, drawers, socks, cotton gloves, 
cotton trousers, and a special jumper. These 
articles must be impregnated with a chemical 
to neutralize CW vapors and fine sprays to 
prevent the contaminant from reaching the 
skin. These outfits are available in three 
sizes — large, medium, and small. 

b. Use . This protective outfit is pri- 
marily for use by teams of the disaster control 
organization when they are working in, areas 
that are contaminated with blister agents. 

c. Effectiveness . This outfit is effective 
against vapors and fine sprays of blister agents 
and all BW agents. Additional protection may 
be provided by the use of standard knee-length 
rubber boots and by the use of rubber gloves 
over the cotton gloves that are provided. 

d. Limitations . The protective clothing 
outfit has the following limitations. 

(1) It is not effective against liquids 
and droplets of blister agents; neither is it 
a protection against nerve gas or gamma 
radiation. 

(2) It is uncomfortable after pro- 
longed wearing. 

(3) The impregnating treatment tends 
to deteriorate in storage and after prolonged 
exposure to bright sunlight. 

e. Shipment . Ten complete outfits are 
packaged in a fiberboard container. Individual 
items are available and are listed in the stand- 
ard stock catalog as follows. 



defense. 



(1) Parka, men's, chemical warfare 



{2) Trousers, men's, chemical war- 
fare defense. 



defense. 



(3) Socks, men's, chemical warfare 



f. Reference Publication. 

Protective Clothing and Accessories , 
TM 3-304, Department of the Army. 




( 



Figure A-33. Permeable Protective Clothing 



A- 54 



o 



A35. PROTECTION AND TREATMENT SET, CHEMICAL AGENTS, M5A1 






a. Description . The M5A1 kit (Figure 
A- 34) consists of a 'waterproof metal con- 
tainer, 3 tubes of M5 protective ointment, 1 
tube of BAL eye ointment, and 1 atropine tar- 
trate injection. The container is about 4 in. 
by 3-1/2 in. by 1 in. It is waterproofed, and 
the lid is held tightly in place by a metal clip. 
Directions for the use of the kit are litho- 
graphed on the container. 

b. Use . This set is provided to furnish 
the necessary material for first-aid and self- 
aid treatment that might be required after a 
CW attack. 

c. Application . The atropine injection is 
provided to treat persons who are suffering 
from the effects of G-agents. The BAL oint- 
ment is provided to counteract the effect of 
Lewisite in the eyes. The M5 protective oint- 
ment provides treatment or emergency decon- 
tamination of skin areas that are exposed to 
blister agents. This ointment may be applied 
either before or after exposure. 



d. Limitation . One limitation of the 
M5A1 set is that extreme care must be exer- 
cised in the use of the atropine injection. 

e. Shipment . Seventy M5A1 units are 
packed in a wooden box that ■weighs 50 lb and 
occupies 1.4 cu ft. 



f. Reference Publication. 



Treatment of Chemical Warfa re Cas- 
ualties, NAVMED P-5041, Depart- 
ment of the Navy. 





Figure A- 34. Protection and Treatment Set, 
Chemical Agents, M5A1 



549252 O-60-17 



A-55 



A36. REPAIR KIT, FIELD, M19, FOR M9A1 PROTECTIVE MASK 






a. Description . The MI 9 repair kit 
(Figure A-35) supports the M9A1 protective 
mask. It contains replacement lenses, head 
harness straps and snaps, replacement outlet 
valves, tools, rubber cement, and other mis- 
cellaneous material. The LWS gas mask 
repair kit supports the M3A1-10A1-6 Light- 
weight Service Mask to the same extent as the 
Ml 9 kit supports the M9A1 protective mask. 

b. Use . The two repair kits are used to 
maintain and repair masks that are damaged 
either during storage or while in use. 

c. Effectiveness . These repair kits are 
designed to furnish the materials and parts 
that are necessary to maintain 1 ,000 masks for 
a period of one year. 

d. Limitations . The repair kits have the 
following limitations. 

(1) The parts and equipment that are 
furnished in these kits are limited to use in 
making minor repairs only. 

(Z) The masks that require major 
repairs must be repaired at a mask repair 
facility. 

e. Shipment. The two types of repair 
kits are shipped in the following manner. 

(1) The Ml 9 kit is packaged in a 
fiberboard box that weighs about 41 lb and 
occupies 1.3 cu ft. 

(2) The LWS kit is packaged in a 
wooden box that weighs about 60 lb and occu- 
pies 2.6 cu ft. 

f. Reference Publication . 

Protective Masks and Accessories , 
TM 3-205, Department of the Army. 







Figure A-35. Repair Kit, Field, Ml 9, for M9A1 
Protective Mask 



A- 56 









A3?. SOAP, SURGICAL, 4-OUNCE, 
WITH HEXACHLOROPHENE 



A38. WATER-PURIFICATION 
TABLET, IODINE 



a. Description, The surgical soap with 
hexachlorophene is similar to commercial 
surgical soap. 

b. Use . Surgical soap is used for the 
decontamination of personnel who have been 
exposed to BW agents. 

c. Application . Soap should be used and 
rinsed off with warm water. The process 
should be repeated several times. 

d. Effectiveness. The effectiveness of 
the soap depends on the thoroughness of the 
showering. 

e. Limitation . One limitation in the use 
of surgical soap is that warm water showers 
are required. 

f. Shipment . Twenty-four cartons, each 
containing 12 bars of soap, are packed in a 
wooden box that weighs 1Z5 lb and occupies 9.0 
cu ft. 






a. Description . The iodine water tablet 
is solid in form and is packed with 50 tablets 
in a bottle. 

b. Use . Water-purification tablets are 
used to decontaminate water in extremely 
small containers, such as canteens, that are 
suspected of being contaminated by BW agents. 

c. Application. Water should be boiled 

for 10 minutes, if possible, and decontaminated 
with 3 tablets of iodine to a quart of water. The 
directions on the bottle that specify one tablet 
to a quart of water are not applicable. 

d. Effectiveness . Iodine tablets will 
make water potable against BW agents after 
the water is boiled for 10 minutes or longer. 

e. Limitations . The water-purification 
tablets have the following' limitations. 

(1) A cut-and-try procedure is nec- 
essary to effect decontamination. 

(2) A waiting period of approximately 
an hour may be necessary before the water is 
ready for consumption, depending upon the 
degree of contamination. 

f. Shipment . Four hundred bottles, each 
containing 50 iodine tablets, are packed in a 
carton that weighs 41 lb and occupies 1 cu ft. 






A-57 



A39. WATERPROOFING SET, C3, FOR LWS MASK, M3A1-10A1-6 






a. Description . The C3 waterproofing 
set (Figure A-36) consists of a metal clamp 
for the hose, a rubber cap for the canister inlet 
valve, and an instruction card. These items 
are tied to the canister nozzle by a cord and 
are issued as required. 

b. Use , The waterproofing set is pro- 
vided to keep the canister dry and also to seal 
the M10A1 canister when the LWS masks are 
being decontaminated with the ETO Freon 
dispenser. 



c. Application. The instructions on the 
card should be followed to waterproof or seal 
the canister. The hose clamp must not be left 
on the hose except 'when it is needed for water- 
proofing or decontaminating. To dry the mask, 
the hose clamp and rubber cap should be left 
in position and the mask should be hung up to 
allow water to drain out of the hose and face- 
piece until the mask is dry. If the mask must 
be donned when it is wet, all water should be 
shaken from the mask and carrier and/ or 
the facepiece should be wiped dry before the 
waterproofing equipment is removed. 

d. Effectiveness. The waterproofing set 
prevents water from enteringthe canister even 
during an amphibious operation. It also seals 
the mask canister when it is being decontami- 
nated with the ETO Freon dispenser in a gas- 
proof bag. 



e. Limitation. One limitation of the 
waterproofing set is that the rubber cap must 
be pressed firmly over the canister rim to 
prevent dis lodgment. 

f. Shipment . Two hundred waterproofing 
sets are packaged in a wooden box that weighs 
about 75 lb and occupies 2.6 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publication - 
Protective Masks and Accessories , 

TM 3-205, 1955, including Changes 
1 through 4, Department of the 
Army. 







Figure A-36. Waterproofing Set, C3, for LWS 

Mask 



A-58 









GROUP PROTECTION 



Items 68 - 78 

Paragraphs A40 - A49 



A-59 






( 



L 



A40. AIR LOCK, PORTABLE 



a. Description . The portable air lock 
(Figure A-37)is a chamber thatis constructed 
in the field in accordance with Yards and Docks 
drawings Nos. 575,412; 575,413, 566,814; 
566,815, and 566,816. It is about 12 ft by 4 ft 
by 8 ft, has three 4-ft compartments, and has 
al-I/2-ft accordion canvas appendage that can 
be attached securely (airtight) to the building. 
It is constructed of wood and canvas. It has 
two air regulators and two clothes chutes be- 
tween the inner and outer compartments, as 
well as an antibackdraft valve that is installed 
in the outer compartment. 

b. Use . The air lock is used primarily 
to prevent excessive loss of inside pressure 
when personnel enter or leave a pressurized 
area. It is also used as an area in which per- 
sonnel can discard contaminated clothing and 
undress before showering. 

c. Application . The portable air lock is 
placed into position and the edges are sealed 
against the existing building with canvas when 
a shelter becomes operational. 

d. Eff ectivene s s ■ Because the air lock 

is at a lower positive pressure than the inner 
rooms are, it will effectively cause the con- 
taminated air to be blown out into the atmos- 
phere. However, it must be considered as a 
contaminated area, and personnel are required 
to keep their protective masks on in the outer 
air lock. 



e. Limitation. One limitation of the port- 
able air lock is that it can be installed in place 
only where protected areas are pressurized. 

f. Reference Publication, 



Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction, NAVDOCKS TP- PL- 8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 




Figure A-37. Air Lock, Portable 






A-61 



A41. CLOSURE, PROTECTIVE SHELTER, ANTIBLAST, Ml 






a. Description 
ure (Figure A-38) is 



The Ml antiblast clos- 
a pressure-actuated 
device for shutting off blast pressures from 
protective shelters and filter units. 

b. Use . The Ml closure is used to pro- 
tect personnel, equipment, and filter units 
from extreme or sudden pressures into the 
intake or the exhaust outlets of a pressurized 
structure as a result of blasts. 



c. Application . The Ml antiblast closure 
is designed for installation in the air intake or 
exhaust outlets of abuilding that requires blast 
protection. Suitable piping extends from the 
inlet to the atmosphere outside the shelter. 
When sudden and extreme pressures develop 
outside the shelter, the disc is forced against 
the perforated portion of the body, thereby 
shutting off the blast pressure into the shelter. 

d. Eff ectivenes s . The Ml closure is 
capable of providing protection against blast 
pressures of at least 20 psi. The closure, 




which is activated by the blast, will close rap- 
idly enough to prevent damaging blast pres- 
sures from entering the structure. 

e. Limitations . The Ml closure has the 
following limitations. 

(1) The closure is designed for use 
with an M6 300 -cfm filter unit. 

(2) Two such units must be connected 
in parallel to provide 600 cfm of air for the M9 
filter unit. 

f . Shipment . The Ml unit is packaged in 
a wooden crate that weighs about 3 30 lb and 
occupies 5,6 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publication. 

Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 

NOTE: Other sizes of blast closure devices 
are being developed. When they are 
available, notice will be given by ap- 
propriate changes to this publication. 







Figure A-38. Closure, Protective Shelter, Antiblast, Ml 



A-62 









A42. FILTER, GAS, 150-CFM, M10, FOR M6 FILTER UNIT 






a. Description . The Ml air filter panel 
(Figure A-39) consists of an aluminum frame 
that contains charcoal filtering media. These 
units are for replacement in the filters in the 
300-cfm filter unit. Two M10 filters are re- 
quired for each M6 unit. The size of the M10 
filter is 24 in. by 24 in. by 2-11/16 in. 

b. Use . The M10 gas filter is used to 
replace filters in the M6 filter unit. 

c. Application . TheMlO filter is a com- 
ponent of the M& filter unit canister. 

d. Effectiveness . The M10 gas filter 
will filter out all known toxic war gases. 

e. Limitation . One limitation of the 
M10 filter is that it must be used with an M9 
parti culate-type filter. 

f. Shipment . Five of these filters are 
shipped in a wooden box that weighs about 265 
lb and occupies 1 7 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Filter Unit, Gas -Particulate, GED 
and EMD, ABC-M6 .TM 3-420, De- 
partment of the Army. 

Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL- 
8, (Revised), Department of the 
Navy. 




Figure A-39. Filter, Gas, 150-cfm, M10, fori 
M6 Filter Unit 






A-63 



A43. FILTER, GAS-PARTICULATE, 600-CFM, M14, FOR M9 FILTER UNIT 






a. Description . The gas -particulate fil- 
ter (Figure A-40) consists of a plywood frame 
that contains 10 charcoal filters and 1 partic- 
ulate filter. The complete replacement unit is 
designated the M14 filter. The filter is 34-3/8 
in. long, 25-1/2 in. high, and 25-1/2 in. wide. 

b. Use. The M14 filter is used to re- 
move chemical, biological, and radiological 
agents from an air flow of 600 cfm. 

c. Application . The M14 filter is a com- 
ponent of the M9 filter unit and is provided as 
a replacement. 

d. Effectiveness , The combined gas and 
particulate filter will remove all known ABC 
agents. 

e. Limitations . The M14 filters have 
the following limitations, which should be 
understood. 

{1) Thefilter will not protect against 
carbon monoxide gas. 

(2) The particulate filter is sensitive 
to punctures from blast pressure and must be 
protected. 

f. Shipment . The Ml 4 filter weighs 325 
lb and occupies 12 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Instruction Manual, EP-3, Protective 
Collector (Filter Unit), GED, 600- 
cfm, E-28, (M9), Department of the 
Army, 1957. 



Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 

Operation and Organizational Mainte- 
nance, Filter Unit, Gas -Particulate, 
EMD, 600-cfm, M9, TM 3-4240- 
208-12, Department of the Army, 
1959- 







Figure A-40. Filter, Gas -Particulate, 600- 
cfm, Ml 4, for M9 Filter Unit 






A-64 






A44. FILTER, PARTICULATE, 150-CFM, M9, FOR M6 FILTER UNIT 



a. Description. The M9 filter panel 
(Figure A-4I) consists of an aluminum frame 
that contains special material with interstices 
that are fine enough to stop the extremely 
small liquid and solid particles that are in the 
form of aerosols. Two M9 filters are required 
for each M6 unit. The size of the filter is 24 
in. by 24 in. by 3-1/16 in. 



Filter Unit, Gas- Particulate, GED and 
EMD , TM 3-420, Department of the 
Army. 

Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL- 
8, (Revised), Department of the 
Navy. 



b. Use . The M9 particulate filter is 
used to remove toxic liquid and solid particles 
from the air at the rate of 150 cfm. It is 
always used with a gas filter that filters gas 
from particle-free air. 

c. Application . This filter is a compo- 
nent of the M6 filter unit canister , and it serves 
as a replacement when filters in the unit are 
expended. 

d. Effectiveness . The M9 filter will stop 
liquid and solid particles and the gas filters 
are designed to stop gases by adsorption. 

e. Limitation . The M9 particulate filter 
has the following limitations. 

(1) It must be used with a gas-type 
M10 filter. 



(2) It is subject to damage from 
nuclear blast pressures when the shelter is 
not protected with a blast closure device. 

f. Shipment . Ten M9 particulate filters 
are shipped in a wooden box that weighs about 
215 lb and occupies 17 cu ft. 




g. Reference Publications . 



Figure A-41. 
M9 



Filter, Particulate, 150-cfm, 
, for M6 Filter Unit 






A-65 



A45. FILTER UNIT, GAS-PAR TICULATE, GED, 300-CFM, ABC, M6 






a. Description . The M6 filter unit 
(Figure A-42)is used to remove ABC contam- 
inants from the air. The unit has a capacity 
of 300 cfm of filtered air against a minimum 
static head of 2 in. of water with a blower speed 
of 3,450 rpm. The filtering medium consists 
of charcoal and particulate paper that is con- 
tained in an aluminum canister. The unit is 
equipped with a centrifugal-type blower that is 
driven by a gasoline engine that is 1-1/2 hp, 
4-cycle, air-cooled, and mounted on the can- 
ister. The overall dimensions are approxi- 
mately 34 in. by 24 in. by 3 9 in. The unit is 
furnished with one inlet and one outlet wire- 
reinforced canvas hose, which has a S-in. 
inside dimension and is 10 ft long with mani- 
fold. A muffler, exhaust tubing, and all fittings 
and J-bolts for installation are also provided. 



It is a light, compact, 400-lb unit that can be 
disassembled into 8 sections for one-man 
loads. It requires 5.8 sq ft of floor space. 

b. Use . The M6 filter unit is used to 
remove ABC contaminants from air that is 
supplied to the pressurized areas so that per- 
sonnel can work without donning gas masks. 

c. Application . The M6 unit is designed 
for installation inside or outside a shelter or 
other building that requires protection. The 
choice of location depends on such factors as 
the noise of the motor, floor space, prevailing 
weather, and the convenience of personnel. 
When the unit is installed inside, contaminated 
air is drawnthrough the canister first and then 
pushed through the blower. When the unit is 



1. FITTED WOOOEH PIECES 

2. SHIPPING BLOCK 

3. J. BOLTS 

4. CARTONS (Acc*«*oci»» and tools) 







Figure A-42. Filter Unit, Gas-Particulate, GED, 300-cfm, ABC, M6 



A-66 









installed outside, the air is pushed through the 
canister by the blower. 

d. Effectiveness . The M6 filter unit will 
filter out all known ABC contaminants. 

c. Limitations. The M6 filter unit has 
the following limitations. 

(1) This unit is portable and designed 
for only small shelters. 

(2) It must beplaced in separate and 
airtight rooms where the unit maybe protected 
from blast pressures. 

(3) The air inlet and exhaust must be 
protected by blast closure devices. 



f. Shipment. The M6 filter unit is 
shipped in a wooden box that weighs 7 00 lb and 
occupies 37.1 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications. 

Filter Unit , Gas -Particulate, GED and 
EMD, ABC-M6 , TM 3-4Z0, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 

Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 

Improvised CBR Protective Shelters , 
TM 3-350, Department of the Army. 






A-67 



A46. FILTER UNIT, GAS -PARTICULATE, GED, 600 -CFM, M9 






a. Description . The M9 gas -particulate 
filter unit (Figure A-43) is used to remove 
ABC contaminants from air that is supplied 
to buildings. It has a capacity of 600 cfrn of 
filtered air against a static head of 2-1/2 in. 
of water with a fan speed of 3,450 rpm. The 
filtering media consist of charcoal filters and 
a particulate filter that is contained in a ply- 
wood housing. The two types together are 
known as M14 filter gas and particulate. The 
unit is equipped with a centrifugal-type blower 
that is driven bya 1-1/2 hpair-cooled gasoline 
engine. The unit is mounted on a wood skid. 
The approximate overall dimensions of the 
filter unit are: length, 81 in., width 30 in., and 
height, 40 in. It is furnished with one 10-ft 
section of flexible tubing that is 10 in. in 
diameter. 



b. Use . This filter unit is used to re- 
move ABC contaminants from air that is sup- 
plied to buildings, such as command centers, 
personnel shelters, and medical stations, so 
that personnel can work without donning gas 
masks. 



c. Application . This unit is designed for 
installation either inside or outside a shelter 
or building that requires protection. Contam- 
inated air is drawn in the screened blower 
inlet and forced through the particulate and gas 
filters. 



d. Effectiveness . This gas-particulate 
unit will filter out all known ABC contaminants. 

e. Limitations . This filter unit is de- 
signed for the protection of only 60 to 120 
reasonably active persons in shelters, com- 
mand centers, and similar areas. 

f. Shipment . This filter unit is shipped 
in a wooden box that weighs 1,200 lb and occu- 
pies 60 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 

Instruction Manual EP-3, Protector 
Collective (Filter Unit) GED, 600- 
cfrn, E-28 (M-9), Department of the 
Army, 1957. 

Operation and Organizational Mainte- 
nance, Filter Unit, Gas -Particulate , 
EMD, 600-cfm , M9, TM 3-4240- 
208-12, Department of the Army, 
1959. 

NOTE: Other sizes with capacities of 1,200, 
2,500, and 5,000 cfm are described in 
Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 







1. 
2. 
3. 
k. 
5- 



Air outlet tube 
Outlet transition 
Filter unit 
Seln shield 
Inlet transition 



6. 
7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 



Sloeer o«»e«oly 
Gasoline engine 
Shock count 
Skid esaeeblj 
Tubing holder 



Figure A-43. Filter Unit, Gas -Particulate, GED, 600-cfm, M9 



A-68 









A47. MANOMETER 



a. Description. The manometer (Figure 
A-44) consists of a glass U-tube about 1-2 in. 
high, half filled with a red oil indicating liquid, 
mounted on a metal backing, with a graduated 
scale to readair pressure in"inches of water." 

b. Use. The manometer* is used to indi- 
cate the air pressure inside a pressurized 
shelter, 

c. Application . The manometer is in- 
stalled on an inside wall with one end of the 
U-tube opened to the air inside the shelter and 
the other end connected to a rubber or copper 
tube that leads through the wall and opens to 
the outside air. The outside end of the tube 
should be so located and protected as to pre- 
vent erratic readings that might be caused by 
wind. 

d. Effectiveness . The manometer re- 
cords, in inches of water, the difference in air 
pressure between the inside and the outside of 
a shelter. 

e. Limitations. The manometer has the 
following limitations. 

(1) It must be accurately plumbed. 

(Z) At frequent intervals, zero ad- 
justments are necessary either by moving the 
scale or by adding colored oil. 

f. Shipment. One manometer is shipped 
in a fiberboard carton that weighs 2 lb and 
occupies about 0.20 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Improvised CBR Protective Shelters , 
TM 3-350, Department of the Army. 

Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construe tion. NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 




Figure A-44. Manometer 






A-69 



A48. REGULATOR, AIR PRESSURE, Ml 






a. Description . The Ml air pressure 
regulator (Figure A-45) consists of a 13- by 
23 -inch steel frame and a sliding panel that 
permits the changing of the size of the 9- by 
9-inch opening. The regulator frame is bolted 
to an opening in the wall between the sections 
of the shelter and is cushioned with a pressed 
felt base to provide an airtight seal. 

b. Use. The Ml regulator regulates the 
flow of air between the air locks of aprotective 
shelter or between rooms inside a pressurized 
area where one of the rooms has an antiback- 
draft valve installed. 

c. Application . The regulator is installed 
in partitions as necessary. 

d. Effectiveness . The regulator is ad- 
justed manually and is effective in regulating 
the air flow. 

e. Limitation. One limitation of the Ml 
regulator is that it does not compensate for 
variations within pressurized shelters. 

f. Shipment. Two regulators are shipped 
in a woodenbox that weighs 50 lb and occupies 
2 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 



Accessory Equipment for Protective 
Shelters , TM 3-4240-203, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 

Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 

Improvised CBR Protective Shelters , 
TM 3-350, Departmentof the Army. 





Figure A-45. Regulator, Air Pressure, Ml 






A-70 






A49. VALVE, ANTIBACKDRAFT, Ml 



a. Description . The Ml antibackdraft 
valve (Figure A-46) consists of a duct that is 
20" to the vertical. A stud that extends back 
into the opening is provided with a counter- 
balancing weight that maybe manually adjusted 
to various positions, thereby varying the 
amount of force that is required to swing open 
the cover and relieve the pressure. 

b. Use . This valve is installed in the 
walls of operation areas to regulate the pres- 
sure between the atmosphere and the operation 
area and to prevent the entrance of outside 
contaminated air when inside positive pressure 
drops to ambient pressure or when outside 
pressure suddenly increases because of winds. 



f. Shipment . The valve is shipped in a 
cardboard carton that weighs about 30 lb and 
occupies about 1.5 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Accessory Equipment for Protective 
Shelters , TM 3-4240-203, Depart- 
ment of the Array. 

Improvised CBR Protective Shelters , 
TM 3-350, Department of the Army. 

Personnel Shelters and Protective 
Construction , NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
(Revised), Department of the Navy. 






c. Application . The antibackdraft valve 
is designed to perform thoee functions. 

(1) It maintains a predetermined 
static pressure of nearly constant value within 
a pressurized shelter. 

(2) It also prevents a reverse flow of 
air from the atmosphere into the shelter if an 
increase in outside pressure were to develop. 

(3) The valve provides a means of 
determining the rate at which air is exhausted 
from the shelter to the atmosphere. During 
the pressurization of the shelter by the exhaus- 
ting of air through the valve, the valve is 
adjusted to obtain the desired static pressure 
(pressure change across the valve). The valve 
cover closes automatically when the pressur- 
izing system is turned off. 

d. Effectiveness . The Ml valve operates 
effectively against normal winds. 

e. Limitation . One limitation of the Ml 
valve is that it requires protection so that it 
will not be damaged or blown away by the blast 
of a bomb. 




Figure A-46. Valve, Antibackdraft, Ml 






549252O-60- IB 



A-71 



DECONTAMINATING MATERIAL 



Items 79 - 91 



Paragraphs A50 - A60 






A-73 






ABO. CITRIC ACID, COMMERCIAL GRADE, 50-LB CONTAINER 



a. Description . The commercial grade 
citric acid is a triacid, C3H4OH (C02H)3- 

b. Use. Citric acid is used with water 
to increase the efficiency of radiological de- 
contamination of selected portions of struc- 
tures and equipment. 

c. Application . A Z-percent solution {by 
weight) of citric acid with water is used to 
scrub the selected portions of structures and 
equipment to reduce radiological contami- 
nation. 



d. Effectiveness . Citric acid increases 
the efficiency of decontamination of the sur- 
faces that have a light film of oil or grease. 



e. Limitation . One limitation of the use 
of citric acid is that it is not logistically feasi- 
ble to use the acid in solution for large-scale 
decontamination procedures because of the 
large quantities that are required. 

f. Shipment . The acid is shipped in a 
fiberboard container that weighs 65 lb (net 
weight 50 lb) and occupies 1.4 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Radiological Recovery of Fixed Mili - 
tary Installations, NAVDOCKS TP - 
PL- 13, Department of the Navy. 

Decontamination , TM 3-220, Depart- 
ment of the Army, 1953. 






A-75 



A51. CITRIC ACID, MONOHYDRATE, TECHNICAL (ANTISET Ml) 6-1/2-LB CONTAINER 






a. Description. The Ml antiset contains 
not less than 99 percent, by weight, of mono- 
hydrate citric acid (C^HgO^H20). 

b. Use . Citric acid is used to facilitate 
the flow and to prevent the drying or "setting" 
of the slurry when it is used as a decontami- 
iiant for CW agents. 

c. Application . The citric acid and water 
are mixed together before the bleach is added 
to the solution. The proportions are 1/2 lb of 
citric acid to 100 lbof bleach to approximately 
17 gal of water. When the solution is mixed in 
the 400 -gal decontaminating apparatus, 6-1/2 
lb of citric acid and 225 gal of water are mixed 
and then 1,300 lb of bleach are added and 
mixed, 

d. Limitation . One limitation is that the 
water that contains citric acid must be agitated 
for about two minutes to dissolve the solid. 

e. Shipping . Citric acid is shipped in a 
fiberboard container that weighs 7.2 lb and 
occupies 0.2 cu ft. 

f. Reference Publications. 



Decontamination, TM 3-220, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 

Decontaminating Apparatus, Power- 
Driven, Truck-Mounted, M3A2 , TM 
3-223, Department of the Army. 

Decontaminating Apparatus, Power - 
Driven, Skid-Mounted, M6, TM 3- 
406, Department of the Army. 

g. Antiset, Decontaminating Slurry, M2 . 
A new antiset, M2, is intended for use in place 
of the Ml antiset. The M2 material is com- 
pounded from equal weights of citric acid and 
sodium tripolyphosphate. This antisetis pack- 
aged in a fiberboard drum that contains 13 lb 
of material. The contents of one drum are 
approximately enough to provide the required 
1 percent additive for one batch of bleach 
slurry (400 -gal tank). Both the old and the new 
antiset appear to provide equal antiset capa- 
bility, but the M2 appears to improve the 
dispersion properties of the bleach in water 
andalsoto provide a more uniform suspension. 
Both antisets cost about the same, but because 
of the advantages of the M2 antiset, it will be 
procured in the future. 






A-76 



( 



A52. DANC SOLUTION UNIT, 3-GAL, M4 



a. Description . The M4 DANC solution 
unit is a mixture of a powder (RH-195) and a 
solvent (acetylene tetrachloride). 

b. Use. DANC solution is used to de- 
contaminate weapons, instruments, vehicles, 
equipment, and metal surfaces that have been 
contaminated by vesicant CW agents, 

c. Application , The dual container holds 
the correct proportions of the RH-195 and 
the acetylene tetrachloride. The solution is 
made by pouring the contents of the upper 
compartment into the contents of the lower 
compartment, stirring the mixture thoroughly, 
and straining the solution into a 3 -gal portable 
decontaminating apparatus. The DANC solu- 
tion can be applied with a broom or with swabs. 
When smaller quantities are desired, the pro- 
portions by volume are 1 part of RH-195 to 
6 parts of the solvent, and the proportions by 
weight are 1 part of RH-195 to 15 parts of 
the solvent. 

d. Effectiveness . DANC destroys most 
blister gases within one -half an hour. 

e. Limitations . The DANC solution unit 
has the following limitations. 



(1) DANC solution is unstable after 
it is mixed; therefore the solution should not 
be made until it is actually needed. 



(3) The residue is corrosive if it is 
left in prolonged contact with metal surfaces. 



plastic. 



(4) DANC tends to soften rubber and 



(5) DANC is very toxic. 



agents. 



(2) It is not effective against G- 



(6) Personnel must wear protective 
clothing and masks when they are using DANC. 

f. Shipment . The DANC solution unit is 
shipped in a 3 -gal dual- compartment container 
that weighs about 59 lb and occupies 1.2 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Decontamination, TM 3-220, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 

Military Chemistry and Chemical 
Agents, TM 3-215, Department of 
the Army, 

NOTE: There is presently in the supply sys- 
tem some bulk RH-195 and tetra- 
chloroethene that may be used to 
prepare DANC solution. The bulk 
material is to be mixed in the propor- 
tions by volume of 1 part of RH-195 
to 6 parts of tetrachloroethene, and 
by weight of 1 part of RH-195 to 15 
parts of tetrachloroethene. When 37 
lb 6 oz of tetrachloroethane are mixed 
with 2 lb and 8 oz of RH-195, the volume 
is equivalent to a 3-gal DANC solution 
unit. 






A-77 



A52.1 DEVELOPMENT OF UNIVERSAL CW DECONTAMINANT 



a. Description . DS2 is a new CW-decon- 
taminant that is currently undergoing field 
tests. If the results are successful, and pre- 
liminary reports are quite promising that they 
will be, the newdecontaminant should be stand- 
ardized in about a year. DS2 has the following 
composition by weight: 



common metals, such as steel, brass, and 
magnesium. 

(2) The data relative to the corrosive 
effects on aluminum and its alloys are ques- 
tionable, and this problem is currently being 
investigated. 



Diethylenetriamine 70% 

Methyl Cellosolve 28% 

Sodium Hydrozide 2% 

b. Use . The DS2 solution will decon- 
taminate mustards, G-agents, and V -agents to 
-25° C in concentrations to meet military re- 
quirements. It is expected to replace DANC. 

c. Application . DS2 will be used in 
limited amounts in the same manner as DANC 
is currently being used. 

d. Characteristics . DS2 has the follow- 
ing characteristics. 

(1) Test data indicate that, for all 
practical purposes, DS2 is noncorrosive to the 



(3) DS2 seems to have very little 
effect on the following materials: sateen, 
natural rubber, GRS rubber, neoprene rubber, 
butyl rubber, plexiglas, and bakelite. 

(4) Wool is affected quite readily. 

(5) The flash point of DS2 is such 
that it should not present any fire or explosion 
hazard under field conditions. 

(6) DS2 will effectively decontami- 
nate painted surfaces, but it will probably 
affect the paint. 

(7) It is stable under all climatic 
conditions when it is stored in cheap steel 
containers. 






A-78 









A53. DECONTAMINATING AGENT, STB 






a. Description, The STB (supertropical) 
decontaminating agent, bleach, is referred 
to as bleaching powder, bleaching material, 
chlorinated lime, or chloride of lime. It is a 
white powder that contains about 30 percent 
available chlorine. 

b. Use . Bleach is used either as a dry 
mix or as a wet mix to decontaminate exterior 
surfaces and ground that is contaminated by 
CW or BW agents. 

c. Application , 

1. Dry Mix . The dry mix is pre- 
pared with 2 parts of bleach to 3 parts of earth, 
by volume. As a dry mix, it may be used in 
a shuffle box to decontaminate the shoes of 
personnel before they enter clean areas and 
shelters, 

2. Wet Mix . 

(a) Slurry . As a slurry, the wet 
mix is used on vertical surfaces for both BW 
and CW decontamination. The slurry consists 
of 225 gal of water, 6-1/2 lb of citric acid 
(antiset Ml), and 1,300 lb of bleach, which 
makes one 400-gal batch of slurry to cover 
1,300 sq yd with the average coverage for 
smooth surfaces. The antiset must be mixed 
with the water before the bleach is added. 

(b) Clear Solution . As a clear 
solution, the wet mix is used on horizontal 
surfaces for BW decontamination only. For 
CW decontamination on horizontal surfaces, 
the slurry mix should be used. The solution 
consists of 7 parts of bleach to 93 parts of 
water by weight. It is applied with either the 
Ml 3-gal orthe400-gal decontaminating appa- 
ratus. The average coverage is 1/8 gal per sq 
yd for concrete surfaces and 1/2 gal per sq yd 
for compacted earth. Other surfaces, such as 
grass, require proportionally more, up to 1 gal 
per sq yd. 

d. Effectiveness . Bleach destroys mus- 
tard gases, lewisite, and, to a limited extent, 
nerve gas by converting them into harmless 
or less toxic compounds. It also destroys BW 
agents. As long as bleach retains its chlorine 



content, it serves to seal in the vapors or 
neutralize them as they rise to the surface of 
the ground. 

e. Limitations . The STB bleach has the 
following limitations. 

(1) Bleach is corrosive to metal and 
fabrics. 

(2) Breathing and continued absorp- 
tion through the skin, is harmful. 

(3) Personnel must wear masks. 

(4) Vapors from the reaction of 
bleach with G-agents are toxic. 

(5) Dry bleach reacts violently with 
liquid mustard gases. 

(6) Bleach loses its chlorine content 
when it is in storage over a period of time. 

(7) Bleach requires continuous sur- 
veillance. Ten percent available chlorine is 
considered the lower usable limit. For test 
procedures, see ABC Warfare Defense Mate - 
riel Inspection and Storage , NAVDOCKS TP - 
PL- 19, Department of the Navy. 

f. Shipment . Bleach is packaged in 8- 
gal metal drums that weight 61 lb. 

g. Reference Publications . 

Decontamination , TM 3-220, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 

Decontaminating Apparatus, Power - 
Driven, Skid-Mounted, M6, 400 - 
Gallon , TM 3-406, Department of 
the Army, 

Decontaminating Apparatus, Power - 
D riven, Truck-Mounted, M3A2 , 
400 -Gallon , TM 3-223, Department 
of the Army. 

Military Chemistry and Chemical 
Agents, TM 3-215, Department of 
the Army. 






A-79 



A54. DETERGENT, WETTING AGENT (POWDER AND LIQUID) 






a. Description. The powder-type wetting 
agent is a synthetic organic detergent that con- 
sists of alkylaryl sodium sulfonate. It is a 
white, flaky solid that is soluble in soft, hard, 
and sea water. The liquid-type wetting agent 
is a general purpose nonionic water soluble, 
Type 1. 



mix. To make a solution for use as laundry 
water for the decontamination of BW agents on 
clothing, 1 part of STB bleach and 99 parts of 
water are mixed and to this mixture is added 
1/2 of 1 percent by weight, or 0.04 lb, of either 
the powder or the liquid for each gallon of the 
mix. 



b. Use . Either the powder or liquid 
detergent may be added to chlorine solutions 
to act as a -wetting agent. 

c. Application . To make a solution for 
the decontamination of BW agents on exterior 
surfaces, 7 parts of STB bleach and 93 parts 
of water are mixed and to the mixture is added 
1 / Z of 1 percent by weight, or 0.04 lb, of either 
the powder or the liquid for each gallon of the 



d. Effectiveness . Either the powder or 
the liquid detergent assures complete wetting 
of the surface and the material. 



e. Shipment . The detergent powder is 
shipped in a fiberboard drum that weighs 225 
lb and occupies 7.0 cu ft. The liquid detergent 
is shipped in 1-gal cans, with 6 cans to a 
shipping case. 






A-80 









A55. ETO-FREON DISPENSER, 50-ML, 12-OZ.M1 






a. Description . The nonflammable gas 
that is contained in this dispenser is a mixture 
of 11-percent ethylene oxide, 44- 1 /2-percent 
Freon 11, and 44-1/2-percent Freon 12 pro- 
pellanta. This gas is contained in a 50-ml 
metal dispenser with a breakoff valve stem. 

b. Use , The ETO dispenser {Figure 
A-47) is used to decontaminate clothing and 
other personnel equipment after a BW attack. 

c. Application . The clothing that is to 
be decontaminated is placed loosely in a gas- 
proof bag, or an individual protective cover 
may be substituted. One ethylene oxide dis- 
penser is placed in the bag; and after the bag 
is tied securely, the dispenser is discharged in 
the bag by breaking off the valve stem. The 
sealed bag is rolled carefully on the ground 
for 5 minutes to disperse the gas throughout 
the clothing, then the bag is stored at a mini- 
mum temperature of 72" F for 12 hours. 

d. Effectiveness . The ETO-Freon gas 
will effectively decontaminate all BW contam- 
inated clothing and other personnel items, 

e. Limitations . The ETO dispenser has 
the following limitations. 

(1) The gas is toxic and can be used 
only in a -well-ventilated building or in the open. 

(2) Personnel who aredoingthe work 
must wear protective clothing and equipment. 

(3) Clothing and other personnel 
equipment must be aerated until the odor can 
not be detected, that is, 15 minutes for clothing 
and several hours for rubber and leather 
items. 




f. Shipment . Shipping data are being Figure A-47. 

developed for this item. 



ETO-Freon Dispenser, 50-ml, 
12-Oz, Ml 






A-81 



A56. ETHYLENE OXIDE GAS IN 15-LB CYLINDER 






a. Description . The decontaminating gas 
is a mixture of ethylene oxide and Freon, and 
it is contained in a 15-lb steel cylinder. 

b. Use . Ethylene oxide gas is used to 
decontaminate equipment and clothing after a 
BW attack. 

c. Application . After a room or chamber 
has been gasproofed with plastic coating, as 
discussed in paragraph 4E7. 02, the gas is dis- 
charged into the room or chamber at the rate 
of 30 lb per 1,000 cu ft of space at a tempera- 
ture of 70° F, 120 lb per 1,000 cu ft at 60° F, 
and 180 lb per 1,000 cu ft at 50° F. Decontam- 
ination below 50° F is not effective. A contact 
of 60 hours is required to assure complete 
decontamination. 

d. Ef f ectivene s s . Ethylene oxide gas 
will effectively decontaminate all contaminated 
articles and the interior of the building. 

e. Limitations . The ethylene oxide gas 
has the following limitations. 

(1} Personnel who are doing the work 
must wear oxygen breathing masks and pro- 
tective clothing. 



(2) The interior of the building must 
be aerated until the odor can not be detected. 



(3) Clothing and other personnel 
equipment must be aerated until the odor can 
not be detected, that is, 15 minutes for clothing 
and several hours for rubber and leather 
items. 

(4) Decontamination is retarded in 
the presence of excess moisture. 

{5) It is extremely flammable and 
must be kept away from heat and sparks. 

f. Shipment . This gas is shipped in 15- 
lb high-pressure gas cylinders. 

NOTE: In the event that personnel come in 
contact with the gas, they should im- 
mediately remove all clothing and 
flush the skin and eyes with large 
quantities of water for at least 15 
minutes. The eyes should then be 
checked by a medical officer. 






A-82 









A57. FORMALIN 






a. Description . Formalin is a mixture 
of methanol and 3 7 -percent formaldehyde 
(HCHO). Formalin is also known as formal- 
dehyde solution. 

b. Use . When formalin is mixed with 
additional methanol, the vapor is used to de- 
contaminate and sterilize the interior of a 
building and also the equipment that is con- 
tained in the building. 

c. Application . To make a formalin mix 
for decontamination purposes, 5 parts of stock 
formalin are mixed with 3 parts of methanol. 
Doors, windows, and other openings of build- 
ings must be closed. Normal openings around 
windows and doors need not be sealed. The 
formalin mix is vaporized by a fog applicator, 
steam, or a high-pressure sprayer. The bac- 
tericidal action of formalin improves with 
increased relative humidity. One quart of 
diluted formalin is required to decontaminate 
and sterilize 1,000 cu ft of space above a tem- 
perature of 70° F with a relative humidity of 
70%. The following amounts of mixed solution 
are required to decontaminate 1 ,000 cu ft of 
space at various temperatures. 



Temperature 


Quantity 


Above 70 
60 - 70 
40 - 60 
Below 40 


1 qt 

1/2 gal 
1 gal 
Not 
effective 



Regardless of the temperature, the humidity 
should be maintained at 70% or above. At 70° F 
the minimum contact time is between 4 and 8 
hours. 

d. Ef f e ctivene s s . Formalin is one of 
the best decontaminants for interiors. It will 



effectively decontaminate and sterilize all in- 
fected equipment except that which is contam- 
inated by dried botulinus toxin. 

e. Limitations . Formalin has the fol- 
lowing limitations. 



(1) The vapor is highly toxic. 

(2) The source of the steam that is 
used to vaporize formalin is outside the area 
that is being decontaminated. 

{3} The end product of formalin is 
toxic and the surfaces must be washed with hot 
water. 

(4) Formalin will not penetrate cloth 
and similar material as effectively as some 
sterilizing gas. 

(5) An open flame is not suitable for 
vaporizing. 

(6) Decontamination below 50" F is 
not recommended. 

(7) Formalin may cause damage to 
delicate instruments, and dampness may curl 
and ripple paper. 

(8) At least a 24-hr aeration period 
is required before a building is usable after 
decontamination. 

(9) Personnel must wear masks when 
they are handling the solution. For extended 
exposures, oxygen breathing masks should be 
used. 

f. Shipment. Stock formalin is shipped 
in 55-gal metal drums that weigh 500 lb and 
occupy 9.3 cu ft. 



A-83 



A58. METHANOL (METHYL ALCOHOL) 

a. Description . Methanol (CH3OH) is a c. Effectiveness . Because methanol is 
toxic, flammable liquid. used as an admixture, its effectiveness is 

governed by the primary constituent of the 

b. Use. Methanol is used as an admix- mixture, 
ture with formalin when water is not available. 

The recommended mixture is 3 parts of meth- d. Shipment . Methanol is shipped in 5- 

anol to 5 parts of formalin. gal containers. 









( 



A-84 



A59. PLASTIC COATING, STRIPPABLE 






a. Description . Strippable plastic coat- 
ing is a solution that forms a tough, elastic, 
waterproof skin. When it dries, it can be 
stripped from the surface to which it was ap- 
plied. It is a vinyl plastic that is dissolved in 
acetone or methyl ketone. It is resistant to 
most acids, alkaline solutions, oils, grease, 
alcohol, water, weather, and sunlight. 

b. Purpose. The coating is used to gas- 
proof a room for the decontamination of BW 
agents with ETO-Freon gas. 

c. Application . The coating is applied by 
spraying over cracks, around windows, and 
doors with an ordinary paint spray gun. A 
nozzle that sprays a band 6 in. to 8 in. wide at 
a 12-in. distance is recommended. A single 
pass sprays on an average thickness of about 
0.04 in. About 16 gal per 100 sqft are required 
to obtain this thickness of coating, which dries 
completely in 16 hours at 70° F. 

d. Effectiveness . Strippable plastic 
coating can make a room absolutely gasproof. 



e. Limitations. Strippable plastic coat- 
ing has the following limitations. 

(1) Cracks over l/8-in.wide mustbe 
sealed with adhesive tape, caulking compound, 
or plaster prior to the spraying. 

(2) The thickness of the coating 
necessitates a long drying period. 

(3) Solids tend to separate from the 
vehicles during storage. 

f. Shipment . The strippable plastic 
coating is shipped in 55-gaI metal drums that 
weigh 440 lb and occupy 9.3 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publication . 

Strippable Coating; Application and 
Maintenance, OP 1483, Bureau of 
Ordnance, 1954. 






A-85 



A60. TAPE, ADHESIVE, PRESSURE -SENSITIVE 

a. Description. , Pressure-sensitive ad- decontamination chamber. Plastic coating is 

hesive tape is light gray treated cloth that is applied over the tape to complete the seal, 

provided in rolls that are 60 yd Ions and 2-1/2 _.. ,, „ „ . . ... , 

T /si c Limitation . One limitation m the use 

in. wide, of the tape ig that the surfaces on w hich the 

tape is used must be cleaned. 

b. Application. The tape is used to am.- * ^ n *<.„■., i „j 

; K ^ : , _ — j — ■ 1 j i ■ -j d. Shipment. One roll of tape is packed 

seal cracks 1/8 of an inch and larger mside , , . — -H^ ., f . ■ , , » 

. ..,. ,, : . . , & , and shipped in a paper carton that weighs 2.6 

a building or room that is to be used as a ,, , rjr £,£ ». ° 

& lb and occupies .Odd cu ft. 



c 






A-86 



DECONTAMINATING EQUIPMENT 

Items 92-101 

Paragraphs A61 - A65 



549252O-60-19 A- 87 



A61. DECONTAMINATING APPARATUS, PORTABLE, 3 -GAL, M 1 






a ' Description . The Ml portable appa- 
ratus (Figure A-48) is aa item of standard 
decontaminating equipment that is intended 
primarily for use with DANC solution. It is a 
pressure-type spray apparatus that consists 
of a 3-gal tank with a shoulder strap, an air 
pump, a hose, a shut-off valve, and a nozzle. 
A funnel and a mixing paddle are provided as 
auxiliary equipment. 

b. Use . The Ml portable apparatus is 
used to spray DANC solution on equipment that 
has been contaminated by CW agents. 

c. Application. The decontaminating ap- 
paratus is carried empty and is filled with the 
DANC solution immediately before it is used. 
On the average the 3-gal tank of DANC will 
cover 50 sq yd of surface. 

d. Effectiveness . The portable appa- 
ratus is effective for relatively small decon- 
tamination jobs, such as for decontaminating 
trucks and other similar types of equipment. 

e. Limitations . The Ml portable decon- 
taminating apparatus has the following limi- 
tations. 

(1) It can not be filled with more than 
3 gal of liquid. 

(2) The solution must be filtered. 

f. Shipment . Two of the MI units are 
packed in a wooden box that weighs 75 lb and 
occupies 8.7 cu ft. 



g. Reference Publications. 

Decontamination , TM 3-220, Depart- 
ment of the Army. 

Chemical Decontamination Company, 
FM 3-70, Department of the Army, 




Figure A-48. Decontaminating Apparatus, 
Portable, 3 -Gal, Ml 






A-89 



A61.1 E17R1 DECONTAMINATING APPARATUS, PORTABLE, 1-1/2-QT 






a. Purpose . TheE17Rl decontaminating 
apparatus was developed for the purpose of 
applying DS2 and to replace the M2, 1-1/2 qt, 
apparatus that is now considered a limited 
standard. Therefore, the E17R1 will be stand- 
ardized at about the same time as the DS2 is 
standardized. (See paragraph A52.) 

b. Description . This unit utilizes nitro- 
gen gas to discharge the DS2 and is therefore 
more simply designed than the M2 is, which 
utilizes a hand pump. It is designed for mount- 
ing on a vehicle. It contains sufficient DS2 to 
decontaminate the vehicle to the extent that 
continued operation can be maintained with a 
minimum of risk. It is nonexpendable. The 
E17R1 is mounted with its content of DS2, but 
it is not under nitrogen pressure until it is 
ready to be used. The operation of a lever 
pressurizes the cylindrical body of the EI7R1. 



Nitrogen is packaged in apressurized cylinder 
that is similar to the CO^ cylinders that are 
used to inflate life jackets. Nitrogen was 
selected as the propellant for this unit because 
of its inertness to DS2 and because it does not 
present a fire hazard. 

c. Effectiveness . Test data indicate that 
the E17RI will satisfactorily spray the entire 
charge of DS2 in temperatures as low as +12° F 
with one N2 cartridge. Between +12° F and 
-25° F part of the DS2 is adequately sprayed 
with the first N2 cartridge, but a point is 
reached where the spray is not broken up ade- 
quately and it comes out as a solid stream. At 
this point, a second cartridge is inserted, and 
the remainder of the DS2 is sprayed. The 
initial pressure in the E17R1 cylinder, at the 
time the N2 is released, is 240 psig. The final 
pressure is 25 psig when 1 cartridge is used. 



I 



A-90 






A62. DECONTAMINATING APPARATUS, POWER-DRIVEN, SKID- MOUNTED, M4 
DECONTAMINATING APPARATUS, POWER- DRIVEN, SKID- MOUNTED, M6 



DECONTAMINATING APPARATUS, 
DECONTAMINATING APPARATUS, 
and M3A3 



POWER-DRIVEN, TRAILER- MOUNTED, M8 
POWER- DRIVEN, TRUCK- MOUNTED, M3A2 






a. Description . 

(1) The M4, M6, and M3A2 types 
of power-driven decontaminating apparatus 
(Figures A-49, A-50, andA-51) are modified 
commercial-types of orchard sprayers that 
are adapted to spray bleach slurry. Each ap- 
paratus consists essentially of a 400-gal tank 
that is equipped with a rotary agitator, a 3- 
cylinder piston-type pump, and a relief valve. 
The discharge rate is 20 gpm (nozzle capacity), 
but the pump's capacity is 35 gpm at a work- 
ing pressure of 400 psi. The 15 gpm difference 
is for the recirculation of the mix. 

(2) The M4 and the M6 models are 
skid-mounted, have auxiliary engines rated at 
22 hp that are mounted as part of the apparatus 
and that supply the power for the operation of 
the pump and the agitators. The M4 and the 
M6 models require a 2-1/2-ton, 6x6 truck 
for transporting. The M3A2 apparatus is 
permanently mounted on a standard 2-1/2-ton, 
6x6 truck, which provides the power for 
transporting and operating the pump. The 
apparatus may be used also as a field shower 
unit. The M3A3 apparatus is the same as the 
M3A2 type except that the M3A3 has a steel 
tank whereas the M3A2 has a wooden tank. 

(3) The M8 (Figure A-52) is also a 
commercial-type sprayer with a 200-gal steel 
tank that is mounted on a two-wheel trailer. 
The M8 is powered bya 1 5-hp, 4-cylinder, air- 
cooled gasoline engine, and has a reciprocating 
pump with a capacity of 20 gpm at 600 psi. It 
has a rear-mounted spray platform with 100 ft 




of3/4-in. i. d. hose. The trailer has a retract- 
able landing leg and lunette for towing by mili- 
tary vehicles of the 3/4-ton class. 

b. Use . These various types of apparatus 
are used to spread decontaminating materials, 
such as slurry and other solutions, over large 
areas and surfaces after a BW or a CW attack. 
Spraying by means of a decontaminating appa- 
ratus is the only convenient method of treating 
the exterior of contaminated buildings. 

c. Application and Time Cycle . The 
procedure and time schedule to be observed in 
operating the different types of decontaminat- 
ing equipment are shown in the following 
tabulation. 



Procedure 


Time eye 


'e (min) 


M4, M6, 


MS 




M3A2 


Filling water from 


10 


5 


stream or other 






source 






Mixing antiset 


2 


2 


Filling tank with bleach 


20 


10 


Mixing bleach with 


15 


15 


water 






Spraying 


20 


10 



The average coverage with slurry on smooth 
surfaces for each filling is 1,300 sq yd for the 
M4, M6, and M3A2 and 600 sq yd for the M8 
apparatus. The slurry mixture for each filling 
for the M4, M6, M3A2, and M8 decontaminating 
apparatus is prepared in the proportions shown 
in the following tabulation. 







Figure A-49. Decontaminating Apparatus, 
Power-Driven, Skid-Mounted, M4, 400-Gal 



Figure A-50. Decontaminating Apparatus, 
Power-Driven, Skid- Mounted, M6, 400-Gal 



A-91 



Ingredients 


Quantities 


M4, M6, M3A2 


M8 


Water 
Bleach 

Antiset 


225 gal 
1,300 lb 
6.5 lb 


113 gal 
650 lb 
3.0 lb 



An operating crew of four men, in addition to 
the mixing crew, is required for the most 
efficient operation. 

d. Limitations . The decontaminating 
apparatus has the following limitations. 

(1) It can not be used in temperatures 
below 20° F because the slurry thickens. 

(2) The equipment must be thoroughly 
cleaned after each use. 

e. Shipment , The different types of de- 
contaminating apparatus are shipped as follows. 

(1) The M4 decontaminating appa- 
ratus, prepared for shipment, weighs 4,600 lb 
and occupies 270,0 cu ft. 

(2) The M6 decontaminating appa- 
ratus, prepared for shipment, weighs 4,925 lb 
and occupies 270.0 cu ft. 

(3) The M3A2 decontaminating appa- 
ratus, prepared for shipment, is 98 in, high, 
252-1/2 in. long, and 87 in. wide. It weighs 
11,090 lb and occupies 1,103 cu ft. 

(4) The M8 decontaminating appa- 
ratus, prepared for shipment, weighs 2,080 lb 
and occupies 240.0 cu ft. 



f. Reference Publications . 

Decontaminating Apparatus, Power- 
Driven, Skid- Mounted, M4, 400- Gal, 
TM 3-222, Department of the Army. 

Decontaminating Apparatus, Power- 
Driven, Skid-Mounted, M6, 400-Gal, 
TM 3-406, Department of the Army. 

Decontaminating Apparatus, Power- 
Driven, Truck- Mounted, M3A2, 400- 
Gal, TM 3-223, Department of the 
Army. 

An instruction manual that is prepared 
by the manufacturer is furnished 
with the M8 equipment. 

Chemical Decontamination Company, 
FM 3-70, Department of the Army. 







Figure A-52. Decontaminating Apparatus, 
Power-Driven, Trailer- Mounted, M8, 200-Gal 




Figure A-51, Decontaminating Apparatus, Power-Driven, Truck- Mounted, M3A2, 400-Gal 

A-92 









A63. DISPENSER, SIMULANT AGENT, BGI, 12-OZ, Ml 






a. Description . The BGI dispenser (Fig- 
ure A-53) is a commercial pressurized con- 
tainer that is filled with Z grams of bacillus 
globigii and 300 grams of Freon 12 gas. The 
container is 2-7/8 in. by 4-11/16 in. 

b. Use . The dispenser is primarily in- 
tended for special training of ABC personnel 
in the collection of biological samples withthe 
M17 biological agent sampling kit. (See Figure 
A-19.) 

c. Application . The simulant agent is 
used by instructors for training exercises. It 
may be sprayed in the air, on the walls, floor, 
equipment, clothing, food, and water. It is then 
collected with the BW sampling kit and for- 
warded to a medical laboratory for identifica- 
tion under a microscope. 

d. Limitation . One limitation of the dis- 
penser is that it has a shelf life of about one 
year. 

e> Shipment . Twenty-four dispensers 
are packed in a fiberboard box that weighs 
about 24 lb and occupies about 1 cu ft. 

f. Reference Publication . 

CBR Training Exercises, FM 21-48, 
Department of the Army. 




Figure A-53. Dispenser, Simulant Agent, BGI, 
12-Oz, Ml 






A-93 



A 64. GENERATOR, FOG, INSECTICIDAL, 40-GPH 






a. Description . The 40-gph insecticidal 
fog generator (Figure A-54)is a self-contained 
portable unit that is furnished with all neces- 
sary" fittings and accessories. 

b. Use. The generator is used primarily 
to dispense formalin as a vapor for the bio- 
logical warfare decontamination of the interior 
of large buildings. It can also be used for 
dispensing insecticidal solutions in the interior 
of buildings and on open terrain. 

c. Effectiveness . The formalin vapor 
that is produced is effective for more than ZOO 
ft in an open room or building. Because of ■ the 
many variations in building layout, the number 
of generators that may be required for effec- 
tive decontamination may not be established. 
It will be necessary to observe the operation 
of the unit and to generate the vapor from as 
many places as necessary to secure complete 
coverage of the building. Paragraph A57inthis 
Appendix contains a discussion on formalin. 

d. Limitation . The insecticidal gener- 
ator has the following limitations, 

(1) It must be carried by a small 
truck, jeep, or flat-bed hand truck and operated 
from the exterior of the building. 

(2) Because the formalin is vapor- 
ized at a temperature of about 1,000° F, care 



must be exercised to prevent fires in the 
building. 

e. Reference Publication. 



See the instruction manual that is 
furnished with the equipment. 







Figure A-54. Generator, Fog, Insecticidal, 
40-gph 



A- 94 






A65. HYPOCHLORINATION UNIT, WATER-PURIFICATION 



a. Description , The water -purification 
hypochlorination unit (Figure A-55) is designed 
for water flows between 2 gph and 100 gph. Its 
performance is as follows. 



Maximum water flow 
treated 

Minimum water flow 
treated 

Automatic propor- 
tioning range 

Maximum hypochlori- 
nator pumping rate 



Minimum allowable 
water pressure 

Maximum allowable 
water pressure 



100 gpm 
2 gpm 
10 to 1 

60 gal/24 hr 

at 12 

strokes/ 

min 

10 psi 

125 psi 



b. Use. This hypochlorination unit is 
used for the chlor-dechlor process todechlor- 
inate water that has been, superchlorinated for 
BW decontamination. 



operationally difficult to hold all water with 10 
ppm residual for an hour and then introduce 
the dechlorinating agent unless there is a suf- 
ficient amount of clear-well storage in the 
plant. 

e. Limitations . The hypochlorination 
unit has the following limitations. 

(1) The use of a hypochlorinator is 
dependent on existing facilities and conditions. 

(2) It is used for BW agents only. 

f. Shipment . The hypochlorinator is 
shippedina box that weighs 175 lb and occupies 
8.7 cu ft. 



g. Reference Publication . 

Hypochlorination Unit, Automatic, 
Portable, 2- to 100-gpm Flow, TM 
5-2032, Department of the Army. 






c. Application . 

(1) The hypochlorinator is connected 
to the water line. Dechlorinating solutions are 
injected into the water line. Water is treated 
to 10 ppm available chlorine and held for one 
hour, then it is dechlorinated. Dechlorinating 
agents and the theoretical amounts that are 
required to dechlorinate 1 ppm of chlorine are 
given in the following tabulation. 



Agent 



Sulfur dioxide, SO2 
Sodium bisulfite, NaHS0 3 
Sodium metabisulfite, Na2S£05 
Sodium thiosulfate , ^28203.5^0 



Amount 



1 ppm 

2 ppm 
1 . 3 ppm 

7 ppm 



(2) The hypochlorination unit can be 
inserted in series with the water main or con- 
nected with a bypass around a restriction in 
the water main by using the bypass assembly. 

(3) In addition, there is provided a 
comparator, with a bottle of orthotoluidine 
reagent, dropper, and test tubes, which is used 
to determine the amount of excess or "residual 
chlorine" in the treated water. It may also be 
used to determine the acidity or alkalinity of 
the water. 



d. Effectiveness. 



The chlor-dechlor 



process is highly efficacious in destroying all 
pathogens, toxins, and protozoa. It might be 








93 










AS 




g 


a 






Figure A-55. Hypochlorination Unit, Water- 
Purification, w/ Comparator 






A-95 



A66. PORTABLE FUMIGANT ATOMIZER, 3-GPH 



I 



a. Description . The portable fumigant 
atomizer (Figure A- 56) is a commercial item 
for vaporizing formalin or insecticides. The 
atomizer utilizes a vacuum that is created in 
a hollow, spinning head to draw fluid from a 
3-gal reservoir through a hollow motor shaft. 
The motor is rated at 1/2 hp at 10,500 rpm. 
The dimensions areabout 14-l/2in. by 12-1/4 
in. 

b. Use . The atomizer is used to dis- 
pense the formalin as a vapor for BW decon- 
tamination of the interior of small structures. 

c. Application . The 3-gal reservoir is 
filled with formalin methanol solution, which 
is dispensed through the atomizer. See para- 
graph A57 for the required amounts of formalin 
solution to be used. 

d. Effectiveness . In an open room, the 
mist from the atomizer should not be expected 
to be effective for more than 30 ft from the 
point of discharge. 

e. Limitation . One limitation of the 
atomizer is that it can be used to decontam- 
inate only small areas. 

f. Shipment . The portable fumigant 
atomizer is shipped in a wooden box that 
weighs 20 lb and occupies 1.5 cu ft. 

g. Reference Publication . 

See the instruction manual that is 
issued with the equipment. 




Figure A-56. Portable Fumigant Atomizer, 
3-gph 



A-96 












APPENDIX B 

PLUTONIUM MONITORING 

AND 

DECONTAMINATION ASHORE 






B-l 









c 






APPENDIX B 

PLUTONIUM MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION ASHORE 
Section 1. INTRODUCTION 






Bl.l SCOPE 

This Appendix pertains to the radiological 
situation that may result from an accidental 
detonation or fire that involves plutonium in 
either land or water areas ashore. The acci- 
dent that is presumed to occur is the result of 
fire, shock, or other cause while plutonium is 
in storage or in transit. The product that is 
dispersed by blast or fire is a dust or a smoke 
that includes plutonium oxide (PUO2). This 
Appendix includes information on (a) the ef- 
fects of nuclear contamination on damage con- 
trol operations, (b) the safety of personnel, 
and (c) the development of plans andprocedures 
for determining and recovering contaminated 
areas. The standard disaster control organi- 
zation that is prescribed in the United States 
Navy Passive Defense Manual , OPNAV IN- 
STRUCTION 3440.6, and United States Nav y 
Passive Defense Recovery Plan, (PDRP), OP- 
NAV, should be utilized. Only necessary 
modifications to these instructions are indi- 
cated herein. 



B1.2 DETERMINATION OF HAZARD 

In any accident that involves the destruc - 
tion of nuclear ordnance, immediate tests 
should be made to determine whether or not 
there is any beta -gamma contamination hazard 
evident. If such a hazard exists, appropriate 
tolerances, as determined by paragraph 19 142, 
United States Navy Precautions , OPNAV 34P1, 
and monitoring and decontamination proce- 
dures, as prescribed in Radiological Recovery 
of Fixed Military Installations ; NAY DOCKS 
TP-PL-13, Interim Revision, 16 April 1958, 
and elsewhere in this publication, should be 
used. Plutonium contamination is a negligible 
hazard to personnel in comparison with beta- 
gamma contamination. The rotation of per- 
sonnel should be utilizedto minimize exposure 
to gamma radiation when it is present. Table 
B-l contains a comparison of the problems 
that are associated with the plutonium hazard 
following a nuclear weapon accident with the 
problems that result from fallout from a nu- 
clear explosion. 



TABLE B-l 

Comparison of Problems Resulting from Accidents with Plutonium and 
Fallout of Fission Products 



Problem compared 


PuO^ Contaminant 


Fallout 


Principal radioactivity 


Alpha particles 


Gamma radiation 


Penetration 


Nearly zero 


Extremely high 


Shielding 


Sheet of paper (100%) 


3-in. concrete reduces 50% 


Decay 


None (half-life is 24,300 years) 1 


Very rapid initially (1/50 from 
H + 1 to H + 24) 


Personnel hazard 


Internal only; principally through 
inhalation 


Internal, external, or dangerous 
even without contact 


Working hazard 


None with protective gear 


Gamma hazard not reduced by 
protective gear 


Monitoring 


Very slow; adequate instruments 
not available 


Rapid, reliable means available 


Decontamination 


Detailed procedures are the same 
as for fallout except for disposal 


Detailed procedures available 



*Pu02 contaminant will reduce with time, not by decay, if the very fine contaminant is spread by 
■wind over a much larger area. For example, this "migration half -life" is approximately 100 
days in the Nevada desert. 



B-3 



Section 2, ASHORE 



B2.1 BASIC DATA 

1. Characteristics of PuO 2 Contaminant. 

(1) Plutonium that is involved in an 
HE explosion becomes molten and burns; also 
in a sufficiently hot fire, plutonium burns, 
much like magnesium. The product in either 
case consists of fine particles of PuC>2. Such 
Pu02 is essentially insoluble in water, has 
practically no decay with time (its half -life 
being 24,300 years), and is of varying particle 
size but so fine that it can be carried as smoke 
or resuspended, even though it clings to the 
other finely divided materials that are involved 
in the fire or explosion. This combination of 
materials is referred to herein as the "Pu02 
contaminant" or simply the "contaminant." 

(2) PuO£ emits alpha particles that 
have a short range in air {the maximum range 
being approximately 1-1/2 in.) and are stopped 
by such thin materials as a coat of paint or a 
sheet of paper. The hazard to personnel is 
principally from inhalation (the significant 
size range is 0.1 to 10 microns), but the rela- 
tive hazard from ingestion or entry through 
cuts is considered negligible; nevertheless 
checks should be made and due precautions 
should be taken. The contaminant particle 
size that presents the greatest hazard is so 
fine that it can be resuspended in an aerosol 
that is invisible to the naked eye, although it 
may sparkle in sunlight. The minute size of 
this contaminant can not be overemphasized, 
and it must be borne in mind that this hazard 
may exist even though the contaminant can not 
be seen. 

(3) Finely divided particles of PuO 2 
contaminant are deposited over large areas by 
normal or by rain or dew-induced settling out. 
The contaminant is difficult to detect (monitor) 
and to eliminate (decontaminate) as a hazard. 
The difficulty in detection is due to the lack of 
adequate instruments and the necessity for 
holding instruments very close (approximately 
1/16") to the dust; the intermixing of soil, the 
roughness of the pavement, and vegetation 
cause erroneously low readings in relation to 
the dust quantity per unit area; and several 
layers of contaminant particles, which is in- 
variably the way the contaminant is found, will 
give meter readings that indicate quantities 
lower than those actually present. This phe- 
nomenon is termed "self -absorption." 

2. Personnel Protection . 

a. Clothing . Complete protection 
against the highest levels of alpha hazard that 



may be expected from accidents that involve 
the PuO 2 contaminant is afforded by a well- 
fitted respirator or standard protective mask 
and also dust -tight, disposable, protective 
outer clothing to facilitate the decontamination 
of personnel and the disposal of the PuO 2 con- 
taminant on clothing. Where weather conditions 
permit, personnel may undress and then wear 
only disposable clothing that is not dust-tight, 
such as coveralls, boots, gloves, and caps. It 
may not be necessary to dispose of clothing 
until the end of all field work, or possibly not 
at all if adequate, controlled cleaning or laun- 
dering facilities are available, (See paragraph 
7 of B2.5.) 

b. Other Precautions . Eating, drink- 
ing, and smoking must be forbidden in any 
hazardous area where personnel are required 
to 'wear respirators. Personnel who are caught 
in a hazardous area where respirators are not 
available should hold a folded handkerchief, or 
some similar protection, over the nose and 
mouth. It is advisable for all personnel to 
remain in closed homes or buildings for some 
time after an accident to avoid contact with the 
dusty atmosphere, which may contain invisible 
contamination. 



3. Hazardous Concentration Level . 

a. Alpha Hazard Level . The alpha 
hazard level concerns unmasked personnel, 
where unrestricted movement is allowed. The 
contaminant is not a significant hazard as long 
as it does not become airborne. The important 
factors are both the degree of contamination 
and the extent to which the material is bound 
to the surface. The level of the alpha hazard is 
the quantity and location of the contaminant 
in the air that will create an inhalation hazard. 
The quantity of the contaminant in the air may 
be caused by the original fire and/ or HE det- 
onation or it maybe the result of resuspension 
from winds and movement of vehicles or per- 
sonnel. (See paragraph 3 of B2.2.) The re- 
suspension in the air is the chronic, or long- 
term, hazard. 

b. Safety Criteria . No standard 
equipment is available for use in the field to 
measure the hazardous quantity of the con- 
taminant in the air; however, studies have been 
made to establish the conservative surface 
concentrations of Pu02 in a contaminant that 
may yield an airborne inhalation hazard. 
These surface concentrations, where the con- 
taminant is spread uniformly on a smooth, flat 
surface, are described in the following para- 
graphs. 









B-4 









(1) If the contamination level of 
PuOj is less than 1,000 micrograms per 
square meter [ug/m^), decontamination is not 
considered necessary, but it should be effected 
to as low a value as possible, consistent with 
reasonable efforts and costs, that is, inex- 
pensive decontamination methods. 



(2) If the contamination level of 
Pu02 is greater than 1,000 /ig/mS decontami- 
nation should be effected by conventional 
methods, such as high-pressure hosing or 
leaching, (See paragraph B2.5 and Tables B-2 
andB-3.) A contamination level of 2,000 jug/m^ 
after decontamination (which indicates the re- 
moval of the lightly bound and respirable 
contaminant) shouldbe generally no more haz- 
ardous than 1,000 fig/m^ untreated. (A con- 
tamination level of 2,000 /j.g/m^ is equivalent 
to alpha readings of 28,000 disintegrations 
per minute per square centimeter for contam- 
inant that is spread uniformly on a smooth, 
flat surface.) 

( 3) If the contamination level of 
Pu02 is greater than 2,000 ^.g/m^ after at 
least two thorough decontamination operations, 
the situation must be evaluated on an individual 
basis. (See paragraph B4.1 .) The problem is 
a long-term one, rather than an immediate 
one, because the lightly bound and respirable 
contaminant, that is, the hazardous kind, will 
certainly have been removed. 

c. Application of Criteria . Thefore- 
going safety criteria have been developed pri- 
marily for application to residential areas 
that are occupied by non-Government civilian 
personnel. If only military personnel and/or 
civilian Government employees are involved, 
these safety criteria, although they are indica- 
tive of the hazard, may not necessitate imme- 
diate decontamination or other drastic action 
because evacuation and other measures may 
be taken by the local commander, 

B2.2 PREDICTED HAZARDOUS AREA 

1. Gross Area . The size and shape of 
the area that will be contaminated as the re- 
sult of an unconfined, or nearly unconfined, 
accident that involves Pu02 will vary with 
meteorological conditions and the terrain, but 
a preliminary estimate of the contamination is 
necessary to define an initial control area, or 
a predicted hazardous area. An accident with 
Pu02 may contaminate an area up to 0.025 
square mile, or 16 acres, in one explosion, 
and the extent of the contamination may be to 
and above the hazardous concentration level. 
(See Section 2, paragraph 3b of B2.1.) 



2. Area Shape . If at the time of the ex- 
plosion there is a wind of to 5 knots, a cir- 
cular area with a 500 -ft radius around the 
explosion center should be consideredhazard- 
ous. The upwind semicircular area should be 
retained for all wind conditions, but the down- 
wind semicircular area should be changed to 
a semi-ellipse with a minor axis radius of 
500 ft and a major axis radius varying with the 
wind velocity as follows: 6 to lOknots, 2,000 ft; 
11 to 15 knots, 3,000 ft; 16 to 20 knots, 4,000ft; 
and above 20 knots, 1 mile (statute). The 
actual critical area will be determined by 
monitoring. This may vary from the assumed 
area. 

3. Changes in Area. The foregoing pre- 
dicted area may be modified by more rapid 
precipitation of the PuO-> contaminant caused 
by rain or dew, or by resuspension of the dust 
through wind-devils and eddies, higher winds, 
wind currents caused by the movements of 
personnel and vehicles, and the carrying of 
dust on tires and human or animal feet, as 
well as by water migration. Accordingly, dust 
control measures should be promptly instituted 
within the predicted hazardous area. (See 
paragraph B2.4.) 

4. Area Control . It is imperative that 
immediate action be taken to evacuate from 
the predicted hazardous area all personnel 
and animals that are caught in the open and to es- 
tablish police perimeter control, with proc- 
essing stations located at each access point. 
However, where buildings have not been 
breached, personnel and animals do not need 
to be evacuated if they remain indoors. All 
personnel in the area must be identified and 
tagged. 

B2.3 MONITORING 

1. General . The "predicted" hazardous 
areacanbe corrected to an "actual" hazardous 
area by monitoring. The first corrective work 
to determine the actual hazardous area should 
be to establish a map contour that approxi- 
mates the limits of the hazardous concentration 
level area that is described in paragraphs 1 
and 2 of B2.2, The limits should be deter- 
mined by using as many point readings as may 
be necessary, but the four most important 
readings are those that are taken directly 
downwind, upwind, and at two crosswind points 
from the point of detonation. These four read- 
ings make the first gross correction of the 
predicted area shape. The first monitoring at 
the site should be to check for the presence of 
beta-gamma hazard. Other monitoring work 
should include the locating and marking of 
"hot spots," some of which could be outside of 
the actual hazardous area, as well as monitoring 



B-5 



to check- the effectiveness of the decontamina- 
tion procedures. Applicable data contained in 
the text of this publication and the Navy Train- 
ing Film series MN7984 should be utilized. 

2. Monitoring Survey Team. Although 
the training of~personnel and the lack of some 
equipment items will pose some problems in 
the early establishment of the monitoring 
survey teams, personnel and equipment of the 
NRDL/EODTC Team will help until such in- 
adequacies are corrected, (See Section 4.) 
The local monitoring team corresponds to the 
ABC Survey Team that is described in the 
U. S. Navy Passive Defense Manual , OPNAV- 
INST 3440.6. It is recommended that at least 
four teams be made available. 

a. Personnel . Personnel should in- 
clude one driver-communicator, one recorder, 
one alpha monitor, and one beta-gamma moni- 
tor. The latter may prove to be unnecessary. 

b. Equipment. Equipment should in- 
clude two (three if possible) alpha radiacme- 
ters, a beta -gamma low-range radiacmeter, a 
gamma high-range radiacmeter, a radio com- 
munication set, protective gear and a low-dose 
self -indicating (pocket) dosimeter for each 
per son, marking equipment, and miscellaneous 
gear. In the absence of a beta-gamma hazard, 
the beta-gamma monitor may be used as a 
second alpha monitor. The third alpha radiac- 
meter is a spare. 

{ 1) The alpha radiacmeter should 
read at least to 14,000 dpm/cm^, or preferably 
to 28,000 dpm/cm^, (See Section 2, paragraph 
3b(2) of B2.1.) The top reading for the cur- 
rent Navy instrument, AN/ PDR-10D, is 10,000 
dpm/150 cm^ or 67 dpm/cm^, which is inade- 
quate for survey use here. However it can be 
"jury- rigged" for the purpose (see Appendix A, 
paragraph All) and, in any event, it may be 
useful for personnel and materiel monitoring. 
Initially monitors must depend upon special 
instruments that are carried by the NRDL/ 
EODTC Team. 

(2) Appropriate beta and gamma 
instruments are as follows: (a) low-range 
beta-gamma radiacmeter, AN/PDR-27G; 
(b) high-range gamma radiacmeter, AN/PDR- 
18B; and (c) low-dose self-indicating (pocket) 
dosimeter, IM-9D/PD or equivalent. 

(3) Protective gear should meet 
the requirements indicated in paragraph 2 of 
B2. 1 . Marking equipment should include atomic 
warning signs, marking crayons, stakes, nails, 
rope, road barricades, and related equipment. 
Miscellaneous gear should include hand tools, 
field rations, and spare gasoline. 



3. Monitoring Techniques . 

(1) To monitor personnel and vehi- 
cles for PuO-, contamination, the monitoring 
techniques for fallout radiation hazards should 
be used, augmented by the use of an alpha 
radiacmeter as described elsewhere in this 
publication and in Radiological Recovery of 
Fixed Military Installations , NAVDOCKS TP- 
PL-13. 

(2) To monitor areas for alpha haz- 
ard contamination, the techniques to detect 
fallout hazards should be used as described 
elsewhere in this publication and in Radiologi- 
cal Recovery of Fixed Military Installations , 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-13. These techniques will 
probably be satisfactory for paved areas only, 
but they should provide sufficient contour 
points to fairly define the actual hazardous 
area. To monitor unpaved areas , soil- sampling 
and laboratory techniques (that is, the "wipe" 
technique) will probably be necessary, and 
these techniques are expected to be provided 
by the NRDL/EODTC Team, 

(3) To monitor buildings and struc- 
tures, the techniques used for paved surfaces 
are generally used. Exteriors should be care- 
fully checked for contaminant concentrations 
in areaways, crevices, corners, and on lee- 
ward sidewalls andalong foundations. A repe- 
tition of monitoring may be required by 
changes of wind direction and/or wind velocity, 
or it maybe required because of the migration 
half-life. (See footnote to Table B-l.) Inte- 
riors of buildings and structures should be 
similarly checked, plus a careful check of 
ventilation systems and filters. 

(4) Records and Reporting . The re- 
cording and reporting techniques that are pre- 
scribed for recording and reporting fallout 
radiation hazards should be used. However, if 
no gamma hazard is found, the recording of 
personnel gamma exposure and the interpola- 
tion of radiation readings to reference time 
(that is, H = 1 hour) are eliminated. 

B2.4 DUST CONTROL MEASURES 

Immediately after a PuO£ explosion, it 
is extremely important to promptly institute 
dust control measures to prevent the resus- 
pension and transport of the contaminants. 
(See paragraph 3 of B2.2.) Wetting-down with 
water, covering the area with wet sand or wood 
shavings, or the use of special compounds that 
absorb the moisture from the atmosphere 
(calcium chloride) are a few of the methods 
used to effect immediate, temporary dust con- 
trol. Some measures may make later decon- 
tamination more difficult. The use of dust 









B-6 



( 



control measures allows more time for the 
usually slow decontamination methods. 

B2.5 DECONTAMINATION 

1. General . The decontamination meth- 
ods for PuO^ are similar to those used for 
fallout, the principal difference being that the 
PuOt contaminant must be contained and/or 
gathered for controlled disposal. Table B-2 
briefly describes many decontarnination meth- 
ods. Additional detailed information on per- 
sonnel, equipment, and the rate of coverage in 
connection with the application of fallout 
decontamination methods may be found in 
Radiological Recovery of Fixed Military 



Installations , NAVDOCKS TF-PL-13. The fol- 
lowing paragraphs in this Appendix contain 
only information in addition to that in Tables 
B-2 and B-3. The effectiveness of decontami- 
nation can be only very grossly estimated be- 
cause of the lack of working experience with 
this contaminant. It is necessary to monitor 
after each decontamination application to 
measure its effectiveness and to determine the 
need for a repetition and/or application of the 
same or another method of decontamination. 
If an alpha radiacmeter with a probe is not 
available, it may be necessary to use labora- 
tory monitoring techniques to check the effec- 
tiveness of the decontamination on irregular 
surfaces. Many decontamination problems can 



TABLE B-2 



Decontamination Methods 






No. 



1 
2 
3 
4 

5 
6 
7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 

19 

20 
21 
22 

23 

24 

25 



Method 



Firehosingl 

Hosing^ 

Scrubbing! 

Swabbingl 

Dip and rinsel 

Motorized flushing-'- 

Motorized sweeping 

Pavement sealing 
Paving 

Asphalt planing 
Scraping 

Soil covering 

Soil stabilization 

Sealing 

Sandblasting 

Vacu-blasting 

Stripping 

Steam cleaning! 

Hot liquid jet* 

Vacuuming 

Plating 

Special cleaners 

Laundering and dry 

cleaning 
Flocculating 
Strippable materials 



Equipment or operation 



Using 1-1/2" firehose from hydrant or pumper. 

Using garden hose from standard hose bib. 

Water and street broom, long-handled or hand scrub brush. 2 

Water and swab (mop) or hand rags.^ 

Water-dip in pan or tank then clean-water rinse. 2 

Using standard street flushing vehicle. 

Using street sweeper, preceded by sufficient wetting to stop re- 
suspension. 

Scalcoat with liquid asphalt, tar, or oil. 

Add course of asphaltic or portland cement concrete. 

Special machine heat-softens and windrows top layer. 

Using dozer, grader, or tractor and scraper to remove top layer 
after wetting -down. 

Covering with new soil, or burial through plowing, discing or ro- 
totilling equipment. 

With equipment and oil, asphalt, portland concrete, or chemicals. 

With paint, sealer, plastic, or wallpaper. 

With standard equipment but only wet method. 

With standard equipment and techniques. 

Sanding, paint removal, wax removal, and refinishing. 

Using equipment such as garage steam jenny (requires control of 
aerosol hazard). 

Using equipment such as that used for motor or aircraft cleaning. 

Using modified standard vacuum cleaners. 3 

Covers removal and/or replating, electrolytic, or dip. 

Such as in-place upholstery and rug cleaning methods and carbon 
tetrachloride. 

Self-explanatory, but see paragraph 7 of B2.5. 

Water treatment precipitation method using chemicals. 
Apply material, then remove with contaminant imbedded.'* 



May require water (liquid) control measures. (See paragraph 4 of B2.5.) 
^With or without laundry detergents, that is, TSP (tri-sodium phosphate); soaps not particularly 

good. 
^Contaminant constituting greatest hazard will pass through standard vacuum cleaner bags (see 

paragraphs 1 (1) and (2) of B2.1); modify with special filter. 
■^Materials include standard strippable coating (FSN G-E 

kinds: cellophane, masking, first-aid, and electrician's. 






549252 O-60-20 



B-7 



TABLE B-3 



Decontamination Applications 



No. 


Application 


Methods (See Table B-Z) 


1 

2 
3 
4 
5 

6 

7 

8 
9 

10 

11 

12 


Paved areas 

Unpaved areas 
Building exteriors 
Building interiors 
Heating and air con- 
ditioning systems 
Furniture and fur- 
nishings^ 
Appliances I 

Personnel effects'- 
Foodstuffs 1 

Vehicles, mechanical 
equipment, and 
watercraft 
Trees and shrubs 1 
Storm and sanitary 
sewers 


Consider methods 1 through 3 and 6 through 10, or combinations; 

that is firehosing/scrubbing/fLrehosing. 
Consider methods 9 and 11 through 13; see paragraph 5 of B2.5. 
Consider methods 1 through 4, 14 through 19, and 25, 
Consider methods 2 through 4, 14, 16 through 18, 20, and 25. 
Wash intakes, replace filters, and vacuum throughout system as 

required. 
Consider methods 3 through 5, 14, 17, 20 through 23, and 25. 

Consider methods 3 through 5, 14, 17 through 22, and 25; give spe- 
cial attention to nonimmersible electrical parts. 

Consider methods 3 through 5, 20, 22, 23, and 25. 

Use methods 3 through 5 for canned and bottled items (re-mark if 
label comes off); swab packaged items with damp cloth; dispose 
of other items in accordance with paragraph B2.6. 

Consider methods 1 through 5, 14, 17 through 22, 25, and car wash 
facilities. 

Flush down with fire or garden hose or remove. 

Reduce the need for decontamination by filtering the input at the 
source or enroute. For ditches; leach, pave, scrape, or install 
pipe and cover over; flush pipes; flocculate and clean catch 
basins. 



Replacement may cost less than decontamination. 



be handled and the application techniques and 
dust control measures can be performed for 
the Navy by the District Public Works Officer 
with his staff and resources. 

2. Criteria . Plutonium decontamination 
criteria have been established by the Joint 
Board on Future Storage of Atomic Weapons. 
These criteria can be summarized as follows. 

Condition A ; Contamination present 
in any amount. 

Action: Decontamination required 
consistent with reasonable effort and cost with 
the use of conventional methods. 

Condition B : Contamination present 
in amounts less than 2,000 ug/m^ after decon- 
tamination. 

Action: No further decontamination 
required. 

Condition C : Contamination present 
in amounts greater than 2,000 fig/m^ after 
decontamination. 

Action: Situation evaluated on an in- 
dividual basis. 



Figure B-l presents a flow chart that 
shows the three conditions listed above and 
indicates the choice of the course of decon- 
tamination action to be taken. Under Condi- 
tion A there are two possible courses of action. 
If the general level is less than 2,000 ug/m^, 
a Class I decontamination procedure is recom- 
mended; where the general level is greater 
than 2,000 /ig/m^, a trial of Class I and Class II 
procedures is recommended to determine 
which procedure will produce the required 
results. 

Either Condition B or Condition C will 
exist after decontamination has been accom- 
plished. If the general level is below 2,000 
/ig/m2, no further decontamination is required 
because the initial decontamination should 
have removed the particles that are susceptible 
to resuspension and the remaining contamina- 
tion should present no hazard. If the general 
level is greater than 2,000 fig/m^ after decon- 
tamination, Class III procedures may be 
required. The decision to conduct further 
decontamination in Condition C will depend on 
such factors as the ultimate use of the area, the 
ownership of the area, the cost of decontami- 
nation versus the cost of replacement, the fea- 
sibility of utilizing continuous air monitors as 
a control function, and other pertinent factors. 






B-8 

























CONDITION A 
Contamination present. 








t 




t 








General Level 2,000 /ig/m^ 




General Level greater than 
2,000 fig/m2 








Use Class I or II procedure 
(depending on trial test) 
over the entire area. 


Use Class I procedure ovei 
the entire area. 




1 


1 
















1 
J/ 


Treat localized spots 
2,000 figlm 2 - with Class I, 
II, or III procedure. 




' 


1 


t 












1 














CONDITION B 
General Level 2,000 (xg/m' 


i 




CONDITION C 
General Level 2,000 fig/m 




No further decontamination 
required. 


Use Class II or III procedure 
over entire area. Evaluate 
on an individual basis. 













Figure B-l. Plutonium Decontamination Flow Chart 



TABLE B-4 indicates the recommended 
decontamination procedures for the various 
components of a built-up area that may be- 
come contaminated with plutonium. The pro- 
cedures are separated into three classes as 
follows. 

(1) Class I procedures are generally 
those that are most readily available and can 
be performed at relatively low cost. 

(2) Class II procedures are those that 
require more effort and are more effective 
than Class I procedures. 

(3) Class III procedures are those that 
involve surface removal techniques or com- 
plete sealing and, by their very nature, are 
costly and time consuming. 



Considerable research has been directed 
toward the development of procedures for the 
removal of fallout that results from nuclear 
detonations. The same procedures are be- 
lieved adequate to meet the plutonium contam- 
ination (Plucon) problem. However, the pro- 
cedural performance may not coincide with 
that normally expected when dealing with nu- 
clear weapon debris, because of the gross 
differences in the chemical and physical char- 
acteristics and the quantity of fallout. 

3, Personnel Decontamination . The 
methods for the decontamination of personnel 
after a PuO;> accident are similar to those for 
decontamination after fallout except that all 
clothing containing the contaminant may have 
to be destroyed. (See paragraph 6 of B2.5 and 
paragraph B2.6.) In addition, the control of 



B-9 



TABLE B-4 (1 of 2) 
Recommended Decontamination Procedures 



r 









Planning 




Class 


Procedure 


Principle of operation 


rate 
(1,000 ft 2 /hr) 


No. of 
men 






Paved areas 






I 


Hosing 


Flush thoroughly with streams of water. 1-1/2-in. 
fire hose recommended. 


15 


6-8 


I 


Motorized 

flushing 


Clean with conventional street flusher. 


35 


1-2 


II 


Scrubbing 


After flushing by one of the above methods, scrub 
■with brushes and detergent, then flush a second 
time. 


10 


11-13 


III 


Sealing 


Cover and fix contaminant to the surface. 


0.75 


2 


III 


Resurfacing 


Spray with liquid asphalt and top with gravel and/or 
sand. 


25 


10 






Land areas 






I 


Soaking 


Saturate with water from fire hydrants, road sprin- 
klers, or irrigation systems to leach the contam- 
inant below the surface. 


30 


1 


I 


Oiling 


Fix the contaminant with oil spray. 


40 


2 


II 


Mixing 


Distribute contaminant uniformly to depth of 
several inches by rototilling. 


3 


1 


II 


Burying 


Turn top layer of contaminated soil under to depth 
of several inches with plow or disc. 


30 


1 


II 


Stripping 


Remove several inches of top soil by scraping, 
bulldozing. 


2-12 


1 


III 


Oiling and 
stripping 


Spray area with oil prior to removing layer of top 

soil 


2-12 


3 


III 


Filling 


Spread several inches of soil, gravel, and similar 
covering over the surface with scrapers, dozers, 
or other equipment. 


3-10 


1 


III 


Stabilizing 


Mix contaminated earth with oil or cement to depth 
of several inches and compact in place. 


1 


4 


III 


Surfacing 


Spray with liquid asphalt and top with gravel and/or 
sand. 


25 


10 


I 


Hosing 


Structural exteriors 


2.5 


2 


Flush down roofs and walls with streams of water. 


II 


Scrubbing 


Flush, scrub with brushes and detergent, and flush 
again. 


2.5 


5 


III 


Sealing 


Cover and fix the contaminant to the surface by 
painting. 


0.75 


2 


III 


Stripping 


Loosen paint with caustic compound and remove by 
hosing. 

Structural interiors and furnishings 


1 


3 


I 


Vacuuming 


Pick up and entrap contaminant with vacuum 
cleaner. 


0.5 


2 


I 


Swabbing 


Pick up contaminant with mops and rags soaked in 
detergent or mild chemical agents. 


0.5 


1 


I 


Dipping 


Dip items in detergent, solvent, or chemical 
solutions. 




1-3 


I 


Laundering 


Standard procedure under controlled conditions for 
clothing and fabrics. 




1-3 



B-10 






TABLE B-4 (2 of 2) 








■ 




Planning 


No. of 


Class 


Procedure 


Principle of operation 


rate 








(1,000 ft2/hr) 


men 






Structural interiors and furnishings — Continued 






I 


Special 
cleaning 


Lift dirt and contaminant out of rugs and upholstery 
with solid chemicals or dry foam cleaners. 




1-3 


II 


Sealing 


Cover and fix contaminant to the surface by 
painting. 


0.75 


1-3 


III 


Resurfacing 


Remove and replace wax, paint, varnish, and other 
surfaces in normal manner, 


0.25 


1-3 


III 


Sanding 


Remove outer surface layer with standard sanding 
machine. 


0.25 


1 


III 


Removal 


Dispose and replace. 

Vehicles, machinery, and equipment 






I 


Washing 


Flush, scrub with detergent, and rinse. 




1-3 


I 


Dipping 


Dip in detergent, solvent, or chemical solutions. 




2-6 


I 


Vacuuming 


Pick up and entrap contaminant with vacuum 
cleaner. 




1 


II 


Steam 

cleaning 


Clean with steam (or hot liquid) jet containing 
suitable additives. 




2 


II 


Degreasing 


Coat with "gunk" and rinse. 




2 


III 


Stripping 


Loosen paint with caustic compound and remove by 
hosing or dip rinsing. 




3 


III 


Sand blasting 


Remove outer surface layer with standard sand 
blasting equipment. 

Special problems 

Trees 


0.03-0.1 


2 


I 


Hosing 


Sprinkle foliage with low-pressure stream. Fog 
nozzles ideal. 




1-3 


II 


Fixing 


Spray with sealing agents (paint, lacquer, or oil) to 
lock contaminant to foliage. 

Stock piles 




2 


I 


Hosing 


Flush down with streams of water. 










shower water may be necessary, and is de- 
scribed in the following paragraph. Medical 
guidance will be required if there are any 
breaks in the skin or any indication that the 
contaminant may have entered a body opening. 

4. Water Control . If it is considerednec- 
essary to prevent the uncontrolled movement 
of the PuO^ contaminant out of the controlled 
area, the -water from showers, from pavement 
washing, from laundering, rain and snow, and 
any other water must be filtered or collected 
in a settling area, such as a dammed-off sec- 
tion of drainage ditch or stopped-off manhole, 
to allow sedimentation whereby the contami- 
nant may be collected. If this is impossible, 
water areas may become contaminated and the 
problems discussed in Section 3 of this Appen- 
dix will be created. 



5. Unpaved Areas . Wetting-down, rain, 
or snow will carry the contaminant into the 
soil (leaching), and thus reduce or even elim- 
inate the present hazard. Because erosion, 
plowing, earth-moving, or other soil distur- 
bances may later re-establish the hazard, 
periodic monitoring checks are necessary. 
The use of liquid asphalt, tars, or oils will 
prevent the resuspension of the dust and keep 
it near the ground surface for removal. 

6. Building Interiors . The usual means 
of cleaning the interior of a building, such as 
vacuum cleaning and scrubbing, are appro- 
priate, but the extreme care that is required 
to collect the contaminant and the need for 
digging out every nook and crevice can not be 
overemphasized. 



B-ll 



7. Laundering and Dry Cleaning . Ap- 
proximately 90% of the contaminant will be 
removed by the standard laundering and dry 
cleaning methods, but the water or cleaning 
solution will have to be filtered or changed 
frequently and disposed of in accordance with 
paragraph BE. 6. The cost of recovery under 
such conditions may exceed the replacement 
cost. 

B2.6 DISPOSAL, OF CONTAMINANT AND 
CONTAMINATED REFUSE 

The decontamination methods described 
in paragraph B2.5 either (a) imbed the Pu/Pu02 



dust by burial or sealing or (b) collect it, 
possibly intermixed with soil, tar, rags, or 
clothing, through scraping, filtering, or 
flocculating-cleaning. Only the collection of 
the contaminant poses disposal problems. It 
may be desirable to transport the contaminant 
and/or the refuse to a central storage and 
processingpoint to await disposal. The choices 
for disposal vary, depending on the geography 
and the regulations of other agencies, such as 
the AEC and pollution control organizations. 
For these reasons, the addition of further 
data is not considered necessary. 






Section 3. WATER AREAS 



B3.1 INTRODUCTION 



B3.4 PREDICTED HAZARDOUS AREA 



The overall problem that is involved in 
connection with a plutonium accident in water 
areas is far less serious than that described 
in the preceding sections in connection with 
accidents ashore. The problem in water areas 
will seldom, if ever, be anything other than a 
long-term one because the hazard is one of 
inhalation. (See paragraph 1(2) of B2.1.) 

B3.2 GENERAL 

This section is concerned with open 
water areas, such as reservoirs, settling 
basins, ponds, lakes, streams, rivers, canals, 
and harbors. The coverage is restricted to 
significant information that differs from that 
in Section 2. The applicable parts of Section 2 
should be utilized. 



B3.3 BASIC DATA 

Because of its slow settling-out rate in 
water, the contaminant that strikes moving 
water surfaces will be carried until the water 
is considerably slowed or stopped unless 
flocculation is employed. Resuspension in 
water is possible because of currents, water 
agitation created by personnel who are swim- 
ming or walking in the water, or by water 
craft. 



The surface predicted area must be re- 
lated to the location of the settled-out contam- 
inant by a study of the water movements that 
are involved, if any. 

B3.5 MONITORING 

Monitoring is not considerednecessary 
in water areas, as stated in paragraph B3.1; 
but if authorities require the monitoring of 
potable water sources and bathing areas, the 
suspended contaminant may be detected by the 
use of a microfilter, by drying and monitoring 
the residue, or by other laboratory techniques. 
The contaminated sediment may be detected 
by bottom -sampling and laboratory techniques. 
Evaporating a water sample and monitoring 
the residue will not be satisfactory because of 
the self -absorption phenomenon described in 
paragraph 1(3) of B2.1. 

B3.6 DECONTAMINATION AND DISPOSAL 

The decontamination of water areas and 
the disposal of the contaminant should not be 
necessary, as explained in paragraph B3.1, 
but it may be required to satisfy public au- 
thorities. The suspended contaminant may be 
removed by flocculation or filtering. The con- 
taminated sediment may be handled by dredg- 
ing, dumping at sea, or depositing ashore for 
drying-out and handling as an unpaved area. 
(See paragraph 5 of B2.5.) 



( 



Section 4. NRDL/EODTC PLUCON TEAM 



B4.1 INTRODUCTION 



B4.2 MISSION 



It is planned that the naval district and 
similar disaster control teams will soon be 
adequate to assume the functions currently 
being performed by the NRDL and EODTC 
PLUCON Teams. 



The mission of the NRDL/EODTC 
PLUCON Team is. to assist the commander 
who is responsible for handling a weapons 
accident as follows. 



B-12 















(1) Augment local teams in radiological 
monitoring of contaminated areas. 

(2) Provide an instrument calibration 
service and advice on monitoring techniques 
and interpret the data derived from monitoring 
and instrument readings. 

(3) Specify hazardous and safe areas, 
basedon currently established tolerance levels 
for surface and airborne contamination. 

(4) Provide advice regarding available 
and desirable methods of decontamination, 
reclamation, and waste disposal, 

(5) Provide information regarding lo- 
gistic and equipment requirements, the antici- 
pated effectiveness of the various recovery 
methods and the cost of recovery in terms of 
time, manpower, and money. 

(6) Provide advice and assistance (a) in 
evaluating the extent of the biological hazard 
that is incurred by personnel who were exposed 
prior to evacuation, and (b) controlling and 
evaluating the biological hazard that was suf- 
fered by recovery and reclamation crews 
during the decontamination operation. 

(7) Provide overall advice on optimum 
methods of handling organizational and opera- 
tional problems that are associated with de- 
contamination and radiological control of large 
areas, 

B4.3 PERSONNEL 

The Team will be composed of the fol- 
lowing members, 

1. Team Leader . The Team Leader will 
coordinate all the Team's efforts. He will 
receive all requests from the commander and 
will relay to him all finds and opinions of the 
Team. 

2. Radiological Safety Specialist . The 
Radiological Safety Specialist is qualified to 
provide advice regarding instrument calibra- 
tion and to recommend and advise on detailed 
monitoring techniques and the interpretation 
of data obtained. He is qualified to specify 
hazardous and safe areas, in accordance with 
established tolerance levels. He is qualified 
to recommend protective measures for all 
operations. 

3. Recovery Specialist . The Recovery 
Specialist is qualified to advise on available 
and desirable methods for decontamination, 
reclamation, and waste disposal. He is quali- 
fied to provide information regarding logistic 



and equipment requirements, the anticipated 
effectiveness of the various recovery methods, 
and the cost of recovery in terms of time, 
money, and manpower. 

4. Medical Officer . The Medical Offi- 
cer is qualified to evaluate the extent of the 
biological hazards that may be incurred by all 
personnel, whether they are exposed prior to 
evacuation or during subsequent monitoring 
and decontamination procedures. 

5. Hospital Corpsman , The Hospital 
Corpsman will assist the Medical Officer as 
required. 

6. Instrument Specialist . The Instru- 
ment Specialist is qualified to calibrate, re- 
pair, and maintain the radiacs that are used 
in the operation, 

B4.4 EQUIPMENT 

The Team will have its ownalpha survey 
meters and beta-gamma survey meters to 
augment, to some extent, the supply that is 
provided by the commander. A detailed list of 
monitoring equipment is contained in Table 
B-5. 

B4.5 LOGISTIC SUPPORT BY AREA 
COMMANDER 

The area commander should supply the 
following support for the Team. 

(1) Berthing and messing facilities for 
six men. 

(2) Transportation for six men and ap- 
proximately 2,750 lb of equipment from the 
point of arrival in the commander's area to 
the scene of the accident. The equipment will 
be packed in cases that total about 170 cu ft, 
with the largest size case being 2 ft by 2 ft by 
3 ft. 

(3) Field laboratory facilities consisting 
of two separate spaces of 100 sq ft each. One 
space will be provided with 30 sq ft of bench 
or table space; the other space will be pro- 
vided with 100 sq ft of shelving or other stor- 
age space for samples. Electric lights and 
2-1/2 KW, 100-volt, 60-cycle, single-phase 
power source will be required. 

B4.6 GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS 

The Team from NRDL will assist on ac- 
cidents that occur west of the Mississippi 
River; the Team from EODTC will assist on 
accidents that occur east of the Mississippi 
River. Each Team will be in readiness status 
to get under way on four hours' notice. 



B-13 



Quantity 



TABLE B-5 



Monitoring Equipment 






Description 



2 Laboratory-type alpha scintillation counters for accurate analyses 

3 Technical associates alpha meter (JUNO) Model SRJ-3, for use as a reference 

instrument for survey meters 

10 Eberline gas-flow proportional alpha survey meters, Model PAC-2G, range 

0-100,000 dpm, with accessories and spare parts 

10 AN/FDR-10 radiac sets: alpha survey meters 

4 AN/PDR-18 radiac sets: gamma survey meters 

4 A1M/PDR-27 radiac sets: beta-gamma survey meters 

25 IM-19B/PD radiacmeters: dosimeters, 0-10 r 

2 PP-354C/PD dosimeter chargers 

23 Check sources and counting standards 

25 Staplex air samplers 

12 Annular air impactors 

2 Wind measuring sets (portable) 

Electronic maintenance and repair equipment, including oscilloscope, Simpson 
meter, radiopulser, voltage regulators, and tools 

50 Contamination signs, metal 

100 Contamination stickers 

100 Marking stakes 

50 Mine marking tapes, 1,000-ft rolls 

50 Plastic bags, 2 1 x 6' 

100 Plastic bags, 1' x 2' 

200 Plastic bags, 6" x 1' 

150 Sample bottles 

500 Air sample filters, type 1106B, MSA 

1,000 Sample envelopes 

60 sets Protective (rad-safe) clothing, including booties, hoods, caps, coveralls, socks, 

and underwear 

12 pr Shoes, leather 

12 pr Rubbers 

12 pr Rubber gloves 

12 pr Leather gloves 

12 Masks, M9A1 

12 Canisters, spare, Mil 

12 rolls Masking tape, 2" -rolls 

b Skin decontamination kits 

12 Laundry bags 






B-14 






APPENDIX C 
PURIFICATION OF WATER CONTAMINATED BY CW AGENTS 






C-l 






APPENDIX C 

DECONTAMINATION OF WATER CONTAMINATED BY CW AGENTS 



tipn 
wat< 






When the supply of water is too heavily 
contaminated by CW agents to pass the screen- 
ing test, every effort should be made to secure 
another natural, noncontaminated source or to 
have pure water supplied from elsewhere. If 
pure water is not available, the contaminated 
water must be treated as outlined briefly below. 
Only trained water-purification personnel 
should undertake such procedures. 

When large volumes of water are to be 
treated, the water must be withdrawn from the 
intermediate levels of the source, with a min- 
imum disturbance of the surface and with no 
disturbance of the bottom water, A limited 
amount of contaminated water is pumped into 
a canvas reservoir and a quantitative analysis 
made by the responsible officer, using the M4 
water testing kit for poisons. The amount of 
water that can be treated at one time will be 
governed by the capacity of the pump that is 
used for recirculation, and the water should 
not exceed one -half the hourly capacity of the 
pump. 

1, Treatment for Nerve Gas Contamina- 
tion . For the treatment of large volumes of 
water that is found to be contaminated with the 
nerve gases, the following procedure is rec- 
ommended. 

(a) After all the contaminated water 
that is to be treated at one time is pumped 
into the treatment tank, the proper amount of 
soda ash is added by submerging it in a wire 
basket. The soda ash is added to the contami- 
nated water at the rate of 5 ppm (1/24 lb for 
each 1,000 gal) for each ppm of nerve gas. 

(b) The soda ash and contaminated 
water are mixed by recirculation to assure 
the equal distribution of the soda ash. The 
mixing is continued until tests show that the 
residual agent concentration is near zero. 
This will be effected when the pH is above 9. 
Normally the mixing will require an hour. If 
the concentration of nerve gas drops too slowly, 
another dose of 5 ppm (1/24 lb per 1,000 gal) 
for each ppm of nerve gas should be added. 

(c) Alum should be added to reduce 
the pH for coagulation. Because of the in- 
creased pH, a higher dosage of alum than that 
usually employed for coagulation will be re- 
quired for a good floe; that is, about 240 ppm 
(2 lb per 1,000 gal) of alum may be required. 
Normal procedures and equipment may be used 
in adding alum and in the coagulation, settling, 
and filtration of the water. 



(d) After filtration, but before chlo- 
rination and use of the water, quantitative 
water tests should conform to the following 
conditions. 

(1) Nerve gas concentration, not 
more than 0.5 ppm. 

(2) The pH, above 5. 

(3) Chlorine demand, less than 



5 ppm. 



(4) No chemical odor or taste. 



(e) In the case of "GA" (one of the 
G-series agents) contamination, aeration of 
the treated water after chlorination is required 
to release from the treated water the cyanide 
gas that was formed by the above treatment. 
This aeration can be accomplished by recir- 
culation of the treated water through any noz- 
zle that will disperse the stream of water in 
the air. If sufficient dispersion is not obtained 
with available nozzles, the stream may be di- 
rected against a suitable baffle for additional 
dispersion. The release of the cyanide gas 
will require either 1-1/2 hours or 6 recircu- 
lations, whichever is the longer. Generally, 
equipment that can be used to test for cyanide 
will not be available; however, if the aeration 
procedure is carefully followed, the treated 
water will be safe for limited use. 

2. Treatment for Arsenicals and Mus- 
tard Contamination . For the treatment of large 
volumes of water that is found by tests to be 
contaminated with arsenicals and mustards, 
the following procedure is recommended. 

(a) Mix a predetermined amount of 
activated carbon to provide the doses given in 
(b) below, with several gallons of water and 
pump this mixture into the tank and then com- 
plete the filling of the tank with the contami- 
nated water. 

(b) The contaminated water should 
be treated with activated carbon (200 mesh) in 
the following doses. 

(1) For lewisite — 30 ppm (l/41b 
per 1,000 gal) of carbon for each ppm of 
lewisite. 

(2) For mustard — 30 ppm (1 /41b 
per 1,000 gal) of carbon for each ppm of 
mustard. 



C-3 



(3) For nit r o g e n mustard-- 60 
ppm (1/2 lb per 1,000 gal) of carbon for each 
ppm of nitrogen mustard. 

(c) The carbon and contaminated wa- 
ter are mixed by recirculation to assure the 
complete adsorption of the chemical agent by 
the carbon. The mixing time should be either 
20 minutes or the time that is required for 
recirculation of the water twi«e, -whichever is 
the longer. Hand mixing with paddles in a 
large tank will not usually give adequate mixing. 

(d) After the carbon and the water 
are mixed, alum and sufficient soda ash should 
be added for good coagulation. The amount of 
alum that is required will depend on the pH of 
the water that is being treated. A requirement 
of 175 ppm (1-1/2 lb per 1,000 gal) of alum 
would not be unusual. Regular procedures and 
equipment for coagulation and settling will be 
suitable for this operation. Sludge from this 



operation is contaminated and should be han- 
dled as such. It is suggested that this sludge 
be pumped into a shallow pit and covered with 
earth. 

(e) The supernatant water should 
then be filtered through the filters at their 
normal rate, or preferably a little slower. 
The filtered water should conform to the fol- 
lowing conditions before chlorination . 



(1) Mustards, not more than 5 



ppm. 



(2) Lewisite (arsenicals), not 

more than 20 ppm. 



5 ppm. 



(3) The pH, above 5. 

(4) Chlorine demand, less than 

(5) No chemical odor or taste. 









C-4 






APPENDIX D 
RADIAC REPAIR FACILITIES 









D-l 






APPENDIX D 

RAD1AC REPAIR FACILITIES 



The following radiac repair facilities have been established by the Chief, Bureau of Ships, 
to provide maintenance service on radiacs free of charge to end-user activities. Schedules for 
such service have been established by each facility and maybe obtained from the cognizant main- 
tenance activity upon request. 






Facility 

NAVSHIPYD Boston 

NAVSHIPYD Portsmouth 

NAVSHIPYD New York 

NAVSHIPYD Philadelphia 

NAVSHIPYD Norfolk 

NAVSHIPYD Charleston 

INDMAN EIGHT NRLNS 

INDMAN NINE GLARES 

INDMAN TEN San Juan 

NAVSHIPYD Long Beach 

RESINDMAN, 1 1ND, SDIEGO 

NAVSHIPYD Mare Island 

NAVSHIPYD SFRAN 

NAVSHIPYD Puget Sound 

NAVSHIPYD Pearl Harbor 

Naval Weapons Plant 
Washington, D. C. 

INDMAN FIFTEEN Balboa 

INDMAN SEVENTEEN Kodiak 



Area of Radiac Maintenance Cognizance 
All 1st ND and ships (except NavBase Portsmouth) 
NavBase Portsmouth and ships 

All 3rd ND and ships (including service to overseas activities) 
All 4th ND and ships 

All 5th ND and ships (including service to overseas activities) 
All 6th ND and ships 
All 8th ND and ships 
All 9th ND and ships 
All 10th ND and ships 
Northern sector of 11th ND and ships 
Southern sector of 11th ND and ship3 
All 12th ND and ships (except NSY SFRAN and NRDL) 
NSY SFRAN and ships (including NRDL) 
All 13th ND and ships 

All 14th ND and ships (including service to overseas activities) 
All PRNC and SRNC and ships 

All 15th ND and ships 
All 17th ND and ships 






Additional information concerning radiac equipment for disaster control purposes is obtain- 
able from the radiac coordinator at each of the activities listed above and from the following 
instructions: 

(1) Priorities of Allowances of Atomic, Biological, and Chemical Warfare Defense Mate- 
rial, OPNAV 04400.4, 7 Apr 55. 

(2) Passive Defense Equipment and Material; Responsibilities for, OPNAV 04400.6, 
11 Feb 57. 

(3) Uniform Maintenance Policy for Radiac Equipment; Establishment of, BUSHIPS 9673.11, 
30 Sep 54. 

(4) Uniform Maintenance Policy for Radiac Equipment; Guidance on, BUSHIPS 9673.11, 
Supplement 1, 10 May 55, 

(5) Bureau of Ships Manual , Chapter 67. 

D-3 



o 






o 






APPENDIX E 



Figures and Tables 






549252O-60-21 E-l 



APPENDIX E 



Figures and Tables 



Figure 
Number 



Title 



Page 



E-l Maximum Wave Height Versus Distancefrom Surface Zerofor 1-KT Explosion 

in Water Having a Scaled Depth of 85 ft E-5 

E-2 Peak Overpressure for 1-KT Airburst E-7 

E-3 Peak Overpressure for 1-KT Surface Burst E-9 

E-4 Peak Air Overpressure at the Surface for a 1-KT Explosion in Shallow Water 

Versus Distance from Surface Zero E-ll 

E-5 Cube Root Scaling Curve E-13 

E-6 Thermal Energy Versus Slant Range (1-KT Airburst) 2- to 50-Mile Visibility E-15 

E-7 Scaling Factor for Initial Gamma Radiation Versus Yield , E-17 

E-8 Comparable Effects of Initial Gamma Dose Rates Versus Yield at Various 

Peak Overpressures (Surface Burst) E-19 

E-9 Comparable Effects of Neutron Radiation Dose Rates at Various Peak Over- 
pressures (Airburst) E-21 

E-10 Crater Depth and Diameter Versus Yield for Surface Bursts in Dry Soil .... E-23 

E- 1 1 Crater Radius Versus Depth of Burst (1 KT, Dry Soil) E-25 

E-12 Dimensions of Underwater Crater Versus Weapon Yield (For Sand, Sand and 

Gravel, or Soft Rock) E-27 

E-13 Idealized Dose Rate Contours at One Hour Reference Time After 1-MT Surface 

Burst (15-Knot Scaling Wind) E-28 

E-14 Dose Rate Versus Time After Explosion E-31 

E-15 Estimated Percent Casualties From Nuclear Radiation as a Function of Total 

Dose and Time Over Which Dose is Delivered E-32 

E-l 6 Damage-Distance Relationship as a Function of Explosion Energy Yield for 

Diffraction-Type Structures E-39 

E-17 Damage-Distance Relationship for Drag-Type Targets as a Function of Weapon 

Yield E-41 

E-18 Probability of Firespread Versus Width of Fire Gap E-43 

E-19 Total Radiation Dose-Rate From Fallout in a Contaminated Area E-47 

E-20 Damage-Distance Relationships for Drag-Type Targets as a Function of Weapon 

Yield E-48 

E-21 Chart for Estimation of Dose Rates at Various Times After an Atomic 

Explosion E-49 



Table 

Number 



Title 



Page 



E-l Approximate Residual Radiation Dose Rate Contours on Ground at Reference 

Time of One Hour After 1 Megaton Surface Burst (Scaling Wind of 15 Knots) E-29 

E-2 Density and Velocity of Missiles E-29 

E-3 Potential Antipersonnel Biological Agents E-33 

E-4 Estimated Blast Damage From Nuclear Weapons E-34 

E-5 Shatter Pressure for Window Glazing Materials E-35 

E-6 Damage Criteria for Shallow-Buried or Earth-Covered Structures E-37 

E-7 Damage Criteria for Land Transportation Equipment E-42 

E-8 Damage Criteria for Parked Aircraft E-42 

E-9 Damage Criteria for Transmitting Towers E-42 

E-10 Reduction of Interior Thermal Radiation by Window Covering E-43 

E-ll Critical Thermal Energies for Materials E-44 



E-3 






El. MAXIMUM WAVE HEIGHT VERSUS DISTANCE FROM SURFACE ZERO FOR 1-KT 
EXPLOSION IN WATER HAVING A SCALED DEPTH OF 85 FT 

Figure E-l shows the approximate maximum crest-to-trough waveheight versus horizontal 
distance from surface zero for 1-KT burst in water having a scaled depth of 85 ft, That is, the 
actual depth divided by Wl/4 i s 85 ft. 

SCALING 

At a given distance from surface zero, the wave height for W-KT explosion is W^' 2 times 
the wave height at this distance for 1-KT burst in water of the same scaled depth. For water 
shallower than 85 Wl/4 ft, the wave height decreases linearly with the depth of water. 

EXAMPLE 

Given: (a) 30-KT bomb detonated in 200 ft of water, 

(b) 30-KT bomb detonated in 100 ft of water 

Find: Expected maximum wave height in each case at 4 

miles from surface zero. 

Solution: (a) Scaled depth of water is 200/ 30 1 / 4 or 85 ft. 
Therefore, Figure E-l is directly applicable to 
this case. From the curve, the maximum wave 
height at 4 miles from 1 KT is 1.0 ft. Therefore, 
for a 30-KT bomb in 200 ft of water the wave 
height is 

1.0 x 30 1 / 2 = 5.5 ft. 

(b) Because 100 ft is less than 85 W 1 / 4 , when W is ( 

30 KT, the wave height will now be proportional 
to the actual depth of the water. When the depth 
is 200 ft, the wave height at 4 miles from the 30- 
KT burst is 5.5 ft; hence for a water depth of 100 
ft, the wave height at the same distance is 

5 5 x 190 _ 2 7 ft 
5 ' 200 " 






E-4 




U Figure E-l. Maximum Wave Height Versus Distance from Surface Zero for 1-KT Explosion in 

Water Having a Scaled Depth of 85 ft 



E-5 



E2. PEAK OVERPRESSURE FOR 1-KT AIRBURST 

Figure E-2 shows the variation, of the peak overpressure with distance from ground zero 
for a 1-KT typical airburst in a standard sea level atmosphere under average surface conditions. 

SCALING 

For yields other than 1 KT, the range to which a given overpressure extends scales as the 
cube root of the yield, W: 



d = d x W"l/3 



where for a given overpressure 



d is the distance from the explosion for 1 KT, 

d is the distance from the explosion for W KT, and 

W^' ^ ig the scaling factor for W KT. (See Figure E-5 for the 
cube root scaling curve.) 

EXAMPLE 

Given: 10-MT typical airburst. 

Find: Distance to which 25 psi extends. 

Solution: From Figure E-5, the scaling factor for 10MT is 21.5. 
From Figure E-2, the peak overpressure of 25 psi 
occurs at a distance of 370 ft from 1-KT airburst. 

Therefore, for a 10-MT airburst 

d 



d Q x W 1 / 3 = 370 x 21.5 = 7,945 ft. 



E-6 



c 







100 1000 

DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (feet) 



Figure E-2. Peak Overpressure for 1-KT Airburst 






E-7 



E3. PEAK OVERPRESSURE FOR 1-KT SURFACE BURST 

Figure E-3 shows the variation of the peak overpressure with distance from ground zero 
for 1-KT surface burst in a standard sea level atmosphere. 

SCALING 

For yields other than 1 KT, the distance to which a given overpressure extends varies as 
the cube root of the yield, W: 



r 



d = d W 1 / 3 



where for a given overpressure 



d is the distance from the explosion for 1 KT, 

d is the distance from the explosion for W KT, and 

W 1 ' 3 is the scaling factor for W KT. (See Figure E-5 for the 
cube root scaling curve.) 

EXAMPLE 

Given: 1-MT surface burst. 

Find: Distance to the 2 psi contour. 

Solution: From Figure E-5, the scaling factor for 1 MT is 10. 
From Figure E-3, the peak overpressure of 2 psi 
occurs ata distance of 2,700 ft from the 1-KT surface 

burst. 



Therefore, for a 1-MT surface burst s 

d = d Wl/3 = 2,700 x 10 = 27,000 ft. 



E-8 



C 



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d = DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (feet) 






Figure E-3. Peak Overpressure for 1-KT Surface Burst 



E-9 



E4. PEAK AIR OVERPRESSURE AT THE SURFACE FOR A 1-KT EXPLOSION IN SHALLOW 
WATER VERSUS DISTANCE FROM SURFACE ZERO 

Figure E-4 gives the peak air overpressure at the surface for a 1-KT explosion in shallow 
water as a function of the distance from surface zero. This curve is for 1-KT explosion at mid 
depth in water that is 66 ft deep. 

SCALING 

The distance at which a given peak air overpressure occurs for a W-KT explosion is ob- 
tained by multiplying the distance for the same overpressure in the case of a 1-KT burst by the 
scaling factor, Wl/3, 

EXAMPLE 

Given: 30-KT bomb detonated in shallow water. 

Find: Distance at which the peak air overpressure at surface 

is 5 psi. 

Solution: From Figure E-4, the peak air overpressure of 5 psi 
will occur at a distance of 0.2 miles from surface zero 
for a 1-KT burst. Hence, the ground zero distance 
from a 30-KT explosion for the same overpressure is 

0.2 x 30!/3 = 0.62 mi. 






' 



E-10 













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1) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0. 
DISTANCE FROM5UR 


I 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
FACE ZERO (mil.i) 



Figure E-4. Peak Air Overpressure at the 

Surface for a 1-KT Explosion in Shallow Water 

Versus Distance from Surface Zero 






E-ll 



E5. CUBE ROOT SCALING CURVE ( 

Figure E-5 gives the values of cube roots that are required in the application of the scaling 



laws . 



EXAMPLE 

Given: 20-KT explosion. 

Find: The scaling factor for use in finding the blast wave 

properties for the 20-KT explosion versus 1-KT 
properties. 

Solution: Enter the scale for W with the value of 20 KT, inter- 
sect a diagonal line, and obtain the scaling factor, 
Wi/3 = 2.71. 






E-12 









i 



W - YIELD IN MEGATONS (MT) 
10 100 



s 

S 
H 
U 
< 



o e* 



H 




1000 



W - YIELD IN KILOTONS ( KT) 



Figure E-5. Cube Root Scaling Curve 



E6. THERMAL ENERGY VERSUS SLANT RANGE 

Figure E-6 shows the variation of thermal energy with distance (slant range) from a 1-KT 
explosion. 

The unit thermal energy for yields other than from a 1-KT explosion varies directly with 
the ratio of yields. 



( 



( 



£-14 






1000 n 



i 



''!'"i Ti" I •flS 1 .0 



.,1 "!l ! ! ]!"!]' J : I- -| 




100 



1000 



1000 10,000 

SLANT RANGE (feet) 



100,000 



Figure E-6. Thermal Energy Versus Slant Range (1-KT Airburst) 2- to 50-Mile Visibility 



E7. SCALING FACTOR FOR INITIAL GAMMA RADIATION VERSUS YIELD 

Figure E-7 presents the scaling factor to be used in conjunction with Figure Z-4. The 
curve is plotted for an airburst. A somewhat lower value of gamma yield will result from sur- 
face bursts, particularly from weapons up to 100 KT. The use of the airburst curve for surface 
bursts is conservative. However, the reduction of gamma yield is not great and, therefore, the 
slant range at which a given dose will be received is not greatly affected. 



I 



E-16 












lOOOr 



Fl 



100 



8 



< 




1,000.000 



100,000 



10,000 



100 1000 

YIELD (kiletem) 



10,000 



1000 
100,000 



Figure E-7. Scaling Factor for Initial Gamma Radiation Versus Yield 



E8. COMPARABLE EFFECTS OF INITIAL GAMMA DOSE RATES VERSUS YIELD AT VARIOUS 
PEAK OVERPRESSURES {SURFACE BURST) 

Figure E-8 presents the initial gamma radiation dose rate that accompanies selected peak 
overpressures from the surface burst of a weapon of a given yield. 

EXAMPLE 

Given: Structure located at such a range as to receive 10 psi 

from the surface burst of a 100-KT weapon. 

Find: Initial gamma radiation dose rate. 

Solution: Enter Figure E-8 with a weapon yield of 100 KT and 
10 psi; read the value of initial gamma radiation dose 
rate of 1,250 r. 






E-18 












a 



10 MT 




100 KT 



1000 10,000 

INITIAL GAMMA DOSE (roentgens) 



100,(1 



1,000,000 



Figure E-8. Comparable Effects of Initial Gamma Dose Rates Versus Yield at Various Peak Overpesssures (Surface Burst) 



E9. COMPARABLE EFFECTS OF NEUTRON RADIATION DOSE RATES AT VARIOUS PEAK 

OVERPRESSURES (AIRBURST) " 

Figure E-9 presents the neutron radiation dose rate that accompanies selected peak over- 
pressures from the airburst of a weapon of a given yield. 

EXAMPLE 

Given: Structure to be located at such a range as to receive 

25 psi from the surface burst of a 1-MT weapon. 

Find: Neutron radiation dose rate. 

Solution: Enter with a weapon yield of 1-MT and 25 psi; read 

26 rem. 






E-20 












10 MT 







1000 10,000 

NEUTRON RADIATION DOSE (rem) 



100,000 



1,000,000 



Figure E-9. Comparable Effects of Neutron Radiation Dose Versus Yield at Various Peak Overpressures (Airburst) 



E10. CRATER DEPTH AND DIAMETER VERSUS YIELD FOR SURFACE BURSTS IN DRY 
SOIL 






Figure E- 10 gives the values of apparent crater diameter and depth as a function of weapon 
yield for contact surface burst in dry soil. The average values of soil factors to be used as 
multipliers for estimating crater dimensions in other soil types are as follows. 

Soil types Diameter Depth 

Hard rock (granite or sandstone) 0.8 0.8 

Saturated soil 1.7 0.7 



EXAMPLE 

Given: 20-KT contact surface burst over a sandy loam soil 

where the water table is within a few feet of the sur- 
f ac e . 

Find: Crater dimensions. 

Solution: From Figure E-10 the crater diameter and depth in 
dry soil are 340 ft and 54 ft, respectively. By the 
application of the soil factors that are listed above for 
saturated soil, the estimated crater dimensions for a 
20-KT surface burst over saturated soil will be as 
fallows. 

Crater diameter, D a = 340 x 1.7 = 580 ft 

Crater depth, H a = 54 x 0.7 = 38 ft 

Diameter of rupture zone, D r = 1,5 D a - 870 ft 
Height of Up, Hi = 0.25 H a = 9 ft 






E-22 















10,000 



I*) 




1 KT 



10 KT 



100 KT 1 MT 

WEAPON YIELD 



10 MT 



Figure E-10. Crater Depth and Diameter Versus Yield for Surface Bursts in Dry Soil 



Ell. CRATER RADIUS VERSUS DEPTH OF BURST <1 KT. DRY SOIL) 

Figure E-ll gives the estimated crater radius as a function of depth of burst for 1-KT 
explosion in dry soil. For other soils, multiplication factors should be used as follows. 

Soil type Relative crater radius 

Hard rock (granite and sandstone) 0.8 

Saturated soil 1.7 

SCALING 

To determine the crater radius for a W KT yield, the actual burst depth is divided by W^'^ 
to obtain the scaled depth. The radius for 1 KT at this depth, as read from Figure E-ll, is then 
multiplied by wW3. 

EXAMPLE 

Given: 20 -KT burst at a depth of 50 ft in saturated soil. 

Find: Crater radius. 

Solution: Scaled burst depth is 50/20 1 ' 3 = 18.5 ft. From Figure 
E-ll, the crater radius for a 1-KT explosion at this 
depth is 90 ft. Hence the crater radius for a 20-KT 
burst at a depth of 50 ft in dry soil is 

90 x 20 ^ 3 = 244 ft. 

Therefore, the crater radius in saturated soil is 

244 x 1.7 = 415 ft. 









E-24 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lOU ■ 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































un ■ 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































* 












































































































$ 










































































































>2 
























































































































































































































3 
























































































































































































































S nn . 




































































































































































































































































































































M 












































































































iu 












































































































H 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































inn ■ 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































80 ■ 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































/ 










































































































j 


• 










































































































/ 








































































































/ 


























































1 
















































/ 










































































































i 










































































































60. 








































- 




,1 































































20 



40 60 80 

DEPTH OF BURST (feet) 



100 



120 



Figure E-1X. Crater Radius Versus Depth of Burst (1 KT, Dry Soil) 






E-25 



E12. DIMENSIONS OF UNDERWATER CRATER VERSUS WEAPON YIELD (FOR SAND, SAND 
AND GRAVEL, OR SOFT ROCK) 

Figure E-1Z gives the depth, diameter, and the lip height of the underwater crater as func- 
tions of yield. The results are for a burst less than 20 ft deep in 60 ft of water with a sand, sand 
and gravel, or soft rock bottom. 

For other bottom materials the crater dimensions can be estimated by multiplying the 
values from Figure E-12 by the following factors. 



Materials 


Diameter 


Depth 


Up Height 


Loess 
Clay 

Hard rock 
Mud or muck 


1.0 
1.0 
0.7 
0.7 


1.7 
2.3 
0.5 
0,4 


0.7 
2.3 

0.4 
0.2 




EXAMPLE 





Given: 200-KT bomb is detonated just below the surface of 60 

ft of water; the bottom is predominantly clay. 

Find: Crater dimensions. 

Solution: Dimensions from Figure E-12 for this burst are as 
follows. 

Factor 
for 

clay Dimension 

Diameter = 1,030 ft x 1.0 = 1,030 ft 

Depth = 37 ft x 2.3 = 85 ft 

Lip height - 3.5 ft x 2.3 = 8.0 ft 






E-26 









10,000 



1,000 



I 

-J 



1,000 



as 



Hi 




100 
WEAPON YIELD (KT) 



1,000 



10,000 



Figure E-12. Dimensions of Underwater Crater Versus Weapon Yield (For Sand, Sand and Gravel, or Soft Rock) 



E13. IDEALIZED DOSE RATE CONTOURS AT ONE HOUR REFERENCE TIME AFTER 1-MT 
SURFACE BURST (15-KNOT SCALING WIND) 






Figure E-13 shows the contours for various values of the Reference Dose Rate at one hour 
after the surface detonation of 1-MT weapon. The scaling wind (from left to right) is 15 knots. 

SCALING 

For weapon sizes other than 1 MT: 

I = I Q W 1 / 3 

d = d Q W 1/3 



where 



Given: 

Find: 

Solution: 



I Q = Dose rate for 1 MT at distance, d Q 

I = Dose rate for W MT at distance, d. 

EXAMPLE 

10-MT surface burst. 

Dose rate at 1 hour at 150 miles downwind, 
d 150 



W 



1/3 



10 



1/3 



= 70 mi. 



At 70 miles downwind, I is 300 r/hr. 

Therefore, at 150 miles downwind, 

I - L.W 1 / 3 = 300 x 10 1 / 3 = 660 r/hr. 





30 ^__ _^ 


I I 1 1 l 










_.._.-.- 


____„_!_ -pi M- — 3*:qr 




— ±:: _ ._. + — _.__ 


_— ■» ■ 




i 1D -^::"S.t 1 - x^iizpl + i+dx 


1 30 r/hr 




,_ --loor/in;; 




1 ~~-.~ i . j 1 ' 


§ ^ ^t-4- '"^ ■> J ---~' ' 


i 4-_ . 1 1 1 1 ! 


= --- - if (t'^s^'-^T - = = "-=- 3000r/hr Ll_i_ _ 5 *(, _ 


I000r/hr- j — — j f-r 5 - ^ 300 ry*» -1 — p — | — 1 


8 ° 1 U^J^H. - i--*| ! ' : "' : ' ■ ~ •,,# 


~r = ] j ' - i : - 


'2 , \ ■ a "•-.-fr 1 *; — -.:: , I • : ' L- — 


-i -+- 4- = -' = " -j- ^ 


B 5 ^ S "T-H / -j^ :! ^^ q '^ ' ' !f [ i \ 


....=-:. . X .... 


\ ^ImHffnfy ?l "^^^ftnfttri^Tl^ 


:=«::::::::::::::::i:«:;;::::«55:::::-~=::=n- : 


p io - ^-- — * - — - '~=-=^-+± + 


^~ i — L -^-i-i t .. . - _ mm ^ =f= -{ 






a -■ | . , -— -K-u 

, 5 xxt±-i±|: „. . , 


r44^4|XLU 1 1 j I |j 1 1 1 1 1 | ||" i rn t — rti 




:_!_:::::::::::.-. 






X 




10 10 20 30 * 

DISTANCE FROM CR 


] 50 60 70 SO 90 
OUHD ZERO (mfl».) 



Figure E-13. Idealized Dose Rate Contours at One Hour Reference Time After 1-MT 

Surface Burst (15-Knot Scaling Wind) 



E-28 



TABLE E-l 



Approximate Residual Radiation Dose Rate Contours on Ground at Reference Time of 
One Hour After 1 Megaton Surface Burst (Scaling Wind of 15 Knots) 1 



Dose rate 

(r/hr) 


Radius 

of 

GZ circle 

(mile) 


Displacement of 

center of GZ 

circle 

(mile) 


Downwind 

distance 
(mile) 


Crosswind 
distance 

(mile) 


3,000 


0.43 


0.60 


22 


3.1 


1,000 


1.40 


0.80 


40 


6.8 


300 


2.8 


1.02 


70 


11.8 


100 


4.7 


1.24 


114 


16.7 


30 


7.5 


1.46 


183 


22.8 


10 


11.0 


1.65 


317 


34.1 



Dose rate contours are for 1-hour reference time. Contours will not be completely established 
at 1 hour after explosion. 






Adjustment Factors for Contour Parameters 
for Various Scaling Winds 



Scaling wind 


velocity 




(knot) 




Factor 


5 




0.7 


10 




0.9 


15 




1.0 


20 




1.1 


25 




1.2 


30 




1.3 


40 




1.4 


50 




1.5 



Area = 1 x basic value. 

Downwind distance = F x basic value. 

Crosswind = (1 / F)x basic value. 

Diameter of ground zero circle = 1 x basic value. 

Downwind displacement of ground zero circle = F x basic value. 



TABLE E-2 
Density and Velocity of Missiles 



Peak 

overpressure 
(psi) 


Maximum 

missile density 

(number per sq ft) 


Missile velocity 

(ft per sec) 


5 
1.7 


480 
3.7 


58 - 382 
35 - 145 






E-29 



E14. DOSE RATE VERSUS TIME AFTER EXPLOSION 

Figure E-14 gives the ratio of the dose rate in r/hr at any time after the explosion to the 
dose rate in r/hr at one hour after the explosion as a function of the time after the explosion in 
hours . 

EXAMPLE 

At 30 minutes after an atomic explosion the radiation dose rate at a certain place, because 
of fallout, was found to be 20 roentgens per hour (20 r/hr). What would the dose rate be after 24 
hours? 

Solution: Enter time scale within 30 minutes, intersect curve to 
obtain value of 2.35 for ratio of dose rate at 30minutes 
to dose rate at 1 hour. 






Therefore, 



-&- -=2.35- 



Dose rate 1 hr 



Then, 



Dose rate @ 1 hr = -^- = 8.5 r/hr. 
2.35 

Enter time scale with 24 hours, intersect curve to 
obtain time value of .022 for ratio of dose at 24 hours 
to dose rate at 1 hour. 



Therefore, 

Dose rate @ 24 hr 



Dose rate @ 1 hr " °.°22. 



Then, 



Dose rate @ 24 hr = .022 x 8.5 = 0. 187 r/hr. 

r%- „ r^ * -u- T. T-, .. tr l {Ratio for X hr) 

Directly: Dose rate at X hours = Dose rate at Y hours x 7= — — ; ttt-; — r- 

' (Ratio for Y hr) 

Therefore, 

Dose rate @ 24 hr = -=^— x 0.022 = 0.187 r/hr. 
2.35 

Note; The Abscissa scale may be used in days if the ratio values in 

hours are multiplied by .022. For example, to find the ratio for 
days, the ratio for 2 hr = .45. Therefore, the ratio for 2 days = 
.45 x .022 = .01. 



E-30 












z 
o 
55 
O 
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Q. 
X 
UJ 

Of 

UJ 



at 

o 

z 

UJ 

z 
o 



UJ 

H 

UJ 

UJ 

< 
K 

UJ 

o 

Q 




0.01 



0.1 



1 10 

TIME AFTER EXPLOSION (hr ) 



100 



Figure E-14. Dose Rate Versus Time After Explosion 






E-31 



700 
600 
500 

2 400 

<J 

t- 
z 
u 

o 

* 

Bl 

O 300 
a 

200 
100 
















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100 10 
TIME (HOURS) 


00 









Figure E-15. Estimated Percent Casualties From Nuclear Radiation as a Function of Total Dose 

and Time Over Which Dose is Delivered 



E-32 









TABLE E-3 
Potential Antipersonnel Biological Agents 



Disease 


Organism 


C ommuni c ati on 


Incubation period 


Distribution 


Anthrax 


Bacillus 


Contact 

Inhalation of 

spores 
Mechanical vectors 
Ingestion 


1 to 7 days 


Rare in man 


Bacillary 
dysentery 


Bacillus 


Contact 
Ingestion 
Mechanical vectors 


1 to 7 days 


Endemic throughout 
world 


Cholera 


Bacillus 


Contact 
Ingestion 
Mechanical vectors 


1 to 5 days 


Endemic in Orient 


Coccidioido- 
mycosis 


Fungus 


Inhalation of 

spores 
Perhaps contact 


1 to 2 weeks 


Southwest U. S. A., 
Mexico, Argentina, 
Uruguay 


Encephalitis 
(Several 
types) 


Viruses 


Mosquito vectors 
Tick vectors 
(One type) 


2 to 15 days 


Specific types in various 
parts of world 


Glanders 


Bacillus 


Inhalation 

Contact 

Ingestion 


3 to 5 days 


Largely Asia and India 


Histoplas- 
mosis 


Fungus 


Not known 


Not known 


Probably general 


Infectious 

hepatitis 


Viruses A 
and B 


A: not known 
B: transfusions 


A: 15 to 40 days 
B: 40 to 150 days 


General 


Influenza 


Viruses A 
and B 


Contact 


A: 1 to 2 days 
B: 12to 18hours 


General 


Plague 
(bubonic) 


Bacillus 


Flea vectors 


4 to 7 days 


Endemic in Asia 


Plague 

(pneumonic) 


Bacillus 


Contact 


1 to 7 days 


Endemic in Asia 


R. M. Spotted 

fever 


Rickettsiae 


Tick vectors 


3 to 10 days 


North and South America 


Scrub typhus 


Rickettsiae 


Mite vectors 


7 to 10 days 


Orient 


Staphylococcus 
poisoning 


Toxins of 
staphylo- 
cocci 


Ingestion 


Up to 4 hours 


General 


Tularemia 


Bacillus 


Contact 

Ingestion 
Vectors 


1 to 10 days 


North America, Europe, 
Japan 


Typhus 


Rickettsiae 


Vectors 
Contact 


6 to 15 days 


General 


Q-fever 


Rickettsiae 


Not definitely 
known 


14 to 26 days 


Apparently widespread 






549252 O-60-23 



E-33 



TABLE E-4 

Estimated Blast Damage from Nuclear Weapons 

[1 Kiloton = 1,000 tons; 1 Megaton = 1,000,000 tons; 1 (X)-Atomic bomb of size used during World War II] 



Bomb size (TNT 
equivalent) 



Zone of A damage 



Radius 
(in miles) 



Area 

(in square 

miles) 



Zone of B damage 



Radius 
(in miles) 



Area 

(in square 

miles) 



Zone of C damage 



Radius 
(in miles) 



Area 

(in square 

miles) 



Zone of D damage 



Radius 
(in miles) 



Area 

(in square 

miles) 



i 



Kilotons; 

20. ... 1(X), 

40 2(X). 

50 2-l/2(X). 

60 3(X). 

80 4(X). 

100 5(X). 

120 6(X). 

140 7(X). 

160 8(X). 

Megatons: 

1 50(X). 

2 100(X). 

5 250(X). 

10 500(X). 

20 1,000(X). 



0.0-0.5 
0.0-0.6 
0.0-0.7 
0.0-0.7 
0.0-0.8 
0.0-0.9 
0.0-0.9 
0.0-1,0 
0,0-1.0 

0.0-1.8 
0.0-2.3 
0.0-3.2 
0.0-4.0 
0.0-5.0 



0.8 
1.3 
1.5 
1.6 
2.0 
2.3 
2.6 
2.9 
3.1 

11 
17 
31 
50 
80 



0.5-1.0 
0.6-1.3 
0.7-1.4 
0.7-1.4 
0.8-1.6 
0.9-1.7 
0.9-1.8 
1.0-1.9 
1.0-2.0 



1.8-3.7 


32 


2.3-4.6 


51 


3.2-6.3 


94 


4.0-7.9 


149 


5.0-10.0 


230 



2.3 
3.8 
4.2 
4.9 
6.0 
6.9 
7.8 
8.6 
9.4 



1.0-1.5 


3.9 


1.3-2.0 


6.2 


1.4-2.0 


7.1 


1.4-2.2 


8.1 


1.6-2.4 


10.0 


1.7-2.6 


11.5 


1.8-2.7 


13.0 


1.9-2.9 


14.4 


2.0-3.0 


15.7 



3.7-5.5 


53 


4.6-7.0 


84 


6.3-9.5 


156 


7.9-11.9 


248 


10.0-15.0 


390 



1.5-2.0 
2.0-2.5 
2.0-2,7 
2.2-2.9 
2.4-3.2 
2.6-3.4 
2.7-3.6 
2.9-3.8 
3.0-4.0 



5.5-7.4 


74 


7.0-9.3 


118 


9.5-12.6 


218 


11.9-15.9 


346 


15.0-20.0 


550 



5.5 
8.7 
10.1 
11.4 
14.0 
16.1 
18.2 
19.4 
22.0 



r 






TABLE E-5 



Shatter Pressure for Window Glazing Materials 










Approximate critical shatter 





Glazing material 




pressures in psi for 14" x 
20" panes 




Single strength window glass 


- 0.087" 


0.30 




Double strength window glass 


- 0.118" 


0.55 




3/16" Window glass 




1.40 




1/4" Plate glass 




2.50 




1/4" Safety sheet glass 




2.50 




1/4" Wired glass — figured 




2.50 




1/4" Polished wired glass 




2.50 




1/4" Tempered glass 




12.00 




1/4" Double plate with 1/4" 


space 


3.50 




1/10" Plastic acrylic 




2.40 




1/8" Plastic acrylic 




3.70 




3/l6" Plastic acrylic 




8.30 




1/4" Plastic acrylic 




14.80 





Note: For other pane sizes, the shatter pressure (P) is: 
k2 



P = 

where 

K a 



KRt' 

A < ln P S1 ) 



(62,000 for acrylic plastic 

. . . , (50,000 for tempered class 

1 tant = Approximately . „'„. ,5 B . 

(10,50U lor ordinary window 

glass 



t = thickness in in. 

A - area in sq in. 

R = size of pane factor from the following tabulation. 



Ratio of 


short 


R 


to long 


side 


1.0 




1.000 


0.9 




1.005 


0.8 




1.02 


0.7 




1.07 


0.6 




1.14 


0.5 




1.25 


0.4 




1.45 


0.3 




1.8 


0.2 




2.6 


0.1 




5.0 



EXAMPLE 

Find the shatter pressure for an 18" x 36" pane of double strength window 
glass. 

„ KRt z 10,500 x 1.25 x (.118) 2 

P =-A-= 18x36 - B °" 28 P si - 






E-35 









c 



El 5. DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION 

The general degrees of damage that are applicable to structures and equipment are classi- 
fied as follows. 

A. The structure is virtually completely destroyed. 

B. The damage is so severe that complete reconstruction is required prior to its re-use. 

C. The structural damage is such that major repairs are required before the structure 
can be used for its intended purpose. 

D. The structure received light damage, so that only minor makeshift repairs (or no re- 
pairs at all) are required to maintain its usefulness. 

The degrees of damage that are applicable to specific types of targets are shown in Table 
E-6, Table E-7, Table E-8, and Table E-9. 






TABLE E-6 
Damage Criteria for Shallow-Buried or Earth-Covered Structures 



Type of structure 


Damage 
class 


Peak over- 
pressure 
(psi) 


Nature of damage 


light corrugated steel arch 
surface structure (10- 
gage, span 20-25 ft) with 
earth cover over crown 


A 
B 

C 

D 


35-40 
30-35 

20-25 

10-15 


Complete collapse 

Collapse of portion of arch fac- 
ing the blast 

Deformation of end walls and 
arch, possible door damage 

Possible damage to ventilation 
system and door 


Light R/C surface or under- 
ground shelter with 3 -ft 
earth cover (2- to 3-in. 
thick panels, beams 
spaced at 4-ft centers) 


A 
B 
C 

D 


30-35 
25-30 
15-25 

10-15 


Collapse 

Collapse of portion of arch 

Deformation, severe cracking 
and spalling of panels 

Cracking of panels, possible 
door damage 






E-37 



E16. DAMAGE-DISTANCE RELATIONSHIP AS A FUNCTION OF EXPLOSION ENERGY YIELD 
FOR DIFFRACTION-TYPE STRUCTURES 

The nomogram and bar chart in Figure E-16 give the nature of the damage that may be 
expected to be sustained by representative diffraction- type structures at various distances from 
ground zero forvarious weapon yields. The symbols A, B, C, and D for various degrees of dam- 
age are defined for the structures that are listed in paragraph El 5. 

SCALING 

The chart may be used directly for yields from 1 KT to 20,000 KT (20 MT). For yields in 
excess of 20 MT, the scaling law is 



» 



d 



2.71 



where 



d = distance from ground zerofor W MT explosion to 
cause a specific damage, 

d Q = distance from ground zero for 20-MT explosion 
to cause the same damage, and 

W = weapon yield in MT. 






E-38 



Merchant Ships 
(Blast Damage) 




Parked Transport 
Aircraft 

(Blast Damage) 



Light Reinforced Concrete 
Surface or Underground 
Shelter, 3 ft cover 



Light Corregated Steel 
Arch Surface Structure 
with 3 ft Earth Cover 



Oil Storage Tank 
(filled) 



Wood Frame House 



Multistory Vail Bearing 
Bldg., Brick Apart- 
ment House Type 



Multistory Reinforced 
Concrete Frame and 
Walts, small Window Typ* 



Multistory Monumental 
Wall Bearing Bldg. 



Blast Resistant 
Reinforced Concrete 
Windowless Bldg. 



: SB — Surface Burst 
AB = Air Burst 



H H- 



Construction Line 



&/ \D *r\ ^ rc\ 



h co \o m ^r m^ 
I i I I I — I 1 r— 



— CG 

d © 
■ ti l l 



\0 ir> 
d d 
H — I 



DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO IN MILES 



£ P 



o o o a o 

H o o o 5 

o o oo o 

— i co ^o lA^^r 

N il I ■ ■< — > 



O ' 

o oo o o o 

o o o o o 
— < oo ^o m ** Ki 

1 I I I I I I — t- 



I I I 



| I I I I | I I 



WEAPON YIELD (W) IN KILOTONS 



Figure E-16. Damage-Distance Relationship as a Function of Explosion Energy Yield for 

Diffraction- Type Structures 






E-39 



E17. DAMAGE-DISTANCE RELATIONSHIP FOR DRAG-TYPE TARGETS AS A FUNCTION OF 
WEAPON YIELD 

The nomogram and bar chart in Figure E-17 shows the nature of the damage tobe expected 
at various distances from ground zero for drag sensitive targets. The damage criteria symbols 
A, B, C, and D are described for drag-type targets in Tables E-7, E-8, and E-9. 

SCALING 

Above 20,000 KT (20 MT), the scaling law is 

d Wl/3 d 

d = ~J7n = d o 

where 

d = distance from ground zero for W MT explosion to 
cause a specific damage, 

d Q = distance from ground zero for a 20-MT explosion 
to cause the same damage, and 

W = weapon yield, in MT. 









E-40 



c 






STRUCTURAL TYPE 



Light Steel Frame 
Industrial Building 
one story, Light Walls 



Medium Steel Frame 
Industrial Building 
One Story, Light Walls 



Multistory Steel Frame 
Office Building 
Light Walls 



Heavy Steel Frame 
Industrial Building 
One Story, Light Walls 



Multistory R/C Frame 
Building with Light 
Walls 



Highway and RR Truss 
Bridge. 250' to 550' Span 
Blast Normal to Axis 



Highway and RR Truss 
Bridge. 150' to 250' span 
Blast Normal to Axis 



AS 

SB 



AB 

SB 



AB 
SB 



AB 



SB 



AB 



SB 



AB 



SB 



AB 



SB 



SB 
AB 



Surface Burst 
Air Burst 




Cons 



taction Line 



35 



— i cor- \a v\ t 



rt'i I I — t- 



O ' 0D SO IT* ■* 

-7 a d d d 



MM I I (- 



DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (Miles) 



| I I + ^ 



- o o o o 



M ill l 



= 8 gggg g 

I I I I I * t 1 I™ 



-Ti DO \£j U^ "^T rr\ 

\ l I I f I I r- 



ll M I I I 1- 



WEAPON YIELD (W) IN (Kilotons) 



Figure E-17. Damage-Distance Relationship for Drag-Type Targets 
as a Function of Weapon Yield 






E-41 



TABLE E-7 



Damage Criteria for Land Transportation Equipment 



Type of equipment 


Damage 
class 


Nature of damage 


Commercial-type vehicles and 
construction equipment 


A 
B 

C 

D 


Completely demolished and parts scattered 

Large displacements, outside appurtenances 
torn off, need rebuilding before use 

Turned over and displaced, badly dented, 
frames sprung, need major repairs 

Glass broken, dents in body, pos sibly turned 
over, immediately usable 


Railroad rolling stock (box, 
tank, and gondola cars) 


A 
B 

C 

D 


Completely demolished and parts scattered 

Car blown from tracks and badly smashed, 
some parts usable 

Doors demolished, body damaged, could roll 
to repair shop 

Some door and body damage, car could 
continue in use 


Railroad locomotives (diesel or 
steam) 


A 
B 

C 

D 


Twisted and generally demolished 

Overturned, parts blown off, sprung and 
twisted so that major overhaul is required 

Probably overturned, can be towed to repair 
shop after being righted, needs major 
repairs 

Glass breakage and minor damage to parts, 
immediately usable 



TABLE E-8 



Damage Criteria for Parked Aircraft 



Damage 
class 


Overpressure 

(psi) 


Nature of damage 


A 
B 

C 

D 


6 
4 

3 

1 


Complete destruction 

Damage beyond economical repair 

Major shop repair required prior to flight 

Minor or no repair or replacement 
required prior to flight 



TABLE E-9 
Damage Criteria for Transmitting Towers 



Damage class 


Nature of damage 


A and B 
C 

D 


Towers demolished or flat on ground 

Towers partially buckled, but held by guylines; ineffective 
for transmission 

Guylines somewhat slack but tower usable for transmission 






E-42 






TABLE E-10 



Reduction of Interior Thermal Radiation by Window 


Covering 




Reduction 


Material 


(%) 


Window glass 





Aluminum shade screen and glass 


70 


Aluminum Venetian blind (slats closed) 


98 


Aluminum Venetian blind (slats at 45°) 


30 


Aluminum insect screen 24 x 24 and 20 x 20 mesh 


50 


to the inch 




Aluminum insect screen 14 x 18 mesh to the inch 


35 


Glass coating — Bon Ami 


50 


Whiting 


90 


Opaque paint 


35 






50 



100 150 200 

WIDTH OF FIRE GAP (feet) 



ivu ' 






I 






























■g 80 T 




a» 










5 I 




& ^ 








Q _£_ 




m \ J 




£ "V H 




* ^ 




"* 60 \ 




_l x 




j V 




= $ 




* \ 




iii j_ 




g \i 






. 






t V 




"* io N 




i w \ — 




v 




>■ V 




i- x ^ 








— ^ ^ 




CD *V 




< > ^ 




co r 




2 ?n N k — 




















^*^ 














*"" "*■*"& 




* k--» ^ 








250 



300 



Figure E-18. Probability of Firespread Versus Width of Fire Gap 






E-43 



TABLE E-ll (1 of 3) 
Critical Thermal Energies for Materials^ 










Critical energy 


Material 


Effect 


(cal/s 


q cm) 


KT weapons 


MT weapons 


CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS 


Acoustical tile, fibretone, 1/2" 
thick 


Sustains afterglow 


47 


94 


Acoustical tile, acoustic elotex, 
cane fiber tile, 1/2" thick 


Sustains afterglow 


46 


92 


Building board, celotex 


Sustains afterglow 


46 


92 


Insulating sheathing, celotex, 
1" thick, black surface 


Sustains afterglow 


40 


80 


Plaster board, gypsum, plain 
wallboard, 1/2" 


Paper surface charred 
through, destroyed 


43 


86 


Plaster board, plain rock lath, 
3/8" 


Paper surface charred 
through, destroyed 


39 


78 


Plaster board, insulating rock 
lath, 3/8" 


Paper surface charred 
through, destroyed 


44 


88 


Plywood, douglas fir, 1/4" 


Flames during exposure 


17 


34 


Plywood, douglas fir, 3/8" 


Flames during exposure 


20 


40 


Roll roofing, mineral surface 


Flames during exposure 


27 


54 


Roll roofing, smooth surface 


Flames during exposure 


11 


22 


Siding, corrugated steel, 28- 
gage, 1-1/4" corrugations 


Not affected up to 


107 


- 


Siding, galbestos, corrugated 
sheet, 22-gage 


Flames during exposure 


14 


28 


Wood, #2 grade, yellow pine 


Flames during exposure 


21 


42 


Woods metal (melting point 
165° F) 


Melts 


25 


50 



*The values in this table are approximations. Values for actual samples under given conditions 
vary, depending on size, thickness, backing, color, moisture content, and orientation. 



E-44 






TABLE E-ll (2 of 3) 
Critical Thermal Energies for Materials 







Critical 


energy 


Material 


Effect 


(cal/s 


q cm) 


KT weapons 


MT weapons 


ELECTRICAL CABLE 


Bell wire, insulated, annunciator, 
wire, twisted pair, #20 


Flames during exposure 


13 


26 


BX, armored, 14-2, 600-volt 


Not affected up to 


107 


- 


Cord, rubber insulated, #12-2, 
600-volt 


Flames during exposure 


13 


26 


Romax, nonmetallic sheathed, 
14-2, 600-volt 


Charring 


8 


16 


FABRICS 


Acetylated cotton coated with 

white plasticol (canopy material) 


Destroyed 


61 


- 


Awning, canvas (green) 


Ignites 


6 


9 


Denim, cotton (blue) 


Ignites 


9 


15 


Drapery, rayon acetate (wine) 


Ignites 


9 


16 


Flannel, wool (black) 


Ignites 


12 


28 


Shantung, acetate (black) 


Ignites 


9 


20 


Sheeting, cotton, (unbleached) 


Ignites 


8 


13 


Twill, rayon (beige) 


Ignites 


8 


16 


Twill, rayon (black) 


Ignites 


7 


14 


Venetian blind tape, cotton (white) 


Ignites 


10 


17 


Window shade, oiled (green) 


Ignites 


5 


11 


EXTERIOR PRIMARY IGN 


ITION POINT AND TRASH- 


■TYPE MATER 


IALS 


Excelsior 


Ignites 


9 


12 


Grass, coarse 


Ignites 


7 


26 


Leaves 


Ignites 


6 


12 


Paper, crumpled newspaper 


Ignites 


4 


I 1 


Paper, shredded newsprint 


Ignites 


3 


8 


Paper, trash can with papers 


Ignites 


6 


12 


Paper, fiberboard carton with 


Ignites 


8 


12 


papers 








Rags 


Ignites 


4 


8 


Waste, oily 


Ignites 


5 


5 


Wood, punky 


Ignites 


4 


9 






E-45 



TABLE E-ll (3 of 3) 
Critical Thermal Energies for Materials 







Critical energy 


Material 


Effect 


(cal/ sq cm) 


KT weapons 


MT weapons 


MISCELLANEOUS MATERIALS 


Bristol board, 3-ply (dark) 


Ignites 


8 


13 


Bristol board, 3-ply (white) 


Ignites 


12 


17 


Dust mop, cotton (grey) 


Ignites 


3 


5 


Hose, fire, cotton, rubber-lined, 
2-1/2" 


Flames during exposure 


ZO 


- 


Paint, fire-resistant (white), 
1 coat on 1/4" plywood 


Flames during exposure 


21 


- 


Paint, fire-resistant (white), 
1 coat on 1/32" steel plate 


Charring 


58 


- 


Strawbroom (yellow) 


Ignites 


8 


17 


Tampico fiber brush (grey) 


Ignites 


9 


27 









E-46 



( 



E18. TOTAL RADIATION DOSE-RATE FROM FALLOUT IN A CONTAMINATED AREA 

Figure E-19 gives curves for determining the total radiation dose from fallout in a contam- 
inated area as a function of the time of entry into the contaminated area after the explosion (or 
time of arrival of the contamination after the explosion) and the time spent in the contaminated 
area. 

Example: Find the total radiation dose from fallout that is re- 
ceived by an individual who enters a region 2 hours 
after the explosion and remains for 8 hours if the dose 
rate 1 hour after the explosion is 20 r/hr. 

Solution: By entering with a value of 2 hours for the time after 
explosion and intersecting the curve for 8 hours in the 
contaminated area, a multiplying factor of 1.2 is ob- 
tained. Therefore, the total accumulated dose is 

20 x 1.2 = 24 roentgens. 






10.0 



§ 

a 
o 



a. 
o 

S 
P 

u 

< 



_i 
a. 



3. 



1.0 



0.10 



0.01 



! t = Time In Contaminated Area. 

iritttiti";iM' ! ri:--irJ , ii£iii 




o.i 



1.0 



100 



10 
HOURS 
TIME AFTER EXPLOSION OF ■ ENTRY INTO CONTAMINATED AREA 
■ ARRIVAL OF CONTAMINATION 



1000 



Figure E-19. Total Radiation Dose-Rate from Fallout in a Contaminated Area 






E-47 



Radio and Television 
Transmitting Towers 
(200 ft. to 500 ft.) 



Telephone and Power 

Lines 

Tangential Orientation 



Telephone and Power 

Lines 

Radial Orientation 



Forests 

(175 trees per acre) 




Vehicles 



Railroad Rolling Stock 



Diesel and Steam 
RR Locomotives 
Side-on Orientation 



Diesel and Steam 
RR Locomotives 
End-on Orientation 



• AB = Air Burst 
SB = Surface Burst 






I— r- 



o 



| M I I I I 1- 



1 I I I i I I 

DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (Miles) 
I 



4+~H 



a 
3 
© 



o 
© 
o 



o 
o 
o 



I II 1 1 I I — » — I- 



c 
o 
o 



lilt 



+H 



— as so w ■* fi 



I M 1 



-t— f- 



YIELD OF WEAPON (kilotons) 



Figure E-20. Damage-Distance Relationships for Drag-Type Targets as a 

Function of Weapon Yield 

(For scaling formula, see paragraph 17) 



E-48 















H 

4- 




O 

O 

z. 

c 

3 

O 

z 



o 
en 
> 

o 
m 
yi 

■a 
O 

o 

c 

n 



> 

O 

o 
5 

o 
o 
> 

I - 

o 
o 
z 

z 
> 

H 

o 
z 



WO HOURS 1,0 00 



i r 



20 DAYS 40 



TIME AFTER EXPLOSION 



Figure E-21. Chart for Estimation of Dose Rates at Various Times After an Atomic Explosion 









c 









APPENDIX F 
MONITORING WITH FISH FOR CW AGENTS IN WATER 






F-l 






( 



APPENDIX F 

MONITORING WITH FISH FOR CW AGENTS IN WATER 



Fl. 



INTRODUCTION 






With the development of more toxic CW 
agents, it becomes increasingly important to 
explore all possible methods for the detection, 
identification, and measurement of contami- 
nants in water supplies. 

Chemical methods have been developed 
for the detection and measurement of certain 
CW agents in water. However, the use of such 
methods to continuously monitor water sup- 
plies would be somewhat difficult and costly. 
Also, other contaminants may be used for 
which chemical methods have not been devel- 
oped. Because fish are extremely sensitive to 
certain toxicants, they provide a rapid and 
inexpensive means of continuous detection. 

After the initial detection of contami- 
nants by fish, other methods may be used to 
further estimate the type and quantity of any 
contaminant. Fish, though not truly selective, 
do have certain physiological reactions and 
time of effect-concentration relationships that 
may be useful in identifying and estimating 
concentrations of a. contaminant. 



F2. 



TEST FISH 






The fish that are used for monitoring 
must be able to live in the normal water sup- 
ply, tolerate handling, be small and uniform, 
and react quickly to concentrations of the 
contaminant that would be harmful to man. 

Tests were made with five species of 
fish to determine their suitability for monitor- 
ing purposes. Of these the fathead minnow 
( Pimephales promelas ), ranging in lengthfrom 
50 mm to 65 mm and weighing about 1 to 1.5 
grams, was used in most of the tests. Blue- 
gills ( Lepomis macrochirus ) , green sunfish 
{Lepomis cyanellus), and goldfigh (Carrassius 
auratus) of similar size and weight were also 
used, as were guppies ( Lebistes reticulatus ) 
that weighed approximately 0.1 gram and 
ranged from 20 mm to 32 mm in length. All 
of these species proved suitable for use in 
monitoring systems. 

F3. CONDITIONS 

Generally, the dissolved oxygen and the 
pH of drinking waters are such that they will 
not adversely affect the test fish. However, 
care must be taken to remove any toxic mate- 
rial, such as chlorine, and some temperature 



adjustments may be necessary. Concentra- 
tions as low as 0.5 mg/1 of free available 
chlorine may be toxic to some species of fish. 
Of the species tested, bluegills andgreen sun- 
fish were the most resistant. Chlorine is 
somewhat more toxic in soft water and in low 
pH water than in hard water and high pH. 

Dechlorination of test waters can be 
accomplished either by aeration and exposure 
to sunlight, by passage through activated car- 
bon, or by adding a reducing agent. When 
sodium thiosulfate, the selected reducing agent, 
was added continuously, it served as the best 
method and agent for a continuous monitoring 
system. It takes about 7 mg of sodium thio- 
sulfate (Na2S20j) to reduce 1 mg of chlorine 
and, because it is highly soluble, it can be 
added continuously into the influent of a test 
aquarium. Sodium thiosulfate is nontoxic to 
fish in the required concentrations. 

The optimum temperature range for 
warm water fish is from 20 to 28 C. They 
can tolerate gradual changes between 4 and 
34 C, but abrupt changes of over 5 C should 
be avoided. Ordinary aquarium heaters will 
help to moderate extremes and make test re- 
actions more valid. 

Dissolved oxygen levels should remain 
above 4 mg/1 during the tests. Lower levels 
may cause fish mortality or abnormal sensi- 
tivity to some toxicants. 

Most species of fish can tolerate pH 
levels between 5 and 9, but pH changes can 
greatly influence the toxicity of chemicals. 
No recommendation is made for pH control; 
however, an accurate record of the pH is de- 
sirable for a subsequent interpretation of 
results. 

False alarms that are caused by heavy 
metals, insecticides, or other toxicants seem 
less likely than the trouble that arises from 
chlorine. Copper, lead, and zinc can be toxic 
to fish in soft water above concentrations of 
0.05, 0.2, and 0.5 mg/1, respectively. 

F4. MONITORING APPARATUS 

The simplest type of monitoring system 
that can be used is the direct flow of water 
from a tap through an aquarium that contains 
fish. If 5 to 10 three-inch fish are used, a 
volume of 10 to 20 liters with a replacement 



F-3 



FROM CONSTANT HEAD SIPHON 



TO WASTE 





INFLUENT 



AIR STONE 



HEATER 






Figure F-l. Continuous -Flow Monitoring Apparatus 



time of 1 to 2 hours is adequate to get a rapid 
response of the fish to possible contaminants. 

Modifications are necessary in most 
cases to dechlorinate water and to control 
water temperature. Figure F-l shows a suit- 
able monitoring apparatus. Accurate records 
of temperature, dissolved oxygen, pH, alka- 
linity, and hardness are useful if any estimates 
of concentration of possible contaminant are 
to be made. 

Very little maintenance is required for 
this continuous flow system. Dead or diseased 
fish should be removed and replaced with 
fresh stock. The fish should be fed about three 
times a ■week with a dry food, and the aquarium 
should be cleanedoccasionally. The thiosulfate 
solution will have to be prepared about twice 
a week. A stock of a reasonable number of 
test fish should be kept on hand. 

F5. TOXICITY OF CW AGENTS 

Nerve gases are considered the chemical 
agents with greatest potential for use in con- 
taminating water. 

Table F-l shows the variation in resist- 
ance of five species of test fish to Sarin in 
soft and hard water. Of these, bluegills were 
found to be the most sensitive species and 
goldfish the most resistant. 



TABLE F-l 

Comparative Toxicity of Sarin to Five Species 
of Fish in Soft and Hard Waters 



Test fish 


Dilution 
water 


TLm for Sarin 1 
(/ig/Uter) 


24 hr 


48 hr 


96 hr 


Bluegills 


Soft 
Hard 


7.5 
23.5 


3.2 
23.5 


3.2 
23.5 


Green sunfish 


Soft 
Hard 


4.6 
15.2 


4.2 

15.2 


4.2 
15.2 


Fathead 

minnows 


Soft 
Hard 


6.5 
32.1 


5.3 
31.9 


4.4 
31.9 


Guppies 


Soft 
Hard 


8.3 
21.0 


7.2 
14.5 


7.2 
13.8 


Goldfish 


Soft 
Hard 


16.1 


11.8 


9.8 



'TL m median tolerance limit, ^g/liter, con- 
centration that causes 50 -percent mortality 
of test fish. 



F6. TIME OF EFFECT, 
RELATIONSHIPS 



CONCENTRATION 



The time of response (loss of equilib- 
rium or death) of fish is dependent upon the 






F-4 









concentration of a toxicant, with the response 
time usually more rapid with the increasing 
concentration of the chemical. By exposing 
fish to known concentrations of a toxicant, a 
time of effect-concentration relationship can 
be established (see Figure F-2), Unknown 



concentrations can thus be estimated from the 
time of fish reaction. Because the human 
tolerance of Sarin is 0.5 mg/l, fish were 
exposed to this concentration and the reaction 
time was noted. When the 50-percent loss of 
equilibrium was used as an end point, this 



1 = 






10,000 
9 



S 
v> 

i 

■j 

S 1,000 

-~ 9 

1 

I 5 



100 

! 

T 
S 



TTTT 



i i i mini i i i mm — i iimy 



• 50 X Deolh 

O 60 X Lots of Equilib'iurr 




I I Mill 



,t .3 * .9 t 7.1 9 W 



3 4 S C 7 89K> 



i i mm i i i mini [ I I Mi 



2 S * » « TUDO 

Time (Minutes) 



3 4 3 6 7 8 91,000 



3 I 9 171! 10,000 



Figure F-2. Effect Curve Showing the Time of 50 -Percent Loss of Equilibrium and Death of 
Fathead Minnows Exposed to Known Concentrations of Sarin 



F-5 



F 1 — I I I M ill 1 I I I M il l 1 I I I Mill 1 — I I I Mill 1 I I t It >M 



:= 



! = 



i 

I 

3-i.on 

i 




I I I I fill I I Jll J 1 I I 1111 

I s — * g J 7 i 1 lo t J • i i T alio ! 3 i ■ * t •■in i 3 . 9 6 V ■ > 1.000 5 J n-TTTT 






= < 



4 9 * T fl 9 100 Z 3 496TI9 I.OOO 

Time (Mlnutts) 



Figure F-3. Time of Effect-Concentration Curve Showing the Time of 50-Percent Death of Fat- 
head Minnows Exposed to Known Concentrations of Sarin in Soft and Hard Water 



F-6 









concentration could be detected in eight min- 
utes; when the 50-percent death criteria was 
used, the detection time was twelve minutes. 

The time of effect-concentration curve 
presented in Figure F-3 shows the effect of 
water quality on the time of 50-percent death 
of fish. 

The general response of fish to Sarin is 
somewhat similar in all concentrations, but 
of course each sequence of events is of shorter 
duration in the higher concentrations. With 



fathead minnows, the initial response was an 
increase in the depth and rate of respiration 
followed by an increase in activity. This was 
followed by a period of high excitability with 
body tremors, and then a complete loss of 
equilibrium, after which they soon died. The 
most conspicious feature was the exaggerated 
respiratory action, extension of gill covers, 
and a. wide opening of the mouth. The exten- 
sion of the pectoral fins forward was a re- 
sponse that was observed with organic phos- 
phorus compounds that had not been observed 
with other chemicals. 






F-7 






I 






APPENDIX G 

ABBREVIATIONS, GLOSSARY, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 






G-l 






I 









ABBREVIATIONS 






Form 


Term 


Form 


Term 


AC 


hydrogen cyanide 


HD 


distilled mustard 


AW 


atomic warfare 


HN-1 


nitrogen mustard 


BW 


biological warfare 


HT 


mustard — T mixture 


cc 


cubic centimeter 


kt 


kiloton 


cal 


calorie 


L 


Lewisite 


cal /sq cm 


calories per square centimeter 


LCt 


unit of lethal dose of war gas 
(c, concentration; t, time) 


CG 


phosgene 










LD 


lethal dose 


CK 


cyanogen chloride 










Mev 


million electron volts 


cm 


centimeter 




(see Glossary) 


Ct 


measure of dose from CW agent. 


Hg/m 2 


microgram per square meter 




(Concentration in nig/m-* multi- 
plied by time, t, or length of 


mg 


milligram 




exposure,) 


mg/m3 


milligrams per cubic meter 


cu yd 


cubic yard 


rat 


megaton 


CW 


chemical warfare 


ppm 


parts per million 


cx 


phosgene oxime 


psi 


pounds per square inch 


dpm 


disintegrations per minute 


r 


roentgen 


dps 


disintegrations per second 


r/hr 


roentgens per hour 


dps /cc 


disintegrations per second per 


Rad 


unit of absorbed dose of radia- 




cubic centimeter 




tion (see Glossary) 


ED 


ethyl dichloroarsine 


Rbe 


relative biological effectiveness 


GA 


tabun 


Rem 


unit of neutron radiation dose 
(see Glossary) 


GB 


sarin 










Rep 


unit of absorbed dose of radia- 


GD 


soman 




tion (see Glossary) (roentgen 
equivalent physical) 


GZ 


ground zero 


RW 


radiological warfare 


H 


mustard 


sq cm 


square centimeter(s) 






G-3 






I 









GLOSSARY 

ABC WARFARE DEFENSE; Those disaster control measures employed to minimize the effects 
of atomic, biological, and chemical attacks, 

ACTIVE IMMUNITY: Immunity resulting from the production of antibodies by the individual's 
own bodycells in response to a stimulus provided bythe presence of antigen in the tissues. 

ACUTE: Having a short and relatively severe course. 

AEROSOL: A suspension of fine solid or liquid particles in air or gas, such as smoke, fog, or 
mist. 

AIRBURST: The explosion of a nuclear weapon at such a height that the expanding ball of fire 
does not touch the earth's surface when the luminosity is a maximum (in the second pulse). 
A typical airburst is one for which the height of burst is such as may be expected to cause 
maximum blast destruction in an average city. 

ALPHA PARTICLE: A particle emitted spontaneously from the nuclei of some radioactive ele- 
ments. It is identical with a helium nucleus, having a mass of four units and an electric 
charge of two positive units. 

ANTHRAX: An infectious and usually fatal disease of animals, especially cattle and sheep. 

ANTIBIOTICS: Substances produced by and obtained from living cells, usually those of lower 
plants, such as bacteria and molds; they are antagonistic to other forms of life, including 
pathogenic organisms. Examples are penicillin and streptomycin. Some may also be 
produced synthetically. 

ANTIBODY: A specific substance produced by the body in reaction to a specific foreign body 
(antigen), such as bacteria and toxins; examples are antitoxins and agglutinins. 

ANTIGEN: Any substance which when introduced in the body stimulates the formation of an anti- 
body. Antigens are usually protein in nature and react in an antagonistic manner with 
specific antibodies. 

ANTITOXIN: A substance found in the blood serum or other body fluids which is specifically 
antagonistic to a toxin. 

APHTHOUS FEVER: Foot-and-mouth disease; characterized by whitish spots in the mouth. 

ARACHNID: One of a class of arthropods, including the ticks, mites, spiders, and scorpions. 

ARTHROPOD: One of a class of animals with segmented body and jointed legs; examples are 
insects, arachnids, and crustaceans. 

ATOM: The smallest (or ultimate) particle of an element that still retains the characteristics of 
that element. Every atom consists of a positively charged central nucleus, which carries 
nearly all the mass of the atom, surrounded by a number of negatively charged electrons, 
so that the whole system is electrically neutral. See Element , Electron , Nucleus . 

ATOMIC BOMB (OR WEAPON): An instrument of combat which utilizes nuclear energy as a 
principal means for inflicting blast, thermal, and nuclear radiation damage upon an enemy. 

ATOMIC CLOUD: An all-inclusive term for the mixture of hot gases, smoke, dust, and other 
particulate matter from the bomb itself and from the environment, which is carried aloft 
in conjunction with the rising ball of fire produced bythe detonation of a nuclear (or atomic) 
weapon. 

G-5 






ATOMIC DEFENSE: Defensive measures against the effects of atomic attack, including defense 
against blast and fires; is a more general term than radiological defense, which is concerned 
only with radiological hazards. 

AW: Abbreviation for atomic warfare. 

BACKGROUND RADIATION: Nuclear (or ionizing) radiations arising from, within the body and 
from the surroundings to which individuals are always exposed. The main sources of the 
natural background radiation are potassium-40 in the body, potassium-40 and thorium, 
uranium, and their decay products (including radium) present in rocks, and cosmic rays. 

BACTERIA: One-celled micro-organisms that have no chlorophyl and multiply by dividing in 1, 
2, or 3 directions of space. 

BASE SURGE: A cloud which rolls outward from the bottom of the column produced by a subsur- 
face burst of an atomic weapon. For underwater bursts the surge is, in effect, a cloud of 
liquid droplets which has the property of flowing almost as if it were a homogeneous fluid. 
For subsurface land bursts the surge is made up of small solid particles but still behaves 
like a fluid. 

BETA PARTICLE: A charged particle of very small mass emitted spontaneously from the nuclei 
of certain radioactive elements. Most (if not all) of the fission fragments emit (negative) 
beta particles. Physically, the beta particle is identical with an electron moving at high 
velocity. 

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS: Viruses, any of certain classifications of micro-organisms and toxic 
substances derived from living organisms used to produce death or disease in man, animals, 
and growing plants. 

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: Employment of living organisms, toxic biological products, and chemi- 
cal plant growth regulators to produce death or casualities in man, animals, or plants; or 
defense against such action. 

BLAST LOADING: The loading (or force) on an object caused by the air blast from an explosion 
striking and flowing around the object. It is a combination of overpressure (or diffraction) 
and dynamic pressure (or drag) loading. 

BLAST WAVE: A pressure pulse of air, accompanied by ■winds, propagated continuously from an 
explosion. 

BOTULISM: Any poisoning by the Toxin from the bacterium, Clostridium botulinum ; infects pre- 
served food, especially sausages, canned meat, fruit, or fodder. 

BUFFER ZONE: Additional strips around a reclaimed working area to obtain the desired reduc- 
tion in radiation field at the edge of the working area. 

BW: Abbreviation for biological warfare. 

CARRIER: An individual who harbors specific disease organisms without showing symptoms, 
thus serving as a means of conveying infection. 

CASUALTY GAS: War gas capable of producing serious injury or death in effective concentrations. 

CELL: A small mass of protoplasm, generally including a nucleus, surrounded by a semipermeable 
membrane or cell wall. It is the structural and functional unit of all living organisms, plant 
and animal, with the possible exception of viruses. 

CHEMICAL SPRAY: Aerial release or device for aerial release of liquid war gas for casualty 
effect, or of liquid smoke for aerial smoke screens. See airplane smoke tank. 

CHEMICAL WARFARE: Tactics and technique of conducting warfare by use of chemical agents. 

CHLORINATION: The use of chlorine to destroy harmful micro-organisms as in the purification 
of water. 

G-6 















CHOKING GAS: Casualty gas which causes irritation and inflammation of the bronchial tubes and 
lungs. Phosgene is an example of this type of gas, 

CHRONIC: Long continued; opposite of acute. 

CLOUD COLUMN: The visible column of smoke extending upward from the point of burst of a 
nuclear (or atomic) weapon. The cloud column from an air burst may extend to the 
tropopause, i.e., the boundary between the troposphere and the stratosphere. 

COLLECTIVE PROTECTION: Equipment, installation, and techniques used by a unit or small 
group for defense of personnel, materiel, and animals against any type of attack, including 
chemical, biological, and radiological attack. 

COLONY: A collection or group of micro-organisms in a culture; they are derived from the 
increase of a single organism or group of organisms. On solid culture media a colony may 
be visible to the naked eye. 

COMMAND CENTER: A term that signifies the location of the command headquarters or center 
from which operations and communications within its responsible area are controlled. 

COMMUNICABLE: Capable of being transmitted from one individual to another. 

CONCENTRATION: Amount of war gas or screening smoke present in a given volume of air; 
expressed in milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m^). 

CONTAGIOUS: Transmissible from one individual to another. 

CONTAGIOUS DISEASE: An infectious disease capable of being transmitted from one individual 
to another. Many infectious diseases are not contagious but require some special method 
of transmission or inoculation. 

CONTAMINATION: The deposit of radioactive material, biological warfare agents, or chemical 
warfare agents on the surface of structures, areas, personnel or objects. In the case of 
radioactive material, the material may beproduced by an atomic explosion, or may be dis- 
tributed by deliberate spread of radiological material produced by other means. 

COUNTERMEASURES: Actions taken to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapons; measures 
taken to permit use of an area at an earlier time after a contaminating attack than would be 
otherwise possible; term includes allpre-attack and post- attack measures whose effective- 
ness can be expressed in terms of a residual number. 

COVERT: Hidden, concealed, insidious. 

CUBE ROOT LAW: A scaling law applicable to many blast phenomena. It relates the time and 
distance at which a given blast effect is observed to the cube root of the energy yield of the 
explosion. 

CURIE: A unit of radioactivity; it is the quantity of any radioactive species in which 3.700 x 1010 
nuclear disintegrations occur per second. The gamma curie is sometimes defined corre- 
spondingly as the quantity of material in which this number of disintegrations per second 
are accompanied by the emission of gamma rays. 

CUTANEOUS: Pertaining to the skin. 

CW: Abbreviation for chemical warfare. 

DAMAGE CRITERIA: Standards or measures used in estimating specific levels of damage. 

DECAY (OR RADIOACTIVE DECAY): The decrease in activity of any radioactive material with 
the passage of time, due to the spontaneous emission from the atomic nuclei of either alpha 
or beta particles, sometimes accompanied by gamma radiation. 

DECONTAMINANT: Anything that is used to bring about decontamination of a person, object, or 
area. 

549252O-60-25 G-7 






DECONTAMINATION: The process of making any object or area safe for unprotected personnel 
by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical, biological, 
Or radiological agents clinging to or around it. 

DETECTOR: Chemical, electrical, or mechanical device for detection and identification of chemi- 
cal agents, biological agents, or radioactive materials. 

DIFFRACTION: The bending of waves around the edges of objects. In connection with a blast 
wave impinging on a structure, diffraction refers to the passage around and envelopment 
of the structure by the blast wave. Diffraction loading is the force (or loading) on the struc- 
ture during the envelopment process. 

DISASTER: A situation, usually catastrophic in nature, in which numbers of persons are plunged 
into helplessness and suffering and, as a result, may be in need of food, clothing, shelter, 
medical care, and other basic necessities of life. 

DISASTER CONTROL: Consists of measures taken to reduce the probability and to minimize the 
effects of damage caused by hostile action, without employing active weapons or initiating 
offensive action; the defense of base without the use of active weapons and without taking 
the initiative. 

DISASTER CONTROL CENTER: A fixed facility at activities and commands from which passive 
defense measures are controlled or coordinated; may be a separate facility or it may be a 
part of a command center or control center. 

DISINFECT: To free from pathogenic organisms or to destroy them. 

DISINFECTANT: An agent, usually chemical, that destroys infective agents. 

DISPERSAL: Act of separating personnel, material, or activities which are concentrated in tar- 
get areas in order to reduce vulnerability to enemy action. 

DISPERSAL IN TIME: Use of work shifts to ensure that only a fraction of the work force is in 
the area at one time. 

DOSE: A (total or accumulated) quantity of ionizing (or nuclear) radiation. The term dose is often 
used in the sense of the exposure dose, expressed in roentgens, which is a measure of the 
total amount of ionization that the quantity of radiation could produce in air. This should be 
distinguished from the absorbed dose, given in reps or rads, which represents the energy 
absorbed from the radiation per gram of specified body tissue. Further, the biological 
dose , in rems, is a measure of the biological effectiveness of the radiation exposure. See 
Rad, Rbe, Rem, Rep, Roentgen. 



c 



DOSE RATE: As a general rule, the amount of ionizing (or nuclear) radiation to which an indi- 
vidual would be exposed per unit of time. It is usually expressed as roentgens per hour or 
in multiples or submultiples of these units, such as milliroentgens per hour. Thedose rate 
is commonly used to indicate the level of radioactivity in a contaminated area. 

DOSIMETER: An instrument used to measure the total amount of radiation absorbed during a 
period of time. 

DOSIMETRY: The theory and application of the principles and techniques involved in the meas- 
urement and recording of radiation doses. Its practical aspect is concerned with the use of 
various types of radiation instruments with which measurements are made. 

DRAG LOADING: The force on an object or structure due to the transient winds accompanying 
the passage of a blast wave. The drag pressure is the product of the dynamic pressure and 
a coefficient which is dependent upon the shape (or geometry) of the structure or object. 

DYNAMIC PRESSURE: The air pressure that results from the mass air flow (or wind) behind 
the shock front of a blast wave. It is equal to the product of half the density of the air 
through which the blast wave passes and the square of the particle (or wind) velocity in the 
wave as it impinges on the object or structure. 

G-8 






o 






ELECTRON: A particle of very small mass, carrying a unit negative or positive charge. Nega- 
tive electrons, surrounding the nucleus, are present in all atoms; their number is equal to 
the number of positive charges (or protons) in the particular nucleus. The term electron, 
where used alone, commonly refers to these negative electrons. A positive electron is 
usually called a positron, and a negative electron is sometimes called a negatron. 

ELEMENT: One of the basic substances (or a kind of matter) which cannot be decomposed by 
chemical means into simpler substances. It is also a subdivision of a Diaster Control Unit; 
elements are composed of diaster control teams. 

EMERGENCY SCENE: The general location of an incident of disaster proportions, whether re- 
sulting from natural causes or enemy attack. 

EMERGENCY RECOVERY STATIONS: Locations established in one or more sections of an emer- 
gency scene; point of contact for all diaster control teams of one element conducting oper- 
ations within that section. These stations are designated by a short title, the first word of 
which indicates the Element of which it is a part, and the second work indicates the section 
to which it belongs; e.g., Engineer One is the contact point for all Engineer Element teams 
operating in Section I of the emergency scene. 

ENDEMIC: Native to, or prevalent in, a particular district or region; an endemic disease has a 
low incidence but is constantly present in a given community. 

ENTRY TIME: Thepredicted time at which radioactivity in a particular location will havedecayed, 
or contamination diffused to an intensity permitting entry of personnel under wartime con- 
ditions. 

EPIDEMIC: An outbreak of disease which spreads rapidly and attacks many individuals in the 
same region at the same time. Analogous to epiphytotic in plants and epizootic in animals. 

EXOTOXIN: A poisonous substance excreted by a living organism. 

FALLOUT: The process or phenomenon of the fall back to the earth's surface of particles con- 
taminated with radioactive material from the atomic cloud. The term is also applied in a 
collective sense to the contaminated particulate matter itself. 

FILM BADGE: A photographic film packet to be carried by personnel, in the form of a badge, 
for measuring and permanently recording (usually) gamma ray dosage. 

FIREBALL: The luminous sphere of hot gases which forms a few millionths of a second after 
detonation of atomic weapon and immediately starts expanding and cooling. 

FIRE PROTECTION: All measures relating to the prevention, detection, and control of fire. 

FIRE STORM: Stationary massfire, generallyin built-up urban areas, generating strong, inrush - 
ing winds from all sides, which keep the fires from spreading while adding fresh oxygen to 
increase their intensity. 

FISSION: A form of asexual reproduction in which the cell divides into two or more parts, each 
of which matures into a complete organism. Atomic fission is the splitting of an atomic 
nucleus, as the result of bombardment by neutrons, into two or more atomic nuclei. 

FISSION PRODUCTS: A general termforthe complex mixture of substances produced as a result 
of nuclear fission. A distinction should be made between these and the direct fission prod- 
ucts or fission fragments which are formed by the actual splitting of the heavy-element 
nuclei. Something like 80 different fission fragments result from roughly 40 different modes 
of fission of a given nuclear species, e.g., uranium - 235 or plutonium - 239. The fission 
fragments, being radioactive, immediately begin to decay, forming additional (daughter) 
products, with the result that the complex mixture of fission products so formed contains 
about 200 different isotopes of over 30 elements. 

FIXED SUPPORT: The rendering of assistance to a critical target area or stricken activity at 
facilities outside its mutual aid area, including extension of facilities for emergency dis- 
persal and evacuation before and after attack, emergency feeding, housing, hospitalization, 
and traffic control. 

G-9 



FLAME DECONTAMINATION: A reclamation method that loosens the contamination from the 
surface by means of heat, so that brushes or abrasive tools can readily remove the 
c ontamination . 

FLASH BURN: A burn caused by excessive exposure (of bare skin) to thermal radiation. 

FREE AIR OVERPRESSURE (OR FREE AIR PRESSURE): The unreflected pressure, in excess of 
the ambient atmospheric pressure, created in the air by the blast wave from an explosion. 

FUMIGATION: Exposure to fumes of a chemical .which destroys micro-organisms. 

V UNGUS: Any one of a group of thallophytic plants comprising the molds, mildews, rusts, smuts, 
and mushrooms; they do not contain chlorophyl and reproduce mainly by asexual spores. 

FUSION: The process whereby the nuclei of light elements, especially those of the isotopes of 
hydrogen, namely, deuterium and tritinum, combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element 
with the release of substantial amounts of energy. 

GAMMA RAYS (OR RADIATIONS): Electromagnetic radiations of high energy originating in atomic 
nuclei and accompanying many nuclear reactions, e.g., fission, radioactivity, and neutron 
capture. Physically, gamma rays are identical with X-rays of high energy, the only essen- 
tial difference being that the X-rays do not originate from atomic nuclei, but are produced 
in other ways, e.g., by slowing down (fast) electrons of high energy. 

GERM: Micro-organism; microbe. 

GROUND ZERO: The point on the surface of land or water vertically below or above the center 
of a burst of an atomic weapon; frequently abbreviated to GZ. For a burst over or under 
water, the term surface zero should preferably be used. 

HALF-LIFE: The time required for the activity of a given radioactive species to decrease to half 
of its initial value due to radioactive decay. The half-life is a characteristic property of 
each radioactive species and is independent of its amount or condition. The biological half- 
life is the time required for the amount of a specified element which has entered the body 
(or a particular organ) to be decreased to half of its initial value as a result of natural, 
biological elimination processes. The effective half-life of a given isotope is the time in 
which the quantity in the body will decrease to half as a result of both radioactive decay 
and biological elimination. 

HALF-VALUE LAYER THICKNESS: The thickness of a given material which will absorb half the 
gamma radiation incident upon it. This thickness depends on the nature of the material — it 
is roughly inversely proportional to its density — and also on the energy of the gamma rays. 

HARASSING AGENT: Any chemical agent used primarily to force masking of personnel. 

H-BOMB: An abbreviation for hydrogen bomb. 

HEIGHT OF BURST: The height above the earth's surface at which a bomb is detonated in the air. 
The optimum height of burst for a particular target (or area) is that at which it is estimated 
a weapon of a specified energy yield willproduce a certain desired effect over the maximum 
possible area. 

HOST: An animal or plant which harbors or nourishes another organism. 

HOT SPOT: Region in a contaminated area in which the level of radioactive contamination is 
somewhat greater than in neighboring regions in the area. 

HYDROGEN BOMB (OR "WEAPON): A term sometimes applied to nuclear weapons in which part 
of the explosive energy is obtained from nuclear fusion (or thermonuclear) reactions. 

HYDROLYSIS: The reaction of any chemical -with water whereby one or more new substances are 
created. 

IMMUNITY: The power of thebodyto resist the development of a disease or to counteract a toxin. 

INCENDIARY: A material that generates sufficient heat upon ignition under field conditions to 
cause the ignition of adjacent combustible substances. 

G-10 



o 



( 



c 






INCUBATION PERIOD: Time between which infection occurs and first symptoms appear. 

INDUCED RADIOACTIVITY: Radioactivity produced in certain materials as a result of nuclear 
reactions, particularly the capture of neutrons, which are accompanied by the formation of 
unstable (radioactive) nuclei. The activity induced by neutrons from a nuclear (or atomic) 
explosion in materials containing the elements sodium, manganese, silicon, or aluminum 
may be significant. 

INFECTIOUS DISEASE: One which is caused by a living agent such as bacteria, protozoa, viruses, 
or fungi; may or may not be contagious. 

INGESTION: The act of taking in, or swallowing for digestion, as into the stomach. 

INITIAL NUCLEAR RADIATION: Nuclear radiation (essentially neutrons and gamma rays) 
emitted from the ball of fire and the cloud column during the first minute after a nuclear 
(or atomic) explosion. The time limit of one minute is set, somewhat arbitrarily, as that 
required for the source of the radiations (fission products in the atomic cloud) to attain 
such a height that only insignificant amounts reach the earth's surface. 

INOCULATE: To introduce a micro-organism, disease, vaccine, or immunizing serum into the 
body; to communicate a mild form of disease by inserting its virus into the skin in order 
to produce immunity. 

INTENSITY: The energy (of any radiation) incident upon (or flowing through) unit area, perpen- 
dicular to the radiation beam, in unit time. The intensity of thermal radiation is generally 
expressed in calories per square centimeter per second falling on a given surface at any 
specified instant. As applied to nuclear radiation, the term intensity is sometimes used, 
rather loosely, to express the exposure dose rate at a given location, e.g., in roentgens (or 
milliroentgens) per hour. 

INTERNAL RADIATION: Nuclear radiation (alpha and beta particles and gamma radiation) re- 
sulting from radioactive substances in the body. Important sources are iodine-131 in the 
thyroid gland, and strontium-90 and plutonium-239 in the bone. 

IONIZING RADIATION: Electromagnetic radiation (gamma rays or X-rays) or particulate radi- 
ation (alpha particles, beta particles, neutrons, etc.) capable of producing ions, i.e., elec- 
trically charged particles, directly or indirectly in its passage through matter. 

IRRITANT AGENT: Chemical agent; toxic in field concentrations; usually not lethal. 

IRRITANT SMOKE: An irritant smoke (sternutator) is a chemical agent that can be disseminated 
as extremely small solid or liquid particles in air and which when so disseminated and 
breathed even in low concentrations, causes intolerable sneezing, coughing, lacrimation, 
or headache, followed by nausea, temporary physical disability, and sometimes mental 
depression. 

ISOTOPES: Forms of the same element having identical chemical properties but differing in 
their atomic masses (due to different numbers of neutrons in their respective nuclei) and 
in their nuclear properties, e.g., radioactivity, fission, etc. For example, hydrogen has 
three isotopes, with masses of 1 (hydrogen), 2 (deuterium), and 3 (tritium) units, respec- 
tively. The first two of these are stable (nonradioactive), but the third (tritium) is a 
radioactive isotope. Both of the common isotopes of uranium, with masses of 235 and 238 
units, respectively, are radioactive, emitting alpha particles, but their half -lives are dif- 
ferent. Further, uranium-235 is fissionable by neutrons of all energies, but uranium- 238 
will undergo fission only ■with neutrons of high energy. 

JAUNDICE: A diseased condition, characterized by yellowing of the skin and eyes and by a deep 
yellow color of the urine; this yellowing is due to the presence of bile pigments in the blood 
and tissue. Jaundice is also known as icterus. 

KILOTON ENERGY: The energy of a nuclear (or atomic) explosion which is equivalent to that 
produced by the explosion of 1 kiloton (i.e., 1,000 tons) of TNT, i.e., lO^Z calories or 4.2 x 
1019 ergs. 

G-ll 






LACRIMATOR: A chemical agent that causes a copious flow of tears and temporary but intense 
eye pain. 

LD-50, LD/50, or LD50: Abbreviations for median lethal dose. 

LETHAL CONCENTRATION: The concentration of an agent that will kill the average unprotected 
man. 

LOADING: The force on an object or structure or element of a structure. The loading due to 
blast is equal to the net pressure in excess of the ambient value multiplied by the area of 
the loaded object. 

LUNG IRRITANT: A chemical agent which, when, breathed, causes irritation and inflammation of 
the interior portion of the bronchial tubes and lungs; the primary physiological action of 
such an. agent is limited to the respiratory tract. 

MACH REGION: The region on the surface at which theMach stem has formed as the result of a 
particular explosion in the air. 

MACH STEM: The shock front formed by the fusion of the incident and reflected shock fronts 
from an explosion. The term is generally used with reference to a blast wave, propagated 
in the air, reflected at the surface of the earth. The mach stem is nearly perpendicular to 
the reflecting surface and presents a slightly convex (forward) front. The Mach stem is 
also called the Mach front. 

MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE EXPOSURE (or Mpe): The total amount of radiation exposure which it 
is believed a normal person may receive day-by-day without any harmful effects becoming 
evident during his lifetime. 

MEDIAN LETHAL DOSE: The amount of radiation received over the whole body which would be 
fatal to about 50 percent of human beings, or animals, or organisms. It is commonly 
(although not universally) accepted, at the present time, that a dose of about 450 roentgens, 
received over the whole body in the course of a few hours or less, is the median lethal dose 
for human beings. 

MEDIAN LETHAL GAS EXPOSURE (LCt5o): The exposure of a war gas required to kill 50 per- 
cent of those exposed. The unit used to express LCt5Q is milligram minutesper cubic meter . 

MEGATON ENERGY: The energy of a nuclear (or atomic) explosion which is equivalent to 
1,000,000 tons (or 1,000 kilotons) of TNT, i.e., 10 15 calories or 4.2 X 10 22 ergs. 

MEV (OR MILLION ELECTRON VOLTS): A unit of energy commonly used in nuclear physics. 
It is equivalent to 1.6 X 10"° erg. Approximately 200 mev of energy are produced for every 
nucleus that undergoes fission. 

MICROBE: Any individual micro-organism. 

MICRO-ORGANISM: Minute living organism, usually microscopic in size. 

MILLIROENTGEN: A one -thousandth part of a roentgen. 

MOBILE SUPPORT: The assistance rendered to a target area or critical target area by emer- 
gency recovery organizations dispatched from outside the mutual aid area. 

MONITORING: The procedure or operation of locating (and measuring) radioactive contamina- 
tion by means of survey instruments which can detect and measure (as dose rates) ionizing 
radiations. The individual performing the operation is called a monitor. 

MUTUAL AID: The organization of local forces within a target area or a critical target area, 
built around the resources of the political subdivisions, military activities, and Federal 
agencies within the area; these resources can be coordinated for the common defense of 
the target area. 

G-12 















NERVE GAS: War gas that, when absorbed into the body by breathing, by ingestion, or through 
the akin, affects the various body functions by its primary action on the nerve structures of 
the body. 

NEUTRON: A neutral particle, i.e., with no electrical charge, of approximately unit mass, present 
in all atomic nuclei, except those of ordinary (or light) hydrogen. Neutrons are required to 
initiate the fission process, and large numbers of neutrons are produced by both fission and 
fusion reactions in nuclear {or atomic) explosions. 

NOMINAL ATOMIC BOMB: A term, now becoming obsolete, formerly used todescribe an atomic 
weapon with an energy release equivalent to 20 kilotons (i.e., 20,000 tons) of TNT. This was 
approximately the energy yield of the bombs exploded over Japan and in the Bikini tests in 
1946. 

NUCLEAR RADIATION: Particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in 
various nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiations, from the weapons standpoint, 
are alpha and betaparticles, gamma rays, and neutrons. Allnuclear radiations are ionizing 
radiations, but the reverse is not true; X-rays, for example, are included among ionizing 
radiations, but they are not nuclear radiations since they do not originate from atomic nuclei, 

NUCLEAR WEAPON (OR BOMB): A general name given to any weapon in which the explosion 
results from the energy released by reactions involving atomic nuclei, either fission or 
fusion or both. Thus,theA(or atomic) bomb and theH (or hydrogen) bomb are both nuclear 
weapons. It would be equally true to call them atomic weapons, since it is the energy of 
atomic nuclei that is involved in each case. However, it has become more or less custo- 
mary, although it is not strictly accurate, to refer to weapons in which all the energy results 
from fission as A bombs, or atomic bombs. In order to make a distinction, those weapons 
in which part, at least, of the energy results from thermonuclear (fusion) reactions among 
the isotopes of hydrogen have been called H bombs, or hydrogen bombs. 

NUCLEUS (OR ATOMIC NUCLEUS); The small, central, positively charged region of an atom 
that carries essentially all the mass. Except for the nucleus of ordinary (light) hydrogen, 
which is a single proton, all atomic nuclei contain both protons and neutrons. The number 
of protons determines the total positive charge, or atomic number; this is the same for all 
the atomic nuclei of a given chemical element. The total number of neutrons and protons, 
called the mass number, is closely related to the mass (or weight) of the atom. The nuclei 
of isotopes of a given element contain the same number of protons, but different numbers 
of neutrons. They thus have the same atomic number, and so are the same element, but 
they have different mass number s (and masses) . The nuclear properties, e.g., radioactivity, 
fission, neutron capture, etc., of an isotope of a given element are determined by both the 
number of neutrons and the number of protons. 

ORGANISM: Any organized living being, animal, or plant. 

OVERPRESSURE: The transient pressure, usually expressed in pounds per square inch, exceed- 
ing the ambient pressure, manifested in the shock (or blast) wave from an explosion. The 
variation of the overpressure with time depends on the energy yield of the explosion, the 
distance from the point of burst, and the medium in which the weapon is detonated. The 
peak overpressure is the maximum value of the overpressure at a given location and is 
generally experienced at the instant the shock (or blast) wave reaches that location. 

OVERT: Open; manifest. 

PANDEMIC: Widely epidemic, affecting or attacking all or most of the population of a region. 

PARASITE: A plant or animal living in, on, or with some other living organism (the host) at 
whose expense it obtains food and shelter, 

PASSIVE IMMUNITY: Immunity created by inoculation with an immune serum. 

PATHOGEN: A disease-producing micro-organism. 

PERSISTENCY: The length of time an agent will remain effective at the point of release. 

PERMEABLE: Penetrable, refers to substances that allow the passage of air or fluids, 

G-13 






PHYSICAL SECURITY: A condition which results from the establishment and maintenance of 
protective measures; ensures a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 

PLANNING DOSE: The maximum dose that mission personnel are allowed to receive, taking into 
account the period of time during which it is received. 

PLASTIC RANGE: The stress range in which a material will not fail when subjected to the action 
of a force, but will not recover completely, so that a permanent deformation results, when 
the force is removed. Plastic deformation refers to dimensional changes occurring within 
the plastic range. 

PRIME TARGETS: Those concentrations of population, and/or industry and installations of the 
Armed Forces or Federal agencies which are considered essential to the prosecution of a 
war; lists of prime targets are classified information. 

PROTECTIVE CONSTRUCTION: Construction designed to reduce vulnerability from the effects 
of enemy attack or natural disaster; including dispersal in time or space; duplicate facili- 
ties and utilities; protective personnel shelters; collective personnel protection features 
against high explosives, atomic, biological and chemical warfare attacks; utilization of pro- 
tective terrain features; camouflage; aboveground blast, shock and fire resistant structures; 
and underground facilities. 

PROTON: A particle of mass (approximately) unity carrying a unit positive charge; it is identical 
physically with the nucleus of the ordinary (light) hydrogen atom. All atomic nuclei contain 
protons. 

PROTOZOA: One of the lowest divisions of the animal kingdom, including one-celled organisms. 

RAD: A unit of absorbed dose of radiation; it represents the absorption of 100 ergs of nuclear 
(or ionizing) radiation per gram of the absorbing material or tissue. 

RADLA.C EQUIPMENT: Equipment used todetect, measure, and indicate radioactivity . Thelettera 
in the term, "radiac," represent the expression: radioactivity, detection, indications, and 
computation. 

RADIOACTIVITY: The spontaneous emission of radiation, generally alpha or betaparticles, often 
accompanied by gamma rays, from the nuclei of an (unstable) isotope. As a result of this 
emission the radioactive isotope is converted (or decays) into the isotope of a different 
element which may (or may not) also be radioactive. Ultimately, as a result of one or more 
stages of radioactive decay, a stable (nonradioactive) end product is formed. 



RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE: A type of warfare in which radioactive materials are spread either 
directly, or from high explosive bombs, chiefly to deny an area to the enemy, or to force 
evacuation of any enemy-held area; not attended by a nuclear explosion. 

RBE (OR RELATIVE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTIVENESS): The ratio of thenumberof rads of gamma 
(or X) radiation of a certain energy which will produce a specified biological effect to the 
number of rads of another radiation required to produce the same effect is the rbe of this 
latter radiation. 

REFLECTED PRESSURE: The total pressure which results instantaneously at the surface when 
a shock (or blast) wave traveling in one medium strikes another medium, e.g., at the instant 
when the front of a blast wave in air strikes the surface of an object or structure. 

RECOVERY COMPLETION TIME: The time at which the recovery job is finished, including both 
the recovery period and the waiting time necessary to allow recovery personnel to enter 
the area. 

RECOVERY CONTROL POST: A facility established enroute to or at the scene of recovery oper- 
ations; necessary equipment facilities, andpersonnel (less staff officers) provided by stand- 
ard disaster control element teams; echelon of the recovery organization served by 
a particular recovery control post indicated by inserting the echelon designation between 
the words recovery and control; e.g., Recovery Group Control Post, Recovery Unit Control 
Post, and Recovery Section Control Post. 

G-14 






(J 






RECOVERY MEASURES: Steps taken after attack or disaster to restore the functional status of 
an activity. These measures are divided into three phases: (1) Emergency Recovery 
Measures, actions taken to keep loss of life and property to a minimum; (2) Operational 
Recovery Measures, steps taken to restore the essential utility of an activity; and (3) Final 
Recovery Phase, steps taken to restore all facilities required to accomplish the complete 
mission assignment of an activity. 

REFLECTION FACTOR: The ratio of the total (reflected) pressure to the incident pressure when 
a shock (or blast) wave traveling in one medium strikes another. 

REM: A unit of biological dose of radiation; the name is derived from the initial letters of the 
terra "roentgen equivalent man (or mammal)." The number of rems of radiation is equal 
to the number of rads absorbed multiplied by the rbe of the given radiation (for a specified 
effect). 

REP: A unit of absorbed dose of radiation; the name is derived from the initial letters of the 
term "roentgen equivalent physical." Basically, the rep is intended to express the amount 
of energy absorbed per gram of soft tissue as a result of exposure to 1 roentgen of gamma 
(or X) radiation. This is estimated to be about 97 ergs, although the actual value depends 
on certain experimental data which are not precisely known. The rep is thus defined, in 
general, as the dose of any ionizing radiation which results in the absorption of 97 ergs of 
energy per gram of soft tissue. For soft tissue the rep and the rad are essentially the 
same. 

RESIDUAL NUCLEAR RADIATION: Nuclear radiation, chiefly beta particles and gamma rays, 
which persists for some time following a nuclear (or atomic) explosion. The radiation is 
emitted mainly by the fission products and other bomb residues in the fallout, and to some 
extent by earth and water constituents and other materials, in which radioactivity has been 
induced by the capture of neutrons. 

RESIDUAL NUMBER: The decimal fraction of the radiation intensity that remains after a counter- 
measure is used. 

RICKETTSIAE: Gram-negative, nonmotile, intracellular, one-celledparasitic micro-organisms, 
probably intermediate between the bacteria and viruses. 

ROENTGEN: A unit of exposure dose of gamma (or X) radiation. It is defined precisely as the 
quantity of gamma (or X) radiation such that the associated corpuscular emission per 
0.001293 gram of air produces, in air, ions carrying one electrostatic unit quantity of elec- 
tricity of either sign. From the accepted value for the energy lost by an electron in pro- 
ducing a positive -negative ion pair in air, it is estimated that 1 roentgen of gamma (or X) 
radiation would result in the absorption of 87 ergs of energy per gram of air. 

RW: Abbreviation for radiological warfare. 

SABOTAGE: Malicious waste or destruction, especially by covert means. 

SECTION: A geographic subdivision of an emergency scene bounded bythe obstructionperimeter 
and/or the support perimeter. 

SECURITY: Measures taken by a command toprotect itself from espionage, observation, sabotage, 
annoyance, or surprise. 

SCALING LAW: A mathematical relationship which permits the effects of a nuclear (or atomic) 
explosion of given energy yield to be determined as a function of distance from the explo- 
sion (or from ground zero), provided the corresponding effect is known as a function of 
distance for a reference explosion, e.g., of 1-kiloton energy yield. 

SCATTERING: The diversion of radiation, either thermal or nuclear, from its original path as a 
result of interactions (or collisions) with atoms, molecules, or larger particles in the 
atmosphere or other mediumbetween the source of the radiations, e.g., a nuclear (or atomic) 
explosion, and a point at some distance away. As a result of scattering, radiations (espe- 
cially gamma rays and neutrons) will be received at such a point from many directions 
instead of only from the direction of the source. 

G-15 



SCREENING SMOKE: A substance dispersed in the air to produce a dense cloud of obscuring 
smoke to reduce visibility. 

SELF-HELP MEASURES: The help which an activity administers to itself to reduce loss of life 
and property, and to continue its assigned mission. 

SHEAR WALL: A wall (or partition) designed to take a load in the direction of the plane of the 
wall, as distinct from lateral loads perpendicular to the wall. Shear walls may be designed 
to take lateral loads as well. 

SHIELDING: Any material or obstruction which absorbs radiation and thus tends to protect per- 
sonnel or materials from the effects of a nuclear (or atomic) explosion. A moderately thick 
layer of any opaque material willprovide satisfactory shielding from thermal radiation, but 
a considerable thickness of material of high density may be needed for nuclear radiation 
shielding, 

SHOCK FRONT (OR PRESSURE FRONT): The fairly sharp boundary between the pressure dis- 
turbance created by an explosion (in air, water, or earth) and the ambient atmosphere, 
water, or earth, respectively. It constitutes the front of the shock (or blast) wave. 

SHOCK WAVE: A continuously propagated pressure pulse (or wave) in the surrounding medium 
which may be air, water, or earth, initiated by the expansion of the hot gases produced in 
an explosion. A shock wave in air is generally referred to as a blast wave, because it is 
similar to (and is accompanied by) strong, but transient, winds. The duration of a shock 
(or blast) wave is distinguished bytwophases. First there is the positive (or compression) 
phase during which the pressure rises very sharply to a value that is higher than ambient 
and then decreases rapidly to the ambient pressure. The duration of the positive phase 
increases and the maximum (peak) pressure decreases with increasing distance from an 
explosion of given energy yield. In the second phase, the negative (or suction) phase, the 
pressure falls below ambient and then returns to the ambient value. The duration of the 
negative phase is approximately constant throughout the blast wave history and may be 
several times the duration of the positive phasel Deviations from the ambient pressure 
during the negative phase are never large and they decrease with increasing distance from 
the explosion. 

SLANT RANGE: The distance from a given location, usually on the earth's surface, to the point 
at which the explosion occurred. 

SMOKE SCREEN: Cloud of smoke used to mask either friendly or enemy installations or maneu- 
vers; may be a smoke blanket, smoke haze, smoke curtain, or blinding smoke. 

SPORE: Primitive reproductive bodies or resistant resting cells produced by some plants and 
micro-organisms. 

STAY-TIME: The period during which personnel may remain within a particular area of con- 
tamination or radiation hazard under wartime conditions. 

STERILIZATION: The process of killing all living cells, especially micro-organisms, by heat, 
chemicals, or other means. 

SUPPORT PERIMETER: A boundary of the target area where debris is first observed in the 
streets or where staytime is one week. 

SURFACE BURST: The explosion of a nuclear (or atomic) weapon at the surface of the land or 
water or at a height above the surface less than the radius of the fireball at maximum 
luminosity (in the second thermal pulse). An explosion in which the bomb is detonated 
actually on the surface is called a contact surface burst or a true surface burst. 

SURVEY: Determination of the location and levels of radiation (monitoring) in a radioactivity 
contaminated area; perimeter survey, the monitoring of boundaries of a contaminated area; 
vital area survey, the detailed monitoring of the vital area; location survey, the monitoring 
of structures and working locations within the vital area; supplementary survey, the moni- 
toring of surfaces on which test runs of reclamation methods are being made, or the moni- 
toring of special objects, such as food and water supplies. 

G-16 



r 



( 



o 












SURVEY METER: A portable instrument, such as a Geiger counter or ionization chamber, used 
to detect nuclear radiation and to measure the dose rate. 

TEAR GAS: Chemical agent which causes a blinding flow of tears and intense, though temporary, 
eye irritation; used for training and riot control. 

THERMAL, RADIATION: Electromagnetic radiation emitted (in two pulses) from the ball of fire 
as a consequence of its very high temperature; it consists essentially of ultraviolet, visible, 
and infrared radiations. In the early stages (first pulse), when the temperature of the fire- 
ball is extremely high, the ultraviolet radiation predominates; in the second pulse, the 
temperatures are lower and most of the thermal radiation lies in the visible and infrared 
regions of the spectrum. 

THERMONUCLEAR: An adjective referring to the process (or processes) in which very high 
temperatures are used to bring about the fusion of light nuclei, such as those of the hydro- 
gen isotopes, deuterium and tritium, with the accompanying liberation of energy. A thermo- 
nuclear bomb is a weapon in which part of the explosion energy results from thermonuclear 
fusion reactions. The high temperatures required are obtained by means of a fission explo- 
sion. 

TOXICITY: The property possessed by a material that enables it to injure the physiological 
mechanism of an organism by chemical means with the maximum effect being death. 

TOXIN: Generally any poisonous substance of microbic, vegetable, or animal origin. Truetoxine 
are of a proteinlike nature, more or less unstable, require aperiodof incubation or a latent 
period to produce symptoms, and induce in suitable animals the formation of specific anti- 
toxins. No incubation period is involved if toxin is introduced into body; incubation period 
is involved only if an organism capable of producing a toxin is introduced into the body, 

UNDERGROUND BURST: The explosion of a nuclear (or atomic) weapon with its center beneath 
the surface of the ground. 

UNDERWATER BURST: The explosion of a nuclear (or atomic) weapon with its center beneath 
the surface of the water. 

VECTOR: Carrier, especially the animal or host that carries the pathogen from one host to 
another, as the malarial mosquito. 

VEGETATIVE CELL: Nonspo reforming bacteria or sporeforming bacteria in their nonsporing 
state. 

VESICANT: A chemical agent that exerts a blistering effect on the skin. 

VIRULENT: Exceedingly hurtful, venomous, deadly. 

VIRUS: A minute infectious agent, smaller than bacteria, capable of passing through filters that 
will retain bacteria and of multiplying only within a living susceptible host cell. 

VOMITING GAS: Chemical agent which causes coughing, sneezing, pain in nose and throat, nasal 
discharge, and sometimes tears — often followed by headache; may cause vomiting; formerly 
called irritant smoke or sternutator. Adamsite is an example of a vomiting gas. 

VACCINE: Preparation of killed or attenuated Lnfective agent used in inoculating to produce 
active artificial immunity. 

VACCINATION: Protective inoculation with micro- organisms, killed or attenuated; protective 
inoculation against smallpox by inoculation with vaccinia (cowpox) virus. 

WAR GAS: Toxic chemical agent, irrespective >i its physical state. 

YIELD (OR ENERGY YIELD): The total effecti\e energy released in a nuclear (or atomic) explo- 
sion. It is usually expressed in terms of the equivalent tonnage of TNT required toproduce 
the same energy release in an explosion The total energy yield is manifested as nuclear 
radiation, thermal radiation, and shod* (and blast) energy, the actual distribution being 
dependent upon the medium in which the explosion occurs (primarily) and also uponthetype 
of weapon and the time after detonatior. 

G-17 



' 






c 






NAVPERS 10899 
NAVPERS 10098 
NAVPERS 10097 
NAVMED P-5041 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-6 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-8 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-9 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-10 

NAVDOCKS TP-FL-13 

NAVDOCKS TP-PL-18 
NAVDOCKS TP-PL-19 
OPNAVINST 3020.18 
NWIP 50-1 
OPNAVINST 3440.6 

NAVDOCKS TP-PL-11 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Passive Defense 1957. 

Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense, 1952. 

Atomic Warfare Defense, 1955. 

Treatment of Chemical Warfare Casualties, Dec. 1956. 

Water Supply for Advanced Bases, 1952. 

Personnel Shelters and Protective Construction (Draft 1959). 

Physical Security of Public Works, 1953. 

Basic ABC Allowance Planning (Continental Shore Activities and Out- 
lying Bases) (Confidential), I960. 

Radiological Recovery of Fixed Military Installations (Interim Re- 
vision), 16 April 1958. 

Natural Disasters, Effects and Engineering Control Measures, 1956. 

ABC Warfare Defense Materiel Inspection and Storage, 1959. 

Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Use, Feb. 1957. 

Battle Control (Confidential). 

U. S. Navy Passive Defense Manual, OPNAVINST 3440.6 (see p. 4-2), 
1955. 

Basic ABC Allowance Planning (Functional Component System), 
(Confidential), I960. 



FCDA TM-14- 1 



OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION 
Rescue Techniques and Operations, 1958. 



OTHER GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, June 1957. 






BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS MOTION PICTURE FILM 

MN-7984A ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Introduction, 19 min., B & W, 1954. 

MN-7984B ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Protective Shelters, 16 min., B & W, 

1954. 

MN-7984C ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Detection of Contaminated Areas in 

Biological and Chemical Warfare, 14 min., B & W, 1954. 

G-19 



BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS MOTION PICTURE FILM — Continued 

MN-7984D ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Protective Clothing for Decontamina- 

tion: Personnel, 12 min,, B & W, 1954. 

MN-7984E ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Biological Warfare Decontamination: 

Personnel, 15 min., B & W, 1954. 

MN-7 984F ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Biological Warfare Decontamination: 

Interiors, 6 min., B & W, 1954. 

MN-7984G ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Biological and Chemical Decontamina- 

tion: Exteriors, 15 min., B & W, 1954. 

MN-7984H ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Biological Warfare Decontamination: 

Personal Equipment, 9 min., B & W, 1954. 

MN-7984I ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Chemical Warfare Decontamination: 

Personnel, 14 min., B 8i W, 1954. 

MN-7984J ABC Warfare Defense, Survey of Disaster, 13 min., B & W, 1955. 

MN-7984K ABC Warfare Defense, Rescue Operations, Part I, 17 Min. ,B frW, 1955. 

MN-7984L ABC Warfare Defense, Rescue Operations, Part II, 18 min., 1956. 

MN-7984M ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Radiological Monitoring, 18 min. ,B &W , 

1957. 

MN-79840 ABC Warfare Defense Ashore, Radiological Decontamination of Per- 

sonnel and Equipment, 11 min., B & W, 1957, 

MN-7984P ABC Warfare Defense, Radiological Decontamination, Buildings and 

Areas, 18 min., B & W, 1958. 



o 






TM 3-304 
TM 3-306 



TM 3-422 or 
TM 3-4240-203 

TM 3-522-15 
TM 3-303 

TM 3-215 
TM 3-420 
TM 3-350 
TM 5-2032 

TM 3-216 
TM 3-222 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 
Technical Manuals 

Protective Clothing and Accessories, 1957. 

Chemical Agent Detector Kits M18, M15, and M9A2, 1958. 

Accessory Equipment for Protective Shelters, 1958. 

Masks, Protective, Field, M9 and M9A1, Oct. 1957. 



Impregnating Set Clothing, Field, M3. Impregnating Outfit Clothing, 
Field, Ml; Kit, Testing, Impregnite- in- Clothing, Ml, Dec. 1956. 

Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents, Aug. 1956, 

Filter Unit, Gas- Particulate, GED and END, ABC, M6, July 1956. 

Improvised CBR Protective Shelter, Sep. 1954. 

Hypochlorination Unit, Automatic, Portable, 2 to 100 GPM Flow, June 
1945. 

Military Biology and Biological Warfare Agents, Jan. 1956. 

Decontaminating Apparatus, M4, Skid-Mounted, Power-Driven, 400- 
gallon, Feb, 1944. 

G-20 



o 



Technical Manuals — Continued 



TM 3-223 

TM 3-290 

TM 3-205 

TM 3-428 

TM 3-228 

TM 3-220 

TM 3-406 

TM 5-295 
TM 3-250 

TM 3-310-15 
TM 3-427 



Decontaminating Apparatus, Power-Driven, Truck-Mounted, M3A2, 
Sep. 1952. 

Individual Protective and Detection Equipment, Sep. 1953, 

Protective Masks and Accessories, April 1955, 

Protector, Collective Hospital, Six-Man, M7A1, Mar. 1956. 

Heater, Water, Portable, Ml, Aug. 1944. 

Decontamination, Oct. 1953. 

Decontaminating Apparatus, Power-Driven, Skid-Mounted, M6, Feb. 
1955. 

Military Water Supply, Aug. 1956. 

Storage, Shipment, and Handling of Chemical Agents and Hazardous 
Chemicals, Feb. 1957. 

Breathing Apparatus, Compressed Air, M15, 1958. 

Water Testing Kit, Poisons, M4, Mar. 1956. 






Chemical Corps Engineering Manuals Furnished With Equipment 
EP-3 Protector Collector (filter unit) GED, 600-cfm E-28 (M-9), 1957. 

EP-14 Instruction Book for Alarm, Field, Automatic, E-21 (M-6), 1955. 

EP-14R2 Instruction Book for Alarm, Field, Automatic, E-21R2 (M6A1), 1958. 



FM 3-5 

FM 21-40 

FM 21-41 

FM 21-45 
FM 21-48 

FM 3-70 
FM 5-25 



Field Manuals 

Tactics and Techniques of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological 
Warfare, Sep. 1958. 

Small Unit Procedures in Atomic, Biological, and Chemical Warfare, 
1958. 

Soldier's Handbook for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare, 
1958, 

Defense Against Biological Warfare, 1952. 

CBR Training Exercises, 1954. 

Chemical Decontamination Company, June 1954. 

Explosives and Demolition. 






TB CML 47 
TB CML 41 



Technical Bulletins 
Decontaminating Apparatus, Portable, 3 -gallon, Ml. 
Food Testing and Screening Kit, ABC, M3, Feb. 1955. 

G-21 



* U.S. GOVEHNMENT PRINTING OFFICE I960 — 54925Z